THE KOREA/JAPAN TREATY CRISIS AND THE INSTABILITY OF THE KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a study of contemporary Korean politics with special reference to the issues and politics during the Korean-Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965, against the background of the historical, social, political and other critical determinants that have influenced the political behavior of Koreans and shaped the Korean political culture, system and process.

By utilizing a combination of various research methods and techniques of social science, this paper examines political parties, political elites, major groups, and their roles in the political process of Korea in an effort to shed new and systematic light upon some selective aspects of the Korean politics and to advance some generalizations about Korean politics.

With the examination of these aspects, this paper purports to explain the problems and causes of the chronic crisis of political legitimacy, the instability of political system, and the incapacity of political institutions and organizations in resolving national issues through normal political and constitutional process - - which were dramatized by the prolonged and acute political crisis during the treaty struggle when the extreme confrontation between the opposing forces and the mass movement in the streets had brought about a virtual breakdown of the normal political process and the constitutional order.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

The purpose of this paper is to examine political parties, political elites, major groups, and their roles in the political process of Korea (Republic of Korea or ROK) in an effort, first, to shed new and systematic light upon selected aspects of the Korean political culture, system and process, and, second, to make certain generalizations about them.

The central theme of this paper, as a case study, concerns Korean politics during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965, which dramatized the chronic crisis of political legitimacy, the instability of political system, and the incapacity of political parties and elites to resolve national issues through the normal political and constitutional process. In particular, the case study of politics during the treaty crisis purports to illustrate and validate the certain generalizations about Korean politics and process. The political aspects dealt with in the paper are examined to reveal how they are inter-related functionally or dysfunctionally in the political process and how they are operative in relation to the problems of developing a viable political system in terms of political stability, political legitimacy, and capacity of resolving national issues, and effective relationship between the political elites and the masses.

The significance of the topic of this paper may be stated in the following terms. The ROK-Japan treaty of 1965 had finally normalized a long standing hostile relationship between the two countries. However the treaty issue was very explosive for several reasons: the bitter Korean experience of Japanese colonial rule in the past made many Koreans fear a renewed interest of Japan in

Korea; the settlement of the outstanding issues between the two countries involved serious national interests as well as national pride; and, above all, because of these reasons, the treaty issue provided a great political opportunity to the opposition to exploit it against the government while providing a severe test of survival for the government.

Such was the nature of the treaty issue, it prompted a massive anti-treaty and anti-government struggle which resulted in the most intense political crisis in the history of the Republic of Korea. The treaty crisis mobilized almost all the political and social forces of significance in Korea; numbering some three and a half million people, representing all important sectors of Korean life, who had participated in debates, lectures, position statements in newspapers, and violent street demonstrations in opposition to or in support of the treaty and the government. Irrespective of their motives, this was an impressive demonstration of political awareness and participation of Koreans in terms of magnitude and sustained activities. Such a heightened public response was a totally new experience in Korean politics. In this respect alone, the mass movement during the treaty struggle was a significant landmark. Because of such degree of public awareness and, hence, of the consequence implicit in the outcome of the struggle, the government and its ruling party employed all available tactics and political resources at hand in support of the treaty and in combating the growing protest activities. On the other hand, the opposition, mainly in alliance with college students and intellectuals, conducted vigorous extra-parliamentary struggle by appealing to Korean nationalism, by arousing a fear

of Japanese re-domination and by fermenting a popular revolt against the government.

Despite fervent polemics between the opposite forces on the treaty issue in their respective versions of "enlightenment campaigns" among the masses throughout the country, the real significance of the treaty struggle lay in the issue of legitimacy of the present government and in the test of capacity of the Korean political system in resolving national issues through peaceful and constitutional means.

The prolonged acute treaty crisis produced a virtual breakdown of the normal political process and the constitutional order when the opposing forces confronted each other with extreme tactics and when the opponents of the government were repeatedly crushed by the military. The functioning of the National Assembly was seriously impaired by repeated violence and irregularities within, and in the end the National Assembly ended up as the so-called "one-party National Assembly" after the opposition members resigned en masse. Over the disputes on tactics and strategies of confrontation in the struggle, both the ruling and opposition parties were also severely incapacitated by factional struggles and both parties could hardly function responsibly and provide necessary political leadership and rational deliberation in resolving the treaty issue. The disaster of the opposition was so complete that it finally disintegrated. The treaty crisis also exposed the critical weakness of the ruling party, in spite of its overwhelming strength in the National Assembly.

The treaty crisis is now a part of history, and some obvious consequences of the crisis are well-known. However, there are still

some fundamental questions left largely unanswered in explaining some critical political aspects of the treaty crisis, although they are subjects of speculation. Was the disintegration of the Korean political process a temporary phenomenon brought about primarily by the treaty crisis or was it a manifestation of a latent instability inherent in Korean politics which was only triggered by the treaty issue? Why was the government weak in spite of the overwhelming strength in the National Assembly? Why were the existing political institutions and organizations not effective in resolving the treaty issue? Why did the opposition place such heavy emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics? Why was there wide support for the extra-constitutional measures of the opposition? Was the massive political awareness and participation of the people an indication of progress toward a popular democracy? Why did the students and the military play such vital roles in the treaty struggle? Why did the government have to resort to the extreme measures against the treaty opponents? Finally, what are the rising quotients in political attitudes among Koreans? This paper attempts to answer systematically these and other important questions and to advance certain generalizations about Korean politics and political process.

Chapter 1 presents the background which, with broad strokes, examines the nature, the pattern and the general trend of contemporary Korean political culture, system and process by analysing some critical determinants: the historical aspects of Korea's social and political experience, the division of Korea and its impacts on political ideological development, the constitutional changes and politics, political parties and elites, and the

political attitudes and behavior of the masses.

Chapter 2 deals with the background of complex issues and fourteen years' protracted negotiations between Korea and Japan and the contents of the ROK-Japan treaty and agreements of 1965. In spite of the fact that other factors were involved in the anti-treaty struggle, the treaty issue was nevertheless the key factor that prompted the political crisis of 1964-1965 in Korea. For this reason, a lengthy examination on the treaty issue is given in this chapter. Another reason for the length of this chapter is that the existing writings, mostly, by Koreans and the Japanese on this subject are not only poor in details but also biased or distorted in presentation of factual accounts due to the lack of data from both Korea and Japan and, perhaps, their difficulty of overcoming national predispositions. I think that it is very important for somebody to present a balanced and impartial picture on this particular topic in detail and length.

Chapter 3, an extension of Chapter 2, focuses on the external and internal factors on both sides of Korea and Japan which contributed to the speedy conclusion of the treaty. However the primary purpose of this chapter is to examine an international and domestic -- political, economic and military -- setting of Korea within which Korea must maintain herself and against which both the government and the treaty opponents have regarded the treaty issue.

Chapter 4 deals, first, with the basic positions of the treaty supporters and the treaty opponents; secondly, with the fundamental causes at root that motivated the treaty opponents and aggravated the treaty crisis; and, finally, with a brief factual account of

the mass movement and politics during the treaty crisis.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the background of the political climate preceding the treaty crisis, the motivational aspects of political actors and forces, and some selected aspects of politics at the time of the treaty crisis.

Chapters 7 and 8 examine in detail the political parties and elites in terms of their origin, goals, leadership, membership, organization, structure, operation and intra-party politics from the point of view of institutionalization of political organizations and process. The main purpose of these two chapters is to examine the reason why the parties failed to provide certain functional requisits particularly during the treaty crisis.

In the light of the failure of political parties, Chapter 9 deals with major groups in Korean society with special reference to the military and the students who play significant roles in the political process as the extra-political forces in Korea.

The scope of this paper covers the political and related aspects of Korea during the two decades, (1945-1965), of its existence as a nation. Additionally the coverage of this paper extends to some distant period preceding the independence of Korea in 1948. However the main focus of attention is given to the recent years before and during the treaty crisis.

In this research, I have combined various methods and techniques, which are essentially similar to those used by Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). The primary methods and techniques employed are historical approach, case study method, analytical method in

terms of structural-functional analysis, group theory in terms of group conflict and power analyses, and behavioral approach, in combination with various other methods and techniques including quantitative method although the utilization of these methods and techniques are not rigorous and precise. I have attempted to support my analyses with available empirical data on political behavior and socio-political characteristics of groups. The quantitative data contained in this paper are presented in simple statistical tables and they are analysed in substantive terms. In view of the lack of systematic studies on Korean politics and of the limited nature of quantitative data on socio-political aspects, a highly rigorous quantitative analysis of Korean politics is beyond my capacity at the present time.

In view of the fact that the subject of my research is vast and complex, that the data are fragmented and less than satisfactory, and that the methods and techniques of handling this subject require a broad and complex research skill, my task in this research has been overwhelming. In presenting certain controversial points here, I might have overlooked the data and made some errors in interpreting them and in presenting the factual accounts, although I have scrutinized all the data which have been available to me. However, I have made every effort to support my assertions with reliable data and impartiality.

A few apologetic words must be said to my countrymen, Koreans. In pursuit of factual accounts and objectivities, I might have offended the feelings of certain persons or groups in my country by suspecting or misrepresenting their motives in certain events in my paper. I can only hope that they will not, however, question my intention of complete honesty and impartiality.

I am grateful to my supervisor, Professor Stuart R. Schram, who has been very generous in providing his precious time to scrutinize my paper with critical comments and helpful suggestions. I am also indebted to my former teacher at University of Pennsylvania, Professor Chong-sik Lee, who has provided me a number of materials for this research and made invaluable comments at various stages of my paper. I have to express my deep appreciation to Mr. B.C. Bloomfield, Deputy Librarian of the School of Oriental and African Studies, who has allowed me free access to the Korean section of the library where I found a valuable collection on the subject.

I have followed the customary rule of presenting Oriental names with the surname first. With a few exceptions the transliteration of Korean names, terms and titles generally follows the McCune-Reischauer system of romanization of Korean names and language.

CHAPTER 1

KOREAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND PROCESS: A PATTERN OF STABILITY

The political history of Korea since 1945 is a history of instability. During the past twenty years (1945-1965), the Korean people have experienced six regimes,[1] three violent upheavals,[2] and five constitutional revisions. The characteristic features of Korean political instability are: fragmentation of political elites; alienation of the masses from politics and the government; recurrent crises of legitimacy; political changes and solutions through extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary means or through extreme conflicts; violence and mob politics; and artificial stability of the government maintained through manipulation of the "popular will," elections, monopoly of key political resources and systematic corruption. The Korean political system, therefore, has yet to evolve into a viable one in which political legitimacy is unquestioned, politics and government are based on consensus and by constitutional means, and political elites are capable of solving national issues through peaceful means and volunary mobilization of the masses.

The purpose of this introductory chapter is to examine selected aspects of the Korean political culture and process and to establish the nature and styles of politics that have impeded development of a stable democratic political system to which the Korean people have aspired since 1945. The root

1. The six regimes are: (1) the American military government, September 7, 1945 - August 15, 1948; (2) the First Republic with President Rhee Syngman, August 15, 1948 - April 27, 1960; (3) the interim government of Hŏ Chŏng, following the ouster of Rhee by the April Student Revolution, April 27, 1960 - August 13, 1960; (4) the Second Republic of President Yun Po-sŏn and Prime Minister Chang Myŏn, August 13, 1960 - May 16, 1961; (5) the military junta (the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction) of General Park Chung-hee, May 16, 1961 - December 17, 1963; and (6) the Third Republic of President Park Chung-hee, December 17, 1963 - present.

2. The three upheavals are: (1) the Korean War, June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953; (2) the April Student Revolution on April 19, 1960; and (3) the military coup d'etat, May 16, 1961.

cause of Kora's incapacity to solve the ROK-Japan treaty issue in 1964-1965 through normal constitutional and political process lies in the failure of developing such a political system.

For the purpose of analysis, the following aspects of the Korean political culture and system will be examined: (1) a historic view of Korea's social and political experience; (2) the division of Korea and its impact on ideology and politics; (3) the Constitution and politics; (4) political parties and elites; and (5) political awareness and participation of the masses.

A HISTORICAL VIEW OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

In Korea the introduction of modern democracy modeled on Western theory and institutions is a new experience which started with the liberation of the country from the Japanese colonial rule in August, 1945. As such, it has been difficult to maintain and has not corresponded well with the traditional idea of power and politics still prevalent in Korean society.

Historically, modern democracy grew and spread from Western Europe over the past three centuries, along with the developing of ideas of individualism and human rights and with the emergence of socio-economic structure appropriate for supporting these ideas. Modern democracy, as historian Edward H. Carr observes, rests on three main propositions; the individual conscience as the ultimate source of decisions; a strong fundamental harmony of interests among different individuals and groups for peaceful coexistence in society; and rational discussion among individuals and groups as the best method of reaching a decision in society.[3] The success of democracy also requires, as Professor Rupert Emerson points out, "the more basic tradition of standing up to do battle for their rights against the remote and superior authorities.[4] Bertrand De Jounvenel adds that liberty, a principal hallmark of democratic society,

3. Edward H. Carr, The New Society (London: Macmillan, 1960), pp.61-62 .
4. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p.279.

has historically been a status gained through struggle, maintained by energetic defence and guaranteed by privileges extorted from authorities.[5] The main propositions cited above presuppose that modern democracy requires a tradition or element of individualism, rationalism and spirit of liberty.

In absence of this tradition, democratic theory and practices adopted by Korea after 1945 were alien ideas, which were the products of neither the mass of Korean people nor of the evolutionary development of Korean society as a whole. Even among small elites who were educated in the West or came under influence of Western ideas, the difficulty of adopting new ideas to the practical life of Korean society remains considerable. This difficulty is at the root of the so-called "confusion of ideas" as pictured in a life of a Korean intellectucal "who keeps Nietzche's, Sartre's and other Western books in his library while sitting cross-legged in the inner-room with traditional feudalistic habits."[6] As serious doubt and pessimism about democracy were recently disturbing the minds of many Koreans under the impact of series of political upheavals in recent years, the confusion of political ideas is increased.[7]

In examining the political values of contemporary Korean society, one has to refer to the traditional social and political values and structure of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) and to the colonial rule of Japan (1910-1945), both of which left strong imprints on the contemporary Korean political process.

Although there are some Korean scholars who have sought some positive social values and institutions in traditional society of Korea in developing a modern democracy there[8] or who have lamented the disappearance of traditional

5. Bertrand De Jouvenel, On Power: Its Nature and the History of Its Growth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p.255.

6. Hong Sa-chung, "Various Stages of Adopting Modern Ideas," Hong I-sŏp and Cho Ji-hun, ed., Iship seki ŭi hankuk (The Twentieth Century's Korea), Series No.5 (Seoul: Pakusa, 1963), p.133.

7. See Hwang San-dŏk, "Democracy: Its Nature and an Intrinsical Condition," ibid., pp.186-7

8. E.g., Cho Yun-je, "National Culture in A Historical View," Sasanggge, January 1966, pp.125-32. Cho says that, for example, the procedures in selecting a leader in a Confucianists Meeting (Yurimhoe) and the manner of debate in a clan council were the proto-types of modern democratic practices. See also, Pak Chong-hong, "Ideology in the Korean People's Life: Democracy in Practice," Korean Affairs, Vol. 1, No.4, 1962, pp.381-9.

values that harmonised the society,[9] old values and institutions that interwove the traditional society were predominantly authoritarian and feudalistic, not only inhibiting the development of individualism and a liberal society but also fragmenting the ruling class into hopeless factional cliques.[10]

In the agrarian society of the Yi Dynasty, a rigid social and political structure was sanctioned and maintained by Confucian precepts. At present no systematic study of the history of Confucianism in the Yi Dynasty is available.[11] The version of Confucianism adopted by the Yi Dynasty was however known to be "Neo-Confucianism," especially teachings of Chu Hsi (1130-1200)[12] who synthesized practically all the important ideas of early Neo-Confucianists of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279) and who gave Confucianism a new meaning which influenced greatly the thinking of the Chinese, Koreans and Japanese.[13] The importation of Chu Hsi's teachings was closely related to the establishment of the Yi Dynasty. As a school advocating social and political reform, particularly in favor of political order maintained by sage-kings and scholar-officials, based on the principles of "the investigation of things" and "the extension of knowledge,"[14] Chu Hsi's school had great attraction for the Korean scholars of the later part of the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) which had become corrupt and weak under the domination of decadent Buddhist monks in the court.[15] Chu's version of Confucianism was ideal for the scholars in combatting the decadent features of Buddhism and of the

9. E.g.,Kim Ha-tae, "Scientific Understanding of a Value System," Sasangge,May 1961, pp.54-61.

10. Edward W. Wagner, "Modernization Processiin Korea: Some Historical Considerations," Korean Quarterly, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn 1963, p.32; and George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950),p.19.

11. Hong Yi-sup (or Hong I-sŏp), Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal System," Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bulletin of the Korean Research Center, No.20, June 1964, p.2.

12. For Chu Hsi (Chu Yuan-hui) and his school, see Chan Wing-tsit, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp.588-653.

13. Ibid., p.588; Hong I-sŏp, Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal System," op.cit., p.3; and W. Theodore De Bary, "A Reppraisal of Neo-Confucianism," Arthur F.Wright, ed., Studies in Chinese Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p.88.

14. See Chan Wing-tsit, ibid.,pp.588 and 592; and W.Theodore De.Bary, ibid., pp.87-105.

15. See Shannon McCune, Korea: Land of Broken Calm (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp.22-3.

officialdom in the Koryo Dynasty and for providing a viable religious and philosophical substitute in reconstructing the society.[16.]

After Chu's teachings played a significant role in the overthrow of the old dynasty, Confucianism became the state philosophy of the Yi Dynasty. A drastic land reform which was designed to strengthen the new dynasty chiefly benefitted the scholar-official class.[17.] The court of the Yi Dynasty was reorganised along classical Confucian patterns modelled on the legal code of the Ming Dynasty in China; "the local government of scholar-magistrates and provincial governors gave political order throughout the peninsula.[18.] As had happened in China,[19.] the more vital teachings of Confucianism such as jen (humanity), benevolence, wisdom and righteousness were however soon lost in the political sphere, and Confucianism became the foundation of oppression and corruption of the officialdom in the Yi Dynasty. Although there was, after the devastation of Korea by the Japanese(Toyotomi Hideyoshi) invasion in 1592, such reform movement as the Silhak (Practical Learning) School which attempted to revitalize Confucianism and the Yi feudalism,[20.] the Confucian precepts degenerated and remained decadent as an autocratic political and social ideology of the ruling class.[21.]

16. Ibid., p.23.
17. See Hadata Takashi, Chōsen shi (Korean History)(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1951,) pp.111-4.
18. Shannon McCune, op.cit., p.24.
19. See W. Theodore De Bary, op.cit., p.85.
20. See Hong I-sŏp, "Silhak School's Criticism on Feudal System," op.cit., pp.1-10.
21. On this subject, see, e.g., Lee Man-gab, "The Value Structure of Korean Society," Sasangge, May 1961, pp.62-7; Lee Man-gab, "Today's Village Society in Korea," Sasangge, March 1965, p.78-9; Hyŏn Du-il, "Village Culture," Hankuk nongch'on sahoehak yŏnkuhoe (Institute of Sociology of Korean Rural Areas), ed., Nongch'on sahoehak (Sociology of Rural Areas) (Seoul: Minchosa, 1965), pp.203-34; The U.S. Department of Army, Foreign Areas Studies Division, U.S. Army Area Handbook for Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office 1964), pp.59-113; Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol.I, No.2, 1962, pp.150-61; Kim Du-hŏn, "Confucian Influences on Korean Society," Korea Journal, Vol.III, No.9, September 1963, pp.17-21; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), pp.3-16.

The dominant political aspect of Confucian teachings was authoritarianism conceived in a hierarchically arranged natural order in human relationships and society. "Three Bonds and Five Relationships" (sankang wulun)[22] was the pillar of the authoritarian values that governed all human relationships. The Three Bonds moralized complete mutal binding as virtue in three paired relationships; king and subjects (or ruler and ministers), parents and children (or father and son), and husband and wife. The Five Relationships stressed obedience to king by subjects; respect for parents by children; supremacy of male over female; deference to elders by juniors; and trust between friends. Obviously the most important political implication of these relationships was the legitimization of obedience as a basis of rule within a family, between social classes, and between the ruler and the ruled.

The basic social unit in society was the extended family, which was in turn a member of a clan whose members were grouped usually in the same village. Within a family or clan, relationships between members and the norms of individuals were strictly regulated by a hierarchical order of paternalism in accordance with the Confucian precepts. As such, the family or clan system was the hotbed of paternalism, authoritarianism and irrationalism that discouraged individual initiative, participation, decision and independence.[23] Individual status, authority and responsibility were derived not from ability or achievement but from patrimonial position as a head of the family or an elder of the clan.[24]

Since social status of an individual was not an individual but a family matter, identification of an individual with his family or clan was assumed a natural obligation. If a member of the family moved up in government position,

22. See Chan Wing-tsit, op.cit., pp.105, 277 and 614; and Chen Li-fu, Philosophy of Life (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), pp.91-8.

23. See Lee Man-gab, "Today's Village Society in Korea," op.cit., p.78; and Hyŏn Du-il, op.cit., p.211. Also cf. H.G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp.125-7.

24. See the U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., pp.110-1.

his family as a whole moved up. It was quite natural for one to feel an obligation to use one's new official position for the benefit and welfare of one's family and relatives.[25] This was a contributing factor to a widespread corruption of the officialdom of the Yi Dynasty -- still a persistent phenomenon in contemporary Korean society. Another negative aspect of the strong identification with family -- epitomized in "To whose family does he belong?" -- was that it bred exclusivism and compartmentalized the society by family and clan.[26] In the bloody power struggles that severely fragmented the ruling class, a family or clan (or a group of families or clans) was, hence, typically the basic structure which provided an organizational basis and division in the Yi Dynasty's infamous factional struggles.[27]

Based on the same Confucian precepts, the ruling class built a social structure and justified the ethical aspects of its authoritarian control over the ruled. The society was divided into three classes:[28] the ruling class (yangban) which was composed of high government officials (both civil and military) and their families who became virtually all large landowners; the class of commoners (sangmin) which comprised small farmers, agricultural laborers, merchants and artisans; and the class of the despised (ch'ŏnmin) which was the lowest in the social scale and was composed of slaves, serfs, petty monks, butchers, travelling peddlers and others. The ruling class was distinguished from the lower classes by prestige, power, wealth, education, dresses, and social manners.

Since it was a rigid class society where vertical social mobility was

25. Ibid., p.110; and Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," op.cit., p.155.
26. Hyŏn Du-il, op. cit., p.212.
27. For an illuminating history and nature of factionalism in the Yi Dynasty, see Kim Kyŏm-kon, Yicho Tangchaeng sawa (A Historical Tale of Factional Struggles in the Yi Dynasty) (Seoul: Samchungdang, 1967).
28. The U.S. Department of Army, op.cit., pp.61-6.

virtually impossible except among members of the ruling class and which was rigorously sanctioned by the Confucian precepts which stressed a vertical relationship among men and classes, the power of the ruling class was virtually total, structured through vertical control of the officialdom which directly reached to the level of county (hyŏn).[29] In this society authoritarian government by the ruling class was not only unquestioned but also regarded as legitimate. Thus government was viewed neither as a contractual arrangement between the ruler and the ruled nor as a "government by law", but as a "government of men," ideally, of the learned and virtuous.[30]

In theory the government in the Yi Dynasty was virtuous and benevolent. Occasionally there were enlightened rulers like King Sechong and his wise court. However, more often than not the kings and their courts were corrupt and despotic, as history has always witnessed it in a "government of men." In such a society where any other role but the political and governing was a disgrace,[31] the attainment of high government positions was the supreme ambition and the measurement of men's success among members of the ruling class. It was the only significant criterion of social mobility. The highly rigorous and competitive imperial examination system (kwagŏ)[32] -- the only formal channel of recruitment of high government officials -- had thus the effect of tightening the rigid social and political structure, with the ultimate establishment of a highly centralized, feudalistic bureaucratic state.

An official position was the basis that brought numerous formal and informal economic and social privileges and benefits, including the ownership

29. See Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "The Political Behavior of Koreans," Asea yŏnku (The Journal of Asiatic Studies), Vol. III, No.1, June 1960, p.8.

30. Cf. Edward S. Corwin's foreward in Hsu Leonard Shihlien, The Political Philosophy of Confucianism (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1932), pp. viii-ix.

31. Edward W. Wagner, "Modernization Process in Korea: Some Historical Considerations," op. cit.,p.33.

32. See Lee Hahn-been, "Bureaucracy and Politics," a draft chapter for Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung-chick, ed., Politics and Society in Korea (a forthcoming book: publisher and publication date unknown), p.3.

of large lands and exemption from taxation.[33] The power of officials was so great that they could grab and enrich themselves and could abuse their authority when the central authority of the government was weak. Especially during the latter half of the dynasty, it was not uncommon that government positions were sold to the highest bidders who usually amassed their fortunes through exploitation of and extortion from innocent people.[34] Thus such an authoritarian-servile attitude as "Respect Officials and Despise Commoners" (Kwanjon-minbi) was characteristic of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled or the government and the people.

Moreover, the very limited number of high positions available for the growing number of those with upper class origins gave rise to deadly competition within the ruling class.[35] This was the proto-type of factionalism -- prevalent among the contemporary Korean political elites -- which contributed in a significant degree to the chronic social and political instability and the eventual downfall of the Yi Dynasty. On this aspect, Professor Edward Wagner says:

> Severely limited movement into and out of the privileged class -- one might even postulate that most such mobility was the direct result of factional strife itself -- contributed to narrow, atomistic loyalties and thus to sharply defined cleavages. 36.

In Summary, the traditional society of the Yi Dynasty was, ideologically, socially and politically, an authoritarian society built on the principle of absolute obedience and dominated by patrimonial heads within a family and by feudalistic bureaucrats within the state. It was a society where

33. See ibid., p. 4; and Hadata Takashi, Chōsen shi, op. cit., pp.120-22.
34. For an excellent study of corruption, nepotism and sales of official positions, see Han U-kŭn, "On the Office-Hunting: A Historical Examination," Sasangge, January 1961, pp.144-51.
35. Lee Hahn-been, op. cit., p.4; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit., p.7.
36. Edward W. Wagner, "Modernization Process in Korea: Some Historical Considerations," op. cit., p.33.

individualism was stifled by familial and social status; where the mass of the people were not only excluded from participation in governmental and social affairs but also without any opportunity of social mobility; and where the government was of and for the privileged few who were often corrupt and despotic and who were internally fragmented by vicious factionalism. This was, thus, a society which not only inhibited the evolution of individualism and liberalism, but also inculcated the political inertia of the masses, the corruption of government, and the factionalism of ruling elites -- all of which the contemporary Korean society has inherited as the most serious factors contributing to its social unrest and political instability.

When Japan annexed Korea in 1910, she established a colonial administrative machinery known as the Government-General of Korea (Chōsen Sōtokufu). Its sole function was, of course, to administer Korea with efficiency and stability with varying styles of totalitarian control such as outright military dictatorship (budan-seiji) or cultural and thought control through systematic police surveillance and torture.[37.]

The Japanese colonial rule destroyed much of the predominent political position of the traditional ruling class, enhanced that of other classes, and created some meager urban elements chiefly through legal abolition of the traditional class distinctions, introduction of modern education, industrialization, and creation of nationalist elites drawn from all classes. It did not, however, fundamentally alter the traditional social structure and authoritarian values: it did in effect reorganize the former and reorient the latter to a more efficient Japanese rule of Korea.[38.]

37. See Hadata Takashi, Chōsen shi, op. cit., pp.203-4,207-11, and 221-3; and Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit., pp.89-126.

38. See Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," op. cit., p.151.

Under colonial rule, the downfall of the traditional ruling class was neither complete nor uniform.[39] Those who held high offices in the government of the Yi Dynasty were replaced by the Japanese, and some of them were reintegrated, as lesser officers, into the colonial administration.[40] Although some of the ruling families lost their lands to the Japanese, most of them however retained their lands as absentee landlords. The land reform carried out by the Japanese actually worked against the illiterate small farmers who were not familiar with claim procedures for land titles, while it strengthened most of the old landowners or created new landlords.[41] The advisory councils (chushuin) at provincial and central levels created as sounding bodies of the Koreans were made up predominantly of men from the traditional ruling class. Even some of the top noblemen and officials of the former dynasty joined the Japanese aristocracy as peers. Together with these upper class men who joined the new masters, the Japanese created a highly centralized bureaucratic machinery with the help of Koreans recruited and trained for the lower ranks of government service.

The Japanese instituted a more tightly organized society than ever partly through utilization of the traditional social structure, for it was more compatible with their colonial aims.[42] In many cases, the Japanese protected and promoted the remnants of the old ruling class as landlords or officials.[43] One outstanding example of using the traditional structure was the development of village administrative structure based on clans or kinship groups, "for the purpose of facilitating such matters as increased production, the delivery of goods, collection of taxes, military conscription,

39. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXVII, No.1, Spring 1964, p.20.

40. See Lee Hahn-been, op. cit., p.5.

41. See Lee Chong-sik, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 93-5.

42. See Han Bae-ho, "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," op. cit., p.153.

43. Lee Man-gab, "The Value Structure of Korean Society," op. cit., p.68.

and the commendeering of resources which were necessary for the forceful execution of Japan's war policies.[44] Consequently, the Japanese rule changed very little the traditional pattern of the ruling class among Koreans. Even those families who lost their former official positions and lands continued to be held in social esteem.

Aside from economic, cultural and other imprints left by Japanese rule, the most important was perhaps the legacy of the Japanese bureaucracy introduced into Korea. It was a re-imported model of Prussian type which was noted for its legalistic, rigid and authoritarian traits.[45] Since the Japanese bureaucracy -- though it provided stability -- was no better than that of the Yi Dynasty in the eyes of the Koreans from the viewpoint of their patriotism or in terms of the exploiting nature of colonial administration, it was universally detested as the symbol of oppression and exploitation. The relationship between the bureaucracy and the people was that of mutual distrust and contempt -- manifested in the arrogant and aggressive attitude of officials towards the people, and in the people's subservience in front of officials and contempt behind their backs and in breaking and evading the laws and taxes.[46] Thus contemporary Korean society inherited a "bureaucratic culture" from both the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese rule.[47] Since the people

44. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No.4, 1962, p.398.

45. See Lee Hahn-been, op. cit., p.6; and Kim Sung-yup, "Past Present and Future of the Civil Service System in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1963, p.45.

46. Cf. Lee Hann-been, op. cit., p.5.

47. See ibid., p.6; Jun Jong-sup (or Chŏn Chong-sŏp), "Some Considerations of the Role of Bureaucracy: Effecting Modernization of Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 10, No.1, Spring 1968, p.27; Chŏng Ŭi-kyu, "An Analysis of the Effects of Japanese Bureaucracy on Contemporary Korean Administration and Our Resolution," Ch'oeko hoeuibo (The Supreme Council Review), a publication of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (the military junta), No.13, October, 16, 1962, pp.106-10.

see and regard their government largely through officialdom, the Koreans' experience with both the bureaucracies undoubtedly created a serious problem of making the government closer to the people.

Therefore, until 1945 the traditional social structure and values of Korean society remained largely unchanged and Koreans never had experienced a popular government either under the Yi Dynasty or under Japanese colonial rule.

Since 1945 the traditional order of Korean society underwent rapid change. The latent social transformation during the Japanese rule suddenly unleashed its effects. It was during Japanese rule that many Korean intellectuals and nationalists at home and in exile were exposed to Western social and political theories, notably nationalism, liberalism and Marxism.[48.] It was also during this period that education and enlightenment of the masses as the vehicles of Korea's eventual freedom and independence were stressed by nationalists.[49.] Through their struggle for independence, there emerged a universal aspiration among nationalists that the future society of a new Korea was to be built on the principles of popular government and equalitarianism.[50.]

With the return of Korean exiles from abroad with Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945, the access to political corps d'elite became no longer the exclusive monopoly of the traditional ruling class. Furthermore, the three years of administration by the American military occupational forces (1945-1948) in southern Korea introduced a number of social economic and educational reforms as well as steps towards a popular government, all of which undermined the traditional social order and structure.[51.] The land

48. The U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., p.203; and Han Bae-ho "Nature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary Korea," op.cit., pp.156-7.

49. Lee Man-gab, "The Value Structure of Korean Society," op.cit., p.68.

50. E.g., Item 8 of "The Immediate Policy," of the Korean Provisional Government (exiled in Chungking), September 3, 1945, available in Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn (The Twenty Years of the Liberation), Vol. for Materials (Seoul: Semunsa, 1965), p.201.

51. About the American Military Government, see Cho Soon-sung, "The Failure of American Military Government in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol.II, Nos.2 & 4, 1963, pp.331-47; Edward G. Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951); and Pak Mun-ok, Hankuk chŏngbu ron (Korean Government) (Seoul: Pakyŏngsa, 1963), pp.293-382.

reform[52.] initiated by the Americans in 1948 and carried through by the new Korean government in 1949 further weakened the economic basis of the traditional ruling class.

The foremost factor that accelerated the social change was, of course, the division of Korea. The division brought the influx of millions of refugees from the north. "Their social backgrounds were varied, and in the south some rose far above their former station while others sank in status."[53.] Finally the Korean War, which not only produced a second massive wave of refugees in both sides of Korea but also uprooted economic bases of many traditional families while giving opportunity to some to rise rapidly through wartime financial operations, erased the last traces of the traditional social order and precipitated disintegration of old values and attitudes.[54.]

By the end of the Korean War Korea came close to having no classes except the unchanged status of poor peasantry.[55.] This is one of the reasons that Korean political parties have no relation with social strata or classes. Today there is no upper class which can be clearly identified as a social and political elite. Today's elite comprises those families of heterogenous social origins who have recently entered into leading positions in government and politics, business, land-holding, education, arts and professions.[56.] Accordingly, the membership of this upper structure has been not only fluid and unstable but as a whole it has failed to provide a force of social and political stability, which was formerly supplied by the traditional ruling class and the bureaucrats in the Yi Dynasty and the Japanese colonial period.

52. See C. Clyde Mitchell, "Land Reform in South Korea," Pacific Affairs, Vol.XXII, No.2, June 1949, pp.144-54; and Koh Yeong-kyeong (or Ko Yŏng-kyŏng), "Land Reform and Agricultural Structure in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol.I, No.4, 1962, pp.428-39.

53. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," op.cit., p.20.

54. Ibid., pp.20-1.

55. William A. Douglas, "The Current Status of Korean Society," Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No.4, 1962, p.391.

56. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," op. cit., p.21; and Yamada Akira, "On the Whereabouts of Yangban Politics," Asahi Jānaru, Vol.3, No.3, January 16, 1966, p.20.

In spite of the disappearance of the conditions that supported the traditional social order and the emergence of new elements of the elite, the change for modernity has neither been accompanied by a substantial transformation of Korea's socio-economic structure nor has completely eradicated the traditional attitudes and behaviors of the masses. The strong imprint of traditionalism is more apparent in the political attitudes and behavior of the rural masses who have hardly improved their economic, social and political positions. Here lies the root of political manipulation of the masses, authoritarian political leadership, and the wide gap between the government and the people.

THE DIVISION OF KOREA AND ITS IMPACT ON IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The division of Korea and the gradual consolidation of rival political regimes in southern and northern Korea ever since the Japanese surrender in August 1945 have profoundly effected the characteristics of political, economic and social development in both sides of Korea. The 38th parallel which demarcated the division was originally a military line for the purpose of accepting the surrender of the Japanese troops in Korea by the forces of the U.S.A. and of the U.S.S.R.respectively in the south and north.[57] But subsequent political disagreement between the two rival occupying powers on the unification of Korea made the military division into a political and ideological one.[58] The division was hardened by the Korean War and perpetuated by inability of the southern and northern regimes to agree on the methods of unification and on the structure of a unified Korea. The continuing division

57. For the origin of the division, see the statement of Hugh Borton, Chairman of the Japan-Korea Secretariat, the U.S.Department of State, The Voice of Korea, January 28, 1947; "Report of the United Nations Commisions on Korea," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 5th Session, Supplement No. 16(A/1350), 1950, p.5; and George M. McCune, "Korea: The First Year of Liberation," Pacific Affairs, Vol.XX, No.1, March 1947, pp.4-5.

58. See United Nations, ibid., pp.4-7; George M. McCune, ibid., pp.14-5; and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp.1-25.

is essentially a reflection of the wider and more fundamental differences of outlook of the two opposing ideologies which have dominated international politics since the end of the Second World War.

The division has been artifical and unnatural to the Korean people who have a common race, language and culture. Economically the division had an disastrous effect by cutting the industrial north from the agricultural south.[59] This economic disruption was further worsened by the sudden withdrawal of Japanese who formerly ran the Korean industries which were developed as an integral part of the larger Japanese economic system.

But the deepest impact of the division was the ideological one which has shaped the political development in the south. As a peaceful political solution to unification became an increasingly remote possibility, the most serious problem faced by the southern part of Korea was safeguarding the stability and national security against Communists -- both southern and northern -- who have resorted to violence of varying degree and methods ranging from sabotage to open aggression (e.g., June 25, 1950).[60]

Under the continuing threat of a Communist take-over, anti-Communism was elevated to the guiding principle of the Republic of Korea. The salient aspects of this development were: (1) the complete domination of the political scene by right-wing anti-Communist conservatives; (2) the strengthening of authoritarianism and a repression of political freedom; and (3) the construction of an ideological monolith which has restricted programs of political parties to a

59. See George M. McCune, "Economic Chaos in Korea," The Voice of Korea, June 6, 1946; and Andrew J. Grajdanzev, "Korea Divided," Far Eastern Survey, Vol.XIV, October 10, 1945, pp.281-3.

60. E.g., before the Korean War (upto April 1950) the Communist terrorists and guerrillas caused the 36,000 dead, the 11,000 wounded, the 50,000 houses burnt and the 432,000 persons dislocated, Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa p'yŏnch'an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee of the History of the Korean Revolutionary Court), Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa (The History of the Korean Revolutionary Court), Vol. I (Seoul, 1962), p.6. See also United Nations, 5th Session, Supplement No. 16(A/1350) op.cit., pp.26-7. For the Communist activities in the south immediately after 1945, see Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington, D.C.: The Korean Pacific Press, 1946), pp.105-31.

narrow sphere of action.

Immediately after the liberation, leftists including the Korean Communist Party in the south had considerable strength. The coalition of leftists and nationalists, known as the Preparation Committee for the Founding of the Nation (Kŏnkuk chunbi wiwonhoe or Kŏnchun), was able to organise an ad hoc national government, the People's Republic (September 1945),[61] which was soon dissolved by the American occupation authorities. The downfall and subsequent elimination of the leftists from the political scene were attributed to their internal division, lack of prestigious leaders like Rhee Syngman, serious tactical mistakes, and violent subversive actities which invited suppression by the American authorities. But the foremost factor in the virtual elimination of the leftists was the Americans' campaign against the left and their policy of strengthening the rightists,[62] after the Russians in the north intensified their policy of establishing a Communist government. In pursuing this policy, the American administration enlisted virtually all former collaborators with the Japanese, particularly policemen, who were for the most part anti-democratic reactionaries, still under the influence of Japanese methods.[63]

In opposition to the left, the rightists were initially consolidated under Rhee, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik who were the leaders of the Korean Provisional Government exiled in China. Because of disagreement over the issue of holding general elections and establishing a government only in the south, Rhee, who favoured such measures in the light of Stalin's intention in the north, soon

61. For the Preparation Committee, see Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," a draft for Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung-chick, ed., op. cit., pp.3-4; and George M. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems, Secretariat Paper No.2 (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947), pp.11 - 3.

62. George M. McCune, ibid., pp.15 and 21; and Cho Soon-sung, op. cit., pp.338-9.

63. George M. McCune, ibid., p.21; and Lee Won-sul, "The Embryo of Korean Bureaucracy in 1945," Nonmum jip (Collection of Theses) of Kyŏnghŭi University, Seoul, Vol.3, October 1964, pp.280-2.

separated himself from the two Kims who opposed Rhee's position. In the process of separation, Rhee consolidated his personal position by allying with the Korean Democratic Party (Hankuk minjutang),[64] the foremost conservative group under the leadership of well-known nationalists Song Chin-u and Kim Sŏng-su. Led by leading conservative elements and supported by the most wealthy and educated strata -- businessmen, financiers, landowners and former officials, the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) was most cooperative in assisting the American military government.[65]

In the struggle against the leftists and, later, the neutralists, the KDP felt the need of cooperation with the "former collaborators" who also needed political protection to reinstate themselves in government positions.[66] As a consequence of cooperation between these two groups, the coalition of conservatives led by Rhee and the KDP had clearly emerged, towards the end of the American rule, as the most powerful group that monopolized power in Korea. This was the beginning of the present domination of politics by the conservatives.

After the establishment of the Republic of Korea through the 1948 general elections, which the extreme leftists and neutralists rejected, anti-Communism became the official ideology of the nation. The 1948 elections under the strict control of Rhee's conservatives were not free and fair, for the highest turn-out (95.5%) of voters in Korean history was evidently engineered by them to create an impression of an overwhelming popular support for the forthcoming Rhee's government.[67] The new government under Rhee was from the outset beset by

64. For the Korean Democratic Party, see Lee Ki-ha, Hankuk chŏngtang paltal sa (The History of the Development of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Ŭihoe chŏngch'isa, 1961), pp.58-65; and Ch'oe Hŭng-cho, Minjikukmintang ŭi naemak (The Inside of the Democratic Nationalist Party) (Seoul: Shinmun ŭi shinmunsa, 1957), pp.17-8.

65. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p.62; and Cho Soon-sung, op. cit., p.339.

66. See Lee Won-sul, op. cit., pp.281-2.

67. See Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the Party Formation in Korea," Asea yŏnku, Vol. IV, No.2, December 1961, pp.53-4.

increasing Communist agitation and violence. In this circumstance, the National Assembly enacted the National Security Law in November 1948.[68] The law outlawed the Communist party and allowed the arrests of Communists and their "fellow travelers." But this law, subsequently strengthened by several amendments, has become the foundation of suppression of the press, the opposition and the critics of the government.[69]

With the outbreak of the Korean War, anti-Communism became the personal instrument of President Rhee. Rhee consolidated his power under the proposition that he was the only leader capable of fighting Communism. Rhee viewed any opposition to his rule as potentially subversive and hence to be suppressed in the national interests.[70] In his victorious power struggle with the National Assembly in 1952, Rhee arrested his opponents under martial law on the charge of conspiracy with Communists.[71] This was the first major step that paved the way for his dictatorship. As the popularity of Rhee and his Liberal Party sharply declined in the 1956 presidential elections and in the 1958 general elections, Rhee amended the National Security Law to suppress the press and the opposition on the pretext of strengthening the law against Communist subversion.[72] Under the revised National Security Law which went into effect in January 1959, the Progressive Party (1956-1959), a democratic

68. For the law and its effects, see United Nations, 5th Session, Supplement No. 16(A/1350), op.cit., pp.25-6; and Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch'ŏ (The Secretariat of the National Assembly, ROK), Chehŏn kukhoe kaeyo (The Summary of the Constituent National Assembly)(Seoul, 1965), pp.45-9.

69. See United Nations, ibid., p.26; and Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., p.7.

70. E.g., Rhee stated at a press conference in September 1956, "If the opposition comes to power, Korea will become red and everybody will die and be perished." Quoted in "Rebutal to the View that Attempts to Identify the Opposition with Communism," a statement of the Democratic Party, September 17, 1956, Minjutang (The Democratic Party), T'uchaeng ŭi chokchŏk (The Footmarks of the Struggles) (Seoul, 1957), p.90.

71. See Rhee's statement "On the Political Conspiracy," June 15, 1952, in Taehanminkuk kongboch'ŏ (The Office of Public information, ROK), Taet'ongryŏng yisŭngman paksa tamwha jip (Collection of Speeches of the President, Dr. Rhee Syngman), Vol. for Politics (Pusan, 1952), pp.216-20.

72. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp.92-7; and "A National Security Law Amendment Bill Proposed," Sasangge, October 1958, pp.168-9.

socialist opposition, was outlawed and its head, Cho Bong-am, was executed in July 1959. Cho and his party were charged with anti-state conspiracy with Communists. But the real reason was that Cho, as one of the major presidential rivals to Rhee since 1952, had to be eliminated.[73] Another well-known abuse of anti-Communism was the use of the Anti-Communist Youth Corps by Rhee's party in terrorizing the opposition and rigging the 1960 presidential elections.

After the military officers came to power through the coup d'etat of May 1961, the military government also enacted the Anti-Communist Law (July 1961)[74] to strengthen the anti-Communist posture which was already vastly stiffened by the existing laws. Allegedly to support this new posture, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a super police-intelligence apparatus, was created in June 1961. In 1964, the opposition and the press charged that, instead of devoting its energy to the problem of national security, the 370,000 men working for the CIA had been engaged in spying on colleagues, invading the privacy of neighbors, creating distrust among the people and dividing the opposition in the interest of the ruling clique.[75]

The flagrant abuse of anti-Communism and its apparatus has been markedly lessened since the departure of Rhee from politics. However it has become a stereotyped pattern of the successive governments to identify any criticism of the government with support for Communism in order to cover up their own

73. See "The Witness of A Half-Century," Series No.39 (The Progressive Party Incident), Chosun Ilbo, March 2, 1965; Hwang Jae-un, "Cho Bong-am and the Progressive Party Incident," Shint'aeyangsa, ed., Hŭkmak (Dark Curtain) (Seoul, 1960), pp.80-93; and Im Hong-bin, "Death of Cho Bong-am and Judicial Power," Shindong-A, December 1965, pp.169-81.

74. See the text of the law in "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 16th Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/4900), 1961, pp.22-3.

75. The editorial of Tong-A Ilbo, January 29, 1964.

failures and repressive policies.[76] During the ROK-Japan treaty struggle the government not only created the impression that the treaty opponents were controlled by infiltrators from the north,[77] but also did not hesitate to punish some students under the anti-Communist Law.[78] Manipulation of anti-Communism was not entirely the monopoly of the government. In the 1963 presidential elections, the opposition candidate Yun Po-sŏn slanderously attacked General Park Chung-hee of the ruling party as a pro-Communist.[79] The attack antagonized many potential voters for Yun.

In confrontation with the Communists in the north, the Republic of Korea is virtually an armed camp with a huge military establishment and a vast security apparatus. Anti-Communism is the ultimate policy of the nation that can determine the extent of freedom of the citizens. The problem has been how to achieve a balance between freedom and the security control and how to define an "enemy." More often than not, the government and its ruling party have abused anti-Communism ruthlessly to protect their own selfish political interests. Therefore, anti-Communism became the most potent symbol of justifying authoritarianism of the government and its rulers.

Under the rigid enforcement of anti-Communism, Korean politics since 1948 have been continuously dominated by conservatives whether they be ruling or opposition party. All the conservative parties have offered progressive programs such as economic planning, equal social and economic opportunities, equitable distribution of wealth, and social welfare, or have identified with

76. See Yang Ho-min, "The Basic Posture of Anti-Communism," Chosun Ilbo, January 12, 1965; Han Ki-shik, "The One and One Half Party Systems in the Far East," Asea yŏnku, Vol. V, No.2, November 1962, pp.82-3; and Lee Chong-kŭk, "Freedom of Expression and Establishment of A Cabinet System," Sasangge, March 1956, pp.145-6.

77. For statements to create such impression, see, e.g., the statement of Minister of Interior Yang Ch'an-u, in Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965; and the statement of the government-sponsored Korean Anti-Communist League in Chosun-Ilbo, April 20 and May 11, 1965.

78. E.g., Chosun Ilbo, September 1, 1965.

79. See Yun's statement of September 24, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, September 25, 1963.

the interests of poor urban and rural masses.[80] But their programs have been largely lip services, not only because they have been designed only to attract votes but also because they cannot be carried out too far beyond the principles of the so-called "liberal democracy" and "free economic system." More fundamentally, the failure of these programs to become actual policies has bee inevitable in view of the fact that the programs have been ironically sponsored and offered by the very force which has been least interested in the success of the programs because any success would undermine its position.[81] Because of this apparent conflict of interests, the political parties have been "progressive" in programs but "reactionary" in outlook.[82]

Since all political parties have to operate under the anti-Communist policy which is even hostile to neutralism in foreign policy and democratic socialism in domestic policy, they have to be extremely conservative and their basic policies have been accordingly predetermined. In foreign policy, the parties have maintained a unification of Korea only through "victory over Communism" (sŭng-kong) and a staunch pro-Americanism. In domestic programs, they have adhered to liberal democracy and capitalism: in practice, this means that they have not been allowed to advocate any radical social, political and economic change and they have not been able to tailor their programs to appeal to the class consciousness of the working class. Even the labor movement has been sometimes regarded with suspicion.[83]

80. See the platforms and programs of the leading conservative parties, the Korean Democratic Party (1945-49), the Democratic Nationalist Party (1949-55), the Liberal Party (1952-60), the Democratic Party (1955-61 and 1963-65), the Democratic Republican Party (1963-), the Civil Rule Party (1963-65) and the Mass Party (1965-67), in Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Materials, op. cit., pp.247-52.

81. Cf. Ko Yŏng-bok, "The Postwar Ideological Current and Self-Effacement," Hong I-sŏp and Cho Ji-hun, ed., op. cit., p.139.

82. See Song Kŏn-ho, "A New Political Force is Desirable," Sasangge, October 1963, pp.67-8.

83. Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.548. Se also Chŏn Chin-han, "The Route I Followed and the Route I Will Follow," Kim Sŏk-yŏng and Hong Myŏng-sam, ed., Na ŭi chŏngch'i paek sŏ (My Political White Paper) (Seoul: Shint'aeyangsa, 1957), p.145.

In order to challenge the conservative domination and to infuse new ideological quotient into politics, there have appeared a number of democratic socialist parties, including the Progressive Party,[84] the first and the only leftist movement of significance, which polled more than two million votes (23.5% of the total)[85] in the 1956 presidential elections. After Rhee was overthrown, a number of leftist parties emerged under the constitutional guarantee of the Second Republic and freely participated in the 1960 general elections.[86] But the leftist movement was soon crushed by the advent of the military government which threw the leaders and officials of the leftist parties into jail. With a few exceptions the leftist parties were both anti-Communist and social democratic, and their programs were less radical than those of the socialist parties in the Western European countries. 87. Nevertheless, the military government, like Rhee's government, believed that the real intent of the leftists was to subvert the nation in conspiracy with Communists.[88] According to the military, the leftists' position on a peaceful unification and neutralization of Korea was in line with the propaganda of the Communist regime in the north and hence subversive.[89]

84. For the Progressive Party, see especially Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., pp.258-86.

85. See Chungang sŏnkŏ kwanri wiwonhoe (The Central Election Management Committee, ROK) (hereinafter referred to as CEMC), Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa (The History of Elections in the Republic of Korea) (Seoul, 1964), p.478. The percentage of votes is calculated by me.

86. For the leftist movement during the Second Republic, see Ko Yŏng-bok, "The Meaning of the Social Movement After the Revolution," Sasangge, April 1961, pp.90-1; and "Agony and Prospect of the Reformists," Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1966.

87. See, e.g., the platform and the basic policy of the Socialist Mass Party (Sahoetaejungtang), in Han T'ae-su, Hankuk chŏngtang sa (The History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Shint'aeyangsa, 1961), pp.390-400.

88. For views of the critics of the government attitude towards the left, see "The Imprisonment of Reformists," Chosun Ilbo, January 25, 1964; and the statement of Assemblyman Kim Tae-jung, Kukhoe hoeŭirok (The Proceedings of the National Assembly), 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No.9 (December 28, 1963), pp.4-5.

89. See, e.g., the court records of trials of the leaders of the Reformist Party and the officers of the Nationalist Daily (Minchok Ilbo), the organ of the Socialist Mass Party, in the military revolutionary courts, in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. III, op. cit., pp.546-53 and 203-15.

Despite the current government policy tolerating the formation of leftist parties, as evident in the existence of the Unified Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party and the People's Reform Party,[90] the hostile measures against them have not been mitigated. For instance, in July 1966 the head of the Democratic Socialist Party Sŏ Min-ho, an anti-Communist and former Vice-Speaker of the legislature, was arrested for his position on the unification issue.[91]

The weakness of the leftist movement in Korea is also attributed to other factors. The first is obviously the weakness of socio-economic bases from which the left could draw strength. The two million votes cast for Cho Bong-am in 1956 were largely anti-Rhee votes; otherwise, most of them would have gone to the major conservative candidate who died during the campaigns. The weak electoral strength of the left was clearly proven in the 1960 general elections in which all leftist candidates drew altogether less than 7 percent of votes cast.[92] Another problem has been a distorted and misunderstood notion among the people of terms "leftist," "socialist" and "reformist."[93] Among the Korean people who are basically conservative, these elements have always been associated, in their notion, with "fellow travelers" of Communists. Because of popular suspicion and fear of reprisal, the leftist parties have been in a greater difficulty in recruitment and fund raising.[94] A partial responsibility for inviting suspicion lies in the leftists themselves who have invariably tried to distinguish themselves from the conservatives by emphasizing

90. See "Agony and Prospect of the Reformists," op. cit.
91. See the indictment against Sŏ, Chosun Ilbo, July 12, 1966.
92. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op.cit., p.435.
93. See Ch'oe Chu-ch'ŏl, "Criticism of the Progress Party Movement," Sasangge, October, 1956, pp.62-73; and Lee Bang-sŏk, "The Ordeals and the Revival of Reformist Parties," Sasangge, March 1964, pp.91-9.
94. See Cho Kyŏng-hŭi, "Hŭimang Magazine Interview: A Politician Cho Bong-am, "Chugan Hŭimang (The Weekly Hope), No.48, November 23, 1956, p.18; and Chang Kŏn-sang,"On Chang Kŏn-sang,""Hŭimang ch'ulp'ansa, ed., Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa (All Truths are Told) (Seoul, 1966), p.443.

the unification issue, instead of domestic programs. Another critical element that weakens the leftist movement has been factionalism, a universal trait of Korean politicians. In view of their limited role as a reformist force in Korean politics, there has been indeed very little room to proliferate diverse ideological differences, as evident in more or less identical programs of the leftist parties. However the left in Korea has repeatedly failed to consolidate its meagre strength behind one or two parties, mainly due to factionalism stemming from personality differences.[95.]

With the leftists practically rooted out of the Korean political scene, Korean politics have been the politics of the status quo by the conservatives who,[96.] in a sense, have rotated political power among themselves. Their only ideology was a narrowly defined "liberal democracy" forcibly maintained by anti-Communism. Since the nature and scope of liberal democracy itself has been severely restricted in practice by the necessity of anti-Communism, it has failed to provide competing political programs and issues that can be the bases of political contests. This has inculcated the tendency of political contests on personality and factional differences rather than on issues.[97.] Due to the lack of programs and exaltation of personalities, political parties have not been able to develop coherent programs and sufficient internal cohesion and have failed to elicit popular support and to build genuine mass parties (see Chapters 7 and 8). In this political soil, authoritarianism of the rightists has flourished and the "politics of manipulation" have become a distinction of Korean life.

95. See Chang Kŏn-sang, "On Chang Kŏn-sang," op. cit., p.441; and Cho Kyŏng-hŭi, "Hŭimang Magazine Interview: A Politician, Sŏ Sang-il," Chugan Hŭimang No.46, November 9, 1956, pp.29-30.

96. Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," Sasangge, April 1966, p.115.

97. For this aspect, see Song Kŏn-ho, "The Background of the Issue Contest," Sedae (The Generation), June 1967, pp.99-105.

THE CONSTITUTION AND POLITICS

For the first time in Korean history a constitutional government was introduced with the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948. The essence of a constitutional government is limiting the government by the terms of a constitution and requiring those who govern to confirm to law and rules.[98] But since 1948 the trend of the constitutional development in Korea[99] has been towards authoritarian constitutional principles, giving a birth to the supremacy of the executive branch of government over the legislative and judicial branches.

The frequent breakdown of constitutionalism in Korea is amply attested by the following facts.[100] During the past twenty years, the transfer of political power from one group to another has never been accomplished by constitutional means. The Liberal Party government of Rhee (1948-1960) was ousted by the April Student Revolution in 1960 and the Democratic Party government of Chang Myŏn (1960-1961) which came to power through the student revolution was in turn overthrown by the military coup d'etat in May 1961. The present Democratic Republican Party government of Park Chung-hee was installed in power through the initial political advantages gained during his military rule (1961-1963) (see Chapter 6). Moreover, their rule has been perpetuated largely through manipulation, revision and abuse of the Constitution and other legal machinery. During this period, martial law has been declared four times by the rulers without valid reasons for national emergency

98. See K.C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p.137; and Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy, Revised Edition, (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1950), pp.121 and 123.

99. See Han Tai-yun (or Han T'ae-yŏn), "Constitutional Development in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1963, pp. 45-55; Mun Hong-chu, "The History of Korean Constitution," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 7, No.3, Autumn 1965, pp.11-25; Yang Joon-mo (or Yang Chun-mo), "Judicial Supremacy in the Korean Constitution," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No.3, December 1964, pp.346-63; Han T'ae-yŏn, Hŏnpŏb (The Constitution) (Seoul: Pŏbmunsa, 1963); and Mun Hong-chu, Hankuk hŏnpŏb (The Korean Constitution) (Seoul: Pŏbmunsa, 1964).

100. For a concise summary of the constitutional breakdown since 1948, see Kim Chin-bae, "Twenty Years of the Constitution," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp.73-5.

prescribed by the Constitution. The acute instability of constitutionalism was aggravated by frequent attempts to revise the Constitution. There were seven such attempts out of which five revisions were successful.

Constitutional development in Korea has revolved largely around the power struggle among political groups and political expediency. The Constitution that came into force on July 17, 1948, was a mixed one that attempted to combine both the presidential and cabinet systems without having clearly defined the executive and legislative roles.[101] The original draft of the Constitution was for a British type of cabinet system, reflecting the wishes of the Korean Democratic Party (KDP)[102] which was then the only party capable of organizing a cabinet under such a system.[103] However, when Rhee, the universal choice for President, strongly objected to the original draft, the KDP and the draft committee capitulated to him and agreed to a mixed system.[104] Rhee argued that Korea was not mature enough to adopt a cabinet system which required a firm establishment of a political party system and that the presidential system was necessary to establish a stable, strong government to lay a firm national foundation.[105] Rhee's argument was supported by the existence of internal and external conditions requiring a stable government built upon a strong executive.

The reason that the KDP had to agree was that it was in no position to challenge Rhee, who then commanded an extraordinary degree of popularity.[106]

101. For the features of the Constitution, see Han T'ae-yŏn, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op. cit., pp.46-8; Mun Hong-chu, "The History of Korean Constitution," op. cit., pp.15-6; and Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch'ŏ, Chehŏn kukhoe kaeyo, op. cit., pp.9-17.

102. The 30-man constitution draft committee was dominated by 14 members of the KDP. See the footnote (6) in Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., p.385.

103. See Lee Yo-han, a member of the Constituent National Assembly, "Various Aspects at the Time of Making the Constitution," Kukhoebo, (National Assembly Review), No. 46, July 20, 1965, pp.77.

104. See Yu Chin-o, Minju chŏngch'i eŭi kil (A Road to Democratic Politics) (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1963), p.137. Dr. Yu was largely responsible for drafting the Constitution.

105. Yu Chin-o, Shinko hŏnpŏh haeŭi (New Interpretation of the Constitution) (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1953), p.27; and Han T'ae-yŏn, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op. cit., p.46.

106. See Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch'ŏ, Chehŏn kukhoe kaeyo, op.cit., p.17.

The KDP was, unofficially, a ruling party during the American military occupation and, as a consequence, it lost popularity among the people. In order to maintain its position in Rhee's administration, the KDP needed the continuing alliance with Rhee. As long as the KDP had Rhee on its side, it believed that it could be able to control the government regardless of the power structure in the Constitution.[107] As the subsequent events had proved, however, Rhee had a different idea when he insisted on the presidential system.

As soon as Rhee became the President and started to organize his first cabinet, a conflict between Rhee and the KDP developed. Since the KDP with the support of minor parties and independents manipulated the Constituent National Assembly, the power struggle between the two became a constitutional struggle between the executive and the legislature for assertion of what each had sought as its proper sphere of power. The battle initially started when Rhee unexpectedly selected non-KDP members to the premiership and other cabinet posts (except two posts for the KDP).[108] The KDP was indignant at Rhee's ingratitude for the support given him in the establishment of the Republic.[109] Rhee believed that the KDP was now a liability to his one-man rule and that he could govern the country by his personal prestige.[110]

Rhee interpreted his executive power much more broadly than the Constitution's provisions, while the legislature under the control of the KDP tried to limit his power by vigorously exercising parliamentary control over his policy and actions.[111] Taking advantage of the atmosphere of general antagonism

107. Lee Yo-han, op. cit., p.78.

108. For his cabinet, see Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op.cit., p.5.

109. See Kim Chin-hak and Han Ch'ŏl-yŏng, Chehŏn kukhoe sa (The History of the Constituent National Assembly) (Seoul: Shincho ch'ulpan-sa, 1954), p.110; Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch'ŏ, Chehŏn kukhoe kaeyo, op. cit., pp.33-5; and Lee Bŏm-sŏk, "On Lee Bŏm-sŏk," Hŭimang ch'ulp'ansa, ed., Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa, op. cit., pp.86-92.

110. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., p.5; and Lee Yo-han, op. cit., p.78.

111. For details of the conflict, see United Nations, 5th Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/1350), op. cit., pp.21-3.

between the executive and the legislature created by the critical report on administrative policies by a legislative investigation committee in January 1950,[112] the KDP introduced a constitutional amendment bill for a cabinet system in order to alter the hitherto ambiguous sphere of power into a clear supremacy of the legislature.[113] Since the KDP was the only party to benefit by a cabinet system, the motive of the bill was transparently partisan. Curiously enough, in his argument against the bill Rhee also invoked his constitutional duty as the guardian of the Constitution against frequent revisions.[114] It was Rhee himself who later amended the Constitution twice at his pleasure. Although the KDP mustered support of more than the necessary two-third of the members before voting, the bill was lost because of massive abstentions due to pressure of the government which ingeniously devised a system to spy on voting.[115]

The first revision to the Constitution was made by Rhee while the government was in Pusan, the wartime capital. Despite a heavy defeat of Rhee's opponents, especially the Democratic Nationalist Party (DNP),[116] in the 1950 general elections, Rhee's position within the National Assembly was not improved mainly due to the continuing self-assertion of the legislature, increasingly antagonized by Rhee's arbitrary and personal rule.[117] In the face of growing

112. Ibid., p.21.

113. For the bill, see Taehanminkuk kukhoe samuch'ŏ, 'Chehŏnkukhoe kaeyo, op. cit., pp.56-7.

114. See Rhee's statement, "Resolute Opposition to the Constitutional Amendment," January 27, 1950, Taehanminkuk kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., pp. 54.

115. Lee Yon-han, op. cit.p.78. A secret ballot is required in voting on constitutional amendment bills, proposals for non-confidence in members of the State Council (cabinet), impeachments, measures concerning personnel or various elections held in the National Assembly, bills returned from the President, and any bill or proposal on which the National Assembly may resolve to vote by secret ballot. The National Assembly Law of 1963, however, newly provides that voting on any constitutional amendment bill shall be made by means of casting ballots with the names of the Assemblymen thereon. See Article 105 of the National Assembly Law (Law No. 1452, November 26, 1963) in the Secretariat of the National Assembly, The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (Seoul, 1964), p.89.

116. In September 1949, the KDP was reorganized into the DNP by absorbing minor parties and independents.

117. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op.cit., pp.23-5.

opposition to his rule in the National Assembly, which was empowered of election of the President, Rhee in November 1951 proposed two amendments to the Constitution. The bill aimed at prolonging his rule through direct election of the President and Vice-President by popular vote instead of by the National Assembly.[118] But the amendment bill was rejected in January 1952 by the National Assembly by a vote of 143 to 19.

Since his presidential term would end in August, Rhee in anxiety launched in February 1952 the so-called "recall campaign" by urging voters in each constituency to recall their Assemblyman who voted against his amendment bill in the hope that popular pressure might reverse the decision of the legislature.[119] Rhee maintained that, even if there was no constitutional provision on "recall," the permanent constituent power of the popular will could change any part of the Constitution and that the recall campaign was an exercise of this power against the legislature which defied the popular will.[120] The so-called "popular will" mobilized in the recall campaign was thoroughly organized and manipulated by the government and Rhee's own mass organizations like the Korean Youth Corps.[121] Rhee also used in this campaign such terrorist organizations as "the White Skelton Corps." Rhee's supporters held massive demonstrations in Pusan and other cities and besieged the National Assembly building throughout the constitutional controversy (February 18 to July 4, 1952).[122]

118. See ibid., pp.25-6.

119. See Rhee's statements, "The Voters' Recall of the National Assemblymen Are Not Illegal," February 16, 1952, and "The Reply to the Questions of the National Assembly on the Recall of National Assemblymen," February 26, 1952, in Taehanminkuk kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., pp.158-9 and 160-4.

120. See Rhee's statement, "Concerning the National Assembly Resolution," March 6, 1952, in ibid., pp.171-5.

121. For the detailed account of the massive demonstration of the "popular will" by Rhee's supporters, see Chŏnkuk chibang ŭiwon tongjihoe (The National Comrades Association of Local Representatives), Minŭi ŭi sŭngni (The Victory of the Popular Will) (Pusan, 1952)

122. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp.27-8 and 30; and "Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitationnof Korea (UNCURK)," "United Nations, Officia l Records of the General Assembly, 7th Session, Supplement No.14 (A/2187), 1952, pp.6-10.

In counter-move, on April 17, 1952 the National Assembly on the initiative of the DNP introduced its own constitutional amendment bill calling for a cabinet system. Against this bill, Rhee reintroduced on May 14 another version of the bill which was rejected in January.[123] In order to exert further pressure on the defiant legislature, Rhee unilaterally declared martial law on May 25 in Pusan and its vicinity, and arrested several opposition leaders and even kidnapped forty-seven Assemblymen who were riding in an official bus to attend the National Assembly meeting.[124] The arrested were accused of anti-state activities in conspiracy with Communists.

On July 4, the National Assembly under siege of Rhee's police was forced to pass a compromise bill.[125] The amendments to the Constitution included Rhee's two main proposals for direct election of the President by popular vote and for creation of a upper house[126] to make the legislature bicameral and the opposition's proposal for individual or collective responsibility of the cabinet to the legislature under certain circumstances.[127] The outcome was a clear victory for Rhee.

In 1954 Rhee was successful, for the first time, in building his Liberal Party into the majority party (136 seats out of the total 203) in the National Assembly through manipulation of the 1954 general elections and absorption of independents by illicit pressures.[128] In September 1954 Rhee's party proposed a constitutional amendment bill to change twenty-eight articles in the Constitution. The main points of the bill[129] were to strengthen the

123. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, ibid., p.29.
124. See ibid., pp.31-2; and United Nations, 7th Session, Supplement No.14 (A/2187), op. cit., pp.7-9.
125. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, ibid., p.38; and United Nations, ibid., p.10.
126. Rhee never held elections for the upper house in violation of the revised Constitution.
127. See Han T'ae-yŏn, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op.cit., p.48.
128. Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., p.236.
129. See Kukhoe t'aimsŭ sa (The National Assembly Times, Inc.), Kukhoe uichong sa, 1954-1955 (The History of Parliamentary Politics of the National Assembly, 1954-1955) (Seoul, 1956), pp.286-7; and "Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 10th Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/2947), 1955, pp.4-5.

executive by making it closer to the American presidential system. But the most important point of the bill was to remove the constitutional barrier forbidding Rhee's third consecutive four-year term and to make him a dictator for life.

The bill was defeated in the showdown vote of November 27, 1954 when Rhee's party, by a single vote, failed to muster the required two-third majority (136 votes).[130] The defeat was declared by the presiding Vice-Speaker Ch'oe Sun-jo. Nevertheless, by order of Rhee on November 29 Ch'oe reversed the previous declaration of defeat and declared the bill passed. Ch'oe explained that two-thirds of 203 being 135.33, the fraction of 0.33 should be counted as one vote since a person (or vote) could not be divided into fractions. Thus the Liberal Party recorded that the final count was in effect 136 votes in favor of the bill. Rhee's highly irregular manner was denounced by many prominent constitutional scholars including Yu- Chin-o.[131]

In the wake of Rhee's ouster by the April Student Revolution in 1960, the presidential system of government was replaced by the cabinet system by the 1960 amendment or the Constitution of the Second Republic.[132] The revision which went into force on June 15, 1960 was the reflection of popular belief that the presidential system was intrumental in the emergence of Rhee's dictatorship.[133] The change was also influenced by a desire to make the

130. For the vote and the subsequent development, see United Nations, ibid., p.5; Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., pp.243-4; and Minŭiwon samuch'ŏ (The Secretariat of the House of Representatives), Kukhoe ŭisa jinhaeng sŏnrye (The Materials on Precedents of Procedures in the National Assembly) (Seoul, 1959), pp. 388-410.

131. See the views of Yu Chin-o and Han T'ae-yŏn in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. 1, op.cit., pp.63-4.

132. For explanations of the new Constitution, see Yu Chin-o, Minju chŏngch'i ŭi kil, op. cit., pp.137-51; and Mun Hong-chu, "The History of Korean Constitution," op. cit., pp.20-1.

133. See Han T'ae-yŏn, "Constitutional Development in Korea," op.cit., p.50, and Yang Chun-mo, op. cit., p.350. The cabinet system was also the key program of Rhee's opponents. See the platform of the Democratic Party, Minjutang, T'uchaeng ŭi chokchŏk, op. cit., p.3.

legislature the main repository of power.[134]

Under the present Constitution of the Third Republic[135] which came into force with restoration of civilian government on December 17, 1963, the presidential system revived. Although the Constitution was formally approved by the popular referendum of December 1962 conducted by the military junta, it was drafted without sufficient and free debates and without participation of political groups. Many important provisions of the Constitution were drafted to reflect the views of military leaders who anticipated control of the forthcoming civilian government (see Chapter 5).

The brief examination of the constitutional revisions has revealed that manipulation of the Constitution for the purpose of strengthening the legal authority and power of certain groups has prevented the principle of constitutionalism from taking root as a strong force of stability in political process. The Constitution has been frequently revised in the direction of authoritarian principles often by illicit and unconstitutional means. The preoccupation of the rulers in exploitation of the Constitution only as the legal source of their arbitrary rule has nourished an attitude, "Law makes right." This attitude has led also to enactment of countless laws without regard to public opinion and in violation of the Constitution.[136] As a result, the Constitution has proved ineffectual as a means to limit the rulers, to provide rules of political fair play and to insure an orderly and peaceful transfer of political power. Due to this ineffectiveness, the

134. "Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 15th Session, Supplement No. 13(A/4466 and Add.1), 1960. p.4.

135. For the main features of the Constitution, see Kim Ki-bŏm, "Certain Features of the Constitution," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 1, April 1964, pp.20-8.

136. See Lee Byŏng-rin, "Which Route for Constitutional Government," Sasangge, January 1966, p.119; and Hyŏn Sŭng-chong, "Inflation of Laws," Sasangge, December 1962, pp.30-7.

Constitution has neither been respected as the basis of legitimacy of government nor functioned as an effective symbol in unifying diverse forces in society.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELITES

Korea has yet to develop a stable and meaningful political party system (see Chapters 7 and 8). Since 1945 no less than five hundred parties have appeared on the political scene.[137] But none of them has been able to consistently maintain its existence. The present ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) which came into existence in 1963 is in fact the oldest surviving party. This phenomenon indicates the extreme instability of the Korean parties as well as the extreme fragmentation of the political elites. In an effort to end this instability and fragmentation of parties, the Constitution, the Political Party Law and the election laws of the Third Republic contain an extensive list of provisions to foster the stability of party politics. But in the 1963 general elections twelve parties still competed.

The chaos of party politics is evident in the large number of parties and in the high percentage of independent candidates in the general elections (see Table I). Many parties were literally "one-man" parties to sponsor a single candidate (see Table I). Until the 1963 general elections, a large

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF PARTIES, NUMBER OF "ONE-MAN" PARTIES, & PERCENTAGE OF INDEPENDENTS PARTICIPATING IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

Election.	No. of Parties.	No. of Parties for Single Cand.	% of Indp.
1948	48	25	44.0
1950	39	18	68.5
1954	14	6	66.0
1958	14	5	42.4
1960	14	5	64.4
1963	12	-*	-*

137. Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.2, Summer 1967, p.18. In 1947 the American military government in Korea reported that there were 344 political parties and groups registered with it. See Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.377.

TABLE II: NUMBER OF PARTIES AND PERCENTAGE OF INDEPENDENTS ELECTED IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

Election	No. of Parties	% of Indep.
1948	16	42.5
1950	11	60.0
1954	5	33.4
1958	4	11.6
1960	6	21.1
1963	5	-*

Sources for Tables I and II: The figures are extracted from the CEMC, Tahanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp.383-466.
* Independents and "one-man" parties are eliminated by the Political Party Law of 1962.

number of independents had been elected to the National Assembly; at one time, they outnumbered party members among the elected (see Table II).

Since it already has been implied that the characteristics of Korean parties are not found in ideology, policy, or class, in view of the level of socio-economic development and of the division of country, this section will focus on the following aspects of parties which shape them to a significant degree: (1) the idea and the development of party politics; (2) the predominant characteristics -- "personalism" and factionalism; (3) the membership of parties at the grassroots; and (4) inter-party politics.

Unlike parties in many developing nations, the Korean parties did not originate from the nationalist movement against Japanese colonial rule.[138] The Japanese rule was so severe in restricting any political movement by Koreans that until 1945 no movement or organization existed which could become the basis for party development in Korea. The efforts of the nationalists' organizations abroad were not able to communicate with the masses in Korea because of the problems of distance, smallness of number and factionalism. Any meaningful start of mass organization, thus, began with the liberation of Korea.

But the mass movements and parties that emerged immediately with the liberation were torn apart by the ideological and factional tension among the

138. See Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., pp.2-3.

former nationalist leaders.[139] In this process, such mass organizations as the leftist Preparation Committee and the group of the Korean Provisional Government collapsed. Rhee's own mass organization, the National Association, was no more than his personal organization, formed to promote an early independence of the southern half of Korea and, as such, was a mass organization not designed to be transformed into a mass party. Rhee had pictured himself as a national leader above all partisan politics.[140] The KDP was then the only party of influence with organization. But it was a closed party of the rightists and wealthy classes, which had indeed little popular support as it was not able to get more than 24.6 percent of the votes in the 1948 general elections.[141]

Because of his extraordinary popularity and prestige among the people[142] and in the Constituent National Assembly, which elected him President by an overwhelming vote,[143] Rhee expected that he -- as the supreme leader of the nation -- could govern the country without party organization. This was one of the reasons that he severed his relationship with the KDP and that he stressed the non-partisan nature of his government. Rhee viewed a party as a factional clique or secret club of the privileged class engaged in power struggles and dividing the nation.[144] His distrust of party politics was reinforced by his intense dislike of the KDP. For instance, in the 1950 general elections Rhee actively urged the people not to elect any candidate

139. See Han Tae-soo (or Han T'ae-su), "A Review of Political Party Activities in Korea (1945-1954)," Korean Affairs, Vol.I, No.4, pp.415-24.

140. Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., p.7.

141. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p.387.

142. E.g., according to a public opinion survey in 1946, Rhee was the choice of 29% of the people for the first President of Korea over such giant rivals as Kim Ku (11%), Kim Kyu-sik (10%) and Yŏ Un-hyŏng (10%), Tong-A Ilbo, July 23, 1946.

143. Rhee received 180 votes out of 196. See Kim Chin-hak and Han Ch'ŏl-yŏng, op. cit., p.109.

144. See Rhee's statement, "Instruction on the General Elections," May 1950, Taehanminkuk konghoch'ŏ, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., p.72.

sponsored by party.[145] As a result of his personal crusade,[146] independents occupied 60 percent of the seats in the National Assembly following the elections (see Table II). During the early period of Rhee's rule, therefore the so-called parties in the National Assembly were actually parliamentary negotiation groups without mass support and organization.[147]

Ironically enough, however, it was Rhee himself who, having disparaged the utility of party, set the turning point for the development of the party system. In the course of his power struggle with the defiant legislature in the constitutional controversy in Pusan, Rhee felt the need for his own party to mobilize mass support against his opponents. Rhee, who had argued against party politics as late as June 1951,[148] suddenly came out in August 1951 in favor of the formation of a mass party for the interests of workers and farmers, arguing that the people were now mature enough for party politics.[149] The Liberal Party (Chayutang) was, accordingly, formed in December 1951.[150]

The formation of the Democratic Party (Minjutang) in 1955 as a grand coalition of all opposition groups was directly stimulated by Rhee's subsequent utilization of his Liberal Party (LP) to strengthen his arbitrary rule. This was the beginning of the domination of the two major parties: the ruling and opposition parties. With the formation of the LP, the role of party organization also began to emerge from the 1954 general elections as the effective machinery for nominating candidates, supplying campaign funds and rendering organisational support to party candidates.[151] The effectiveness of large

145. See ibid.
146. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op.cit., p.9.
147. Cf. Lee Chong-sik "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., p.8; and Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.523.
148. See his statement, "Elimination of Confrontation and Division," June 8, 1951, Taehanminkuk kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Politics, op. cit., pp.195-9.
149. See Rhee's "Commemoration Speech on the Third Independence Day," August 15, 1951, ibid., pp.134-5.
150. For the origin of the Liberal Party, see especially Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp.39-42.
151. Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.54; and Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., p.10.

party organization was evident in the decline of the number of minor parties successfully participating in the elections and in the decline of independents elected (see Tables I and II).[152] Although party politics as a whole is still chaotic and weak, a general trend has been nevertheless towards a two-party system.

Why are political parties and the political party system still weak? The obvious answer is that parties have been unable to institutionalize themselves. The foremost factor responsible for this is strong "personalism."[153] Personalism characterizes the authoritarian nature of Korean parties which stress vertical relationship between a political leader and his followers, and it is the foundation of atomistic loyalties that breeds factional struggles within parties.[154]

Without exception, all Korean parties are dominated by one personality or a few key personal leaders in their establishment, organization and operation. One clear indication of this is the fact that the life span of parties is dependent on the life span of current leaders: the Korea Democratic Party (Chosŏn minjutang) disappeared with Cho Man-sik, the Korean Independence Party (Handoktang) with Kim Ku, and the LP with Rhee. The inability to survive or failure to adapt to change is inevitable, for parties are essentially personal organizations of a single or a few leading personalities who assembled their personal followers[155] to make parties. Since the

152. See also Kim Kyu-taik, "A Statistical Analysis of the Elections in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No.2, Summer 1967, p.73.

153. See Oh Byung-hun (or O Byŏng-hŏn), "Party System in Korea," Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities," the Bulletin of the Korean Research Center, No. 21, December 1964, p.59; Kim Ch'ŏl-su, "New Dimension of Korean Political Parties," Sasangge, October 1963, pp.82-3; Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea, op. cit.,27-9; and Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., p.546.

154. Kim Ch'ŏl-su, ibid., p.83; See also Kim Sŏng-hŭi, "Korean Political Parties," Shinsekye (The New World), January 1963, pp.66-7.

155. For the characteristics of the followers (i.e. party members), see Kim Tong-myŏng, Chŏk gwa tongji (Enemy and Comrade) (Seoul: Ch'angp'yŏngsa, 1955), p.196; Ŏm Sang-sŏp, Kwŏlryŏk gwa chayu (Power and Freedom) (Seoul: Kyŏngku ch'ulp'ansa, 1956), pp. 261-7; and Lee Ch'ŏl-bŏm, "Political Realities and Leaders in Korea," Kukhoebo, No.47, August 20, 1965, pp.62-6.

parties are not the assemblages of the persons who share some durable political ideals and objectives (Cf. Chapters 7 and 8), the fate of parties are invariably dependent on the fate or actions of individual leaders.[156] Thus, the success of a party has been closely related to the exceptional quality of a single leader or to the strength of a number of well-known personalities who can attract followers as well as voters. For this phenomenon, one can argue, from the point of view of circular causation, that the weakness of organizational foundation of parties is also responsible for heavy dependence on prestige and quality of individual leaders.[157]

The LP of Rhee and the recent DRP of Park Chung-hee are typical of a highly personalized party dominated by a single personality. The LP was created by Rhee to prolong his personal rule, adopted his personal ideas as the ideals of the party, operated by the dictate of his personal whim,[158] and suddenly disappeared with him. It was the "overflow" of Rhee's personal cult or charisma that enabled the LP to develop a certain degree of party structure and to generate some diffuse support.[159] Although Rhee's authoritarian leadership[160] was never challenged within the party, the LP as a coterie of heterogeneous politicians without common ideological ties constantly suffered from power struggles among factional leaders.[161] In 1956 there was a strong reform movement inside the LP to ameliorate its deteriorating

156. Cf. Cho Hyo-won, "An Analytical Study of Some Characteristics of Korean Political Parties," Sahoekwahak (Journal of Social Science), No.2, March 1958, p.145.

157. See Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," op.cit., pp.28-30.

158. See, e.g., "The May 15th Elections: Activities of the Liberal Party," Chugan Hŭimang, No.19, May 4, 1956, pp.6-7; and Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the Party Formation in Korea," op.cit., pp.63-70.

159. Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op.cit., p.12.

160. Rhee himself is a fascinating subject for his authoritarian character. About him there are a number of studies. See Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1954); Richard C.Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960); Song Kŏn-ho, "Political Ideas of Dr. Syngman Rhee," Shindong-A, September 1965, pp.214-9; and Shin Sang-ch'o, "An Outside View of Syngman Rhee," Shindong-A, September 1965, pp.201-7.

161. See Kim Tong-myŏng, Chŏk gwa tongji, op. cit., pp.124-46; and Pak Yong-man, Kyŏngmudae pihwa (The Secret Stories at Kyongmudae) (Seoul: Samkuk munhwasa, 1965), pp.190-211 and 228-43. Kyŏngmudae is the Presidential Palace, known now as Ch'ŏnghwadae (Blue House).

position among the people. But Rhee's refusal to accept the reform programs put an end to the movement.[162] This is one of the critical inabilities commonly found among "personal parties." The LP, thus, never developed into a party that could transcend the personal fate of Rhee.

The organizers of the DRP had professed that theirs was based on a set of perspectives and organizational strength, not on personalities. Nevertheless, the DRP was from the outset a party of one faction of the military junta to support Park's presidential candidacy. The party soon became a personal party of Park serving him only as an electoral instrument and its majority in the legislature became a mere sounding body to support Park's programs (see Chapter 7). Like the LP, the DRP, no less an assemblage of diverse personalities, has been unable to function with cohesion due to constant factional struggle. The DRP is ipso facto a party of parties.

Unlike a ruling party which has a single powerful leader who commands his party by virtue of his powerful presidential office, the emergence of a single supreme leader in opposition parties is almost impossible. Nevertheless, the opposition parties always suffer severely from factional struggles of leading personalities (see Chapter 8). The old Democratic Party (DP) and the recent Mass Party (MP) were the coalitions of leading personalities, each commanding an autonomous political base and followers inside the parties. The issues in conflict among them were always on the matters of party hegemony and presidential nomination. Due to the intense factional struggle, the old DP was immediately divided into two parties along the factional line as soon as Rhee -- the chief target of their coalition -- was overthrown. For the same reason, the MP was not able to provide an effective opposition during the ROK-Japan treaty struggle and eventually divided into two parties.

The effects of the domination of politics by conservatives with tendencies

162. See "The Liberal Party in Dilemma," and "For Politics of Good Sense," Chugan Hŭimang, No.24, June 8, 1956, pp.4-5 and 12.

to political contests on personality and factional differences rather than on issues were already discussed in connection with the ideological development. This may be an original circumstantial reason for the lack of ideology and issues in Korean politics. It can be also said, however, that personalism and factionalism among politicians are responsible for inhibiting development of party politics based on ideology and issues.[163] This aspect will become implicitly clear again in Chapters 7 and 8.

Closely related to personalism, factionalism is, perhaps, the most cancerous feature of Korean parties as well as of all other organizations in Korea. The present discussion is confined to the general nature and effect of factionalism. The nature of factionalism in contemporary Korea is essentially same as that in the Yi Dynasty regarding the struggle for position and wealth and the atomizing activities centred around the leadership of one dominant personality. Sociologist William A. Douglas describes the prevalence of factionalism in Korea as follows:

> Political parties, labor unions, student groups and businesses are often merely factions composed of one leader and his personal followers. This makes it difficult in Korea to build any organization larger than the number of persons one man can personally gather around him. Larger organizations can be built only by putting various factions together, and therefore they suffer from disunity. Koreans often seem to have no clear concept of an organization as an entity in itself ... the Korean tradition of factionalism is a serious block to progress. 164.

Since position and wealth are the main objectives that bring politicians together and divide them in the morass of emerging, merging, separating and disappearing political parties, an ideal factional leader or boss must be a well-known personality who possesses considerable political experience, the

163. Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., pp.546; and O Byŏng-hŏn, "Party System in Korea," op. cit., pp.59-60.

164. William A. Douglas, "The Current Status of Korean Society," op.cit., p.395. For an illustration of factionalism, see Kim Sŏng-jin, "Eradication of Aca demic Factions," Kim Sŏng-jin et al, ed., Chŏnja ch'unch'u (Seoul: Chinmunsa, 1955), pp.28-30.

ability of procuring and distributing political funds, the capacity of attracting and controlling his followers of diverse origins, and even the know-how in manipulation and conspiracy.[165] The relationship between a leader and his followers demands a total commitment to the norms of the faction, and "deviation on even peripheral issues is regarded as a sign of defection or betrayal."[166] This is the reason why a party -- a federation of factions -- faces the crisis of disruption when factions strongly disagree on certain issues.

All the Korean parties have been financially maintained by funds illicitly collected from industrialists and businessmen. But in absence of a single channel of collecting and distributing funds, factional leaders maintain their own sources of political funds to command their followers.[167] The wide dispersion of factional "pipelines" of political funds is one of the main factors contributing to continuing personalism and factionalism. Due to the manner of illicit and secretive fund raising activities, political funds are also often the quid pro quo for special interests and favors for the donators[168] -- the foremost factor for corruption in politics and business.

In view of the more or less permanent rule of the party in power under "one and a half party system" and, hence, of greater opportunity for powerful position and wealth, factionalism is much more intense under the seemingly calm surface of the ruling party. In case of an opposition party, the intensity of factionalism directly varies with the chance of becoming the next ruling party. Although factionalism is a pattern of power struggle within a

165. Han Bae-ho, "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of Party Factions," Kukhoebo, No.47, August 20, 1965, p.53.
166. Lee Chong-sik, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., p.27.
167. For the cases of the current parties, see, e.g., "Political Funds," Series No.6 (The Genealogy of Political Funds and the Factions), Chosun Ilbo, June 14, 1966. For the case of the LP, see Kim Sŏng-hŭi, "Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p.66.
168. Han Bae-ho, "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of Party Factions," op. cit., p.53.

party, its "spill-over" effect is bound to set up the same pattern of struggle between the ruling and opposition parties,[169] since opposition parties are formed by the factions eliminated through power struggle from the original inner ruling circle.

How does factionalism effect politics in Korea? Professor Han Bae-ho suggests the following effects:[170] (1) factionalism cultivates exclusivism detrimental to the development of party cohesion; (2) as it prevents institutionalization of central party leadership and structure, it is responsible for discontinuity and instability of party politics and hampers the development of stable and diffuse support for parties; (3) due to its irrational struggle, parties can hardly serve as the normal training ground for future political leaders; (4) it is responsible, to a great degree, for nepotism and corruption in the government and parties; (5) the constant factional bickerings are detrimental to making and executing consistent party policies; and (6) elusive and irresponsible factional politics makes it difficult to develop a responsive and responsible politics.

The membership of parties at local level[171] indicates the weakness of parties at the grassroots. A local party unit is also a collection of several personal groups usually gathered around a National Assemblyman or prospective candidates. The members of each group are recruited through money, blood relations and geographical affinity.[172] Depending on party affiliation of factional bosses in the center, local party bosses and their followers change their party affiliation.[173] Observing this constant shift of party allegiance, one prominent political commentator lamented, "To expect integrity from politicians of this country is as foolish as to expect chastity

169. Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," op.cit., p.116.
170. See his views in ibid. and his "Twenty Years from the Viewpoint of Party Factions," op. cit., p.54.
171. See especially Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "The Placenta of New Political Parties," Ch'oeko hŏŭibo, No.16, January 16, 1963, pp.52-6.
172. See ibid. p.53; and Kim Sŏng-hŭi, op. cit., p.67.
173. See Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, ibid.

from prostitutes."[174].

Because politicians have indulged in selfish personal gains and party activities are often the source of potential personal troubles in the light of frequent political upheavals, parties and party functionaries are widely discredited and looked upon with suspicion and apprehension among ordinary people. Furthermore, because of the laws[175]. which prohibit joining of parties by public officials, military servicemen, educators, students, and employees of public or semi-public corporations, the number of potential party members among those who can exercise independent political judgement and contribute party fees is radically reduced to the minimum. Most of "professional" party members at provincial and district levels are thus the political illiterates, the unemployed and the poor who invite further contempt of parties among the people.[176].

Socially respectable members often found in the ruling party were there by pressure of local government authorities (police)[177] or without their personal knowledge by virtue of their membership in some non-political organizations which were forced to join the party en masse.[178]. In the case of opposition parties, the lower quality of members is constant because few respectable men can withstand the indignity of persecution and pressure of the government.[179].

Due to the reasons cited thus far, parties are still regarded with suspicion, distrust and contempt, and have yet to develop into organizations with stability, respectability, and mass support.

Another significant aspect of party politics in Korea that hampers and disrupts political development is the perpetual imbalance of power between the

174. Kim Tong-myŏng, Chŏk gwa tongji, op. cit., p.58.
175. E.g., Article 17 of the Political Party Law.
176. See Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "The Placenta of New Political Parties," op. cit., pp.54-5. For socio-economic status of party members in a local district, see Tak Hŭi-jun and Lee Chŏng-jae, "Movement in the Tague Community," Sasangge, May 1961, p.170.
177. Kim Sŏng-hŭi, op. cit., p.67.
178. See Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "The Placenta of New Political Parties," op.cit., p.54.
179. Ibid.

ruling party and the opposition --- the pattern commonly described as "one and a half party system."[180] The relationships between the LP and the DP during the First Republic, between the DP and the New Democratic Party during the Second Republic, and between the DRP and the Civil Rule Party (or later MP), are typical of this pattern.

The political contests between opposing sides are so prejudiced against the opposition that the outcome of contests, whether in elections or in the legislature, is always in favor of the ruling party which ruthlessly controls, exercises and manipulates all available political resources, i.e. administrative and coercive apparatus, economic power, electoral laws and machinery, and even the Constitution and laws. The victory of the ruling party in elections, therefore, is a foregone conclusion, and accordingly, there has never been a peaceful transfer of power by constitutional means. The basic cause of the recurrent crisis of legitimacy stems from this fundamental imbalance between opposite political elites.

Because the ruling party perpetuates power and governs the country through procedures and means which the opposition regards as illegitimate and unlawful, the substance of issues in conflict between them always starts from fundamental procedural issues,[181] such as the unconstitutionality of government policy or acts, irregularities in elections, and encroachment on basic freedoms. Therefore the opposition struggles against the government with extraordinary zeal of an "opposition of principle." The opposition in desperation often resorts to extreme militant measures and becomes irresponsible and adventurous;[182] the government reacts with coercion and force. This is also one major reason why militant factions on both sides can dictate the tactics

180. For this aspect, see Han Bae-ho, "Korean Parliamentary Politics from the Viewpoint of the Theory of Conflict," Kukhoebo, No.46, July 20, 1965, pp.57-9; Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition," Sasangge, March 1964, pp.76-80; Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., pp.549-50; and Han Ki-shik, op. cit., pp.83-4.

181. As to how "procedural issues" become "substantial issues" that create the problem of consenses in constitutional politics, see Herbert J. Spiro, Government by Constitution (New York: Random House, 1959), pp.363-71.

182. See Hwang San-dŏk, Chahwasang (Self-Portrait) (Seoul: Shin-a ch'ulp'ansa, 1966), pp.248-9.

and strategies of confrontation in times of crisis. Under these circumstance, political decisions or changes have been made very often by extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary means, largely through violence and mob politics in the streets.

Why is the ruling party unwilling to abide to the rules of the game? Of course, it can be traced to the authoritarian tradition of Korean society in which the rulers tend to personalize political power and position.[183] The authoritarian trait of the rulers is manifest in their indifference to public opinion and their intolerance of the opposition,[184] which, in their eyes, is a subversive group undermining the integrity of the nation. The latter attitude is evident in the abuse of anti-Communism against political foes of the government. Another basic problem is the lack of opportunity for wealth and prestige in professions other than politics. There must be somewhere positions of influence, prestige and affluence available for defeated political aspirants. "Where political defeat brings a ticket to oblivion, competition for office may become bitter."[185] Since political positions in Korea are the source of power, wealth and prestige and the positions are quite limited to the members of small ruling group, the struggle for power is constant and bitter and the elimination through this struggle means often the danger to personal safety.[186] This is a where "each side comes to regard the victory of the other as a fundamental threat to some highly ranked values."[187] Thus once in power the ruling group entrenchs itself in power by all means and, as a result, the peaceful transfer of power between opposing political elites becomes difficult.

183. See Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "The Political Behavior of Koreans," op.cit., pp.6-23.
184. See Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition," op.cit., p.78; and Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.549.
185. Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), p.138.
186. See O Byŏng-hŏn, "The Political Pattern of Korea," Shindong-A, June 1965, pp.60-2; and Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," op.cit., p. 115.
187. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p.96.

A brief examination of the selected aspects of political parties and elites reveals that the immaturity of party politics and chronic political instability stem from (1) the lack of tradition and experience in party or organized politics; (2) the non-institutionalization of parties as mass organizations due to strong personalism and authoritarianism; (3) the extreme fragmentation of political elites due to factionalism; (4) the fragility of parties at the grassroots; and (5) the imbalance of power between the ruling and opposition parties.

POLITICAL AWARENESS AND PARTICIPATION

Since 1945 political awareness among the Korean people has considerably improved, particularly through the expansion of education, rapid economic and social changes brought about by the division of country and the Korean War, political awakening under the impact of two violent political upheavals (the student and military revolutions) and experience in holding electoral contests. The high awareness is also partially stimulated by an ever-widening gap between the increasing level of popular expectation and the inadequacy of governmental performance.

Despite this change, political attitudes and behavior of most urban[188] and rural masses still remain traditional, inert and negative, and the extent of their political participation ends with casting votes in elections. Apart from the factors of poverty and ignorance, they are still psychologically inhibited from freely forming their own political judgement and from exercising

188. The total urban population (living in cities of 20,000 or more) in Korea increased from 27.5% in 1949 to 38.5% in 1960. But urbanization in Korea is not an "industrial urbanization" which accompanies all the real attributes of social changes necessary for political development. The Korean urbanization thus contains various traditional and rural characteristics. See Lee Taik-Whi, "Urbanization and Its Political Implications in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 3, December 1964, pp.304-14.

their political rights for their own interests.[189] The persistent pre-modern pattern of political behavior of the masses is, in a greater degree, an indication of the failure of political parties in developing themselves into mass organizations which educate the people, formulate issues for them, meet the needs of the people, and develop party identification. Because of this, there exists a big gap between the masses and the political elites. This is primarily responsible for political apathy among the people who dutifully march to the polling stations but occasionally register their protest as in the case of the 1956 presidential elections.

Although electoral participation and voting behavior in Korea also vary with demographic characteristics (such as education, income, age and sex), or with geographical areas (urban and rural), the overall voting behavior of Koreans still reflects the traditional socio-economic pattern and the level of political underdevelopment. The majority of the people are indifferent to political and governmental affairs. A survey indicates that only about 11 percent of the voters have ever involved in political or public activites to redress their grievances.[190] This is predominantly due to the traditional servile attitude towards officials and due to the sense of helplessness.[191] Even among those who are informed and have critical opinions, they are reluctant to express their opinions in public and to take part in political

189. Since 1960 there have appeared a number of empirical studies on political attitudes and behaviors of Koreans based on surveys. The important ones are: Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," Asea yŏnku, Vol. IV, No. 1, June 1961, pp.1-52; O Byŏng-hŏn, "Analysis of the July 27th General Elections," Asea yŏnku, Vol. III, No.2, December 1960, pp.29-64; Chŏng Dŭk-kyu, "Voting Behavior in the Province of Chŏllanamdo," Nonmun jip (Collection of Theses) of Chŏnnam University, Kwangju, Vol. 10, 1964, pp.1-47; and Kang Kyŏm-kŭn, "Political Analysis of Korean Regional Society," Haengchŏng nonch'ong (Collection of Theses in Public Administration) of School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, Vol. II, No.1, 1964, pp.126-56.

190. Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," op.cit., p.31.

191. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," op. cit., p.401: and Han Bae-ho, "Korean Political Culture," op.cit., p.117.

or protest activities because of fear of earning displeasure of the authorities.[192]

Still under the influence of patrimonial and kinship bonds and authoritarian tradition, as well as due to ignorance and poor access to mass media,[193] most of the voters, especially in the rural areas, are influenced by family members, relatives and "influential persons" in forming their views on candidates and campaigns.[194]

Even though the voting rate has been steadily declining both in urban and rural areas,[195] it has been nevertheless high, especially in rural areas. The high voting rate reflects the fact that many voters are obliged to go to the polls for the particular candidates under persuasion or pressure of "influential persons" or "notables" in each area.[196] In the past the voters in remote areas went to vote in fear of retaliation by authorities for their failure to vote.[197] Often they were under various pressures to vote for the candidates of the ruling party.[198] This is the reason why in the past the ruling party took votes of peasants for granted. The decrease in voting rate in the recent elections is attributable partly to the disappearing of this type of coercion, and, mainly, to the growing doubt among the voters in the efficacy of elections in particular and politics in general.[199]

What are the criteria of choice in elections? All the surveys confirm that the voters make their choice based on the personality of candidates, not

192. Lee Man-gab, ibid.

193. See Richard Garver, "Communication Problems of Underdevelopment: Cheju-do, Korea, 1962, "The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXVI, No.4. Winter 1962, pp.613-23.

194. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," op.cit., p.403; Chŏng Dŭk-kyu, op. cit., p.22; and Lee Joung-sik, "Voting Behavior in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol.II, Nos. 3 & 4, 1963, p.358.

195. The highest 95.5% in the 1948 general elections decreased to 72.1% in the 1963 general elections. For an analysis of the trend of voting rate, see Kim Kyu-taik, op. cit., pp.62-7.

196. Ibid., p.66.

197. Ibid., p.67.

198. According to Yun Ch'ŏn-ju's survey, 79.7% of the voters were pressed by the Liberal Party to vote for its candidates in the 1958 elections, Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," op.cit., p.45.

199. Kim Kyu-taik, op.cit., p.62; and Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "Political Indifference and the Crisis of Democracy," Sasangge, April 1961, pp.60-9.

on party identification and party platforms.[200] This is not surprising in view of the fact that parties are hardly organized at the grassroots, that they are collections of personalities and that they fail to campaign on issues and programs. The lack of voters' indentification with parties is also revealed by the tendency that the voters rarely vote for the same party they voted for previously. For example, throughout the 1954, 1958 and 1960 general elections, one survey indicates that only 38 percent of the voters had consistently voted for one party.[201] Another obvious reason for the weakness of party indentification is that their choice is determined by such irrational and traditional elements as personal relationship, familial and kinship relationship, deference to "influential persons" and immediate material benefits.[202] The irrationality of the voters is congruent with the attitude of most candidates, who consider elective office as a source of personal gain.[203] Electoral contests, especially in rural areas, become the contests among personal groups, organized by candidates' families, their kinship groups, and their friends through extravagant expenditure and promises to purchase votes.[204]

Since the elections have been such, there has been a great potential for manipulation especially by the candidates who belong to or who are supported by the ruling party and the government. An overwhelming majority (90%) of the people believe that the elections have been rigged[205] mainly through public officials and purchase of votes.[206] The easiness of manipulation of elections

200. E.g., in a government survey, 72.7% of the voters made choice based on "personality of candidate," and 14.7% on "party and platforms." See Hankuk Ilbo, December 28, 1960. See also other similar indications in the surveys of O Byŏng-hŏn, "Analysis of the July 27th General Elections," op. cit., pp.47-50. of Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," op. cit., p.36; and of Chŏng Dŭk-kyu, op. cit., p.26.

201. Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, ibid. p.39.

202. See Chŏng Dŭk-kyu, op. cit., pp.31-2; and Kang Kyŏm-kŭn, op.cit., pp.153-4.

203. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," op.cit., p.403.

204. See Shin Bŏm-shik, "Electoral System and Election Management," Sasangge, July 1962, p.72.

205. Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," op.cit., p.46.

206. Chŏng Dŭk-kyu, op. cit., p.40.

directly increases with the high degree of concentration of traditional rural characteristics. This is clearly evident in the electoral statistics, for the rural areas with high voting rates have been traditionally the strong bases of the ruling party while the urbanized areas with relatively low voting rates have been the main pockets of the opposition.[207]

What conclusions can be drawn from the voting behavior of Koreans? The obvious thing is that, in spite of the heightening of political awareness and the establishment of formal institutions of democracy such as universal suffrage and political parties, the rural and urban masses in Korea are hardly exercising their political rights or participating in political decision-making due to their own social and political inertia and the constant manipulation by politicians and the government. In this sense, their participation is a "totalitarian participation." This means that the overwhelming majority of the people is effectively alienated from politics and neglected by the government. In their place, smaller but articulate elements in the urban areas -- the military, students, bureaucrats, professionals, the press, businessmen and industrialists -- play certain roles, which are often out of proportion and out of their proper sphere to the point of endangering the general interests of the people (see Chapter 9).

207. See Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Voting Behavior of 'Eup' Inhabitants," op.cit., pp.11-8.

CHAPTER 2

THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY AND ITS BACKGROUND

After two decades of antagonism and hostile relations following World War II, on June 22, 1965 the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the ROK) and Japan finally took a step towards friendly and normal relations by signing the Treaty on Basic Relations and other agreements.[1] Negotiations between the ROK and Japan had commenced with preliminary talks on October 20, 1951. The complexity of the issues and negotiations between the two countries is told by the seven formal conferences, not to mention numerous other informal contacts and talks, which took place during the fourteen intervening years, and by the number of documents signed by both countries.[2]

The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the issues involved in the negotiations, and the contents of the treaty and of the agreements concluded on June 22, 1965, in Tokyo.

1. The treaty and the related agreements were subsequently ratified by the National Assembly of the ROK on August 14, 1965 and the National Diet of Japan on December 11, 1965. The instruments of ratification were exchanged in Seoul on December 18, 1965.

2. Besides the Treaty on Basic Relations, the important agreements which required ratification were the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning the Property and Claims and on the Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on Fisheries, the Agreement on the Legal Status and Treatment of the Nationals of the Republic of Korea, and the Agreement on the Art Objects and Cultural Cooperation. In addition to these agreements, twenty other documents were signed on the same date. For an authentic text in English of the Treaty on Basic Relations, see Oemupu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK), Taehanminkuk oekyo nyŏnpyo, pu chuyo munhŏn 1965 (1965 Yearbook of the Republic of Korea Diplomacy with Important Documents) (Seoul, 1966), pp. 324-5. For other related agreements in Korea, see Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965; and in English prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Documents", The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 10, 1966.

The preliminary talks opened in October 1951 were the first official contact between the two countries after the defeat of Japan. The talks were urged and arranged by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP), after the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan had been signed but before it took legal effect on April 18, 1952. Both sides agreed to place the following issues on the agenda: the legal status and treatment of Koreans residing in Japan and the question of title to the vessels in Korean harbors at the time of the Japanese surrender (as of August 9, 1945).[3] The ROK's request to include the issue of fisheries was refused by Japan. In late 1951 the preliminary talks were suspended without any progress in resolving the issues.

The first formal ROK-Japan conference (February - April 1952) discussed the issues concerning basic (or diplomatic) relations;[4] the ROK's claims to compensation for losses of property and lives under Japanese rule; and the Japanese claim to compensation for property formerly held in Korea, in addition to the issues already opened to discussion in the preliminary talks. During the successive conferences a number of important issues were added -- some of them deliberately provocative - -

3. This is the date on which Japan accepted the terms of the Allied powers spelled out in the Potsdam proclamation, July 26, 1945. The SCAP ordered the Japanese authorities to return all vessels registered in Korea but removed to Japan by the Japanese after the above date. See Taehanminkuk chŏngpu (Government of the ROK), Hanil hoedam paeksŏ (White Paper on the ROK-Japan Talks) (Seoul, 1965), pp. 190-1.

4. The words, "basic relations," and "Treaty on Basic Relations" were coined by the Koreans. The Treaty on Basic Relations is in reality a treaty of friendship and trade. The ROK did not want to use the word "friendship" in fear of a possible reaction by the Koreans who were not really friendly towards the Japanese. See Kim Yong-shik's explanation in ibid., p. 191.

to the already tense negotiation list. They were: the Peace Line or the "Rhee Line" as it is called by Japan; the question of title to Dokto (or Takeshima, in Japanese) which consists of two small islands; the ROK's demand for the return of Korean art objects removed to Japan; the fate of the Japanese fishermen interned in the ROK in violation of the Peace Line, and of the Koreans detained in the Japanese detention camp in Ohmura, Japan; the repatriation of the Koreans residing in Japan to North Korea; and above all, the question of "two Koreas" and jurisdictional control of the ROK in the Korean Peninsula.

For the purpose of analysis, these issues are grouped under the following categories: (1) the basic relations, which deal with the validity of past relations, the jurisdictional control of the ROK, and future relations; (2) the problem concerning property claims; (3) the problem concerning fisheries, including the limit of continental shelves in connection with the Peace Line and future cooperation in fisheries; (4) the problem concerning the legal status and treatment of the Koreans residing in Japan; and (5) the dispute over Dokto.[5] These are the points of dispute which produced many side issues and triggered the

5. For different positions taken by both sides, see Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit.; "Materials on the ROK-Japan Problem: Summary of Positions Maintained by Both Sides along the Major Issues," Kukhoebo, No.42, March 25, 1965, pp. 115-8; Kimura Shūzo, "Details of Japan-ROK Negotiations," Nihon kokusaiseijigaku kai (Japan International Politics Society), Nikkan kankei no tenkai (Development of Japan-ROK Relations) (Tokyo, 1963), pp. 111-27; and Won Yong-sŏk, Hanil hoedam shipsa nyŏn (Fourteen Years of the ROK-Japan Talks) (Seoul, Samwha ch'ulpansa, 1965), pp. 1-288. For a Japanese legalistic view of the issues and the contents of the treaty and the agreements, see Oda Shigeru, "The Normalization of Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No.1, January 1967, pp. 35-56.

exchange of hostile words and actions between the two countries while arousing emotional hatred of the peoples in both countries.[6]

THE BASIC RELATIONS

Dr. Yu Chin-o, a leading intellectual and the former president of Korea University who was a member of the Korean delegation to the first ROK-Japan conference and the chief of the Korean delegation to the fifth conference, described the impasse in ROK-Japan negotiations as due to the fact that the attitudes of the two countries were "diametrically opposed rather than basically different."[7] These attitudes were in evidence throughout negotiations in designing bases for future ROK-Japan relations. The ROK maintained that normalization of relations between the two countries must be preceded by a Japanese apology for the unfortunate past.[8] The ROK insisted that normalization of relations should be formalized in a "treaty" in which Japan explicitly recognized that the unfortunate past between the two countries was mainly due to the immoral and illegal Japanese occupation of Korea, and in which Japan also specifically repudiated all the previous treaties or agreements, from the very beginning of their

6. For objective analyses of the emotional problems, see especially Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXV, No.4, Winter 1962-63, pp. 315-26; and Lawrence Olson, Japan and Korea: The Bitter Legacy, American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, East Asia Series, Japan and Korea, Vol IX, No.7, June 10, 1961.

7. Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of the Korea-Japan Conferences?" Korean Affairs, Vol. I, No. 2, 1962, p. 122.

8. For the ROK's position, see Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 14-5.

conclusions, which had successively subjugated the old empire of Korea into a part of the Japanese colonial empire.[9] The Koreans felt that a true and friendly relationship could not be built upon the remnants of unequal status and humiliating stigma inflicted on the Koreans by the Japanese agression. Such a treaty was, therefore, desirable for the purpose of restoring dignity to the Koreans as well as for the sake of eradicating suspicion on their part of possible Japanese re-aggression.

The Japanese position was that relations should be normalized by a joint ROK-Japan declaration, instead of a formal treaty, and that the status of the old treaties or agreements should not be a subject for discussion since they were no longer valid nor effectively in force following the separation of Korea from Japan in 1945.[10] Besides, the existence of the old treaties or agreements was a historical fact that no one could deny. The important thing was to draw a historical lesson from these facts and to work for the mutual prosperity of the two nations.[11] Thus, while the ROK regarded the ROK-Japan negotiations as negotiations for a kind of

9. These treaties or agreements are: the "Agreement Between Korea and Japan," August 22, 1904, by which Korea became obligated to accept the Japanese advice on matters of foreign affairs and finance; the "Convention Between Korea and Japan," November 17, 1905, by which Japan assumed control of foreign affairs of Korea; the "Agreement between Korea and Japan", July 24, 1907, by which Japan took control of the internal administration of Korea; and finally the "Treaty of Annexation," August 22, 1910. See Oemupu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK), Hanil kwange ch'amko munsŏjip (Collection of Reference Documents on the ROK-Japan Relations) Seoul, 1958); and "Documents" relating to Korea-Japan relations, Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, the Bulletin of Korean Research Center, Seoul, No. 23, December 1965, pp. 49-57.

10. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 14-5; and see also the recollection of Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, "The First Year of the ROK-Japan Normalization and Prospective," Kukhoebo, No.51, January 15, 1966, pp. 86-7.

11. E.g., the editorial of Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 1965.

peace treaty aimed at resolving the problems arising from the Japanese occupation, Japan refused to see the problems in the Korean context. The Japanese refusal to admit their past misdeeds in Korea or to express their regret for the past was evident in the first ROK-Japan conference, as the following episode, revealed by Dr. Yu Chin-o, indicates:

> Dr. Yang Yu-chan, the chief of the Korean delegation, read a prepared speech (I understand this speech was given directly to Dr. Yang by President Rhee at that time). Included in this speech was a phrase "... let us bury the hatchets." Mr. Chiba, the Japanese alternate chief delegate who was listening to the speech in silence, said one thing at the end. He said, "What are the hatchets to bury?" In other words, this suggests that Japan never invaded Korea against Koreans' wishes.[12]

The position of the ROK on the importance of Japanese apology in basic relations had been consistently pronounced by the leaders of the ROK. Had this basic requirement been satisfied, relations between the ROK and Japan would have been quite different. President Rhee Syngman's hostility towards Japan is well known. But it should be noted that President Rhee was not always as hostile and arrogant towards Japan as he appeared later. He was one of the first Korean nationalistic leaders to favor early establishment of amicable relations with Japan, provided this basic foundation was laid.[13] On October 22, 1948, immediately

12. Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of the Korea-Japan Conferences?" op. cit., p. 123; see also Kamada Mitsuto, "The Japan-ROK Relations From the Point of View of Korean People's Resentment of Japan," Shinwa, No. 143, January 15, 1965, p. 9.

13. E.g., "Address by Syngman Rhee before the First Congress of the Republic of Korea, May 31, 1948," The U.S. Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, Publication 3305 (Washington, D.C:, Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 73-7 (Annex 17).

after the independence of the ROK, President Rhee said, "We are trying to forget and will forget the past. If the Japanese would meet the Koreans with truthfulness and sincerity, friendly relations would be renewed. We believe in a peaceful co-existence with a neighboring country."[14] He suggested normalization of trade relationships between the two countries as the first step towards normalization of diplomatic relations, even before a peace treaty was concluded between Japan and the Allied powers.[15]

President Rhee visited Japan three times; in October 1948 as the guest of General MacArthur, in February 1950 again as his guest, and in January 1953 as the guest of General Mark Clark, the Commander of the United Nations Forces, and of the U.S. Ambassador Robert D. Murphy. The Japanese leaders' reaction to his repeated stress while he was in Tokyo on the necessity of early relations between the two countries sheds some interesting light on the state of the ROK-Japan relations at the time, and could explain partly the subsequent hatred of Japan by Rhee. In his open letter to Dr. Kakawa Toyohiko,[16] a wellknown Christian

14. "Speech Concerning the ROK-Japan Trade," October 22, 1948, Taehanminkuk kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Economic, Diplomatic, Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, op. cit., p. 2.

15. "Speech on the ROK-Japan Trade," September 20, 1949, ibid., p. 14.

16. Dr. Kakawa had written an open letter, "Appeal to President Rhee Syngman," in Mainichi Shimbun, December 13, 1955. He emphasized the historical, cultural and ethnical affinity of the two peoples, and appealed for his tolerance of the Japanese misdeeds in the past and for improvement of relations between the two countries.

leader, which was carried in a Japanese daily, Mainichi Shimbun (December 21, 1955), Rhee revealed,

> When I went to Japan six years ago..., I was interviewed by reporters. I told them frankly that, even if I am reportedly not a friend of Japan, I am willing to completely forget the past and am ready for re-starting for new relations with Japan if the Japanese show the same cooperative spirit.
>
> I expected a favorable reaction to my statement from the official spokesman of the Japanese Government. I was deeply disappointed when there was no reaction at all.
>
> When I visited Japan again..., I asked Japan to extend generosity to the ROK, a weaker neighbor, in the same spirit as shown by the U.S. to Japan... While I was talking, Prime Minister Yoshida and Foreign Minister Okasaki made smiling faces. But they made no comment on my speech after all. Your [i.e. Kakawa's] apology for the forty years of the Japanese rule over Korea drew my serious attention because it was, in fact, the first statement of such nature I have ever heard from prominent Japanese people. In the absence of such expressions as yours, one could understand why we Koreans have believed that the Japanese intent is not to be friendly towards the ROK, but to re-dominate Korea. ...
>
> Japan does not show her willingness to resolve the disputes by negotiating with us. Instead, she has maintained that we are violating international law and is threatening us that all problems will be settled when Japan becomes militarily strong...[17]

A more recent statement by General Park, then chairman of the military junta and who, more than anyone else, strongly wished to bring about normalization of relations with Japan, represents the same basic position.

> As I already mentioned, we cannot overlook the possibility that so-called economic cooperation with Japan may bring forth another form of Japanese aggression against Korea. Therefore, Japan should strictly observe the principle of mutual benefit, along with respect for Korea's national sovereignty so as not to repeat the mistakes of the past, and should first of all legally settle its past aggression against the Korean people. "New wine should be put in the new bottles only." So, the Japanese people,

17. See also the letters of Dr. Kakawa and of President Rhee, in Pak Sŏng-ha, Unam yisŭngman (Unam Syngman Rhee) (Seoul: Myŏngsedang, 1956), pp. 215-3.

> especially Japanese leaders, should reflect on what they did to us during the past 36 years. It is the concensus of our national sentiment that Japan's moral reflection on and legal expression of its regret for its past aggression should precede any cooperation with Japan on our part.[18]

The feeling that Japan did commit many misdeeds against the Korean people and that Japan should apologize for the past before any normalization of relations took place was widely shared not only by the leaders of the ROK but all Koreans.[19]

Closely connected with their bitterness and moral indignation over Japanese rule in the past was the Korean's belief that Japan as the defeated country in the war owed some indemnity to the ROK. This is a victor complex, and it reinforced the Koreans' basic attitude. "What is meant by victor complex," Dr. Lee Chong-sik explains, "is that when Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945, the Korean people automatically identified themselves with the Allied powers, envisioning themselves as the winners of World War II. The fact that the liberation of Korea was brought about not as a result of the Korean people's struggle against Japan did not concern the Koreans. It was enough that Japan was defeated."[20] This complex was in fact widely shared by many Koreans, particularly

18. Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path (Seoul: Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 163-4.

19. E.g., see "The Four Point Resolution," adopted by the House of Representatives of the National Assembly, on February 3, 1961. A full text translated into English is available in Takita Kazuo, "Negotiations with South Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXI, No. 10, March 9, 1961, p. 409; the resolution adopted by the National Assembly, March 27, 1964, "The Materials on the ROK-Japan Problem: the Resolution of the National Assembly Concerning the ROK-Japan Problem," Kukhoebo, No. 42, March 25, 1965, p. 119; "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," Hankuk Ilbo, February 23, 1964; and the opinions expressed by artists, clergymen, editors, educators, political commentators, students, and writers in "Why Are We Opposed to the Present ROK-Japan Negotiations?" Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, pp. 130-44.

20. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," op. cit., p. 320.

the Korean nationalist leaders who had been struggling for Korea's independence for more than three decades. They were proud of the fact that the Korean Provisional Government in exile in Chungking did declare war against Japan on December 9, 1941,[21] and that Korean military groups had participated in actual combats against the Japanese in China and Manchuria, even if the Korean contributions to the Allied war efforts were insignificant and ignored by both the Allied powers and Japan. Many Koreans felt that it was not totally unrealistic for the ROK, as a belligerent at war with Japan, to try to become a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, even if it might be a bit unreasonable.[22] The Koreans who really entertained this idea of going to the peace conference in San Francisco expected that the ROK would be treated as one of the Allied nations in matters of, for example, the settlement of Korean property claims and of the legal status of the Koreans in Japan.[23] The Koreans' victor complex was reflected in the ROK's position that their negotiations with Japan should be regarded as peace negotiations, when the ROK was barred from being a signatory to the Peace Treaty because of the technicality of non-belligerency.[24] On the other hand, the Japanese position was that she had nothing to regret or to pay to the ROK under international law since the two countries were never belligerent parties at war. It may appear

21. For the text of the Korean Provisional Government's declaration of war against Japan, see Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Materials, op. cit., pp. 201-2.

22. Yu Chin-o, "What Prevents the Successful Conclusion of the Korea-Japan Conferences?" op. cit., p. 124. Actually President Rhee announced that the ROK will attend the peace conference in San Francisco in order to "recover what we are entitled to." Tong-A Ilbo, January 9, 1950. For the story of the ROK's diplomatic activities to gain a seat in the conference, see Min Pyŏng-gi, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Korea-Japan Relations," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.4 - Vol. 9, No. 1, Winter 1966-Spring 1967, pp. 69-99.

23. Min Pyŏng-gi, ibid, p.76.

24. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 191

at first glance that the leaders of the two countries were quibbling over simple moral and ethical questions. But in fact, the admission of "guilt" on the part of the Japanese would have had great significance in matters of property compensation and indemnity.

When negotiations between the two countries commenced in October 1951, Japan had just been restored to sovereign status. More than six years had passed since her defeat in 1945 and a radically different international situation existed, especially in regard to her former colonial possessions in the Far East. In 1945, the ROK, as well as North Korea, had become de facto separate states, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration (November 1943)[25]. and the Potsdam Proclamation (July 1945)[26]. The first of these documents promised and the second reaffirmed the independence of Korea after the war. Thus for the postwar Japan, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951 was the first opportunity to accede retroactively to the independence of Korea from Japan --- three years after the ROK and North Korea (the Korean People's Democratic Republic) had respectively declared their independence in 1948. Article 2(a) of the Peace Treaty[27].

25. "Joint Declaration by President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill," declared November 27, 1943 and released December 1, 1943, The U.S. Department of State, Selected Documents on American Policy (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 10.

26. "The Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," July 26, 1945, The U.S. Department of State, Korea's Independence, Publication 2933 (Washington, D.C.:, Government Printing Office, October 1948), p. 17 (Annex III).

27. For the text of the treaty, see The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 46, Supplement Nos. 71 and 72, 1952.

provides:

> Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

When Japan signed the Peace Treaty, she thus recognized Korea's independence, and also subscribed to Resolution 195(III) of the United Nations General Assembly, in regard to the ROK's independence and her legitimacy in Korea. The General Assembly declared on December 12, 1948:

> ...that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea when the /UN/ Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which was observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea; ...[28.]

When the Peace Treaty came into force, April 18, 1952, Japan thus automatically recognized retroactively the existence and independence of the ROK.[29.] Japan further recognized the ROK when she reaffirmed, by a note verbale of April 28, 1952,[30.] the accredition of the ROK Mission in Japan. This mission had been in Japan since April, 1949, accredited to the SCAP with the usual diplomatic privileges and immunities.

Notwithstanding the fact that Japan had thus recognized the existence of de jure ROK even before April 18, 1952, doubts of

28. For the text of this resolution, see United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, 1948, Part I, Resolutions.

29. The Japanese Government made it clear later that Japan recognized the ROK on April 18, 1952, not before this date. E.g., Prime Minister Sato's statement, Sangiin Kaigiroku (Proceedings of the House of Councillors), 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 8 (November 19, 1965), p. 13, and Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Shugiin Kaigiroku (Proceedings of the House of Representatives), 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 8 (November 1, 1965), p. 5.

30. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 39.

Korea's independence remained in the minds of the Japanese leaders, and even more ambiguity covered the question of the jurisdictional control of the ROK in the Korean Peninsula. For both the ROK and Japan, the question of the effective date of the separation of Korea from Japan, or the date of Korea's independence, was important, for it was the date on which property claims would be based. Partly because of this, Japan had vigorously asserted that Japan had no apologies to make for the past. Instead, Japan maintained that the Japanese rule had been benevolent to the Koreans, and if it was immoral at all, it had been necessitated largely by the game of power politics in the early twentieth century.[31] If Japan had admitted to the ROK that she was guilty of atrocities and misdeeds[32] committed against the Korean people and if Japan had declared that the old treaties or agreements were null and void from the beginning because they were illegal and immoral, she would then have to face logically and affirmatively the ROK's demand for indemnity. This point the Japanese had kept in mind. The Japanese government was also aware that if it made an apologetic statement there would be angry cries from opposition forces and nationalists at home.[33]

31. Ishihara Shintaro, "The Japanese Views of Korea," Chosun Ilbo, December 18, 1965.

32. To cite only two large incidents, in the Samil Movement (the March First Movement for Korea's independence in 1919), 6,670 Koreans were killed, 14,610 injured, and 52,770 detained by the Japanese authorities; and in the earthquakes of Kanto, Japan in 1923, thousands of the Koreans in Japan were indiscriminately murdered by the Japanese as scapegoats, see the statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, No.4 (March 27, 1964), pp. 5-6.

33. Yoshioka Totao in a discussion, "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Anti-Korean Sentiment," Shindong-A, October 1965, p. 148.

The contrasting attitudes between the two nations was further made obvious by the following incident. The highly charged situation produced by these conflicting attitudes came to a head during the third conference (October 6 - 21, 1953). In an atmosphere of mutual contempt and resentment, Kubota Kanichiro, the chief Japanese delegate, made a highly inflamatory statement which instantly prompted the infuriated ROK delegates to walk out of the conference for four years.[34] The important points of Kubota's statement were: (1) the independence of the ROK before the signing of a peace treaty was not normal; (2) the Allied powers should be criticized for disposing of Japanese property in Korea before the treaty was signed, and therefore Japan reserved the right to claim for property in Korea; (3) the 36 years of Japanese rule in Korea were not altogether bad, and in fact had brought spectacular advances to Korea in such areas as education, health, transportation and agriculture; and (4) the reference in the Cairo Declaration to the Korean people as being in "enslavement" was an exaggeration caused by the emotional stress of war.[35]

After Kubota's statement, there were many statements from responsible Japanese leaders and officials which further inflamed the Koreans. Komatsu Shigeo has listed some of these, typical of Japanese official attitudes.[36]

34. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 199. Japan officially withdrew Kubota's statement on December 31, 1957 and the two countries opened the fourth conference. See "Joint Communique," December 31, 1957 in Tokyo, between ROK Ambassador Kim Yu-taik and Foreign Minister Fujiyama, "Documents," Japanese Annual of International Law, No.3, 1959, pp. 221-2.

35. See excerpts of Kubota's statements recorded by the Korean delegates, in Yu Chin-o, Minju chŏngch'i ŭi kil, op.cit., pp. 262-64. See also a summary of Kubota's statement by Nakaho Yosaku, former chief editor of Keijō Nippō (The Seoul Daily), in Oriental Economist, April 1958, p. 186.

36. Except Ohira's statement, all are from Komatsu Shigeo, "Korean Problem According to My Experience," Saito Takashi and Fujishima Udai, ed., Nikkan mondai o kangaeru (Considerations on Japan-ROK Problems) (Tokyo: Taihei shuppansha, 1965), pp. 210-2. Ohira's statement is from Mainichi Shimbun, August 6, 1962.

> Ultimately emphasis of the Japanese diplomacy should be given to a close co-operation with America. In order to do this, the ROK and Formosa will have to be closely related. If feasible, it would be nice to form the United States of Japan with the ROK and Formosa. (Ōno Banboku, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party, 1958).

> Japan should penetrate into Korea, following the example of Ito Hirobumi /the Japanese Resident-General in Korea who masterminded the annexation of Korea/. (Ikeda Hayato, Prime Minister, 1962).

> To the ROK, normalization of ROK-Japan relations is a matter of life or death. Therefore the ROK is primarily responsible for bringing about normalization of relations. (Ohira Masayoshi, Foreign Minister, 1962).

> Managing Formosa, annexing Korea, and dreaming of co-operation and peace among the five races in Manchuria, if this was Japanese imperialism, it was an honorable imperialism. (Shiina Estsusaburo, Foreign Minister, 1962).

> It would have been better had Japan ruled Korea twenty more years. Even though it was a colony, Japan did good things for Korea. (Takasuki Shinichi, the chief delegate to the seventh ROK-Japan conference, 1965).

Statements such as these drew the indignation not only of the Koreans, but also of Japanese who were sympathetic to Korean resentment of Japanese arrogance. Some thoughtful Japanese criticized these attitudes as the "embodiment of terrible arrogance and ignorance."[37].

Professor Hadata Takashi of Japan analyses the Japanese attitudes as follows:

> The basic policy of Japan in Korea was assimilation. It was a kind of expansionism of the interior for domestication. It was aimed at disarming the characteristics of the Korean people and at Japanizing them....Prohibition of using Korean in school and meetings, Japanization of Korean names, worship at Shinto shrine, thorough memorization of the

37. Komatsu Shigeo, ibid, p. 213; and see also Kurota Hisao, the Socialist Party's Chairman of Special Committee Against the Japan-Korea Talks, "Why Opposed to the Japan-ROK Talks?" Chūōkōron, February 1963, p. 202.

> loyalty oath of an imperial subject, etc.... From the Japanese point of view, it was assimilation and imperialization of the subjects. But from the Korean point of view, it was the total liquidation of the Korean nationality...
>
> The Japanese rulers believed that this policy of liquidation of nationality had given benefits to the Koreans instead of pains and torture to them.[38]

Accordingly for a great many contemporary Japanese, the Japanese rule over Korea was for the benefits of the Korean people and, in fact, a great burden assumed by Japan in order to enlighten the Koreans, who were considered incapable of self-rule.[39]

In contrast to what the Koreans call the "ruling mentality" or "superiority complex" of the older generation of Japan, the younger generation of Japan feels either indifference or resentment towards Korea.[40] Indeed many Japanese people, particularly younger people, honestly believed that they should not feel guilty, or have to pay compensation to the ROK from their tax money; they had also suffered and been victimized in consequence of the irresponsible war waged by the same aggressive militaristic circles who ruled Korea.[41] The attitude of the younger Japanese people was direct opposition to that of their Korean counterparts who had been given an anti-Japanese education by Rhee Syngman.[42]

38. Hadata Takashi, "A New Understanding of the Japan-ROK Talks: The Japanese View of Korea," Sekai, December 1963, p. 53.

39. Ibid.

40. According to an opinion survey of November 1962 among Japanese college students by Jijitsūshin (the Current Affairs Press), reported in The Japan Times, December 22, 1962:

The most popular country:	U.S.A.	37%
	U.K.	26%
	Switzerland	25%
	ROK	2%
	Others	10%
The most disliked country:	U.S.S.R.	43%
	China	24%
	ROK	19%
	Others	14%

41. Hadata Takashi, "Japan-ROK Friendship and Japan-ROK Treaty," Saito Takashi and Fujishima Udai, op. cit., pp. 16-18.

42. According to an opinion survey of October 1962 among college students by Seoul National University, reported in The Japan Times, December 22, 1962:

The most popular country:	Switzerland	28%
	W. Germany	25%
	U.S.A.	14%
	Japan	3%
	Others	30%

The Korean insistence on an official apology from Japan was finally satisfied. On February 17, 1965 Foreign Minister Shiina Estsusaburo, came to Seoul to initial a tentative draft of the Treaty on Basic Relations, expressed that "I, ...really regret that an unfortunate period existed in the long history of the two nations, and deeply reflect on such a past."[43] The Korean reaction to this statement was very favorable. Chosun Ilbo, in its special report on Shiina's visit, commented that " ...as such an official statement is the first one that the Japanese government had ever made in sixty years, it is a considerate expression mindful of the Korean people's sentiment. One will have to admit that the statement will be definitely not a factor hindering the future relations."[44]

Article II of the Treaty on Basic Relations of June 22, 1965 reads:

> It is confirmed that all treaties or agreements concluded between the Empire of Korea and the Empire of Japan on or before August 22, 1910 are already null and void.

As it stands, Article II is reasonably clear. But the governments of both the ROK and Japan are rather equivocal and interpret it differently as it suits them. The government of the ROK has maintained that on the strength of Article II the old treaties or agreements concluded on or before August 22, 1910 (the date on which

43. See the text of his speech, Chosun Ilbo, February 18, 1965. He expressed also the same remarks in "Joint Communique" (English text), February 20, 1965, with Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, see Taehanminkuk oekyo nyŏnpyo, pu chuyo munhŏn 1965, op. cit., pp. 78-79. The word "reflect" used in the English is a translation of the Japanese word "hansei(suru)." "Hansei" also means "self-examination" plus some degree of "regret".

44. Chosun Ilbo, February 21, 1965. Reportedly Japan expressed a personal apology of Prime Minister Kishi through Yatsuki Kasuo, a personal emissary of Kishi, to President Rhee in May 1958. See Yatsuki Kasuo, "The Interview with President Rhee Syngman," Bungei-Shunju, July 1958, pp. 182-8.

the Treaty of Annexation was concluded) had been null and void from the date of their signing.[45] The ROK is also of the view that Article II is in reality the Japanese legal expression of regret over the past.[46] On the other hand, a different interpretation has been repeatedly given by the Japanese government. This is that the Treaty of Annexation became invalid with the independence of the ROK on August 15, 1948[47] and all other old treaties or agreements concluded prior to this treaty had already become invalid by the virtue of comprehensiveness of the Treaty of Annexation.[48] Therefore, in the Japanese view, the Treaty of Annexation was the only one invalidated on August 15, 1948, and the invalidation was not retroactive to August 22, 1910. According to the Japanese view the ROK could not dispute the legal acts performed by Japan during her occupation of Korea. "The only justification of the Korean view may be found in the statement of the Prime Minister of the ROK that, while the facts of the past could not be ignored, they should not be acknowledged in the light of self-respect and the honor of the Korean people."[49]

The jurisdictional control of the ROK was another basic point

45. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 19; Prime Minister Chŏng Il-Kwon's statement, Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965; and Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, "The First Year of the ROK-Japan Normalization and Prospective," op. cit., p. 86.

46. "Joint Statement of the Members of the State Council," July 13, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 1965.

47. Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Shūgiin kaigiroku, 48th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 7 (March 19, 1965), p. 6 and his statement, Sangiin kaigiroku, 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 8 (November 19, 1965), pp. 8 and 19.

48. The statement of Director of Bureau of Treaties, Foreign Ministry, Shūgiin kaigiroku, 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 10 (November 5, 1965), p. 2; and Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Sangiin kaigiroku, 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 5 (October 16, 1965), p. 12.

49. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 41.

of dispute, developing from the division of Korea and the role that Japan has been nourishing in the postwar era. The ROK has maintained that she is the only legitimate government representing the whole of Korea, and that her administrative and jurisdictional control covers the entire area. Their national jurisdictional control is asserted in Article 3 of the Constitution of the ROK, and based on the authority of the aforementioned UN Resolution 195(III) as well as the fact that the majority of the nations have recognized the ROK.[50] The ROK had repeatedly made clear to Japan that unless this view was fully accepted by Japan, negotiations for normalization of relations would be put aside.[51] At the beginning of the negotiations, the ROK's view was hardly challenged, because at that time Japan was still struggling with problems brought upon her by defeat in the war, and was still under strong American influence. But after 1955 her position on "two Koreas" began to change, as her economic prosperity increased and she felt the need of active Asian trade, irrespective of ideological differences with the countries concerned. In the Japanese view, it became also extremely difficult to isolate the ROK from North Korea as it was difficult to separate the "two Chinas."

On May 27, 1955 Japan concluded a fisheries agreement with North Korea, ostensibly in the name of the Japanese fishermen.[52] At the same time Japanese missions, composed of businessmen and industrialists, started to visit North Korea. In December 1956

50. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 15 and 17. By the end of 1967, 77 nations recognized the ROK.
51. Ibid. p. 15.
52. Seoul Shinmun, June 9, 1955

Japan repatriated twenty Koreans of south Korean origin to North Korea and since then (from 1959 to 1965) Japan has repatriated some 85,000 pro-Communist Koreans to North Korea.[53] These Japanese arrangements with North Korea were the first signs of the new Japanese position on "two Koreas," as well as calculated retaliation for the ROK's position on the Peace Line and the seizure of Japanese vessels inside the line.[54] In June 1955, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro stated that Japan was free to negotiate with either the ROK or North Korea "depending on practicality of the questions, even though she would not conclude any official agreement with the North Korea."[55] This statement was tantamount to de facto recognition of North Korea. The Japanese ambiguity on the question of "two Koreas" was also among the reasons why President Rhee, a hard-line anti-Communist, took an increasingly unfriendly attitude towards Japan.[56]

In 1962 Japan publicly stated that there were two Koreas, and that the sovereignty of the ROK was limited to the area where she effectively exercised her control.[57] Since that date Japan has specifically maintained that she would recognize the ROK as the only government in Korea in such a sense that the UN Resolution 195(III) indicated the specific circumstance of establishing the ROK and characterized it as the only legitimate government in Korea

53. See the recollection of Yu Tʻae-ha, former chief of the ROK Mission in Japan concerning the repatriation, Chosun Ilbo, March 4, 1965.
54. Ibid.
55. Seoul Shinmun, June 9, 1955.
56. See President Rhee's open letter to Kakawa, December 21, 1955, op. cit.: and Robert T. Oliver, "Destiny of the ROK and Japan," Chugan Hŭiman, No. 44, October 26, 1956, p. 6.
57. E.g., Foreign Minister Kosaka's statement, Song Munsan, "The Japan-ROK Negotiations and the Character of the Park Regime," Sekai, May 1962, p. 195.

under that circumstance. As such the ROK's effective jurisdictional control is practically limited to the south of the armistice line.[58]

In this connection, opponents in Japan of the ROK-Japan treaty took the views, among others,[59] that recognition of the ROK as the only legal government, and establishment of diplomatic relations only with the ROK, to the prejudice of North Korea, (1) would be legal sanction to a permanent division of Korea, (2) would add another obstacle to unification of Korea, and (3) would not be fair on the part of Japan to have the ROK as the sole agent speaking for

58. This view is widely shared in Japan. See, e.g., the editorials of Asahi Shimbun, February 21, 1965 and of Mainichi Shimbun, April 4, 1965.

59. Other main reasons that some Japanese - - - nationalists, intellectuals, and particularly leftist parties and labor organisations - - - opposed to the ROK-Japan normalization were:

(1) the agreements on the property claims and fisheries were disadvantageous to the Japanese national interests - - - (the position of nationalists and some leftists).

(2) Article IV of the Treaty on Basic Relations, which provides a close cooperation between the ROK and Japan "in promoting their mutual welfare and common interests" in conformity with the principle of the Charter of the United Nations, is an open provision which will eventually tie Japan with an American sponsored tripartite military pact among the United States, Japan and the ROK. Such an alliance would be in violation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan which prohibits Japanese rearmament, and it will intensify tension in the Far East - - - (the position of leftists, Communists and intellectuals).

For an intellectual view, see especially Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Ideological Transformation of Japanese Diplomacy: the U.S. - China Confrontation in the Japan-ROK Cooperation," Sekai, January 1966, pp. 18-36. For leftists' views, see Ishino Hisao, "The Real Struggle Begins Now," Gekkan Shakaito (The Monthly Review of Socialist Party), No. 97, June 1965, pp. 4-9; Ishihara Sakao, "American Asia Policy Centering Around the Japan-ROK Talks," Sekai, October 1965, pp. 53-8; Nihon Chōsen Kenkyusho (Japan Institute of Korea Research), Ajia no heiwa to nikkan joyaku (Peace of Asia and the Japan-ROK Treaty) (Tokyo, 1965); Eto Shinkichi, "The Logic of Non-intervention," Chūōkōron, August 1965, pp. 50-63; Chairman Ota Kaoru's address at the extraordinary convention of Sohyo (General Council of Japan Trade Unions), October 6, 1965, Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1965; and an article on the leftist view, "Five Phases of Japan-ROK Treaty," Part I, Asahi Shimbun, September 29, 1965.

the whole Korea in settlement of the issues.[60] Therefore, the question of "two Koreas" and the scope of jurisdiction of the ROK was a sensitive issue for the Japanese government to handle under the pressure of the powerful socialists' and intellectuals' opposition as well as in the face of bitter denouncement of the North Korean regime.[61]

Article III of the Treaty on Basic Relations provides:

> It is confirmed that the Government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful Government in Korea as specified in the Resolution 195(III) of the United Nations General Assembly.

The ROK holds that by Article III the ROK's assertion of jurisdictional control over the entire area of the Korean Peninsula was fully recognized by Japan.[62] And as a result of this recognition, the ROK maintains, Japan has admitted the illegality of the North Korean regime, and is barred from establishing any official relations with North Korea.[63] Disagreeing with the ROK's

60. E.g., Saito Takashi, "A Divided Nation, the ROK, and the Characteristics of the Park Regime," Sekai, October 1965, pp. 45-52; Hadata Takashi, "Japan-ROK Friendship and Japan-ROK Treaty," op. cit., pp. 8-9; Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 204; Nomura Kōichi, "Japan-ROK Treaty and National Interests of Japan," Sekai, October 1956, pp. 75-86; and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, "Advice to Japanese Diplomacy," Sekai, April 1965, pp. 56-66.

61. For the North Korean official statements denouncing the ROK-Japan normalization of relations, see Japanese texts published by Zainichi Chōsenjin sōrengōkai (The General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan), Kanichi kaidan o ronsu (Arguments on the ROK-Japan Talks), Korean Problems Series No.23 (Tokyo, March 1965), and Kanichi kaidan no sho kyotei wa muko de aru (All Agreements Concluded in the ROK-Japan Talks Are Null and Void), Korean Problems Series No. 25 (Tokyo, July 1965).

62. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 20-21; statement of Minister Without Portfolio Won Yong-sŏk, Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1965; and Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, Chosun Ilbo, August 10, 1965.

63. Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon's statement, Chosun Ilbo, August 11, 1965 and Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, Tong-A Ilbo, August 9, 1965.

view on Article III, Japan still holds that it does not mean that Japan recognizes the ROK's jurisdiction over all of Korea.[64]

Japan said, however, that as a member of the United Nations she will honor the UN Resolution 195(III) that the ROK is the "only such /legitimate/ Government" and in that sense, Japan, unrelated to Article III, would not establish diplomatic relations with North Korea.[65] How will Japan deal with North Korea? Japan will treat problems concerning North Korea as practical questions, not as legal questions.[66] It is clear that Japan has to live with both the ROK and North Korea as practically as possible and to maintain cultural and economic relations with both of them.[67]

THE PROBLEM CONCERNING PROPERTY CLAIMS

One of the main issues arising from the separation of Korea from Japan after the war was that of property claims which each side presented against the other.

64. Foreign Minister Shiina's statements, Sangiin Kaigiroku, 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 8 (November 19, 1965), p. 14.

65. Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1965.

66. Ibid; and Prime Minister Sato's statements, Nihon Keizai, October 5, 1965, and Shūgiin kagiroku, 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 13 (December 1, 1965), p. 3.

67. See Tanaka Naokichi, "Two Koreas and the Japan-ROK Normalization," Kokusai mondai (International Problems), No.62, May 1965, pp. 37-43. For a critical analysis of the Japanese "two Koreas" policy, see Cho Soon-sung, "Japan's Two Koreas Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No.10, October 1967, pp. 703-25. Cho argues that Japan's "two Koreas" policy might not be harmful to Korea because "it might facilitate communication between the two regimes and thus gradually build a mood for unification." (p. 725).

In the first ROK-Japan conference, the ROK outlined to Japan a long property claims list grouped in eight categories.[68] In summary, the main items of the Korean claims were:

(1) About 250 million grams of gold bullion and some 67 million grams of silver bullion that Japan removed to Japan through the Bank of Chosen (Korea) during the period of 1909 to 1945.
(2) Various postal savings, insurance, and pension funds, etc., that the Japanese Government-General of Korea owed to Korean nationals as of August 9, 1945.
(3) The bank deposits drawn by Japanese nationals from banks in Korea and monies transferred or remitted from Korea to Japan since August 9, 1945.
(4) Properties of the Tokyo office of the Government-General of Korea, the properties in Japan possessed by any legal corporation which had its main office in Korea and various assets held in Japan by the banks with their main office in Korea as of August 9, 1945.
(5) Claims for negotiable notes, Japanese currencies, unpaid salaries, pensions and compensations (of the conscripted Korean workers), dividends, etc. that the Government of Japan and Japanese nationals owed to Koreans.
(6) 668 vessels that Japan removed from Korean harbors after August 9, 1945.
(7) Art objects that Japan removed from Korea during her rule.

Against the ROK's claims, which Japan refused to discuss, Japan offered counter-claims for property owned by the Japanese government and Japanese nationals in Korea prior to the surrender of Japan. This property had been in effect confiscated by the Allied powers. On December 6, 1945, the U.S. Military Government in Korea issued Ordinance No. 33, "Vesting Title to Japanese Property Within Korea," which gave title to all Japanese properties in Korea, including those possessed by corporate, private and public bodies, to the U.S. Military Government in Korea, as of September 25, 1945.[69] After independence of the ROK, by the "Agreement

68. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 44-6. See also Yokomichi Setsuo, "My Questions on the Japan-ROK Treaty," Asahi Jānaru, November 28, 1965, p. 94.
69. USAMGIK, Official Gazette, Ordinance No. 33, December 6, 1945.

Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on Initial Financial and Property Settlement" of September 11, 1948 the United States transferred to the ROK all right, title and interest held by the U.S. Military Government in Korea to former Japanese properties.[70] Finally under Article 4(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan recognized the validity of this American disposition of the properties to the ROK.[71]

However Japan refused to acknowledge the validity of the measures taken by the United States, and interpreted Article 4(b) of the Peace Treaty differently.[72] The official Japanese view of Article 4(b) was stated as follows by Professor Yamashita Yasuo:

> The Japanese property in Korea was vested in the U.S. Military Government for disposition; the disposition made by the U.S. Military Government was recognized by the Korean Government; and all liabilities including all current and future claims arising out of vesting, administration and disposal of Japanese property in Korea, passed to the Korean Government. Hence, the claims of Japan and its nationals to their property in Korea should be regarded as against Korea.
> ...
> The fact that Japan recognized the validity of the dispositions of the Japanese property made by the U.S. Military Government in Korea should not be considered to mean that Japan has renounced all title claims to the disposed property.[73]

In other words, Japan took the view that Japan and her nationals were entitled to recover their property in Korea.

Under this interpretation, Japan could claim for 85 per cent of the total property in Korea, according to Kubota the chief Japanese delegate to the third ROK-Japan conference.[74] This

70. The U.S. Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, op. cit., pp. 104-12 (Annex 27).
71. Article 4(b) provides, "Japan recognizes the validity of disposition of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3."
72. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 41-42.
73. Yamashita Yasuo, "Title Claim to Japanese Property in Korea," The Japanese Annual of International Law, No. 2, 1958, p. 41.
74. Robert T. Oliver, "Destiny of the ROK and Japan," op. cit., p. 6.

extraordinary property claim seemed largely intended to cancel out the Korean property claims.[75] The ROK's position, that the Japanese claim to property in Korea had been nullified by her signature to the Peace Treaty, and consequently should not be subject to negotiation, was supported by the U.S. Department of State. Japan finally withdrew her claim to property in Korea on December 31, 1957 when she accepted "The U.S. Memorandum on the Interpretation of Article 4(b) of the Peace Treaty with Japan."[76]

The ROK's property claims were for the first time put on the agenda in the fifth conference (October 1960 - May 1961). The ROK (under the new government of Chang Myŏn) argued that the Korean property claims were based on legitimate and legal grounds, and that they were not intended as war reparations, but for restoration of property removed from Korea to Japan.[77] The first Japanese position was that the ROK's property claims had no solid legal basis, and, even if they were legitimate, the effective dates on which the claims were based were all questionable.[78] Later Japan agreed to offer compensation for the property claims of the ROK, in so far as the ROK could present solid legal evidence.

75. According to Yu Chin-o, the Japanese delegates assured the Korean delegates in private talks, "We would not really claim for property in Korea." See Yu Chin-o, "About the ROK-Japan Talks," Kim Sŏng-jin et al, ed., op. cit., p. 110.

76. Japan disclaimed for property in Korea officially in "Joint Communique," December 31, 1957, between the ROK Ambassador Kim Yu-taik and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, in "Documents," op. cit., p. 222. The memorandum was originally delivered to the Governments of the ROK and Japan on April 29, 1952, but both Governments refused to accept it. An excerpt of the memorandum is available in Oda Shigeru, op. cit., pp. 44-5.

77. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 194.

78. E.g., the editorial of Mainichi Shimbun, September 9, 1961.

But the ROK was not really able to produce the necessary documents for evidence.[79] During the Korean War, the documents which had been collected were destroyed or lost. The problem of producing evidence was further complicated. For example, identification and separation of the names of Korean nationals from those of Japanese nationals in the record books was very difficult, because practically all Koreans used Japanese names under the Japanese rule.

President Rhee was reported to have instructed the ROK delegation to claim anywhere between $2,000 million to $8,000 million, countering the $5,000 - $6,000 million that Japan had claimed for her property in Korea.[80] In the fifth conference, Chang Myon's government calculated $1,250 million based on the eight categories of claims, and sounded out Japan's willingness to settle the claims at $800 million.[81] Japan recognized first a legal basis for Korean claims amounting to no more than $15 million, but later raised this to $50 million.[82] The military junta of the ROK again demanded $800 million at the beginning of negotiations in the sixth conference (October 1961 - April 1964), while Japan was willing to pay the maximum amount of $70 million.[83]

79. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 246-50; testimony of Kim Tong-cho, former Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (February 21, 1964), p. 24.

80. Statement of Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chŏng Il-yŏng, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 6 (February 12, 1964), p. 14. According to Setsuo, a member of Japan's House of Representatives, Korea claimed between $1,200 million and $1,400 million while Japan claimed $9,000 million - $12,000 million, Yokomichi Setsuo, op. cit., p. 91.

81. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 246; and Hankuk soshik (News from Korea), Supplement Issue for the ROK-Japan Talks, April 21, 1965, p. 12.

82. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, ibid., p. 250: and Yokomichi Setsuo, op.cit., p. 92.

83. Asahi Shimbun, January 14, 1964; Mainichi Shimbun, November 14, 1962; and testimony of Kim Chong-pil, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964), p. 3.

In 1962 both the ROK and Japan decided to settle the property claims of Korea through high level political negotiations. Japan was now reported to be ready to compensate the ROK up to $300 million[84.] including much desired economic assistance, provided that all other issues were settled at the same time. On November 12, 1962, Kim Chong-pil, Director of the Korean C.I.A., and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi reached an understanding, which was not made public until January, 1963. This understanding became known as the "Kim-Ohira Memorandum" and became a source of controversy because of the secrecy shrouding its negotiation and its content.

The "Kim-Ohira Memorandum" set guidelines for settlement of the Korean property claims, as follows:[85.]

> (1) $300 million grant for the Korean property claims (payable in 10 annual instalments).
> (2) $200 million in government-to-government credits to the ROK as economic assistance (at annual interest rate of 3.5%, to be paid back over a period of 20 years after 7 years grace period).
> (3) $100 million or more in commercial credits (terms in accordance with usual international financial practice).
> (4) Grant and credits to be payable in Japanese products and services.

The Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation of June 22, 1965 was drawn up following the guidelines of the "Kim-Ohira" understanding, except Japan understood that the commercial credits to the ROK could be increased from $100 million up to $300 million.[86.] Although the Agreement differentiates the amount of $300 million, as a grant, from the rest of the settlement as credits for economic development of the ROK, it does not clearly state that the grant is compensation for the Korean property claims arising from the

84. Testimony of Kim Chong-pil, ibid.
85. Ibid., p. 4; and Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 49.
86. See Exchanged Notes Concerning Article 1(2) of the Agreement.

"unfortunate past," as the ROK maintained. While the ROK sees the whole settlement as constituting such compensation,[87] Japan regards it as "economic cooperation", or as a "congratulatory fund for independence".[88]

FISHERY PROBLEM AND PEACE LINE

The fishery problem between the ROK and Japan had been perhaps the key stumbling block in negotiations.[89] The problem was closely connected with the origin of the ROK's "Proclamation Concerning the Sovereignty of the Coastal Seas", which established the so-called "Peace Line", referred to as the "Rhee Line" by Japan. The Peace Line was proclaimed by President Rhee on January 18, 1952, about two weeks after Japan had refused to negotiate for a fishery agreement in the first ROK-Japan conference.[90]

When Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, she became obligated under Article 9 to negotiate fishery agreements immediately with any Allied country so desiring. Under Article 21, the ROK was specifically entitled to negotiate with Japan for such an agreement. By Article 9 Japan also acknowledged restrictions on her right to fish in open waters around the Allied nations and the ROK. Accordingly Japan had concluded fishery agreements with the United States and Canada on May 9, 1952. The negotiations for these agreements started in November 1951, six months before the

87. Hankuk soshik, op. cit., p. 12.

88. Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Shūgiin kagiroku, 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 4 (October 27, 1965), p. 6. When the Japanese leaders explained that the claims settlement was really a congratulatory gesture on the part of Japan, the Koreans and some Japanese denounced this as an arrogant expression. See, e.g., Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 206.

89. For an objective legal study on the fishery dispute, see Guenter Weissberg, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and the Japanese-Korean Fishery Dispute (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).

90. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 256.

Peace Treaty went into effect. But at the time she refused to negotiate with the ROK, because Japan was not yet prepared for such negotiations.[91] The ROK viewed the Japanese refusal as arrogance, as well as a violation of the provisions of the Peace Treaty.[92] The ROK also interpreted the Japanese refusal as a wait-and-see attitude until the Peace Treaty became effective, in April 1952, and the MacArthur Line, which had been established to restrict Japanese fishing activities during the occupation period, was abolished. Under this circumstance, the ROK took other measures to protect her fishery resources in her coastal waters from Japanese fishing vessels, which always had superior techniques.[93] This is the origin of the Peace Line. It was declared by Rhee, upon advice of the Korean delegates returning from the first conference. It did not originate from Rhee's hostility as has been believed.[94]

In the Proclamation, President Rhee declared that he was acting in "accordance with established international precedents and impelled by the necessity of safeguarding permanently national welfare and defense."[95] It established an exclusive fishery zone around the ROK bounded by demarcation lines which extended out

91. Ibid., pp. 76 and 256, and the testimony of Yu Chin-o Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs No. 9 (February 21, 1964), p. 1.

92. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 256.

93. Ibid., p. 76 and the testimony of Yu Chin-o, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (February 21, 1964), pp. 1-2.

94. Yu Chin-o's discussion with Yu Chang-sun in "Discussion: The Inside Story of 10 years Negotiations and 6 Conferences", Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, p. 33; and the testimony of Kim Tong-cho, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (February 21, 1964), p. 21.

95. "Proclamation Concerning the Sovereignty of the Coastal Seas," January 18, 1952, Taehanminkuk Kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Economic, Diplomatic, Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, op. cit., pp.82-4.

50 to 60 nautical miles from the Korean Peninsula and its insular coastal lines. It also stated that:

(1) The ROK holds and exercises national sovereignty over all natural resources, mineral and marine, that exist or will be discovered in the future in, or beneath, the shelf adjacent to Korean Peninsula and its insular coasts, in order to conserve and develop them.
(2) The Government of the ROK places all these resources and related industries, particularly fisheries and fishing, under its supervision and control in order to prevent this exhaustible type of resources from being exploited to the disadvantage of the Korean people or decreased or destroyed to the detriment of the nation.
(3) The ROK will modify the demarcation lines in accordance with new circumstance arising from new discoveries, studies or interests that may come to light in the future.
(4) This declaration by no means interferes with rights of freedom of navigation on the high seas.[96]

In September 1952, immediately following the rioting by Communist prisoners-of-war on Kŏje Island, General Mark Clark, Commander of the United Nations Forces, declared a line, an approximate duplication of the Peace Line, primarily as a military defense line, in order to prevent infiltration of the Communists and illegal traffic of contraband goods from North Korea and Japan. This "Clark Line" was also partly intended to mitigate the dispute between the ROK and Japan near the Peace Line.[97] The Clark Line ceased to be effective with the signing of the armistice of the Korean War in July 1953, and was later abolished. Because of the Clark Line, the ROK felt that the legitimacy of the Peace Line as a defense line was reinforced.

On December 12, 1954, the ROK enacted the "Law for Conservation of Fishery Resources" (Law No. 298). The law was enacted to provide legal means to deal with the Japanese fishermen caught

96. Ibid. See also Rhee's statement, "Amplification of the Proclamation Concerning Sovereignty of the Coastal Seas," February 8, 1952, ibid., pp. 84-5.
97. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 201-2.

inside the Peace Line.[98] After the proclamation of the Peace Line (1952-1964), a total of 232 Japanese vessels were seized, and 2,784 fishermen were sentenced to terms ranging from a few months to more than one year in the Aliens Detention Camp in Pusan.[99]

The ROK has never denied the unilateral nature of the Peace Line, but she has viewed it as a legitimate and proper measure to conserve and protect fishery resources, following international precedents set by declarations of the United States, Australia, Canada, and Latin American countries.[100] As a disinterested observer of the Korean-Japanese fishery dispute, Professor Guenter Weissberg, however, concluded:

> The Rhee Line, which Korea has established under the pretext of a conservation measure and whose legality has by implication been rejected at the Geneva Conferences, has little foundation in international law. Of all the precedents cited by Korea only the equally debatable decrees and declarations of less than a handful of Latin American states lend it any semblance of support.[101]

The Japanese reaction to the proclamation of the Peace Line was an immediate proposal for fishery negotiations. Negotiations for a fishery agreement got nowhere, but the Peace Line gave the ROK powerful leverage against Japan, then and later.[102] Throughout the negotiations, the Japanese held that the Peace Line was a clear violation of international law; that the seizures of Japanese fishing vessels were all illegal acts which violated the freedom of the high seas; and that Japan reserved all claims for compensation for suffering, damages, and losses stemming from the seizures.[103]

98. Ibid., p. 205.

99. The figures are Oda Shigeru's, op. cit., p. 51. The ROK's official figures between 1954-1963 are 160 vessels and 1,939 fishermen. Kŏngbopu (Ministry of Public Information), Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang (The ROK-Japan Talks and Our Position) (Seoul, 1964), p. 22.

100. E.g., Seoul Shinmun, October 23, 1958.

101. Guenter Weissberg, op. cit., p. 80.

102. The Rhee's policy was to use the Peace Line as a long-term weapon in bargaining for other issues. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 258.

103. For Japanese views of the Peace Line, see, e.g., Mura Tsuneo, "The Rhee Line," Japan Quarterly, Vol. VI, No.1, January-March 1959, pp. 26-7.

The Japanese official position has been not to recognize the coastal nations' rights in regard to continental shelves, and Japan considers that such rights are not recognized under international law.[104] Although Japan acknowledges that the necessity for conservation of fishery resources is now universally recognized, she maintains that this does not necessarily mean that a coastal nation can enforce unilateral control over fishing in the high seas.[105]

As the Peace Line represented an illegal and unilateral exercise of power to the Japanese, the seizure of Japanese vessels and the detention of fishermen by the ROK outraged them. After 1955 a number of rallies condemning the Peace Line and the ROK took place in Tokyo and other western Japanese coastal cities. The local fishermen, the families of those detained by the Koreans, and their representatives in local and national legislatures demanded from the government better protection for Japanese vessels, suspension of trade with the ROK, and other retaliatory measures against the ROK.[106] As the Korean seizures continued, the Japanese Government assigned patrol ships of the Maritime Security Agency to escort Japanese fishing vessels inside the Peace Line. The ROK reacted to the Japanese measure by strengthening her own patrol and by increasing her seizures. In turn the Japanese government retaliated by restricting economic activities of the Koreans residing in Japan.[107]

In the midst of mutal escalation of hostility, Japan repatriated,

104. Foreign Minister Shiina's statement, Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1965.
105. See the general views of Japanese scholars and also the official view of Japan, as summarized by Mura Tsuneo, op. cit., pp. 32-3.
106. Seoul Shinmun, December 6, 1955 and December 7, 1955.
107. Seoul Shinmun, January 15, 1956.

as mentioned previously, the twenty pro-communist Koreans to North Korea, as a prelude to the mass repatriation of Koreans that started in December 1959. The United States, deeply concerned over the aggravation of relations between the two countries, stepped in and mediated the agreement of 1957 for the mutual release of detainees - - - Koreans held in the Alliens' Detention Camp in Ohmura, Japan, and Japanese fishermen detained in the Aliens' Detention Camp in Pusan, Korea.[108.]

The agreement provided a cooling spell. But this initial success was nullified by the failure of the ROK's efforts to halt the mass reparation of Koreans to North Korea. The United States again arranged a repatriation to the ROK of some 6,000 Korean families residing in Japan (most of them had been conscripted laborers during the Japanese rule), in an effort to cancel out the Japanese plan for the mass repatriation to North Korea. But the ROK and Japan failed to agree on the minor technicality of selecting the proper channel for handling the repatriates' settlement fees.[109.] After this breakdown, the mass repatriation of Koreans to North Korea began, and it further contributed to aggravation of their relations. All these seemingly arrogant and ill-advised acts on both sides are told here to illustrate the emotional stress and human sufferings generated by the Peace Line and the fishery problem.

Towards the end of his regime, President Rhee was said to be in favor of negotiation with Japan for an exclusive fishery zone of the ROK by modifying the Peace Line,[110.] in return for a

108. See "Joint Communique," December 31, 1957, between the ROK Ambassador Kim Yu-taik and Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro, op. cit., p. 222.

109. The recollection of former Ambassador Yu Tae-ha, op. cit.

110. Rhee's interview with the AP bureau chief in Tokyo in July, 1959, Hankuk soshik, op. cit., p. 8.

favourable settlement of the Korean property claims.[111] Prime Minister Chang Myŏn, who replaced Rhee Syngman, called the Peace Line "a kind of cancer" in ROK-Japan relations[112] and assured Japan that the Peace Line would be modified, if Japan showed sincerity in settling the Korean property claims.[113] Again in November 1961 when General Park visited Japan, he repeated the suggestion of his predecessor.[114] And Kim Chong-pil, co-author of the "Kim-Ohira Memorandum," made the ROK's proposal more honest by stating that "the Peace Line is not based on international law and our case is not favorable if we contest in the International Court of Justice."[115] Japan was favorably impressed by the changing attitude of the ROK on the Peace Line. In return she repeatedly indicated that she was willing to take a more accommodating position on the ROK's property claims, if the ROK would really show flexibility on the Peace Line.[116] The consensus of Japanese public opinion was that any concession on the part of Japan in the matter of the Korean property claims could be justified only by abolition or modification of the Peace Line.[117]

In this connection, it would be appropriate to mention some critical economic consequences of the Peace Line. In Japan the

111. The statement of Ambassador Yang Yu-chan in Washington, ibid.

112. His statement on July 20, 1960, ibid.

113. The testimony of Chŏng Il-yŏng, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 39th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (January 14, 1964), p. 5.

114. Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1961.

115. His testimony, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964), pp. 15-6.

116. Prime Minister Hatoyama suggested it as early as 1955. See Yu Chin-o, "About the ROK-Japan Talks," op. cit., p. 109, and see also Kimura Shūzo, op. cit., p. 121.

117. E.g., the editorials of Asahi Shimbun, January 8, 1965, and of Mainichi Shimbun, December 28, 1962; and the statement of Prime Minister Ikeda in Kondo Yasuo, "Economic Basis of Withdrawal of the Rhee Line," Sekai, March 1964, p. 119.

Peace Line had been always a source of political discontent, especially in the western coastal areas, such as the prefectures of Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki, where the victims of the Peace Line were concentrated. According to Mura Tsuneo, the Peace Line denied to Japan annually about 2 million metric tons of fish, valued at 27 billion in Japanese yen.[118] The waters off the Cheju Island alone had prevented Japan from earning annually 13 billion yen. As a result, 39 per cent of trawl fishing industry, involving sixty different companies, was in a state of bankruptcy.[119] The "Peace Line" of the Koreans was the "grudging line" to the fishermen of western Japan.[120]

To the Korean fishermen, the Peace Line was taken for granted during the long years of its existence. For them it was a "life line" protecting their underdeveloped fishing industry from the far superior Japanese fleet. Ironically, the Peace Line which had allegedly provided protection for the welfare of the Korean fishing population numbering some 10 million had actually never served this purpose well. It had instead contributed to the stagnation of the fishing industry in the ROK.

The government of the ROK reported that each month several hundred Japanese fishing vessels under the protection of the Japanese Maritime Security Agency crossed the Peace Line, and took out of Korean waters some 230,000 tons of fish each year.[121] The inability to police the Peace Line stemmed directly from the

118. Mura Tsuneo, op. cit., p. 33
119. Ibid.
120. Nishimura Toshio, "The Rhee Line Viewed from Inside," Asahi Jānaru, March 15, 1964, p. 6.
121. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., pp. 20-1

weakness of the ROK Coast Guard as compared to the strength of its Japanese counterpart.[122] Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon testified in the National Assembly that it would cost the ROK ₩1,000 million to upgrade the Korean Coast Guard sufficiently to defend the Peace Line.[123] The wisdom of spending such a large amount was questionable. The government of the ROK was also aware of the fact that the total Korean fishery production was not improving over the years and that the income per capita of the fishing population had remained at the low level of ₩30, in spite of the Peace Line.[124] An important contributing factor here was Japanese retaliation to the Peace Line in form of strict restrictions on the exporting of fishing vessels and equipments to the ROK.[125]

In the fifth conference, the ROK and Japan began to discuss the substantial aspects of the fishery problem. The basic position of the ROK was that the settlement must include the following considerations: (1) permanent preservation and development of fishery resources in the Korean coastal waters, (2) establishment and maintenance of fishery zones for the exclusive use of the Korean fishermen, with guarantee of their rights and interests, and (3) rapid modernization of the Korean fishing industry to the level of that of the advanced countries.[126] On the other hand, the Japanese position was that settlement must (1) be based on

122. See ibid., p. 21.
123. His statement, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 7 (December 26, 1963), p. 14.
124. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 22. See also Nishimura Toshio, "The Rhee Line Viewed From Inside," op. cit., pp. 6-7.
125. Kondo Yasuo, op. cit., p. 123.
126. Won Yong-sŏk, Hanil ŏŏp hoedam ŭn wae ŏryŏun munje inga (Why are the ROK-Japan Fishery Talks A Difficult Problem?) (Seoul: Samhwa insaeso, 1965), p. 5.

general practices and international precedents, and (2) take into consideration the Japanese fishery records and the present state of the Japanese fishing industry.[127]

Both countries had agreed on the principle of establishing fishery zones extending 12 miles, within which each country would exercise exclusive jurisdiction. The problem was, however, how to draw the baselines for 12 mile zone from the Korean coastal line. The ROK insisted on drawing straight baselines connecting the extreme outward tips of the off-shore islands; while Japan wanted to base the 12 mile limit on the low tide line of the coastal peninsula.[128] In other words, the ROK wanted 30 to 40 miles in average from the coastal line of the Korean Peninsula, while Japan would recognize 12 miles from the coast of the peninsula as the exclusive fishery zone.

Another problem was presented by the joint regulation zones to be set up outside the exclusive zone - - - what should be their scope and what regulatory measures allowed?[129] The ROK wanted wider zones, and power to regulate the Japanese fishery activities as much as possible; while Japan was in favor narrow zones and of less stringent control. The final remaining question was that of the amount of the loans for the fishery cooperation fund. The ROK demanded $178 million; Japan offered $30 million.[130]

The Agreement on Fisheries of June 22, 1965 is a product of compromise. It reflects the ROK's position in the exclusive

127. Ibid. See also "The Japan-ROK Negotiations Came to Near Conclusion," Asahi Jānaru, March 22, 1964, pp. 13-5.
128. Won Yong-sŏk, ibid., p. 6.
129. For the positions taken by both countries, see ibid., pp. 31-4; and Hankuk Ilbo, February 1, 1964.
130. Hankuk Ilbo, February 1, 1964.

fishery zone, and the Japanese position in the joint regulation zone. The Agreement recognizes that each country has the right to establish an exclusive fishery zone of 12 miles limit, provided that, when a straight baseline is used to establish the zone, the baseline must be determined by mutual agreement.[131] Japan agreed to allow the ROK to establish her exclusive fishery zone from four straight baselines connecting the tips of the various off-shore islands.[132]

Both countries also established joint regulation zones outside the ROK's exclusive zone, and agreed on various provisional regulatory measures in regard to the maximum number of fishing vessels in the area, size of the vessels, type of fishing.[133] The task of observation and enforcement of the regulations, and the jurisdictional control over the violator of the regulations in the area are entrusted to each country's patrol boats whose flag the fishing vessel concerned flies.[134] Along with this agreement, Japan offered ₩120 million in commercial loans to the ROK for her fishing industry (₩90 million for general purposes and ₩30 million for ship-building) as a partial settlement of the property claims.

The Peace Line is not mentioned in the agreement. This raises the question whether the Peace Line still exists. The ROK at first stated that "the Peace Line was never discussed, it remains as it was".[135] Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won later clarified this

131. Article 1.
132. Exchanged Notes Concerning Use of Straight Baselines, June 22, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965.
133. Articles 2 and 3, Annex, and the Minutes of the Discussion regarding to the Agreement.
134. Article 4.
135. The statement of Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Ch'a Kyun-hŭi, Chosun Ilbo, April 4, 1965.

position by saying that it still existed as far as its aims were concerned, i.e., national defense and conservation of fishery resources.[136] On the other hand, Japan maintained that it was not necessary even to mention the Peace Line in the agreement since the Peace Line was illegal from the beginning and was never recognized by Japan.[137] However Foreign Minister Shiina stated that Japan would not object to the continued existence of the Peace Line as the ROK's defense line since Japan has nothing to do with military problems overseas.[138] For Japan, the most important thing is that safe fishing operations have been guaranteed. Other arguments beside this point are "not practical".[139]

THE LEGAL STATUS AND TREATMENT OF KOREANS IN JAPAN

The problem of the Korean minority in Japan formed an important chapter in the history of the ROK-Japan negotiations.[140] At the end of World War II, there were more than 2,000,000 Koreans in Japan.[141] Following the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910,

136. Chosun Ilbo, October 7, 1965.
137. The statement of Director General of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, Shūgiin Kaigiroku, 49th Session, Standing Committee on Budgets, No. 2 (August 4, 1965), p. 24.
138. His statement, Asahi Shimbun, October 15, 1965.
139. Prime Minister Sato's statement, Nihon Keizai, October 5, 1965.
140. For the origin of the Korean minority in Japan, see Richard H. Mitchell, The Korean Minority in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967); Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan, 1804-1950 (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951); and Lee Yu-gan, Zainichi kankokujin no gojūnenshi (A Fifty Year History of the Koreans in Japan) (Tokyo: Shinkibussan, 1960).
141. Hōmushō, nyūkoku kanri kyoku (Ministry of Justice, Immigration Control Bureau, Japan), Shutsunyūkoku kanri to sono jittai (Immigration Control and Its Facts) (Tokyo, 1958), p. 12.

a large number of Koreans, most of them rural origin, uprooted from their traditional rural life, had emigrated to Manchuria, Siberia and Japan in search of livelihood. The Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931 (the Manchuria Incident) led to rapid expansion of Japanese industry which required a huge labor force to meet war needs. By 1933 the number of Koreans in Japan was approximately 456,000 and in 1936, 690,000.[142.]

In March 1938 the Japanese Diet enacted the National General Mobilization Act to meet the labor shortage. Under this Act between 1939 and 1945 hundreds of thousands of Korean laborers were brought forcibly to Japan.[143.] Most of the conscripted Korean laborers worked in mines or as stevedores. At the end of the war the number of conscripted Korean laborers in Japan was 680,000.[144.] Thus at the end of the war the number of Koreans in Japan was altogether more than 2 million.

Immediately after the war the SCAP facilitated the repatriation of Japanese in Korea to Japan, and of Koreans in Japan to Korea. Between August 1945 and August 1947, about 1,390,000 Koreans left for the southern part of Korea.[145.] But the SCAP directive of September 22, 1945, which restricted the baggage allowance (to what they could carry) and the cash which could be taken (up to 1,000 yen per person), discouraged probable Korean repatriates from planning to return home.[146.] Other reasons for their discouragement were

142. Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., p. 76.
143. Ibid., p. 78.
144. Ibid., p. 84.
145. Edward W. Wagner, op. cit., pp. 43-6.
146. Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 102-3; and Shinozaki Heiji, Keisatsujō Keibinika (the Second Section of the Security, Bureau of Police), Zainichi chōsenjin undō (Movement of Korean Residents in Japan) (Tokyo: Reibunsha, 1955), p. 43; The SCAP decreed such restrictive measures to halt further deterioration of economic conditions in Japan, Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 190.

the prospect of a permanent division of Korea, the rapid deterioration of economic conditions, and widespread unemployment in the southern part of Korea.[147] As a result more than 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. Today most of them are still unskilled laborers with a very low standard of living and little education.[148] They are in general considered undesirable by the Japanese.

In an attempt to clarify the status of the Koreans for administrative purposes, on November 20, 1946, the SCAP decreed that Koreans in Japan were to be treated as Japanese nationals.[149] The Koreans refused to accept the status of Japanese nationals, and demanded a status equal to that of Allied nationals in Japan. However in June 1948 the SCAP accorded to the Koreans a special status -- "semi-independent" from the Japanese nationality.[150] The SCAP further increased the uncertainty of the Korean status when it stated, in a memorandum to the Japanese authority, June 27, 1950, that the status of the Koreans was undetermined until such time as the ROK and Japan should conclude an agreement following the Peace Treaty.[151]

In the meantime the Japanese authorities had enacted the Alien Registration Law of May 2, 1947 which required Koreans to register as nationals of either "Chōsen" (Korea) or "Kankoku" (ROK).[152] On April 28, 1952 the government of Japan enacted Law No. 126 which permitted continued residence to those Koreans who had entered

147. Hōmushō, nyūkoku kanrikyoku, op. cit., p. 12.
148. See the statistics in Morita Kazuo, Sūji kara mita zainichi chōsenjin (The Koreans In Japan From the Statistical Views) (Tokyo: Gaimushō, ajia kyoku, 1960), pp. 9-23.
149. Shinozaki Heiji, op. cit., pp. 14-5 and 27-8.
150. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 25.
151. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," op. cit., p. 319.
152. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 50.

Japan prior to September 2, 1945 and had since resided there "until such time as their status and the period of their stay might be determined by some future law".[153] Thus the status of the Koreans in Japan was uncertain, varying from that of "Japanese nationals", to "special status nationals" or "aliens".

In October 1951, when the ROK and Japan opened negotiations, the basic position of the ROK was: (1) in determining the status of Koreans in Japan, the unique historical circumstance of their existence in Japan must be the foremost consideration; (2) therefore, a favorable legal status unique among aliens in Japan should be given to the Koreans, with the privilege of permanent residence for themselves and their descendants, and with freedom to remove their personal property and funds to the ROK, when they choose to return there; (3) they should be accorded the same privileges and opportunity in matters of education, health, social security, employment, business activities and property rights as enjoyed by Japanese nationals; and (4) all Koreans must be treated as the nationals of the ROK under the protection of the ROK (not that of North Korea).[154] The Japanese position was that she would recognize the unique origin of Koreans in Japan. But she would not grant favorable legal status and treatment to the Koreans to the prejudice of other aliens in Japan.[155]

In the first conference in 1952, Japan agreed to classify all Koreans as nationals of the ROK.[156] Japan also made concessions

153. Ibid., p. 49.
154. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., pp. 26-7.
155. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 28.
156. Japan insisted on classifying all Koreans in Japan as citizens of the ROK, fearing that the ROK might demand Japanese citizenship as the right of Koreans in Japan. See the testimony of Yu Chin-o, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (February 21, 1964), pp. 16-7.

to the ROK's demands as to privileges of permanent residence, favorable treatment, and the removal of property and funds.[157] But in the subsequent conferences the main point of discussion was the right of the Japanese authorities to deport the Koreans. The ROK felt that if the Japanese government held full authority to deport Koreans, the right of permanent residence to be given to the Koreans as well as their property rights could be endangered at the discretion of the Japanese officials. Under the Japanese Immigration Control Ordinance, a Korean could, for example, be arrested and sentenced up to one year of imprisonment for not carrying his alien registration card (Article 18) and could then be deported for having been sentenced to imprisonment (Article 24).[158] Further negotiations on the status and treatment of the Korean were however brought to a standstill by the 1959 mass repatriation by Japan of the Koreans to North Korea. The mass repatriation to North Korea provided Japan with a partial solution to the pressing problems of the Korean minority in the country, but it worsened relations between the ROK and Japan.[159]

Under the Agreement on Legal Status and the Treatment of the Nationals of the ROK residing in Japan of June 22, 1965, Japan granted the right of permanent residence to all nationals of the ROK who entered Japan prior to the end of the war (August 16, 1945),

157. Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit., p. 27.
158. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," op. cit., p. 319.
159. For the details of the mass repatriation, see "Repatriation of Koreans in Japan to North Korea," Chosun Ilbo, March 4, 1965, and Richard H. Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 139-44. For the official reaction of the ROK, see the statement of Foreign Minister Cho Chŏng-hwan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, Speeches and Statements by Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho (Seoul, 1959), pp. 84-5. See also the statement of the Korean delegate Yu Chin-o at a meeting with the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneve, March 16, 1959, Yu Chin-o, Minju chŏngch'iŭi kil, op. cit., pp. 291-9.

and who have resided in Japan continuously from that date to the present, and also to their lineal descendants.[160] The Agreement also guarantees that any national of the ROK will not be deported to the ROK unless he is sentenced in Japan to long imprisonment for serious crimes.[161]

Thus, as far as the scope of permanent residence and the conditions of deportation were concerned, the ROK's views were generally well reflected in the Agreement. On other points, the ROK's contentions were sympathetically received by Japan in the Agreement. Japan agreed to give "due consideration" in matters of education, protection of livelihood and health insurance to nationals of the ROK, and expressed willingness to initiate certain necessary measures to that effect.[162] Japan also assured the ROK that she would give "due consideration" to the matter of removal of personal property and remission of funds to the ROK in cases involving nationals of the ROK who renounced permanent residence in Japan.[163] In all other respects, the nationals of the ROK were subject to the Japanese laws and regulations applied equally to aliens.[164]

The Agreement does not clarify the citizenship of Koreans in Japan. The original Japanese position was to regard all Koreans in Japan as national of the ROK. But after the Korean War Japanese policy changed, and Koreans were registered as the nationals of either "Chōsen" (Korea) or "Kankoku" (ROK); the latter applied only to those who carried identification cards issued by the ROK Mission in Japan.[165] In either case, "Chōsen" and "Kankoku" were

160. Articles 1 and 2.
161. See Article 1 and 2.
162. Article 3.
163. Article 4 and the Agreed Minutes Concerning the Agreement.
164. Article 5.
165. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 50.

to the Japanese government no more than geographical concepts.[166] Koreans registered under the column of "Chōsen" were generally regarded as pro-Communists or neutrals favoring North Korea. Minister of Justic Ishii Mitsujiro of Japan testified in the Diet that as of the end of January 1965, 349,407 Koreans were registered under "Chōsen" and 230,072 under "Kankoku."[167]

The division of the Koreans in Japan by ideology or loyalty was the practical reason for Japan's refusal to assign a single nationality as demanded by the ROK. The Agreement provides however that the benefits of this agreement are available only to those Koreans who present the evidence of citizenship from the ROK.[168] The ROK anticipates that this agreement along with normalization of over-all relations will immensely strengthen her position among Koreans in Japan at the expense of North Korea.[169] However the Japanese government maintains that the Koreans who would not register with the ROK and therefore are not eligible for permanent residence and the diplomatic protection of the ROK, would continue to enjoy the same treatment as they have received in the past.[170]

166. For the past and present view of the Japanese government on the nationality question of Koreans in Japan, see "The Unified View of the Government," Asahi Shimbun, October 27, 1965.

167. His statement, Shūgiin Kaigiroku, 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 7 (October 30, 1965), p. 6. The ROK's figures are different. The number of the Koreans registered with Mindan (the pro-ROK Korean organization in Japan) is 230,000, with Chōsōren (the pro-North Korean organization) 170,000, and neutrals 175,000, Hankuk soshik, op. cit., p. 10

168. The Agreed Minutes Concerning the Agreement.

169. Hankuk soshik, op. cit., pp. 10-11; and Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 8.

170. The statement of Prime Minister Sato, Chosun Ilbo, October 19, 1965; and the statement of Minister of Justice, Shūgiin kaigiroku, 50th Session, Special Committee on Japan-ROK, No. 10 (November 5, 1965), p. 6.

PROBLEM OF TITLE TO DOKTO

Dokto, or Takeshima (in Japanese terminology) consists of two tiny islands (practically two rocks where no human being can live), located at 37°9'30"N and 131°55'E in the Sea of Japan. The dispute over title to these islands erupted when the ROK took them under its jurisdiction with the proclamation of the Peace Line in 1952. Japan immediately counter-claimed that they had been Japanese territory since 1905, when they were incorporated into the Japanese prefecture of Shimane; this was five years before the Treaty of Annexation of Korea,[171.] but one year after Japan had already effectively taken over control of the foreign affairs of Korea by the treaty of 1904. One of the ROK's arguments was that the Japanese incorporation of the islands into her territory was in reality an annexation under duress.[172.] The issue was not placed on the agenda of the ROK-Japan conference because both sides felt that the islands were not a matter to be negotiable. The claims of both Japan and Korea are supported by the historical and legal studies of scholars of both countries.[173.]

In June 1953, Japan sent two naval ships to the islands, expelled Korean fishermen working on the islands, and planted a signpost of Japanese title to the islands. In reaction, the ROK immediately took physical control of the islands by stationing a small security force there.[174.] Following this some minor skirmishes occurred from time to time, and Japan had proposed that the dispute be submitted to the International Court of Justice.[175.]

171. Lee Chong-sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," op. cit., p. 317.
172. "The Question of Title to Dokto," Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, pp. 116-7.
173. E.g., Pak Kang-rae, Dokto ŭi sapŏbchŏkin yŏnku (A Historical and Legal Study of Dokto) (Seoul: Ilyo shinmunsa, 1965); and Kawakami?, Takeshima no rekishi-chirigokuteki kenkyu (A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima) (Tokyo, 1966)
174. "Dokto," Tong-A Ilbo, February 8, 1964.
175. E.g., the statement of Foreign Minister Kosaka, Hankuk Ilbo, December 5, 1962.

But the ROK rejected the Japanese proposal on the ground that there could not be any dispute over territory that is the ROK's without question. From the Japanese point of view the ROK's claim to the islands involved encroachment on her fishing rights in the Sea of Japan, as well as providing some justification to the extent of the Peace Line. The Japanese government assured its people that relations with the ROK would not be normalized until and unless the dispute was settled.[176.]

When two countries normalized their relations, they still had not settled the dispute over the islands. They agreed however to seek settlement of any dispute between the two countries by "peaceful means, through diplomatic channels, that would be agreeable with both countries," as stated in the Exchanged Notes Concerning Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (June 22, 1965).[177.] Irrespective of the Notes, the ROK maintains that "Japan will not make /Dokto/, which is clearly a territory of the ROK, an issue, at this stage."[178.] On the other hand, Japan rebuffed the position of the ROK saying that "Takeshima is a territory inherently belonging to our country."[179.] Since the islands are at present under the physical control of the ROK, the prospect for settlement by arbitration is dim.[180.] Probably Japan will not force a showdown on the issue, for the ROK's exclusive fishery zone does not include the waters around the islands.

176. Oda Shigeru, op. cit., p. 54.
177. Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965.
178. Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won's statement, Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1965.
179. Prime Minister Sato's statement, Nihon Keizai, October 5, 1965.
180. See the report of Vice-Chairman Ito Ushiro, the leader of the Democratic Socialist Party's Survey Mission to the ROK, submitted to the central committee of the party on October 14, 1965, Tokyo Shimbun, October 14, 1965.

CHAPTER 3

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE ROK-JAPAN RAPPROCHEMENT

THE U.S. PRESSURE

One of the most important factors working towards the normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan was the pressure applied by the United States. From the close of the Korean War the successive administrations of the United States had been trying to bridge the gap between the two countries. As allies in the Pacific, closer relations between them was vital to the interest of the United States. With the disappearance of uncompromising President Rhee Syngman, the United States became one of the main forces behind the scenes sustaining negotiations between the two countries. Pressed by the dollar drain, the United States wanted a prosperous Japan to take an active role in sharing some of the U.S. burden in Korea.[1] The United States' anxiety is understandable. Military and economic assistance of the United States to the ROK between 1946 and 1964 amounted to more than $6 billion.[2] During this period $3.9 billion had been given in economic aid alone.[3] In spite of such massive help, self-sufficiency for the ROK was still not in sight.[4]

At the first U.S.-Japan economic ministers conference, in December 1962, President Kennedy reportedly asked Japan to help

1. E.g., see Chŏng Kyŏng-hŭi, "Transition: From the ROK-U.S. to the ROK-U.S.-Japan", Series No.1, Hankuk Ilbo, February 29, 1964; and U Pyŏng-kyu, "Gains and Losses at the Starting Point of Conclusion of the ROK-Japan Negotiations", Series No.2, Chosun Ilbo, February 24, 1965.
2. The U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Korea, Publication No. 7782 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, June 1966), Table II.
3. Ibid.
4. The per capita GNP grew from $71 in 1953 to $104 in 1964 -- an average of 4.5% growth rate against the annual population growth rate of 2.9%. See ibid., Table I. The official figures of the ROK are slightly higher. See the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook 1967 (Seoul, 1967), Table 21, p. 26.

the U.S. economic effort in the ROK.[5] The U.S. request was followed by a series of conferences among the leaders of the three countries. In other words the ROK-Japan problem had in fact become the problem of the three countries. In early 1964 David Bell, head of the U.S. Agency for International Development, stated that supporting assistance (i.e., grant) given to the ROK would hopefully be terminated in three to five years time, because there was first of all some indication that the ROK was on the way to economic self-sufficiency, and secondly there was now "another economic aid source" in addition to the United States.[6] The other source of economic aid referred to by the United States was Japan. More specifically the United States was referring to the $300 million property claims settlement plus other government and commercial credits that would result from the normalization of Korean relations with Japan. James S. Killen, head of the U.S. aid mission in the ROK reiterated, "In a relatively few years, Korea will no longer depend on foreign assistance."[7]

The ROK officials, who considered continued substantial economic aid from the United States to be essential, interpreted the U.S. view as preliminary to the imminent transfer of part of her financial burden to Japan.[8] According to a Korean wire service, the Tonghwa T'ongshin, during the third economic ministers

5. Kurota Hisao, op. cit., p. 201; and the editorial of Hankuk Ilbo, January 31, 1964.
6. See the analyses of Bell's statement in Chosun Ilbo, January 23, 1964, and Tong-A Ilbo, January 22, 1964.
7. The New York Times, July 12, 1964.
8. The analyses of Bell's statement in Chosun Ilbo, January 23, 1964 and Tong-A Ilbo, January 22, 1964.

conference held in Tokyo in January 1964, the United States and Japan discussed the specific problem of future Japanese economic aid to the ROK, considering particularly the division of the aid program, the amount of the Japanese share, the coordination of the program, and the selection of aid projects.[9.]

In October 1964 when the ROK and Japan had deadlocked in tackling their differences, the United States sent William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on a mission of reconciliation to both countries. In Japan he pointed out that, "As a great power Japan bears special responsibilities to settle outstanding problems with its smaller and heavily burdened neighbor. The Republic of Korea stands as a bulwark against the forces of aggression that threaten the peace of the Far East, and the security of Japan is vitally connected with the ability of the Korean people to maintain their independence and to develop a strong and prosperous economy."[10.] In Korea he also stated that "normalization of relations between Korea and Japan would be an important contribution to the cause of peace in Asia," and further added his hope that "public opinion in Korea on this matter would recognize the national interest on non-partisan basis."[11.] Later Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won told the National Assembly that the Bundy's mission was a decisive factor in adjusting the differences between the ROK and Japan.[12.]

9. Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 11, 1964.
10. Quotation in Kim Pyoung-hoon, "Korea-Japan Rapprochement," Korean Affairs, Vol. IV, No. 1, May 1965, p. 15.
11. "Five-Point Communique," October 3, 1964, with Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, The Korean Republic Weekly, October 7, 1964.
12. Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 45th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No.12 (November 20, 1964), p.6.

The United States repeatedly denied the Korean view that its policy sought to place the ROK again under Japanese economic dominance, in order to lessen its own burden of aid,[13] and also repeatedly assured the ROK that U.S. economic and military aid policy would not change after normalization of relations between the two countries.[14] Nevertheless the pressure exerted by the United States was great. It extended to such matters as President Park Chung-hee's planned visit to Washington, which actually took place in May 1965. The Government of the United States made it clear that he would be welcome only after the ROK and Japan had settled their problems.[15]

Neither was Japan immune from American diplomatic pressure nor in a position to antagonize the American government. For Japan the continuing partnership with the United States is vital in terms of Japan's sustaining economic growth: the United States is, after all, the largest export market, the supplier of raw materials and the chief creditor for Japan's trading deficits. The United States also heavily contributes to Japan's economy by spending its huge expenditure there for countries like Korea and South Vietnam. Thus a higher posture of Japan's economic growth makes a lower posture of Japan's diplomacy with the United States.[16]

THE CHANGING SITUATION IN ASIA AND THE POSITION OF THE ROK

Another important factor that necessitated the normalization of relations between the two countries was the developing critical

13. The New York Times, February 14, 1965.
14. See "The ROK-U.S. Joint Statement," January 29, 1964, between President Park and Secretary of State Rusk, Hankuk Ilbo, January 30, 1964; and "Joint Statement," May 18, 1965, between President Park and President Johnson, Chosun Ilbo, May 19, 1965.
15. The New York Times, February 14, 1965.
16. For this aspect, see especially Seymour Broadbridge and Martin Collick, "Japan's International Policies," International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 22, April 1968, pp. 240-53.

situation in the Far East. The Koreans felt that the tension in the Far East was heightened when Communist China became a major military power with nuclear bombs, and with the escalation of the war in Vietnam.[17] President de Gaulle's diplomatic recognition of Communist China on January 27, 1964 aroused further the apprehension of the Koreans.[18] In this rapid changing military and political situation, the Koreans feared that their once stable position as an anti-Communist defense out-post would lose its significance while the United States was preoccupied with the war in Vietnam.[19] This was the ROK's appraisal of her own position, a view which was sympathetically shared by the United States.

The joint statement of President Park and Secretary of State Dean Rusk of January 29, 1964 specifically recognized the political and military implications of growing Chinese influence. The statement said that they "discussed the impact of the French recognition of Communist China on the security of the free nations in the Pacific. Both agreed that early conclusion of the ROK-Japan negotiations would contribute to the interest of not only the two nations but also the entire free world."[20] The growth of Chinese power made it for both the ROK and the United States more urgent than ever before to have Japan enlisted immediately behind the ROK-U.S. military-economic coalition in Korea.[21] Japan as the only modern industrial power in Asia was indispensable to the ROK and the United States in strengthening the security of the non-Communist countries in Asia. Normalization of relations

17. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 5.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. "The ROK-U.S. Joint Statement," January 29, 1964, op. cit.
21. E.g., the statement of Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon, Chosun Ilbo, March 8, 1965; and the statement of Foreign Lee Tong-won, Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1965. See also Ch'oe Sŏ-yŏng, "When the ROK-Japan Relations Are Normalized," Series No.5, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 27, 1964.

between the two countries would be the first step towards closer future political and military cooperation among the ROK, the United States and Japan.

Against this background, the newly installed government of Prime Minister Sato in November 1964 stated that negotiations with the ROK were one of the important problems facing them, and that Japan would exert the utmost efforts to achieve an early and reasonable solution of the two countries' differences.[22.] Japan's decision to normalize relations with ROK might have been influenced by Japan's belated realization of its own national security problem created by the relative weakening of the military and moral strength of the ROK and the United States resulting from the growing Chinese strength as well as from both countries' military intervention in Vietnam.[23.] It is not known however how much Japan's concern for her own national security determined her decision to normalize relations with the ROK. But it was no secret that in some extreme conservative circles, including former Prime Minister Kishi (Prime Minister Sato's brother) and other influential politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party, the view was held that the normalization of relations with the ROK would be a step away from de facto Japanese neutrality, and towards an active adherence to the free world.[24.]

Although the leaders of the present Japanese government did not take this extreme position, they did believe that prosperity

22. The New York Times, November 15, 1964.

23. This view was strongly advanced by many intellectuals and socialists in Japan. See especially Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu of Tokyo University, "Ideological Transformation of Japanese Diplomacy: The U.S.-China Confrontation in the Japan-ROK Cooperation," op. cit., pp. 28-30; "The Japan-ROK Problem and Future of Diplomacy," Asahi Shimbun, December 12, 1965; and "Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty, Part I, op. cit.

24. "The Japan-ROK Problem and Future of Diplomacy," ibid.

in the ROK, stimulated by Japanese economic cooperation, would contribute to the stabilization of the ROK, and would in turn strengthen the security of Japan.[25] Professor Tanaka Naokichi, an advocate of the normalization of relations with the ROK, further elaborated this position, that for the sake of Japan's national security, it was necessary to stabilize the ROK's economy, because economic imbalance between South and North Korea could eventually destroy the status quo in the Far East.[26] Asahi Shimbun extended this thesis as follows:

> To help the ROK will be to strengthen the bulwark of the anti-Communist forces against North Korea and Communist China. If the ROK is controlled by North Korea and if Pusan (the Korean port across from Japan) is covered by red flags, Japan will be flooded by mountainous waves of communist forces. This is the way of thinking to defend Japan, which is deeply rooted within the Liberal Democratic Party and is common to the so-called "Pusan red flag" argument.[27]

Commenting on this change of the Japanese viewpoint, former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer said, "the Japanese have for the first time since the war begun to look at the problems of defense and their relations with neighboring countries, not in terms of how Japan should react to American or Communist contentions, but in terms of Japan's own interest and goals."[28] It would be politically unrealistic for Japan to assume that the United States would assume indefinitely the defense of Japan, with

25. E.g., this is the idea of Prime Minister Sato. See "Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty," op. cit.

26. Tanaka Naokichi, "Two Koreas and the Japan-ROK Normalization," op. cit., pp. 36-42; and Tanaka Naokichi, "Positive Meaning of Normalization of Japan-Korea Relations, "Asahi Jānaru, October 10, 1965, p. 61.

27. "Five Phases of the Japan-ROK Treaty," op. cit.

28. Edwin Reischauer, "Our Dialogue with Japan, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLV, No.2, January 1967, p. 220.

no corresponding effort on her part.[29.]

In spite of some change of Japanese attitude in the problem of defense, one should not overly believe that Japan was taking recently more positive role in the containment of communist forces. George R. Packard cautioned, "It is true, of course, that Japan has recently shown a greater willingness to take the burden of its own sea and air defense, and that the naive pacifism of the postwar period is disappearing. But there is an enormous difference between these halting steps and full involvement in the containment of communism in Asia."[30.] Reluctance of Japan's involvement in the containment of communism is apparent in the Japanese attitude towards Communist China. In spite of the United States' efforts to make Japanese fear Communist China as a threat, most Japanese believe that their long-range interest will be better served by developing closer relations with Communist China and trying to moderate Chinese militancy.[31.] They do not regard Communist China as a cold war enemy, partly due to the fact that a disarmed Japan, leaving her defense problem to the hands of the United States, has been so comfortable that "she has lost both desire and the capacity for serious consideration of military matters."[32.] They see essentially the Chinese militancy as a passing phase of the Chinese revolution which will disappear as the Communists gain more confidence in their internal development and external relations.[33.]

29. This was also the argument of Professor Sinarayan Ray of the University of Melbourne. See his "Korea-Japan Relations," Koreana Quarterly, Vol.7, No. 4-Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 1965-Spring 1966, p.13.

30. George R. Packard III, "Living with the Real Japan," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XLVI, No. 1, October 1967, p. 194.

31. Ibid., p. 204.

32. Ogata Sadako, "Japanese Attitude Toward China," Asian Survey, Vol. V, No. 8, August 1965, p. 389.

33. Ibid., p. 390

The depth and dimension of this attitude are, for example, indicated clearly by the two rival groups within the conservative Liberal Democratic Party. Although the pro-Peking group (Afro-Asian Problems Research Association) is the minority and led by junior members of factional groups of the party, as a rival to the mainstream's pro-Taiwan group (Asian Problems Research Association), its influence in shaping Japan's policy on China is considerable.[34]

Regarding this as a good indication of Japan's general positions on the problem of the containment of Communism and the extent of its relationship with the ROK, the normalization of relations between the ROK and Japan does not necessarily lead to some joint security arrangements, as some have speculated. Unless there should be dramatic change of the situation in the Far East, a military pact between the two countries is a remote possibility for a considerable time to come even if the two countries desire such a pact. The strong Korean distrust of any Japanese military involvement in Korea, as well as the strong opposition of the

34. The factional break-up of the two groups is as follows:

	Pro-Peking group		Pro-Taiwan group	
Sato faction	9	(3)*	27	
Kōno faction	17		2	
Ikeda faction	8		12	(1)
Miki faction	18	(3)	9	(2)
Fujiyama faction	10	(1)	9	(2)
Ōno faction	13	(1)	9	(2)
Kawashima faction	1		4	
Ishii faction	0		10	
Kishi-Fukuda faction	0		13	
Others	1		3	
Totals	78	(8)	98	(7)

*() indicates members of the House of Councillors.
Source: Reproduced from ibid., p. 395. The original source is "Conservatives and Progressives Are Questioned on Their China Policy," Ekonomisuto, February 23, 1965, pp. 14-23.

Japanese socialists and intellectuals to any military alliance militates further against such a pact.[35] The possibility was in fact emphatically denied by repeated official statements of the leaders of both countries.[36] But it did not mean that Japan was not concerned for her own security in the face of the growing military potential of Communist China. There existed certain political forces in conservative circles that believed that a closer cooperation with the ROK was certainly desirable in the interest of over-all stability and the maintenance of a favorable balance of military power in the Far East. In this sense, both countries' concern for their security appears to have had some effect on the rapid progress of the ROK-Japan negotiations,[37] although there still remains a larger question of whether Japan's security as well as her economic interest would be in the long run best served by a strict neutrality.

35. Koreans have always been suspicious of Japanese rearmament and have opposed any military cooperation with Japan. President Rhee said that a rearmed Japan "will be another enemy to the ROK;" see his speech, "Concerning Speculation of Japanese Rearmament," February 16, 1949, Taehabminkuk Kongboch'ŏ, Vol. for Diplomatic, Military, Cultural and Social Affairs, op. cit., pp. 68-9. Former Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang stated the same position in March 1965; see "Tragedy of Divided Korea," Sekai, June 1965, p. 209. For the Japanese view of a military pact, see the references in my footnote 59. in Chapter 2. The Japanese opposition to any military pact is best illustrated by the studies on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty crisis of May-June 1960. See Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 125-53; Edwin O. Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, No. 1, October 1960, pp. 11-26; and George R. Packard, Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

36. See, e.g., the statements of Prime Minister Sato, Nihon Keizai, October 5, 1965, and Shūgiin Kaigiroku, 50th Session, Plenary Meetings, No.3 (October 13, 1965), p. 2; the statement of Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon, Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 1965; and the statement of Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won, Asahi Shimbun, October 14, 1965.

37. This was also the view of Ike Nobutaka. See his "Japan, Twenty Years After Surrender," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No.1, January 1966, p. 27.

In spite of reasons to believe that Japan was interested in the normalization of relations, there was also a fear, on the part of the ROK, that if the negotiations between the two countries were not brought to an early conclusion, time would work against the ROK. The ROK reasoned that there was a real possibility that Japan might decide not to establish diplomatic relations with the ROK after all, if a conclusion to the negotiations was not in sight soon and if Japan developed more lucrative trade relations, or a political accommodation with Communist China under the Japanese practice of "seikei bunri" (separation of politics from economics).[38] The Korean leaders were aware that the leaders of the Japanese ruling party knew well the Korean fear.[39] The possibility of Japanese indifference was thought to increase appreciably with the ascendancy of Communist China.[40] The ROK feared particularly that the opposition of the Socialist Party, the Japanese Communist Party and the leftist Sohyo (General Council of Japan Trade Unions) to an ROK-Japan rapprochement would become strong enough to deter the Liberal Democratic government from establishing normal relations with the ROK. The ROK was doubtful that the Japanese government would risk then its political life, in the face of mounting opposition, by undertaking another political crisis similar to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty crisis of May-June 1960.[41] Implicit in the possibility of Japan's losing

38. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 5.

39. The testimony of Kim Chong-pil, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No.5 (February 10, 1964), pp. 12-13. The statement of Foreign Minister Ohira that "To the ROK, normalization of ROK-Japanese relations is a matter of life or death" implied this strongly. See Mainichi Shimbun, August 6, 1962.

40. See Lee Hang-ŭi, "When the ROK-Japan Relations are Normalized," Series No. 3, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 24, 1964.

41. For the leftists' announcements and plans for maximum struggles against the ROK-Japan rapprochement, see Ishino Hisao, "The Real Struggle Begins Now," op. cit.; Hashii Senji, "The Seriously Unreasonable Japan-ROK Talks," Gekkan Shakaito, No. 97 June 1965, pp. 10-22; "Analysis of the Japan-ROK Treaty," Gekkan Shakaito, No. 102, November 1965, pp. 4-29; Nihon Keizai, June 22, 1965; and Asahi Shimbun, October 6 and 13, 1965.

interest in the normalization of diplomatic relations with the ROK was also a hardening of her "two Koreas" policy. Behind the ROK's fear was a sense of being isolated.

In this connection, the ascendancy of Communist China as a world power meant also the ascendancy of North Korea vis-a-vis the ROK. If Communist China should be seated in the United Nations, the U.S.-sponsored position of the ROK in that body was bound to become less favorable. The present claim of the ROK to be the sole legitimate government in Korea would become hard to maintain, especially among the Afro-Asian neutrals whose number was yearly increasing in the General Assembly.[42] Thus the sense of isolation became a feeling of urgency that stiffened the ROK to press harder for normalization of relations with Japan. The leaders of the ROK felt that ties with Japan would strengthen the ROK's economic and diplomatic resources for the ultimate showdown with North Korea, apart from psychological and moral comfort to be derived from them.[43]

42. See Nagasue Eiichi, "The Japan-ROK Negotiation and Future Calamity," Chūōkōron, June 1965, p. 250; Nomura Kōichi, op cit., p. 79; George Hendricks, "Re-assessment in Seoul," Far Eastern Economic Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 7, May 14, 1964, pp. 341-42; and Kim Chong-pil's view in Tong-A Ilbo, February 6, 1964.

43. See, e.g., the statement of Pak Chun-kyu, a National Assemblyman and at present Chairman of Committee on Foreign Affairs, in a discussion with others, "Why Unification is Difficult," Shindong-A, September 1965, p. 153; and the speech of Kim Chong-pil, "Design for Modernization of Fatherland," October 27, 1967, in Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic Republican Party), Chŏnjin ŭn tang gwa tŏburŏ (Forward with the Party) (Seoul, 1965), p. 172.

THE ROK'S SEARCH FOR AN ECONOMIC SOLUTION

The ROK's economy had been suffering the heavy strain of maintaining a standing armed force of some 600,000 men ever since the signing of the Korean War armistice. The ROK was annually spending over 33 per cent of its total budget for defense,[44] and the prospect of cutting military forces and reducing defense expenditures was slim. Meanwhile, the active interest of the United States in the ROK-Japan talks had been actually accompanied by a steady decrease of U.S. economic aid to the ROK,[45] particularly by the gradual replacement of supporting assistance with development loans. This forced the ROK, who had been depending on the United States for her physical survival,[46] to look for other sources to compensate the shortage of foreign exchange. Since 1962, the ROK began to examine critically her traditional "lean to America" economic orientation. At the same time, in 1962, the ROK launched an ambitious economic development plan designed to put her economy on a basis of self-sufficiency and to meet the eventual termination of U.S. economic aid. With this in mind the ROK also had been actively seeking to diversify her economic ties with other nations, such as Japan, France, West Germany and Italy, who could supply capital investments to fill the financial gap created by decreasing U.S. aid.[47]

44. In 1960 37% of the total budget was spent for defense, 35% in 1961, 36% in 1962, 32% in 1963, 34% in 1964 and 25% in 1965. See Ministry of Public Information, ROK, Korean Economy (Seoul, 1966), pp. 32-33.

45. The U.S. aid had been decreasing from $265.8 million in 1961 to $194.3 million in 1965. See The U.S. Department of State, Background Notes: Korea, op. cit., Table II.

46. For a critical consequence of Korea's dependence on U.S. aid, see Nakakawa Nobuo, "Economic Aspect of the Treaty," Asahi Jānaru, October 10, 1965, pp. 51-3.

47. Hanil hoedam gwa ui ipchang, op. cit., p. 7; and see Kim Kyŏng-rae, "The Problem of the ROK's Property Claims Against Japan," Kukhoebo, No.35, March 20, 1964, p. 75.

In this gloomy economic picture, Japan was ideally the immediate source of substantial relief, provided that the outstanding issues between the two countries were resolved. The Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962-66) undertaken by the military government in 1962 required a huge amount of foreign capital and extensive technical aid.[48] The plan did not specify how or where to get foreign capital. However Kim Chong-pil did expressly state that Japan was expected to contribute substantially to the implementation of the economic plan, following an over-all settlement the ROK-Japan problems.[49] As the negotiations with Japan progressed more smoothly, the leaders of the ROK openly pointed to this as one of the imperative reasons for an early conclusion of the ROK-Japan treaty.[50]

The anxiety of the leaders of the government for the earliest possible economic cooperation with Japan was understandable. When they took over power by the military coup d'etat of 1961, the military leaders promised the people "the establishment of a self-supporting economy" as one of the "Six Revolutionary Pledges."[51] In other words, their justification for overthrowing the constitutional government of Chang depended upon how well they could solve the economic problems of the ROK.

48. The plan required a total foreign exchange of $684 million out of the total investment of 321,450 million won (about $2,472 million) in the plan during the five years. The rate of growth of GNP was to be 7.1% during the period. The emphasis of the plan was on the key industries of electric power, coal, fertilizer, cement and food production. See The Economic Planning Board, ROK, Summary of the First Five-Year Economic Plan, 1962-1966 (Seoul, 1962). For an appraisal of the plan, see Hankuk Ilbo, January 14, 1962; and Charles Wolf, Jr., "Economic Planning in Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 10, December 1962, pp. 22-8.

49. His statement in an interview with Murakami Kaoru, in Murakami's "Lonely Men of the ROK," Chūōkōron, February 1962, p.173.

50. E.g., the statement of Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon, Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965.

51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, The Military Revolution in Korea (Seoul, 1961), p. 12. This pamphlet is sometimes referred to as "The White Paper" on the military revolution.

However the military government was not successful in solving the chronic problems of inflation, unemployment, and shortage of foreign exchange. During the 31 months of military rule (May 1961-December 1963), the average price of consumer goods increased by 32 per cent and the price of rice increased by 64 per cent while the average wage of industrial laborers increased only 19 per cent.[52] During the same period, the acute inflation and shortage of foreign exchange also caused increases of 34.3 per cent in the average prices of imported industrial goods.[53] As a result the goals of the economic plan upon which the fate of the military government depended had to be modified.[54] What the government needed most was a quick and massive injection of foreign capital. The heirs of the military government, still pressed by the same economic problems, consequently continued to look upon an early settlement of the disputes with Japan as the most urgent business that confronted them.

Bad relations with Japan had not only prevented the ROK from utilizing the property claims settlement fund and discouraged Japanese capital investment in the ROK, it had also penalized the ROK's trade with Japan. For example, in retaliation for the Peace Line, Japan had severely restricted the importation of Korean fishery products, an important export item for the ROK.[55]

52. The Bank of Korea, op. cit., Table 1, pp. 2-3, and Table 171, p. 315. For the Park regime's economic difficulty since it came to power in 1961, see C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of Ulsa," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No.1, January 1966, pp. 37-8.

53. The Bank of Korea, ibid., Table 168, p. 303.

54. The economic plan was however successfully completed. Its goals in the sectors of manufacturing, power, mining, and services were far exceeded. For evaluation of the present state of Korean economy, see Princeton N. Lyman, "Economic Development in South Korea: Prospects and Problems," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No.7 July 1966, pp. 381-8.

55. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 9.

President Rhee's suspension of trade with Japan in June 1959 was a policy disastrous to the economy of the ROK, instead of being a punitive measure against Japan.[56] Although ROK-Japan trade relations improved somewhat after Rhee Syngman was gone from power, Japan did not altogether remove its restrictive measures against the ROK's goods. As a result the balance of trade between the two countries was extremely unfavorable to the ROK.[57] Normalization of relations between the two countries, it was hoped, would correct the trade situation which had been unfairly disadvantageous to the ROK.[58]

56. For criticism of Rhee's trade policy with Japan, see Kim Chae-kon, a member of House of Representatives of the National Assembly, "History of the ROK-Japan Trade and a Counter-measure," Kukhoebo, No.29, July 1960, pp. 10-13.

57. The volume of ROK export and import with Japan are as follows:

unit: million $

	1963		1964		1965	
Total ROK export	86.8	(100%)	119.0	(100%)	175.1	(100%)
Export to Japan (A)	24.8	(28.5%)	38.1	(29.9%)	44.0	(25.1%)
Total ROK import	560.3	(100%)	404.3	(100%)	463.4	(100%)
Import from Jap.(B)	159.3	(28.4%)	110.1	(27.2%)	166.6	(35.9%)
(A):(B) in volume	1 : 6		1 : 3		1 : 4	

Source: Computed on the basis of the figures given in The Bank of Korea, op. cit., Tables 158 and 159, pp. 262-5.

58. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 9.

THE PRESSURE OF ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS

A final factor bringing an early conclusion to the negotiations between the two countries was the pressure exerted by business groups in both countries. These business groups are closely linked with the conservative politicians of their respective countries. The business group in the ROK strongly supporting an ROK-Japan rapprochement consisted of the business and financial magnets who belonged to the Korean Businessmen's Association (KBA).[59] A handful of KBA businessmen, who controlled the economy of the ROK and were participating in the five-year economic plan, saw great business opportunities in the prospect of some $800 million of Japanese capital which would be brought into the ROK with normalization of relations. This was, in fact, the third great opportunity for expanding their wealth since the ROK's independence.[60] The first opportunity had been the special political favors received from the government in disposal of the vested properties (former Japanese properties) after the independence, and the second developed from manipulation of U.S. economic aid and illicit dollar deals during and after the Korean War.[61]

Their monopolistic domestic market was already saturated beyond the point of further expansion. The prospect of better Japanese relations thus provided them an opportunity of shifting

59. See, e.g., the statement of the National Council of Federation of Economic Organizations, in which the KBA was the leader, in Chosun Ilbo, April 4, 1965. The KBA was originally organized in 1961 by a dozen of the big businessmen such as Lee Byŏng-ch'ŏl, Lee Chŏng-rim, Chŏng Chae-ho, Lee Han-ŭng, and Pak Hŭng-shik, who were condemned as "illicit fortune accumulators" by the military government, in order to protect their interests.

60. See, e.g., Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964.

61. For the illicit and irregular fortunes accumulated by the Korean capitalists, see Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 132-6; and "The Comprador Capital," Series Nos. 1-6, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 10-18, 1964.

the orientation of their businesses from the poor domestic market to the exploration of richer foreign markets, with the help of Japanese capital, technology and marketing skills.[62] The Korean businessmen hoped that the highly developed Japanese industry would gradually transfer a number of her light industries requiring a large labor force to the ROK, instead of to Hong Kong or Taiwan. The Koreans felt that the ROK could take over from Japan such industries to employ the ROK's abundant and cheap but skilled labor force.[63] The Korean businessmen were also hopeful that Japan would liberalize her tariff and eliminate other restrictions on the importation of Korean products to improve the ROK's balance of trade.

In Japan those businessmen who promoted an early conclusion of the ROK-Japan negotiations were a group of powerful capitalists, known as the "Korean Lobby", in alliance with the "Pro-ROK Faction" of conservative politicians.[64] Most of them belonged to the so-called "Kansai Zaibatsu", and among them were the fifteen top capitalists in Japan, who finance the key factional bosses in the Liberal Democratic Party.[65] The pro-Korean lobbists were led,

62. See the statement of the KBS president, Kim Yong-wan, Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965; and his "Posture and Direction of the ROK-Japan Economic Cooperation," Chosun Ilbo, January 11, 1966. See also "Koreans Build A Peacetime Economy," The Business Week, May 7, 1966, pp. 170-5.

63. "Motive of the Japanese Economic Survey Mission to the ROK?" Chosun Ilbo, April 15, 1965. See also "The Underlying Current of the Japan-ROK Negotiations," Sekai, March 1962, pp.178-9.

64. See Lee Hang-ŭi, op. cit. and "The Japan-ROK Negotiations came to Near Conclusion," op. cit., p.17.

65. Lee Hang-ŭi, ibid.

among politicians, by former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, Minister Justice Ishii Mitsujiro, Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party Ōno Banboku, former Minister of Finance Shibusawa Keizo and former chief of Defense Agency Funada Naka; among businessmen, by Uemura Kōgorō, Adachi Tadashi, Doko Toshio, Anto Toyoroku and Ansai Masao, all of major business organizations and firms. Their formal organization was the Japan-ROK Economic Cooperation Organization, which included or was allied with key members of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, of the Federation of Economic Organizations and of the Japan Federation of Employers Associations. The primary political organization of the pro-ROK group was the Consultative Study Committee for the Japan-ROK Problem inside the Liberal Democratic Party. Their views were regularly expressed in the monthly, Shinwa (Friendship) of the Nikkan Shinwakai (Japan-ROK Friendship Society). Also there were front youth organizations like the Kotama's, the Miura's and the Machii action groups.[66].

The importance which they attached to the rapprochement of the ROK and Japan is demonstrated by the report that the Korea lobbists and the Liberal Democratic Party spent between 500 million yen and 900 million yen, mobilized about 150 national organizations of various kinds, and distributed about 3 million propaganda

66. Information on these Japanese organizations and the leaders of the pro-ROK group is from various sources, such as ibid.; Chosun Ilbo, April 15, 1965; The New York Times, August 1, 1965; Yomiuri Shimbun, October 14, 1965; Chŏng Chong-shik, "Meaning of Ōno's Visit to Korea," Shinsekye, January 1963, pp. 136-41; Lawrence Olson, op. cit., p.9; Donald Hellmann, "Basic Problems of Japanese-South Korean Relations," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No.3, May 1962, pp. 19-24; and "Analysis of the Japan-ROK Treaty," Gekkan Shakaito, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

pamphlets of a dozen different kinds, in the publicity campaign supporting ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty.[67] The publicity campaign was the most massive one that Liberal Democratic Party had ever undertaken in its party history.

Their argument for a close friendship with the ROK ran something like this: Japan knows the ROK better and is really friendlier to her than any other nation; Japan is a reformed country which has no desire to re-colonize Korea and is able to contribute economically in rebuilding the ROK and Japan should be invited to play an active role in the ROK, rather than merely being a supplier of American aid goods to the ROK.[68] But the real interest of the so-called Korea lobbists was in the development of new markets for their industrial products and the utilization of Korean labor.[69] Between 1962 and 1965 four Japanese economic survey missions, including leading figures of industry and finance, visited the ROK to explore the opportunities for Japanese investment there.[70] Of their former colonial markets, the ROK

67. For the massive publicity and organization campaign for ratification of the treaty, see "Analysis of the Japan-ROK Treaty," ibid.; "The Japanese Ratification Diet Just Before the Fierce Storm," Chosun Ilbo, September 23, 1965; "The Japan-ROK Treaty Diet and the Publicity Activities of the Liberal Democratic Party," Asahi Jānaru, September 26, 1965, pp. 6-7; and Imazu Hiroshi, "Movements for Ratification and Against It," Asahi Jānaru, October 10, 1965, pp. 22-3.

68. A paraphrased summary of Nikkan Shinwakai's in "Promoting ROK's Economic Construction," Shinwa, No. 83, September 15, 1960.

69. Teramoto Mitsuro, "How Is the Japan-Korea Economic Cooperation Progressing?" Asahi Jānaru, May 16, 1965, p. 14-8.

70. The Consultative Study Committee for the Japan-ROK Problem had reportedly pressed for the survey missions. See Mainichi Shimbun, January 27, 1962.

was the most ideal one especially in view of geographical and cultural affinity as well as of their comfortable knowledge of Korea.[71] Moreover, expanding investments of the United States, West Germany, France and Italy in the ROK in conjunction with the five-year economic plan, caused Japanese businessmen to fear that they would be eliminated from the Korean market, unless diplomatic relations were soon established.[72] Economic cooperation which would involve at least $800 million worth of products and services, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, was the prime concern of the pro-Korean Japanese lobbists.[73] Growing Japanese interest in the ROK was clearly evident by the end of February 1964 when about sixty leading Japanese business firms had already opened branch offices in Seoul.[74] This was well before the signing of a treaty for normalization of diplomatic relations.

Thus it is clear that considerable pressure was exerted on their governments by the capitalists of both countries, especially those of Japan, and that this pressure became one of the decisive factors in bringing the ROK-Japan negotiations to early conclusion. Because of this, Japanese intellectuals and leftists called the ROK-Japan rapprochement a "monopolistic capitalists' aggression against Korea", "exploitation of the Korean market and cheap labor"

71. Lee Man-sŏp, "The ROK-Japan Talks Observed Here (Tokyo)," Hankuk Ilbo, November 8, 1961.
72. Donald C. Hellmann, op. cit., p.21; and "The Japan-ROK Negotiations Came to Near Conclusion," op. cit., p.17.
73. Lee Hang-ŭi, op. cit., and "Motive of the Japanese Economic Survey Mission to the ROK?" op. cit.
74. Kang Bŏm-sŏk, "Transition: From the ROK-U.S. to the ROK-U.S.-Japan," Series No.2, Hankuk Ilbo, March 1, 1964.

or even "oppression of the Japanese workers by using the surplus labor of the ROK at low wages".[75] Koreans who opposed to the ROK-Japan treaty used similar terms, but in a different context, describing the treaty as economic aggression by Japan.

75. E.g., see Ishino Hisao, "The Real Struggle Begins Now," op. cit., p. 9; and the address of Ota Kaoru, Chairman of Sohyo, October 6, 1965, Asahi Shimbun, October 6, 1965. For a detailed criticism of the nature of Japan's economic cooperation with the ROK, see Noguchi Yuichiro, "False Structure of Japan-ROK Economic Cooperation," Sekai, September 1965, pp. 51-61.

CHAPTER 4

THE DEBATES AND THE STRUGGLES IN KOREA

In spite of overwhelming public support in the ROK for normalization of relations with Japan,[1] the ROK-Japan rapprochement was challenged by a great many Koreans every step of the way to ratification. There were wide differences of opinion in the ROK as to "when"[2] and "how"[3] the issues between the ROK and Japan should be settled in order to bring about a just and equal settlement that would still be advantageous to the interest of the ROK. This continuing debate created the most massive and intense political crisis in the ROK's political history, mobilizing almost all the political forces in the ROK either in support of, or in opposition to, the ROK-Japan negotiations being carried out by the Government.

It is the purpose of this chapter to present and analyze some selected points of the arguments in Korea on the ROK-Japan normalization of relations. This chapter will also briefly review the opponents' struggles against the normalization of relations between the two countries.

1. According to the public opinion survey of November 1964 by the Ministry of Public Information, 99.1% of the Koreans were in favor of normalization of relations with Japan. Chosun Ilbo, December 23, 1964.

2. According to the same survey referred to in ibid., 69.1% favored the earliest settlement, 12.7% were opposed to an early settlement, and 18.2% was "don't know," Chosun Ilbo, January 1, 1965. But among 103 National Assemblymen (out of 175) who responded to the Chosun Ilbo survey of January 1964, 48 (46%) favored the earliest settlement, 48 (46%) were opposed to a hasty settlement, and 5 (8%) were in favor of postponement of the settlement until the ROK should be in a stronger position vis-a-vis Japan. See Chosun Ilbo, January 22, 1964.

3. On the question of the property claims settlement, for example 50% of college students polled said that the ROK should not compromise with Japan while 44.9% expressed that the issue could be compromised. See survey conducted by Chosun Ilbo, reported on May 8, 1965.

The Arguments in Support of the ROK-Japan Rapprochement

After Park Chung-hee became the constitutional president of the new civilian government (the Third Republic) through elections, the aims and attitudes of the government in continuing negotiations with Japan were pronounced as follows: (1) to recover what the ROK is entitled to claim, i.e. the property claims, in order to utilize these funds for economic development; (2) to strengthen the economic and political bases of the ROK in preparation for the reunification of Korea; (3) to negotiate with Japan in terms of equality and to the mutual benefit of the two countries.[4]

After the conclusion of the negotiations, the government argued that although the settlement was not of course completely satisfying to the ROK, it had achieved all the fundamental aims of the government through negotiations conducted in terms of equality and mutual benefit. In this respect the government, its ruling party and their supporters argued that the treaty and the agreements were concluded to the best possible advantage of the ROK. Specifically they pointed out to the critics and opponents of the treaty:[5]

(1) All old treaties or agreements that had humiliated the Koreans for the past thirty-six years were nullified, effective from the date of their conclusion. Furthermore Japan and the

4. Hanil hoedam gwa uri ŭi ipchang, op. cit., p. 16.

5. For the following arguments, see especially, "Special Speech on the Signing of the ROK-Japan Treaty," of President Park, June 23, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 24, 1965; "Joint Statement of Members of the State Council," July 13, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, July 14, 1965; "Why is the Normalization of the ROK-Japan Relations Necessary," the statement of the Ministry of Public Information, Chosun Ilbo, March 29, 1964; Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon and Chairman of the Democratic Republican Party Chŏng Ku-yŏng's arguments in "Debates on Gains and Losses At the Final Stage, "Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965; the debate between Pu Wan-hyŏk, a political critic, and Minister Without Portfolio Won Yong-sŏk, "Arguments and Counter-Arguments," Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1965; "Diplomacy of Gains or Losses," Hankuk Ilbo, March 27, 1964; Hanil hoedam paeksŏ, op. cit. pp. 1-9 and 187-259; and the following publications of Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic Republic Party), Hanil kukkyo chŏngsanghwa wa kŭ munjechŏm (The ROK-Japan Normalization of Relations and the Problems), Vol. 2, (Seoul, 1965), and Maedŭp chiŭn hanil hoedam (The Concluded ROK-Japan Talks) (Seoul, 1965).

Japanese people had recognized their past mistakes in dealing with the Korean people, and expressed an apology for their deeds.

(2) The ROK was recognized by Japan as the only legal government in Korea, and the ROK had successfully prevented Japan from establishing official relations with the illegal North Korean regime. This strengthened the international position of the ROK.

(3) The fishery settlement was very much in the best interest of the Korean fishermen, because it established a larger exclusive fishery zone within the straight baselines, as well as the joint regulation fishery zone. This agreement recognized fully the legitimate rights and interests of the Koreans in the conservation and development of fishery resources. Furthermore, the fishery cooperation fund and technical aid to be provided by Japan would rapidly benefit the Korean fishermen and fishing industry. The Peace Line was actually not abandoned. What had been abandoned was the ineffective and costly aspect of the Peace Line, in exchange for a realistic and efficient fishery agreement.

(4) The normalization benefited the Korean economy; the property claims had been settled in the maximum amount that the ROK would ever get, and by the most favorable terms. The settlement fund would contribute to the economic development of the ROK. In addition Japan is to invest in the ROK and assist in technical improvements. This economic cooperation with Japan will enable the ROK to expand its trade not only with Japan but also with other foreign countries. Economic development will also bring political stability to the ROK, by enabling the ROK to achieve the economic self-sufficiency needed for true political independence. Close economic cooperation with Japan now is a timely step towards the gradual replacement of the uneasy bilateral economic relations with

the United States by multiple economic relations with all free nations. Economic cooperation will also strengthen the national security of the ROK in the long run against the threat of North Korea, and also give an advantage to the ROK in the eventual showdown with North Korea on reunification of Korea.

For these reasons the potential danger of Japanese economic aggression is far outweighed by the benefits of the property claims settlement and the economic cooperation accompanying it. Irrespective of the name "economic cooperation," rather than "compensation" or "reparation," attached to the $800 million payment in the property claims settlement, the important matter is the substance, not emotionalism, especially since Japan had already expressed an official apology for its past illegal occupation of Korea.[6]

(5) The normalization secured a favorable legal status and treatment for the Koreans in Japan. Although the final details of their status in matters of education, protection of livelihood, health, and removal of personal property and funds were to be worked out further, the important thing is that Korean residents in Japan are guaranteed permanent residence rights under the exclusive diplomatic protection of the government of the ROK. This will destroy the North Korean scheme of control of the Koreans in Japan.

The above arguments are not very different from the position that the government of the ROK had maintained in interpreting the

6. According to Kim Chong-pil, the Japanese Government was extremely reluctant to settle on a larger amount beyond what it found to be legitimate for the ROK's property claims if the ROK insisted on naming the whole settlement "compensation". The Japanese Government had a problem of its own in convincing its political foes on the question of the legal basis of the amount. Kim agreed with the Japanese Government's position. See Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964), pp. 4 and 7.

provisions of the treaty and the agreements. The gist of their arguments is that an early normalization of relations with Japan was the only realistic way to fullfil the ROK's long-range economic and political aspirations, as well as to meet the immediate pressures of economic, political and security problems. Any argument that denied, slighted or overlooked these aspects were, to the supporters of the ROK-Japan rapprochement, emotional, impractical, unconstructive, and even, politically motivated.

The Arguments Against the ROK-Japan Rapprochement

On the other hand, the opponents of the ROK-Japan rapprochement held quite different views. It was mentioned earlier that the overwhelming majority of the people agreed on the necessity of normal relations with Japan. A non-partisan resolution, desiring good relations with Japan, adopted by the National Assembly on March 27, 1964 was indicative of this. However, the resolution stipulated the following points:

(1) The content of settlement must be "convincing and reasonable" to the people and the settlement must be concluded only under the condition that "the maximum national interest" be guaranteed.
(2) The basic relations must be based on "the principles of good neighbors, mutual benefit and equality" and must be preceded by Japanese recognition of the invalidity of all the old aggressive treaties or agreements made under duress.
(3) Although the amount of money would by no means adequately compensate the losses and sufferings of the Koreans during the Japanese rule, "the maximum amount" of the property claims settlement must be received in one payment or, if not in one payment, in "a minimum number of installments".
(4) The settlement of the property claims must be accompanied by "sincere Japanese economic cooperation," for the ROK contributed to Japanese economic prosperity during the Korean War and has served as a defensive wall against the threat of the Communist bloc.
(5) The settlement must at the same time eliminate unfair Japanese trade restrictions against the ROK and must put amend to the unfavorable balance of trade.

(6) The Peace Line must be defended and preserved.[7.] (The words in quotation marks are the literal translations of the original.)

In spite of the non-partisan support for the resolution, such phrases as "convincing and reasonable" settlement, "mutual benefit and equality," "the maximum amount," and "sincere Japanese economic cooperation," were subject to varying interpretations.

As the negotiations between the ROK and Japan progressed rapidly apparently without consideration of the concern of the opponents, the latter argued that the contents of the Treaty on Basic Relations and other agreements being negotiated were humiliating and disadvantageous to the ROK and were inviting Japanese economic and political aggression against the ROK. Their apprehension was further increased by the growing belief that the whole process of negotiation was irregular and illegitimate as carried out by the present rulers, who had gained power in the military coup d'etat.

Why were the negotiations irregular and illegitimate? Before the signing of the treaty the focal point of the opponents' attack was the controversial secret Kim-Ohira Memorandum. In spite of the government's promise of non-partisan diplomacy[8.] and its efforts to enlist prominent opposition members and critics in a non-partisan delegation to the ROK-Japan conference,[9.] the opposition parties would not believe the sincerity of the government so long as it

7. "The Materials on the ROK-Japan Problem: The Resolution of the National Assembly Concerning the ROK-Japan Problem," op. cit., p. 119. See also Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 41st Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 1 (March 25, 1964). pp. 1-6.

8. See President Park's "State of the Nation Message of 1964," Kyunghyang Shinmoon, January 10, 1964.

9. The Government had tried several times to persuade the leaders of opposition parties to serve in the delegation to the sixth ROK-Japan conference. See Hankuk Ilbo, January 19, 1964, and Chosun Ilbo, January 17, 1965.

stood fast to the Kim-Ohira Memorandum. The opponents of the negotiations urged the re-opening of genuine non-partisan negotiations and the scrapping of the secret memorandum.[10] The memorandum, which served as the basic political understanding in solving the over-all issues between the ROK and Japan, had been made unilaterally by the military government in the absence of political opposition, or proper consideration of public opinion. Shin Sang-ch'o, one of the leading political commentators, criticized the memorandum as follows:

> Taking advantage of absolute authority the military government, which gained power by the May 16th coup d'etat, made the Kim-Ohira Memorandum without consent of the people, in darkness and in humiliating posture, in order to conclude the ROK-Japan negotiations in a hurry, which will have an immense impact on our own and our descendants' destinies.[11]

The opponents of the memorandum strongly suspected that it involved secret deals on such matters as the Peace Line, in exchange for some huge political fund for Kim Chong-pil's political group.[12] Kim Chong-pil, co-author of the memorandum, testified that he negotiated with the Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira under the instruction of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (i.e. the supreme council of the military junta) and that the content

10. See "The 1965 Basic Policy Speeches" of the President of the Civil Rule Party, Yun Po-sŏn, in Tong-A Ilbo, January 28, 1965, and of the President of the Democratic Party, Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, in Tong-A Ilbo, January 29, 1965; and the editorial of Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 27, 1964.

11. Chosun Ilbo, February 18, 1965. See also Lee Myŏng-yŏng, "The Way I see the ROK-Japan Talks," Kukhoebo, No. 42, March 25, 1965, p. 111.

12. See, e.g., the Yu Chang-sun's argument, "Discussion: The Inside Story of 10 Years Negotiations and 6 Conference," op. cit., p. 35; Kim Sam-kyu, "A Korean View of Ratification," Japan Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 4, October-December 1965, p. 446; Yang Ho-min, "The Posture of the Government and the People in the Negotiations," Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, p. 27; and Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'i nŭn kilko chŏngkwon ŭn tchapda (Politics is Long, Power is Short) (Seoul: Sasanggesa, 1967), p. 160.

of the memorandum was later approved by the Supreme Council.[13] He insisted that there was nothing irregular either in the negotiation process or in the content of the memorandum.[14] It is probable that Kim Chong-pil might have given Japan a strong hint that the ROK was ready to make major concessions on the Peace Line although he did not specifically discuss the Peace Line at the time.[15] However, the credibility of Kim Chong-pil's explanation was not only challenged by Kim Chae-ch'un, a former member of the Supreme Council of the military junta (later Director of the CIA and a leading political adversary to Kim Chong-pil),[16] but also weakened by an implied admission of such irregularity by Foreign Minister Lee Tong-won.[17]

The opposition parties warned the government in early 1964 that any hasty settlement, in disregard of public opinion, would meet a strong protest from the people as well as their parties.[18]

13. Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964), pp. 3 and 5.

14. Ibid., pp. 3-6.

15. On the Peace Line the ROK had already suggested its flexible position in the statement of General Park Chung-hee on November 11, 1961. See Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1961. One reason, I believe, that Kim did not make any deal on the Peace Line was, the tone of the major Japanese newspapers at the time. If he had made any bargain for a greater amount of the property claims settlement, the usually well-informed Japanese papers would have commented. The newspapers strongly demanded, in fact, a reciprocal concession from the ROK on the Peace Line to balance the Japanese concession on the property claims. See Mainichi Shimbun, November 14, and December 28 1962; and Yomiuri Shimbun, November 14, 1962.

16. The Kim Chae-ch'un's statement in "Something Will be Wrong With National Defense: Discussion Among Retired Generals," Sasangge, Supplement, April 1964, p. 67.

17. Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 45th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 12 (November 20, 1964), p. 7.

18. "The 1964 Basic Policy Speeches" of Yun Po-sŏn of the Civil Rule Party, Tong-A Ilbo, January 14, 1964, and of Pak Sun-ch'ŏn of the Samminhoe (a negotiation body composed of the Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Party of People, in the National Assembly), Hankuk Ilbo, January 16, 1964.

The opponents of the negotiations maintained the following position:

(1) The basic (diplomatic) relations must be preceded by a sincere Japanese apology. The negotiations and the settlement must be based on the principle of equality and mutual respect. All the old treaties or agreements must be nullified from the date of their conclusion. And the legality of the government of the ROK must be reaffirmed.[19]

(2) The Peace Line must be maintained for protection of the Korean fishermen and as a national defense line. It cannot be in any way modified or reduced. Only if Japan demonstrates her sincerity in resolving the fishery dispute and other outstanding issues, shall the Japanese fishermen be allowed to fish in certain limited areas within the Peace Line. But under no circumstances can the Peace Line be bartered for the property claims or for economic cooperation.[20]

(3) The property claims payment must include compensation for property losses, mental sufferings and loss of Korean lives, and must take the form of reparation. Under no circumstance can the property claims be settled by the offer of "economic cooperation"

19. Concerning the basic relations, see, e.g., "The 1964 Basic Policy Speech" of Yun Po-šon, ibid.; "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," op. cit.; the statement of National Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong of the Civil Rule Party, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 4 (March 27, 1964), p. 6; "Why Are We Opposed to the Present ROK-Japan Negotiations?" op. cit., pp. 130-44; and "Review of the Basic Positions of the Ruling Party and the Opposition Parties on the ROK-Japan Talks," Hankuk Ilbo, February 14, 1965.

20. Concerning the Peace Line, see, e.g., "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," ibid.; "The Basic Policy Speeches" of Yun Po-sŏn, ibid.; the statement of National Assemblyman Kim Yŏng-sam of the Civil Rule Party, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 7 (December 26, 1963), p. 6; "Resolution" of the Struggling Committee of Pan-People Against Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan, April 17, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 18, 1965; "Statement," of the Federation of the Korean Christian Churches, on April 17, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 20, 1965; "The Seven-Point Resolution" of the Students of the Seoul National University, April 10, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 11, 1965; Chŏng Mun-ki, "Our Marine Treasures That Japan Desires," Sasangge, April 1964, pp. 66-73; Hong Chong-in, "The Peace Line is being Openly Violated," Chosun Ilbo, May 23, 1963; and Lee Kang-u, "Gains and Losses At the Starting Point of Conclusion of the ROK-Japan Negotiations," Series No. 5, Chosun Ilbo, February 27, 1965.

or a "congratulatory fund for Korea's independence." The total amount for settling the property claims must be $2,700 million ($1,500 million for the property claims based on the eight categories and $1,200 million for mental suffering and loss of life). If Japan promises to correct the unfavorable balance of trade and recognizes the legitimacy of the Peace Line, the $1,200 million for mental suffering and loss of life can be justed. But the agreed amount in the Kim-Ohira Memorandum is totally unacceptable.[21.]

(4) The plans for economic cooperation and introduction of capital funds must include protection from the danger of Japanese economic and political aggression, and must be duly followed by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. Unless the form of economic cooperation is carefully negotiated and planned there is danger that the ROK will become a dumping market for surplus and obsolete Japanese industrial goods, that Korean businessmen will become agents for monopolistic Japanese capital, and that through use of Japanese capital in partisan political funds, the "compradors" will then control the politics of the ROK.[22.]

21. Concerning the property claims, see, e.g., "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," ibid.; "The 1965 Basic Policy Speech" of Yun Po-sŏn, op. cit.; Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, "Debates on Gains and Losses At the Final Stage," Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965; the statement of Assemblyman Kim Yŏng-sam, ibid.; the statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 4 (March 27, 1964), pp. 6-8; Kim Kyŏng-rae, "The Problem of the ROK's Property Claims Against Japan," op. cit., p. 78; "Review of the Basic Positions of the Government Party and the Oppositions Parties on the ROK-Japan Talks," op. cit.; "Diplomacy of Gains or Losses," op. cit.; Hong Chong-in, Inkan ŭi chayu wa chonŏm (Freedom and Dignity of Man) (Seoul: Sudomunhwasa, 1965), pp. 19-22 and 61-4; and Obata Misao, "A Grave Doubt About the Japan-ROK Negotiations," Sekai, November 1962, pp. 28-30.

22. Concerning the economic cooperation, see, e.g., "The Basic Position of the Civil Rule Party on the ROK-Japan Talks," ibid.; Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, "Debates on Gains and Losses At the Final Stage," ibid.; "The Spirit of the March First Movement and Settlement of the ROK-Japan Problem," the editorial of Sasangge, March 1964, pp. 26-27; the statement of Assemblyman Kang Mun-bong, ibid., p.8; Captain Y and six other ROK Army officers (names withheld), "A Proposal for the ROK-Japan Talks," Sasangge, March 1965, p. 157; the statement of Yun Po-sŏn, Chosun, Ilbo, April 3, 1965; Yang Ho-min, op. cit., p. 28; the statement of Cho Chae-ch'ŏn of the Democratic Party, March 21, 1964, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 22, 1964; and "The Japan-ROK Negotiations Came to Near Conclusion," Asahi Jānaru, March 22, 1964, p.16.

These were the main arguments of opponents of the negotiations. Their demands seemed too unreasonable for the government policy to reflect them fully in negotiating with Japan. But their arguments could not be totally ignored by the government. During the sixth conference, in March 1964, the government was pressed by college students and opposition politicians to suspend the conference. And President Park was impelled to assure the people:

> I, mindful of the students' demands, have today instructed the Korean delegation to the ROK-Japan conference to try up to the last moment for consummation of our contention.[23.]

He pledged also to the people,

> We swear before history, with my personal life and the life of this Government, that we have acted in the negotiations only for the interest of the nation and the people, without the slightest personal ambition.[24.]

The strength of the opposition pressure felt by the government was indicated by the immediate recall of much-criticized Kim Chong-pil, from Tokyo, where he had been overseeing the negotiations in the sixth conference. In June, 1964 he resigned from the chairmanship of the ruling Democratic Republican Party and departed for a prolonged overseas trip. It was reported that under the pressure of the opponents ROK delegates to the seventh conference raised on several occasions new objections to some details on which both the ROK and Japan had already agreed.[25.] However the opponents were not satisfied with the government and argued that the only change made by the government was in the style of negotiations, not in the substance of the agreements, to which the government had irrevocably committed itself.[26.]

23. "The Special Speech of President Park," March 26, 1964, Tong-A Ilbo, March 27, 1964.
24. Ibid.
25. Mori Kyōzō, "Japan-ROK Treaties Initialed At Last," Japan Quarterly, Vol. XII, No. 3, July-September 1965, p. 285.
26. The commentary of Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 1964.

THE ROOT OF OPPOSITION TO NORMALIZATION

More fundamentally analyzed, the arguments of the opponents to the ROK-Japan negotiations stemmed from their deep distrust of Japan and of their own government, and their frustration over the tragic division of Korea. Distrust of Japan was not confined only to the opponents of the negotiations. This was a national sentiment, especially strong among elderly nationalists and intellectuals, who had known Japanese colonial rule, and among the younger generation brought up under anti-Japanese indoctrination.[27] Even after the end of the Japanese rule over Korea and the rehabilitation of Japan, many Koreans could not believe that Japan had purged itself of former colonialists and reformed itself completely during the short period of the American occupation.[28] Kim Pyoung-hoon lucidly describes an extreme Korean view of the Japanese as follows:

> For example, the still picture of a "typical" Japanese vividly retained in the "image screen" of a "typical" Korean mind might be chronologically arranged like this: In the first frame, a Korean sees "The savage and unfeeling Japanese," who came to Korea at the beginning of the century to plunder. In the second frame, he sees "The punished little criminal" kneeling before the American liberator in unconditional surrender. In the next frame, "The unscrupulous nouveau riche," who got rich quick thanks to the War in Korea, where millions of Koreans suffered untold sorrow and misery. And now in the latest frame, the Korean suddenly encounters "The arrogant Japanese," who refuses to recognize Korea's exclusive right to fish in the Peace Line.[29]

Mr. Pyŏn Yŏng-t'ae, former Prime Minister under Rhee and a highly respected intellectual, stated:

27. After the signing of the treaty with Japan, the ROK's Ministry of Education started to revise the hostile remarks on Japan in the textbooks of elementary school children. See the controversy of the revision in Chosun Ilbo, July 18, 1965.

28. For analysis of Korean resentment and distrust of Japan by a Japanese, see Nishimura Toshio, "The Deep Root of Distrust of Japan," Asahi Jānaru, May 10, 1964, pp. 8-9; also his, "The Complexity of the Undercurrent of Resentment of Japan," Asahi Jānaru, January 12, 1964, pp. 6-7.

29. Kim Pyoung-hoon, "Korea-Japan Rapprochement," op. cit., p. 17.

> It seems that there are some people who believe that we can live better only by opening diplomatic relations with Japan. It is the story either of the fools or of those who want to prolong their political power by Japanese financial resources.... Think what Japan did to us. Think what today's Japan is. It is all clear that Japan will again invade and dominate us, this time, by cultural, political and economic means, even if its form of rule might be different.[30.]

The Christians, who spearheaded the Korea's independence movement and were persecuted most by the Japanese, declared;

> The anti-Japanese struggle is not simply a patriotic act. But it is, we are convinced, a solemn order of God that we have to carry out.[31.]

Anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiment was amply demonstrated by hundreds of protest rallies and demonstrations throughout the 1964-1965 campaign against the ROK-Japan rapprochment.

Although the significance of the statements quoted above and of such rallies might be exaggerated, it was symbolic of the Koreans' sentiment; the fear of resurgent Japan was real.[32.] They feared that the ROK was not economically and politically strong enough to resist the possible economic aggression of Japan, or to protect Korean fishermen from the Japanese competition.[33.] They believed

30. Pyŏn Yŏng-t'ae, "What Does the Signing of the ROK-Japan Agreements Mean?", Chosun Ilbo, June 20, 1965.

31. The statement of Hankuk kidokkyo yŏnhaphoe (the Federation of Korean Christian Churches), April 17, 1965, op. cit.

32. See Kamada Mitsuto, "The Japan-ROK Relations from the Point of View of Korean People's Resentment of Japan," op. cit., p. 11.

33. See especially Chang Chun-ha, a prominent political critic and the publisher of the monthly Sasangge, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 22, 1964; Chŏng Mun-ki, the foremost expert on fishery, "The Present Problem of the Korean Fishing and Fishery Fund," Chosun Ilbo, June 10, 1965; Kim Kyŏng-rae, "When the ROK-Japan Relations is Normalized," Series No. 1, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 20, 1964, and his "The Problem of the ROK's Property Claims Against Japan," op. cit., pp. 76-77; "The Spirit of the March First Movement and the Settlement of the ROK-Japan Problem," op. cit.; Kim Yun-kyŏng, "Here the Remnents of the Japanese Imperialism," Sasangge, March 1964, p. 53; Yang Ho-min, op. cit., p. 28; Mori Kyōzō, op. cit., p. 284.

that Japan would shamelessly deplete Korean fishery resources within a few years, as recompense for the property claims settlement fund and economic aid given to the ROK. They pointed out that even before normalization of relations a number of giant Japanese business firms had already made deep inroads into the Korean market. Faced with the overwhelming assault and the attraction of Japanese capital, the opposition feared that the weaker and immoral Korean businessmen would eventually become "compradors" of the Japanese capitalists.

The Koreans' distrust of Japan was matched by their distrust and suspicion of their own government.[34] On March 26, 1964 National Assemblyman Kim Chun-yŏn of the Liberal Democratic Party alleged that the ruling Democratic Republican Party had already received a $130 million advance from Japan, from the property claims settlement fund, and that the government and the ruling party used the money in organizing their political party.[35] His alleged charge was a symptom of the widespread distrust and the suspicion that the

34. In a survey among college students in Seoul conducted by the Research Institute of Sukmyŏng Women's University, the students gave the following reasons for their demonstrations on March 24, 1964 against the ROK-Japan normalization of relations:

Fear of Japanese economic-political exploitation	31%
Distrust of the government	20%
Distrust of the government's method of negotiations	15%
Opposition to removal of the Peace Line	13%
Others	21%

Source: "The Political Awareness of College Students at the Time of March 24 Demonstrations," Sae kyoyuk (The New Education) No. 120, October 1964, pp. 39-45.

35. See Chosun Ilbo and Tong-A Ilbo March 27, 1967. The allegation was not proved in the court, and Kim was sentenced to imprisonment of one year and six months for falsification. See Chosun Ilbo, July 29, 1965 and August 11, 1965.

ruling party was hurrying the settlement of the issues between the ROK and Japan in order to maintain itself in power.[36] Distrust increased further when it was revealed by the Japanese government that the government of the ROK had already arranged several commercial loans of more than $100 million through the Japanese government, disregarding its own previous statement that it would not ask any economic cooperation of Japan before normalization of diplomatic relations.[37]

The opponents of the negotiations argued that the government was so corrupt that it could not check Japanese economic and political aggression, and that in consequence Japanese economic cooperation would enrich only a handful of priviledged businessmen and corrupt politicians.[38] The reasons for general discontent were not unfounded. The Park government had experienced a series of big scandals such as, the so-called "Four Great Scandals" (manipulation of the stock market, embezzlement of funds in the Walker Hill resort construction, the illegal disposition of imported Japanese automobile parts, and the illegal import of pin-ball machines); illegal disposition of the lands of a public park, and other public lands; massive corruption in the Office of Railroads; special loans to big businesses; and price rigging for excessive profiteering by the sugar, flour mill and cement industries - -

36. E.g., statement of Cho Chae-ch'ŏn of the Democratic Party, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24, 1964; the statement of Yun Po-sŏn, Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1965; and Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil (National Salvation Through Thorn Thicket) (Seoul: Hankuk chŏngkyŏngsa, 1967), pp. 181 and 186.

37. "The Problem of Economic Cooperation with the ROK," Asahi Jānaru, July 12, 1964, p. 9; and The New York Times, August 1, 1965.

38. E.g., The New York Times, August 8, 1965; and the statement of Chŏng Hae-yŏng of the Civil Rule Party, Chosun Ilbo, April 2, 1965.

all of which involved incalculable amounts at the expense of the people.[39] The resignation of Minister of Finance Lee Chŏng-hwan on November 26, 1964, in protest against excessive favoritism to few big financial magnets tells enough of these scandals.[40] Corruption and abuse of authority were so rampant that the government disciplined or dismissed about 1,000 public officials during the first two months of 1965 alone.[41]

The massive demonstration of college students in Seoul, on March 24, 1964 against the ROK-Japan negotiations was an indication of the widespread discontent. On May 25 the college students passed an Extraordinary Resolution in which they demanded:

> Present rulers, you give a clear account of numerous irregularities and corruptions committed, and apologize before the nation!...Begin the severe punishment and confiscation of country-selling monopoly capitalists to cope with the people's disastrous destitution.[42]

Thus the demonstrations and rallies against the ROK-Japan negotiations were partly an expression of the people's distrust of their government and discontent with the state of economic, political and social affairs in general. This explains also the intense determination of the government to achieve an early conclusion of the negotiations, in the hope that they would then be able to

39. See Paek Nam-ju, Ŭihok sok ŭi 20 nyŏn (20 Years in Suspicion) (Seoul: Kaejoch'ulpansa, 1965), pp. 241-7, 255-9 and 278-86; Hankuk Ilbo, January 25, 1964 and February 7, 1964; Chosun Ilbo, December 24, 1964, January 31, 1965, February 7, 1965, March 14, 1965, and October 4, 1966; Kyunghyang Shinmoon, February 20 through February 27, 1964; and Lee Byŏng-chŏn et al., "Digging Economic Scandals," Sasangge, April 1964, pp. 88-101.

40. See Chosun Ilbo, November 27, 1964. For analysis of his resignation, see Kwang Yŏng-ho, "Sick Plutocracy," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, op. cit., Vol. for Records, p. 717-8.

41. The New York Times, March 7, 1965. For various cases of corruption of officials, see Chosun Ilbo, April 5, 1966 and April 13, 1966.

42. The resolution was censored by the government, and is available in English in the article written by an anonymous writer, "South Korea's 'Other Side'," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 12, June 18, 1964, p. 593.

quickly patch up the troubled nation with Japanese economic cooperation. The opposition became more suspicious of the motivation of the government as it was intensifying its determination.

At the root of their opposition was also a sense of the helplessness of the Koreans over the division of Korea. This feeling was stronger among intellectuals and college students. Although there are no accurate surveys taken to assess Koreans' feelings about the reunification of Korea, many Koreans in the south feel that in the long run their economic plight can be solved only by the reunification of the predominantly agrarian south with the industrialized north.[43] But reunification is actually a remote possibility, in spite of a strong sense of national identity among the people of the two regions.[44] Although there are a considerable number of people who desire reunification even by direct political negotiations with North Korea, the majority of the south Koreans regard such negotiations as dangerous.[45]

43. In a Chosun Ilbo survey of January 1964 (see the issue of January 22, 1964) among the National Assemblymen, the following were their answers to "What should be the best way in the long run that our people can live better?"

Depend upon American and Japanese aid	11%
Early unification	39%
Patience and economic development	44%
Others	6%

See also a special report of Rafael Steinberg. "Korea Eyes Greener Pastures," The Philadelphia Inquirer, February 24, 1965.

44. For the prospect of unification, see especially Lee Chong-sik, "Korean Partition and Unification," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1964, pp. 221-33.

45. In a survey of November 1964 by the Ministry of Public Information, the preference of various methods of unification are as follows:

UN supervised election	44.9%
Negotiation with North Korea	11.4%
Unification by military force	4.0%
Neutral nations supervised election	1.8%
Elections only in North Korea	1.8%
Others	1.8%
Don't know	34.3%

See Chosun Ilbo, December 23, 1964.

The ROK-Japan negotiations provided an opportunity for re-examining the problem of the future of the ROK in its search for stable solutions to its economic and political problems. The alternatives faced by the Koreans in the south are hypothetically: (1) unification, (2) dependence on outside support and (3) self-sufficiency. But the first alternative is unattainable for the foreseeable future. The last alternative is within the realm of possibility, but it also presupposes some assistance from abroad as in the second alternative. Those who were opposed to the ROK-Japan negotiations thus had a feeling of tragedy about the fate of their divided country, which had little choice but to negotiate with Japan even at the terms considered disadvantageous to the ROK.

To the unhappy Koreans who had little pride in their dependence on the United States, the American attempt in the ROK-Japan negotiations to shift financial responsibility to Japanese shoulders was alarming. The opposition and the press criticized the United States for presiding over the Japanese take-over of Korea and inviting Japanese economic aggression.[46] Former President Yun Po-sŏn, once a staunch pro-American, became a leading critic of the United States and charged that the U.S. attempt to burden Japan in the ROK was to expect "a loan shark to do a philanthropic work."[46]

46. See e.g., articles and editorials openly critical of the United States in Hankŭk Ilbo, January 28, 1964 and September 15, 1964; and Tong-A Ilbo, September 30, 1964. The Struggling Committee sent a strong protest to President Johnson on June 21, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 22, 1965. For analysis of anti-Americanism in the ROK, see J. Mark Mobium, "The Japan-Korea Normalization Process and Korean Anti-Americanism," Asian Survey, Vol. VI, No. 4, April 1966, pp. 241-8; and Kamada Mitsuto, op. cit., p. 12.

47. Yun Po-sŏn, "Debates on Gains and Losses at the Final Stage," Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965. See also his open letter to President Johnson, Chosun Ilbo, October 30, 1966.

Open criticism of U.S. policy either by such conservative politicians as Mr. Yun, or in the press was hitherto unheard of in the ROK. The degree of anti-American resentment reached such an extent that Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, had to make personal efforts to assure Mr. Yun and other opposition leaders of the continuing support of the ROK by the United States, and to calm down their vigorous campaign against the ROK-Japan rapprochement.[48]

A significant development during the campaign against the ROK-Japan rapprochement is thus nationalism. That is the resurgence of sentiment for unification by the initiative of the Korean people themselves. The sentiment was initially small in degree and largely confined to the writings of Korean neutral unificationists, intellectuals, and socialists residing in Japan.[49] After the Student Revolution in April 1960, there was a rising demand in the ROK for a "solution of the Korean problem through direct negotiations with North Korea." It called for exchange of mail, culture, and goods

48. Chosun Ilbo, May 1, 1965. Shortly before Green's visit to Korea, Yun Po-sŏn wrote an open letter to General Hamilton H. Howze, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, in which Yun strongly protested that the tear gas and some U.S. army trucks furnished to the government of the ROK by his command were being used to suppress the anti-ROK-Japan treaty demonstrators. See Chosun Ilbo, April 22, 1965.

49. In most cases the neutralists' views are exaggerated and misinformed. Among them, Kim Sam-kyu, the chairman of "the Committee for the Neutralization of Korea," is most prominent. His views are regularly expressed in his Japanese magazine, Koria Hyōron (The Korea Review), published in Tokyo. See his "A Korean View of Ratification," op. cit., pp. 452-3. See also his Chōsen no genjitsu (The Realities of Korea) (Tokyo: Shiseido, 1960). For others, see Kim Tal-su, "The Destiny of the Korean People," Chūōkōron, May 1963, pp. 145-53; Lee Yŏng-kŭn, "Appeal to Japanese Intellectuals," Sekai, March 1964, pp. 129-37; Pak Dŏk-man, "The Presidential Elections in the ROK and the Unification Movement," Sekai, December 1963, pp. 146-53; and Son Sŏng-cho, "The Political situation in the ROK After Ratification," Sekai, September 1965, pp. 74-83.

between South and North Korea as initial steps towards unification.[50] Although the movement was promoted by important segments of college students and socialists, it was also, significantly, approved by some conservative politicians, such as Sŏ Min-ho, the Vice-Speaker of House of Representatives, Yang Il-tong, Minority Floor Manager, Kim To-yŏn, the head of the opposition, and even Yang Yu-ch'an, former Korean Ambassador in Washington.[51] The movement was abruptly suspended by the military government.

The latest appearance of this sentiment was the demand of a students' organization in the "Letter to the Editor" of Kyunghyang Shinmoon (May 11, 1964) which said, "The Government should pave the way for cultural and economic cooperation between North and South Korea, instead of conducting talks with Japan..."[52] This sentiment was further heightened by the much publicised Shin Kŭm-dan incident on October 9, 1964 during the Tokyo Olympics. The heart-breaking separation of Shin Kŭm-dan, a North Korean female star runner, from her father, who fled from North Korea fifteen years earlier, after a ten minute reunion under the watchful eyes of the Communist agents dramatized again the tragedy of the division.[53] Immediately after the incident, Assemblyman Lee Man-sŏp of the ruling

50. See the court records of the trials of the socialists in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. III, op. cit., pp. 203-15 and 546-53. See also Han Hae-bok, "April Anniversary in Korea," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, May 4, 1961, pp. 210; and Murakami Kaoru, "Study on the Trouble Spot of the World," Chūōkōron, February 1963, pp. 109-10.

51. Murakami Kaoru, ibid., p. 110 and Pak Dŏk-man, op. cit., p. 148.

52. The letter was purportedly sent in by a "Worker." The heads of the Kyunghyang Shinmoon's management and editorial staffs were immediately arrested and eventually the paper was given a new management by the government. The letter is available in "South Korea's 'Other Side'," op. cit., p. 594.

53. See Tong-A Ilbo, October 10, 1964. See also Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, op. cit., Vol. for Records, pp. 710-1.

party, submitted to the National Assembly a proposal for negotiating with North Korea on arrangements for a meeting place for members of separated families of the south and the north.[54] In his proposal, he stated, "Some people say that we must be careful about the proposal because it might arouse an undue sentiment for unification.... But I do not understand what is wrong with it. Unification is the task of our people. It is an historic task rather than a political question."[55] The proposal died when President Park ruled that the desire for unification must be matched by a corresponding ability and that there cannot be any unification method other than the official policy of general elections throughout the south and north supervised by the United Nations.[56] However a public opinion survey at the time of the proposal revealed that 56 per cent of the people approved it, and 24 per cent opposed it.[57] The sentiment for reunification was further suppressed by the arrest and prosecution in November 1964 of Hwang Yong-ju, an intellectual and president of a private broadcasting company. He had proposed a unified federal government following steps of mutual recognition of the regimes in the south and north, withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea, and reconciliatory approaches by both Koreas.[58]

54. Haebang iship nyŏn, ibid., pp. 714-5.
55. Ibid., p. 715.
56. His speech at Kwangju on November 3, 1964, Tong-A Ilbo, November 3, 1964.
57. A Chosun Ilbo survey October 29 and 30, 1964, from Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p. 714.
58. Ibid., p. 716. For a detail of the case, see Lee Byŏng-su et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn sa (History of Twenty Years of Liberation) (Seoul: Himang ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), pp. 1190-1.

In spite of suppression, there was signs of renewed sentiment for unification even in some conservative quarters during the campaign against the ROK-Japan normalization of relations. For example Pyŏn Yŏng-t'ae's opposition to the treaty was partly that it would create another formidable obstacle to unification.[59] Sŏ Min-ho, who eventually led a socialist reform party in the 1967 presidential and general elections, suggested, upon his return from the campaign against the treaty, that "the opposition must now be aware of the existence of nation-wide opinion desiring unification."[60] Actually the remarks of Pyŏn and Sŏ were understatements of their views, because of the delicacy and danger of discussing the subject under the strict censorship laws imposed to maintain the government's official position on unification. Thus the opposition to the ROK-Japan negotiations had also at its roots the national unhappiness over the division of Korea, and provided an impetus for the resurgence of a spirit of nationalism expressing at once the desire for national dignity, the sense of national identity, and the desire for unification of Korea.

THE CRISIS OF MARCH 1964 - SEPTEMBER 1965

Because of the reasons mentioned, the opponents of the normalization of relations between the two countries maintained a massive and sustained struggle against the treaty and the agreements (hereinafter referred to just as the treaty) both before and after

59. Pyŏn Yŏng-t'ae, op. cit.
60. Kameyama Akira, "Korean Students Shake the Park Regime," Sekai, June 1965, p. 199.

it was signed, on June 22, 1965. The following is a brief account of some of the main events in the long, intense, and widespread popular struggles in the streets during one and a half years from March 1964 to September 1965.

During this period the total accumulated number of about three million students and at least a half million others participated in protest activities throughout the country,[61] in various forms of rally, street demonstration, hunger-strike, debate, and protest statement. Most of the rallies and demonstrations were accompanied by violence, and arrests resulted from the clashes with policemen and troops. The total number of participants may not seem large, but it is quite impressive, considering the extremely harsh measures and all-out pre-cautionary efforts taken by the government against such activities.

The campaign against ROK-Japan negotiations began on March 6 1964. The opposition parties in the National Assembly on that day formed the "Struggling Committee of Pan-People Against the Humiliating Diplomacy with Japan" (hereinafter referred to as the Struggling Committee) in order to organize their opposition to the negotiations more effectively, both inside the National Assembly and among the people.[62] The Struggling Committee was joined by about two hundred prominent leaders from various walks of life. It adopted a declaration calling for immediate suspension of the negotiations in Tokyo.[63] Between March 15 and 21, the Struggling Committee

61. The figures are my rough estimates based on various newspaper reports. See especially the daily accounts of the protest activities before the signing of the treaty in Chosun Ilbo, June 22 1965; and Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Materials, op. cit., pp. 179-96. See also Kameyama Akira, ibid, pp. 194-9; and "The ROK in Upheaval," Sekai, October 1965, pp. 11-7.

62. Chosun Ilbo, March 7, 1964.

63. Ibid.

conducted its first speech-making campaign in major cities of Korea. The campaign attracted some 120,000 people,[64] including 35,000 people in the Seoul rally of March 21.[65] In reaction to the growing strength of the opposition campaign, President Park expressed his determination to conclude the negotiations regardless of mounting opposition to them.[66] The opposition leader, Yun Po-sŏn, countered President Park's statement by declaring that if the treaty between the two countries were ratified, he would resign his seat in the National Assembly.[67] On March 23 Kim Chong-pil and Foreign Minister Ohira agreed in Tokyo on a time schedule which set early May 1964 as the date for conclusion of the negotiations.[68]

Angered by the determination of the government to bring the negotiations to an early conclusion and aroused by the opposition campaign, about 5,000 college students in Seoul staged their first demonstration in Seoul on March 24, 1964, denouncing the "humiliating diplomacy." From Seoul the demonstration rapidly spread to all major cities, and continued for five days in spite of the introduction of some military forces into Seoul to suppress it. The March 24th demonstrations involved some 80,000 students.[69] The prime targets of the students' attack were Kim Chong-pil, who reportedly said

64. See Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between March 16 and 22, 1964.
65. Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 22, 1964.
66. Chosun Ilbo, March 17, 1964.
67. Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 1964.
68. Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24, 1964. See also Kim's role and activities in Tokyo in "The ROK-Japan Talks Seen from Lobby," Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 24, 1964.
69. About the March 24th demonstrations, see especially Hong Sŭng-man et al ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp. 682-4; and Lee Byŏng-su et al ed., Haebang iship nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 1174-5. See also Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between March 24 and 30, 1964. For basic reasons for the students' demonstrations, see various expert opinions in Hankuk Ilbo, March 28, 1964.

that he would not mind being called the "second Lee Wan-yong" (the last primer of the Yi Dynasty, who signed the 1910 Treaty of Annexation with Japan),[70] if he could bring about the conclusion of the negotiations,[71] and the controversial Kim-Ohira Memorandum. The students returned to school only when the government made concessions to them. President Park praised their demonstrations as patriotic acts;[72] on March 28 he recalled Kim from Tokyo; on March 31 he made a direct personal appeal to the student leaders;[73] and he revealed the Kim-Ohira Memorandum partially to the representatives of the students.[74] In April he suspended the negotiations.

In May 1964 when the newly installed cabinet of Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon (replacing moderate Ch'oe Du-sŏn) announced its renewed determination to conclude the negotiations by the end of the year,[75] student demonstrations erupted again. On May 20 a rally at the Seoul National University openly challenged the government and its ruling party by staging a "funeral service" of "nationalistic democracy," the foremost political slogan of the Democratic Republican Party.[76] The protest rally ignited another wave of

70. Lee has been a symbol of treason to Koreans. About Lee, see Ch'a Mun-sŏp, "Lee Wan-yong," Lee Sung-hŭi et al, ed., Hankuk ŭi inkan sang (Portraits of Korean Leaders) (Seoul: Shinkumunhwasa, 1965), pp. 478-99.

71. Kim blamed the news media for distorting and omitting his full statement made in November 1962 in Tokyo. See Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 40th Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, No. 5 (February 10, 1964), p. 6.

72. The statement of President Park, March 26, 1964, Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 1964.

73. Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964.

74. Chosun Ilbo, April 1, 1964.

75. Tong-A Ilbo, May 11, 1964.

76. See the resolution and the declaration adopted by the students in Tong-A Ilbo, May 20, 1964.

demonstrations among students all over Korea. The focus of the students' protest shifted from attacks on the "humiliating diplomacy" to demands for the "resignation of Park Chung-hee." On May 29 they issued an ultimatum demanding that the government immediately implement their Extraordinary Resolution of May 25.[77.]

In Seoul the May demonstrations were climaxed by bloody street battles on June 3 between the students, 15,000 strong attempting to storm major government buildings including the Blue House (the presidential palace), and the outnumbered policemen.[78.] The demonstrations were at last quelled by combat troops called in under a martial law declared on June 3 in the area of Seoul. At the same time all colleges and universities were closed until the following term, assembly was prohibited, and the press was silenced by the military censorship. In connection with the May 20th demonstrations, 168 students, 7 reporters and 173 other people were arrested and prosecuted.[79.] From June 3 to July 29, 1964, Seoul was under the control of the military. However Kim Chong-pil was forced to resign from the chairmanship of his party on June 5, and left Korea for his second "exile" to the United States on June 18.[80.]

In 1965 the campaign against the ROK-Japan negotiations commenced with the visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Shiina to

77. Chosun Ilbo, May 29 and 30, 1964. For an excerpt of the resolution, see the part cited by my footnote 42. in this chapter.

78. About the May 20th demonstrations, see Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp.686-9; and Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between May 20 and June 4, 1964. See also New York Herald Tribune, June 4, 1964; The New York Times, June 5, 1964; and Time, June 12, 1964, p. 42.

79. Chosun Ilbo, June 18, 1964.

80. Kim's resignation and departure were reportedly urged also by the United States. See The New York Times, June 7 and 15, 1964.

Seoul. He arrived on February 17 to initial a tentative draft of the Treaty on Basic Relations. On February 19 the Struggling Committee tried to hold a huge rally in the City Hall Plaza to impress the visitor with the strength of Korean opposition to the ROK-Japan treaty. The Struggling Committee failed to obtain permission from the city authorities to use the Plaza, and before the planned rally could be held the waiting police force began to disperse the people. However the angry crowd of about 10,000 tried to proceed with the demonstration, marching behind such prominent leaders as former President Yun Po-sŏn, the head of the Democratic Party Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, and a well-known religious leader Ham Sŏk-hŏn. But the march was also broken up by the police. In this battle former President Yun's head was hit by a swinging police club, and hundreds of people, including two opposisition National Assemblymen, were arrested and detained by police.[81.]

On March 20 the Struggling Committee succeeded in staging a protest rally in the Seoul Municipal Stadium, attracting some 30,000 people.[82.] Between March 27 and April 4 the Struggling Committee conducted a series of speaking tours in the southern provinces.[83.] Again between April 9 and April 15 the Struggling Committee conducted its second major campaign of 1965 attracting a sizable number of people in major cities of Korea. The second campaign reached its peak on April 17 when about 45,000 protestors

81. About the incident on February 19, see Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, February 19 and 20, 1965.
82. Chosun Ilbo, March 21, 1965.
83. See Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between March 27 and April 5, 1965.

were gathered for a rally in Hyoch'ang Park Stadium in Seoul.[84] After the rally about 5,000 protestors clashed with thousands of riot-police, who had surrounded the stadium, and in anger attacked a police sub-station.[85] In this violent clash 227 demonstrators were arrested and hundreds of both demonstrators and policemen were injured (including four opposition Assemblymen). The government immediately declared the Struggling Committee an illegal and subversive organization and denounced the demonstration as an open insurrection. The opposition on the other hand charged the government with deliberate intervention in a peaceful rally, and declared that the use of riot-policemen, armed with tear gas to suppress a righteous protest of the people, was a criminal act.[86]

In the meantime a student demonstration started in Kwangju on March 31 in conjunction with the Struggling Committee's rally there and rapidly spread all over the country. Again the whole month of April was literally anarchic, as rallies, demonstrations, and violent clashes with local authorities occurred daily. In May the ferocity of the demonstrations abated somewhat due to a systematic crack-down by the police in combination with the use of punishments such as suspension or expulsion from school, induction into military service,[87] or criminal prosecution. Nevertheless in June the campuses and the streets of Korea were again chaotic with the recurrence of students' protest activities, including

84. Chosun Ilbo, April 18, 1965.
85. Ibid.
86. See Chosun Ilbo, Kyunghyang Shinmoon, and Tong-A Ilbo, between April 18 and 21, 1965. See also The New York Times, April 18, 1965.
87. The local authority in Kwangju, for example, ordered a number of student demonstrators to report for military service. When the public learned that some of them were even too young to be inducted, public opinion was furious. E.g., see the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 1965.

hunger strikes. On June 21 the hard pressed government ordered an early summer vacation for the thirteen colleges and universities and 58 high schools which were considered to be the centers of student movement.[88.]

Deeply embittered by the government's brutality in handling the opposition campaigns against the ROK-Japan negotiations,[89.] the Struggling Committee continued to carry on a determined campaign both inside the National Assembly and in the streets up to the last moment before the signing of the treaty on June 22. Shortly before the signing of the treaty, the Struggling Committee sent a series of messages to the governments of Japan and the United States as well as to the ROK delegation in Tokyo.[90.] When messages were sent, about 10,000 students were demonstrating, and about 800 students were on hunger strike, in Seoul alone.[91.]

After the treaty was signed, the opponents immediately declared that it was null and void. They pledged their determination to wage a maximum struggle to prevent ratification of the treaty and called for redoubled national struggle to abrogate it.[92.] The Struggling Committee and the opposition, restrained from a street campaign by police rulings, staged sit-in demonstrations at their headquarters. Yun Po-sŏn, Pak Sun Ch'ŏn, and other leaders of the opposition were on hunger strikes. On June 23 all opposition Assemblymen and the leaders of the Struggling Committee also joined in a hunger strike for 24 hours.[93.]

88. Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965.
89. E.g., see the interpellation on the Ministers of Home Affairs and of Justice, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 41st Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 2 (March 24, 1964), pp. 1-25.
90. Chosun Ilbo, June 22, 1965.
91. Chosun Ilbo, June 23, 1965.
92. Ibid.
93. Chosun Ilbo, June 24, 1965.

After several days of hunger strike, the Struggling Committee held a massive rally in Seoul on July 5 and declared: (1) the "country selling" treaty concluded by the government is invalid; (2) the Park government must stop the "anti-national" oppression of the legitimate expression of public opinion against the treaty; (3) the United States and other allies must recognize that the Korean people are opposed to the treaty because its content is contrary to the principle of mutual benefit; and (4) they are resolutely determined to sacrifice themselves in the struggle against ratification of the "treacherous treaty."[94]

Because of the early vacation and the effective suppressive measures taken by the government, organized student protest activities were markedly subdued in July. The activities of the political opposition also somewhat lost their energy, as the attention of the leaders turned to internal political struggles for hegemony of the new Mass Party, a merger of the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party formed on June 14. At this time also there was a rapid shift of the arena of struggle from the streets to the National Assembly as it began to deliberate ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty.

Although the street campaigns became less frequent and intense, the discontent of the people with the treaty and with the government's suppression of opposition continued to be expressed. On June 30, the Korean Federation of Educators issued a strong protest, criticizing the government for its excesses in suppressing the students' protest.[95] On July 1, 77 well-known Christian leaders

94. Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 1965.
95. Chosun Ilbo, July 2, 1965.

and ministers issued a statement,[96] which was followed by "prayers for the nation" in churches throughout the country.[97] On July 12, 354 professors representing eighteen colleges and universities in Seoul appealed to the National Assembly to defeat ratification of the treaty.[98] On July 13 eleven prominent leaders (eight of them retired politicians) criticized the high-handedness of the government in handling the ROK-Japan problem, and urged it to respect public opinion.[99] On July 14, eleven well-known retired generals expressed their determination to oppose ratification of the treaty.[100] The generals included former Prime Minister Song Yu-ch'an, former Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il, former Defense Minister Son Won-il, former Defense Minister Pak Byŏng-kwon, former Minister of Justice Lee Ho, and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Kim Chae-ch'un - - all served under General Park Chung-hee. In addition a number of other national organizations opposed ratification of the treaty for various reasons.

On July 22 thirty-eight persons representing thirteen such organizations met to unify their individual strengths into a concerted opposition to ratification of the treaty.[101] The representatives included students, lawyers, retired generals, former politicans, writers and artists, professors, Christian leaders and Confucian scholars, and leaders of several patriotic organizations.[102] On July 31 they formally organized a non-political, pan-national

96. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 3, 1965.
97. See an analysis of the Christians' movement, "Christianity and Social Participation," Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 1965.
98. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 1965.
99. Chosun Ilbo, July 13, 1965.
100. See their statement, Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1965.
101. Chosun Ilbo, July 23, 1965.
102. See Chosun Ilbo, July 23 and 29, 1965.

organization, called the "Consultative Council of the People for Protection of the Fatherland" (hereinafter referred to as the Consultative Council). The Consultative Council became the most militant and powerful pressure group opposed to the ROK-Japan rapprochement representing broad segments of the population.[103] Thus it was apparent that the opponents of the ROK-Japan treaty included not only the students and the opposition political parties, but also large and important segments of the community at large.

On July 14, amidst scenes of violence between members of the ruling party and the opposition, the ratification bill was placed on the agenda for the 51st special session of the National Assembly. But the 51st session ended on July 21, in fear of further head-on collision between the ruling party and the opposition, until the following session. President Park and Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, the head of the Mass Party, met on July 20 and reached a compromise including agreement on the postponement.[104] The opposition not only refused to take part in debate on the ratification bill, but insisted on dissolution of the National Assembly and on the election of a new National Assembly with specific instructions for dealing with such an important bill. The opposition leaders warned the ruling party that they would resign from the National Assembly en masse if they failed to achieve dissolution of the National Assembly, or to halt ratification. With the initial compromise, hope for a dialogue between the determined government and the resolute opposition revived somewhat,[105] only to die soon after when the

103. See a special report, "The Consultative Council of the People for Protection of the Fatherland," Chosun Ilbo, August 6, 1965. See also Tong-A Ilbo, August 1, 1965.

104. The talks resulted in the "five-point compromise" including adjournment of the 51st session as a step for seeking an exit from a collision course. See Chosun Ilbo, July 21, 1965.

105. See "Dialogue Opened," Chosun Ilbo, July 21, 1965.

two sides failed to agree on a date for the special session to be convened.[106]

Impatient with the strategy of the opposition, President Park convened the 52nd special session on July 29. The National Assembly immediately formed the Special Committee for Deliberation on Ratification of the ROK-Japan Treaty. The new committee was a larger body consisting of 28 members: 17 Democratic Republicans, 10 members of the Mass Party, and one independent.[107] The formation of the Special Committee was readily agreed to by both parties, but for different reasons. The ruling party favored a large special committee to create the impression that the government and the ruling party had made a concession to the opposition, and also because this would block the opposition's demand for separate subcommittees, where debate on the ratification bill could be dragged out indefinitely as the details of the treaty were examined one by one.[108] On the other hand, the opposition hoped that its greater representation in a large committee would make it easier to use such delaying tactics as filibusters, lack of quorum, and prolonged debates, to kill the bill.[109]

But a more serious political crisis was already in the making. On July 28, Yun Po-sŏn, the leader of the minority "militant" faction in the Mass Party, announced his resignation from the party,[110] as part of his movement to dissolve the National Assembly. Under

106. Chosun Ilbo, July 22, 1965.
107. Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 1965.
108. See "Utility of the Special Committee," Chosun Ilbo, August 3, 1965.
109. Ibid.
110. About his resignation, see Chosun Ilbo, July 29 and 30, 1965.

the existing law, his resignation from the party would automatically lead to his loss of membership in the National Assembly.[111] In spite of the apparent willingness of the majority faction of the opposition party to participate in the Special Committee's debate, mounting pressure from Yun and his faction, as well as that of the Struggling Committee and the Consultative Council, made it very difficult for the National Assembly to engage in proper parliamentary debate on the bill.

At last, at 11.10 p.m. on the night of August 11, the members of the ruling party, in a lightning coup taking less than one minute, amidst confusion, forcibly concluded the debate and won approval of the ratification bill in the Special Committee.[112] Taken by surprise and indignant at this irregular and undemocratic process, on the following day 59 members of the opposition party gave notice of their resignation from the National Assembly.[113] On August 14 the "one-party National Assembly," consisting of 110 Democratic Republicans and one independent, approved the ratification bill by 110 votes with one abstention.[114]

The opposition party and the students (upon their return from summer vacation) resumed angry protest against the ratification of the treaty, condemning the irregular processes of ratification.

111. Article 38 of the Constitution provides: "A person shall lose his membership in the National Assembly during his tenure when he leaves or changes his party, or when his party is dissolved...."
112. See Chosun Ilbo, August 12, 1965.
113. See Chosun Ilbo, August 13, 1965.
114. See Chosun Ilbo, August 15, 1965.

But their protest was ruthlessly crushed on August 26 by a division of combat troops called into Seoul under the decree of "garrison state."[115]

During the treaty crises some three and a half million people waged their determined struggles against the treaty. Irrespective of the merits of their cause or its motivation, the opposition campaign to the treaty demonstrated an impressive degree of political awareness and participation among some important segments of Koreans. In this respect alone the struggle against the treaty will have to be viewed as an important landmark in the contemporary political scene of Korea.

115. Chosun Ilbo, August 26 and 27, 1965. See also, "The ROK in Upheaval," op. cit., pp. 15-7. A decree of "garrison state" can be imposed by a district military commander at the request of a local or provincial government in an emergency created primarily by some military contingency. Justification for the decree in this case is debatable. The decree has almost same effect as martial law, except that it allows continued functioning of civil administration and freedom of the press in the area affected.

CHAPTER 5

THE EMBRYO OF THE TREATY CRISIS : THE CONFLICT BETWEEN POLITICAL ELITES

The struggle between the treaty opponents and the government resulted in a breakdown of the normal political process and constitutional order when the demonstrations and other protest activities had to be quelled by the army under martial law on several occasions. In the end the National Assembly itself was the scene of violence and ended up as a "one-party National Assembly" after the opposition members resigned *en masse*. Why did they struggle for or against the treaty to such an extreme degree? To focus the whole struggle as a political conflict, it was an ultimate power struggle in naked strength between the government which was determined to stay in power and the opposition which was equally determined to overthrow the government and to recapture power, taking the maximum advantages of their respective positions on the treaty issue.

In a larger political view, disintegration of Korean politics during the treaty crisis was an aggravation of a symptom of a latent instability inherent in the Korean society, which was only triggered by the treaty issue. In this connection, there are important questions. Why did the opposition place such heavy emphasis on extra-parliamentary tactics? Why was there wide and fervent support for the extra-constitutional measures of the opposition? Was the massive public awareness and participation an indication of progress towards a popular democracy or was it an indication of political malady? These are some of the crucial questions which could be perhaps the important lines of inquiry into the political aspects of the treaty crisis in order to understand the general aspects of contemporary Korean politics. The purposes of the following two chapters are, first, to reconstruct in part a background of the political climate preceding this

crisis; second, to examine the motivational aspects of political actors and forces; and, lastly, to analyse some selected aspects of their politics at the time of the crisis (see also Chapters 7 and 8).

ATTITUDES OF THE MILITARY ELITE AND THE CIVILIAN ELITE

The political crisis during the ROK-Japan treaty struggle was a crisis of political legitimacy. Professor Seymour Martin Lipset defines legitimacy as "the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society".[1] He postulates that the political stability of any democracy depends largely on the legitimacy of its government as well as on the actual performance of the government. A crisis of legitimacy, i.e., instability, during a transition occurs particularly if the status of the major established groups and their values are threatened, or if the major groups do not have access to the political process.[2] If any of the above is a sufficient cause of political crisis, Korean politics before and during the treaty crisis could be characterized by both these symptoms. These symptoms in Korea were manifested by rejection of the legitimacy of the government by large segments of Koreans.

In politics it was a continuing emotional power struggle, at its peak, between the opposition who held the view that President Park Chung-hee's Democratic Republican Party (DRP) government was,

1. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New York: Doubleday, 1960). See his chapter "Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy," pp. 64-86.
2. Ibid., p. 65.

by origin and by the process of establishment, illegitimate and should hence be overthrown, and Park's government and his party who regarded the opposition as a body of reactionary cliques engaged in subversive activities. These fundamentally contrasting attitudes between them had carried their old mutual fear and suspicion into the treaty struggle, and had contributed to the extremity of political conflict in the whole crisis. This was the basic reason why the government and the opposition could not compromise in that important treaty issue and instead had crystalized their differences into a deadly power struggle.

The sources of their continuing struggle (and hence of the treaty crisis) should be traced, more recently, to the origins of the Third Republic, of the present leadership and of the opposition. The Third Republic was established in December 1963 as a civilian constitutional government through the presidential elections of October 15 and the general elections of November 26, 1963, after the two and a half years' rule of the military government led by General Park Chung-hee and his junta.

After his inauguration, President Park appealed to the opposition parties for reconciliation of their political differences, by calling for "creation of a new political climate of cooperation between the government and the opposition parties" and by declaring that on his part he "will be ready to modify government policies on the basis of sound alternative policies from the opposition parties".[3] He also declared that the urgent task of the new civilian government was, among other things, "to restore political and constitutional order to normality".[4] But

3. "The State of Nation Message" of President Park, January 10, 1964, op. cit.
4. Ibid.

Park's gesture for reconciliation did not appeal to the opposition parties. The opposition parties, after a considerable time of silence imposed by the military government, were in no mood to let the first political opportunity for sharp condemnation of the military rule and its performance, for which the present leaders of the Third Republic were responsible, be wasted.

In spite of some efforts by the anxious DRP government to please the opposition parties, for example, by giving one of two Vice-Speakerships to Assemblyman La Yong-Kyun of the Civil Rule Party, by prompt and courteous appearances of the cabinet members to answer the questions of the opposition members in the National Assembly, by soliciting support of the opposition parties in sponsoring some non-partisan resolutions in matters of foreign affairs, and by paying greater respect to Mr. Yun Po-sŏn, the head of the largest opposition Civil Rule Party,[5] the National Assembly became soon the arena of political struggles between the ruling party and the opposition. At the first opportunity when the members of the first new cabinet were introduced to the National Assembly, the members of the opposition parties immediately plunged into bitter denunciation of the Park government, retroactively charging for alleged irregularities in the last elections as well as asking for a political account for failures and corruption of the military regime, especially enumerating the so-called "Four Great Scandals", economic hardships of the people, inflation, the harsh rural credit policy, "deceptiveness" of the Five-Year Economic Plan, responsibility for decreasing U.S. economic aid to the ROK, and above all the

5. See Hankuk Ilbo, January 6, 1964.

irregular processes in negotiations with Japan.[6]

The ominous sign of political troubles of the Third Republic became more apparent when former President Yun Po-sŏn, who was defeated by Park Chung-hee by a very narrow margin in his bid for presidency in the last elections, made a serious statement, in his policy speech of January 14, 1964 for his Civil Rule Party, tantamount to denial of the Park government and advocating the overthrow of the government by force. A part of that statement was as follows:

> Mr. Park Chung-hee said that the /military/ revolution was necessary for the sake of anti-Communism, of eliminating corruption, of putting an end to irregularities in elections, and of solving economic hardships of the people.
>
> But the posture of anti-Communism is now a matter of grave concern among the informed people, especially in view of a deepening suspicion that among the persons who play very important roles in the Park government there are some whose ideologies are impure. Corruption is now more rampageous and widespread than ever. Irregularities have completely now determined the outcomes of the elections. The people are now in the extreme economic distress to an unprecedented degree.
>
> I ask now the Park government for a plain answer to this question: Whether this situation of the present affairs would or would not justify another revolution overthrowing the Park government, in turn, in the name of anti-Communism, elimination of corruption, the end to the election irregularities, and a solution to economic hardship of the people.[7]

This bitter feeling was equally shared by Madam Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, the head of the Democratic Party which was the revival of former Premier Chang Myŏn's ruling Democratic Party overthrown by the military coup d'etat. She stated in her party policy speech in 1964:

> Third, I would like to point out that the present regime is in reality nothing but a continuation of the military regime,

6. The speech of Assemblyman (Civil Rule Party) Kim Yŏng-sam, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 7 (December 26, 1963), pp. 3-9. General Park himself confessed of harshness in carrying out the Five-Year Economic Plan and failures in the currency reform in 1962, farm policy and food crises, in Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I (Seoul: no publisher given, 1963), pp. 97-8.

7. "The 1964 Basic Policy Speech" of Yun Po-sŏn, January 14, 1964, op. cit.

> even though it is a pro forma civilian regime.... Fifth, I would like to point out that the event of May 16th was not a revolution. It was a coup by the military to take over power of the government.[8]

Even after one year of Park's government the feeling of bitterness and illegitimacy of the Park government was still burning in the minds of the opposition leaders, as evidenced, for example, by the party basic policy speech of Madam Pak:

> "/Park Chung-hee/ is the President who committed a historic crime of suspending the Constituion by guns and bayonets and of halting development of political democracy and national economy by coup d'etat. Nevertheless in order to cover up his crime, he has been preoccupied with explaining away the coup d'etat as inevitable because the former regime was incompetent...[9]

From the above statements of Yun and Pak, it was amply clear that the opposition viewed the present government as a de facto extension of the military rule, which originated by a naked military coup under the false and presumptious assumption that crises existed in the Second Republic. This attitude was, of course, directly contradicted by the military leaders. They took the view that the military rule was effectively terminated when the function of the Constitution and political, administrative, judicial and legislative activities were restored to normality.[10] Furthermore they argued that it was immaterial in determining the true character of the new civilian government whether the military leaders participated in the elections or returned to their original military duties.[11] The opposition also accused the military leaders, in spite of their denial, of entrenching themselves in political power by rigging the 1963 elections to give a semblance of constituional legitimacy.

8. "The 1964 Basic Policy Speech" of Pak-Sun-ch'ŏn, January 15, 1964, op. cit.
9. "The 1965 Basic Policy Speech" of Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, January 29, 1965, op. cit.
10. E.g., Kim Chong-pil, "Modernization of Korea and A New Leading Force," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 4, Winter 1964, p.34.
11. Ibid.

The speeches of the opposition leaders, particularly Yun's, aroused the apprehension and outrage of the ruling party because the speeches had shattered the President's hope for reconciliatory and moderate politics based on issues and policies. When Yun Po-sŏn was totally indifferent to the ruling party's demand for apology for and withdrawal of his "subversive statement," the emotionally charged Democratic Republicans in the National Assembly, after the opposition members walked out from the Assembly, unilaterally adopted a resolution which empowered the Committee of Legislation and Justice to draft a censure motion against Yun.[12] The opposition contented that, first, the ruling party's attempt to censure Yun was a tyranical attempt of the majority party to subvert freedom of speech in the legislature as well as to destroy parliamentary democracy; and, secondly, such a resolution involving one of its own members adopted in an open session was in violation of the National Assembly Law.[13] Beginning with the controversy on Yun's speech, hope for a new politics began to die rapidly.

Why was bitterness remaining so strong in the minds of the opposition leaders? First of all, it can be traced to the attitudes of the leaders of the military government towards the former politicians whom they replaced by the coup. After the military overthrew Chang Myŏn's government of the Second Republic, it repeatedly charged that the old political order was corrupt, incompetent and chaotic largely due to the politicians who were ideologically unsettled, dishonest in motives, greedy for power

12. See Tong-A Ilbo, January 15, 1964; and the editorial of Tong-A Ilbo, January 16, 1964.

13. Tong-A Ilbo, January 16, 1964. Later the DRP dropped the case against Yun Po-sŏn.

and material things, and unsure of their own ability.[14] Here are some of the reasons in General Park's own words, that necessitated the military intervention in politics:

> The Army does not want any part in politics. Neither can it have any!
>
> When the April 19th Student Revolution faced a crisis because of the shooting by traitors, the Army kept tight and just watched the events. To the last minute they were faithful to their original duty. The people have seen this and know this to be true.
>
> But patience and indifference are two different things. There had to be a limit! It was impossible for them to endure doing nothing. Must the Army adhere to the ostensible duty of national defence, patient and looking on, while the national economy breaks into pieces and is tempered with, society is confounded to its extreme by the rashness and crimes of former politicians, and the nation is threatened with the imminent danger of ruin?...
>
> The May 16th Revolution may be summarised, therefore, as rejection of "conspiracy" and as a tactical movement, of the Army, to destroy the enemy within.[15]

Following the April Student Revolution the social and political order had rapidly degenerated into chaos and confusion. The Chang Myŏn government, with lesser authority than its predecessor under the new cabinet system, could not successfully cope with the daily occurence of street demonstrations by students and various groups[16].

14. See Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., pp.176-98; and Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, op. cit., pp. 57-8. See also an indictment of Chang's government by the military junta in "The Achievement of the Revolution in Two Months", the statement of Office of Public Information, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, July 27, 1967, by Kim Chong-uk, ed. 5.16 kunsa hyŏkmyŏng yoram (The Survey of The May 16th Military Revolution) Vol. IV (Seoul: Chaechŏngsa, 1961), pp. 11-2; and Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 185-204.

15. Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, ibid., pp. 53-4. The emphasis by underlining is mine.

16. For example, the military regime gave the following statistics on demonstrations during the period between April 1960 and March 1961:

Number of Demonstrations since April 19, 1960

Organisation/group	No. of Demonstrations	No. of Persons Invol.
Political Orgs.	57	76,280
Students	747	527,819
Labor	675	219,303
Religious/cultural	35	40,713
Others	486	310,678
Totals	2,000	1,174,802

Source: Chŏng Tae-jin, edited, 5.16 kunsa hyŏkmyŏng yoram (The survey of The May 16th Military Revolution), Vol. I, (Seoul: Chaechŏngsa, 1961), p. 80.

and could not meet their excessive demands unleashed by the revolution.[17] Although the defenders of the Chang government and the Second Republic conceded that the performance of the government during its eight months of office failed to bring political and social order and economic stability to the nation, they had nevertheless an important claim to make which was of credit to the Chang government. The claim, it is true, was that the Chang government was the first government after ROK's independence in 1948 which demonstrated and practised faith in popular government and liberal politics, even ultimately at the expense of its own downfall.[18] The fact is more impressive, considering the disadvantages of inheriting the political and economic devastation left by the Rhee government and considering the fact that the Chang government came to power by the revolution made by and credited to the students. Because the revolution was the creation of the students and the Chang government was established by that revolution, the government was mortally weakened by student power and its

17. About the demands and the difficulties of the Chang government, see Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: The New Regime," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIV, No.1 Spring 1961, pp. 54-7; Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "Illusion of Politics by the Cabinet Government," Sasangge, March 1961, pp. 110-22; Ko Yŏng-bok, "The Meaning of the Social Movement After the Revolution," op. cit., pp. 86-93; Cho Ka-kyŏng, "Spiritual Confusion of the Revolutionary Mainstream," Sasangge, April 1961, pp. 70-7; and David M. Earl, "Korea: The Meaning of the Second Republic," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 11, November 1960, pp. 169-75.

18. E.g., Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p. 399; and Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'i nŭn kilko chŏngkwon ŭn tchapda, op. cit., p. 30. See also former junior minister Kim Ki-ch'ŏl's story about Premier Chang Myŏn's refusal to suppress student demonstrations. Premier Chang told his advisors, "Of course, peace and order should be maintained. Nevertheless you must have appropriate laws to take actions... We are the very same persons who denounced and fought against the Liberal Party's abuse of laws. It is inconceivable for me to suppress illegally the street demonstrations." Kim Ki-ch'ŏl in a discussion, "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," Sasangge, January 1966, p. 162.

excessive demands.[19]

Premier Chang's government was toppled by the military revolution in the midst of carrying out his political convictions, which he later explained as follows:

> While the Democratic Party was still engaged in the bloody struggle against the Liberal Party, the thing that the party promised to the people was the absolute guarantee of freedom and removal of tyranny. Thus we reaffirmed freedom when we came to power...
>
> Even though the society [of the Second Republic] was deep in chaos by the daily occurence of demonstrations, the Democratic Party government could not violate its own pledge of freedom that it made before coming to power...
>
> We could not betray the people under the pretext of a time of chaos. Of course we could have declared the state of emergency on some dubious pretext. But we believed in a "true democratic order based on freedom", rather than in a "superficial order imposed by guns and bayonets"...
>
> In short, "Let them once enjoy the unlimited freedom that they had been longing for", was the credo of the Democratic Party government. We tried to govern the people by time, instead by an iron fist even in the face of increasing chaos. In the meantime, we were also preparing some plans of stern measures to prevent degeneration of this social disorder reaching a certain point where it might endanger essential maintenance of national security and welfare.[20]

Chang's faith in liberal democracy even at the expense of the efficiency of the government was embedded in the thinking of many civilian politicians of the old regime who had struggled against the authoritarian Rhee government.[21] The politicians' credo was

19. For the student power, see Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: The New Regime," op. cit., p. 54; Cho Ka-Kyŏng, op. cit., pp. 72-3; and Ko Yŏng-bok, "The Meaning of the Social Movement after the Revolution,", op. cit., pp. 87 and 92. About the excessive claim of the students' role in the revolution, Premier Chang said: His Democratic Party's long struggle was actually a decisive factor in eventually bringing down Rhee's dictatorship. Nevertheless since the Democratic Party was not directly involved in that revolution and did not earn political power outrightly by its own right, it was one of the critical factors that crippled his governmental authority in disciplining the people. See his "On Chang Myŏn," Hŭimang Ch'ulp'ansa, ed. Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa, op. cit., pp. 390-1.

20. Chang Myŏn, "On Chang Myŏn," ibid., pp. 382-3.

21. For example, former Ambassador, Chang Ri-uk, a close friend of Premier Chang bitterly stated that destruction of a constitutional government by the military in the name of political efficacy would never be justified. Chang ri-uk, "For Reconstruction of Political Morality," Sasangge, October 1964, p. 19.

diametrically opposed to that of the military leaders who were trained in discipline, efficiency and survival. "First of all, armies by nature are", Professor Lucian W. Pye has stressed, "rival institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other... He thus has... a greater sensitivity to weakness in his own society."[22] Because of this difference in their experience and values, the defenders (the former politicians) and the military leaders polarized their estimates of the political performance of the old regime by the miliary or of the military government by the former politicians.

Professor Rupert Emerson observes in defence of democracy against the military interventions in developing countries,

> The erosion of democracy in the new states has taken two characteristic forms: the seizure of power by the military and the turn to a one-party system. Whichever way the dice come up, a common feature is that politicians and political parties are denounced as corrupt, self-interested and divisive betrayers of the public interest. Politics itself becomes an evil word, and Western-style democracy is publically discredited by its fruits, or lack of them. In contrast, the military or the single party are billed as representing the creative and unified national force which is needed to promote the common good and rescue the country from the disintegration with which the politicians and their parties threaten it.[23]

In fact many political observers at the time felt that in spite of its internal difficulties which unduly overshadowed the performance and perspective of the Chang government, the Second Republic was making good progress and maturing along the road of democracy.[24] Chang Myŏn himself asserted that his government was nevertheless making steady progress towards political and economic stability,

22. Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 178.
23. Rupert Emerson, op. cit., p. 82.
24. See such as Richard C. Allen, "South Korea: The New Regime", op. cit., pp. 54-5; David M. Earl, "Korea: The Meaning of the Second Republic," op. cit., p. 174; and United Nations, 16th Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/4900), op. cit., p. 5.

even though he was accused of responsibility for the "incompetent Chang government" by the military.[25] In retrospect he believed that he could have done much better if he only had "a little more time" before he was thrown out by the impatient and self-righteous military.[26] To make a fair assessment of the Chang government, one of the main "weaknesses" of the Chang government was its refusal to depend on authoritarian measures, and as a result it could not keep pace with the expectation created by the April Student Revolution.[27]

THE MILITARY JUNTA AND "PUNISHMENT AND REFORM"

Believing in their sacred mission of saving the nation from confusion and chaos at the hands of the irresponsible politicians, the military junta expressed its repeated determination that, once a civilian government was restored, it would not tolerate the country coming again under the grip of former politicians "tainted by corruption and injustice".[28] The foundation of the new civilian government, the military junta insisted, had to be constructed first of all on a new generation of politicians in order to reform politics in Korea.[29]

As soon as the coup was successful, the military junta immediately prohibited all political activities of the politicians, dissolved legislatures at all levels of government, and arrested many of the politicians including all members of the Chang cabinet.[30]

25. Chang Myon, "On Chang Myŏn," op. cit., p. 385. See also former Minister of Justice Cho Chae-ch'ŏn's defence of the Chang government, in his "On Cho Chae-chŏn," Kim Ch'ang-jin et al., edited, Chŏngkye yahwa (Evening Stories About Politics), Vol. II, (Seoul: Hongu ch'ulp'ansa, 1966), pp. 464-6.

26. Chang Myŏn, ibid, p. 386.

27. Former President Yun Po-sŏn of the Second Republic was very critical of Premier Chang. But he agreed with this assessment. Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kahipat'kil, op. cit., p. 81.

28. Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., p. 5.

29. Ibid.; and Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, op. cit., p. 17.

30. See Decree No. 4 (Declaration of Transfer of Governmental Power from the Chang Government to the Military Revolutionary Committee) of the Military Revolutionary Committee, May 16, 1961, in Chŏng Tae-jin, ed., Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 20-1.

In the first two months of military rule, the military junta had consolidated its control by reorganizing itself on May 20 as the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and became the supreme governing body of the country with the aid of the newly organized CIA.[31] The junta summarily suppressed all potential sources of political opposition. By Decree No. 6 of the SCNR, all political and social organizations except those of non-political nature engaged in relief, academic and religious activities were ordered to be dissolved.[32] Accordingly fifteen existing political parties and 238 various social organizations were dissolved.[33] In spite of the SCNR's explanation that "it is basically not a denial of freedom of assembly but a measure fitting for their past activities which deviated from their proper spheres of activities and had done great harm to the nation and people,"[34] the result of the decree was a general uprooting of political organizations to an unprecedented degree so that the politicians found themselves at the mercy of the military rulers and hardly capable of recuperating their political strength when political activities were allowed again later.

Critics of the military junta were also harshly suppressed by a

31. For organization and function of the SCNR, see "The Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction" (Appendix 2) and "The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction Law" (Appendix 3), in The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, Military Revolution of Korea (Seoul, 1961), pp.149-56 and 157-69.

32. See Decree No. 6 (Order for Dissolution of Political Parties and Social Organizations) of the SCNR, May 22, 1961, in Chŏng Tae-jin, op. cit., pp. 28 and 38-9.

33. "The Achievement of the Revolution in Two Months," the SCNR, in Kim Chong-uk, Vol. IV, op. cit., p. 1.

34. Ibid.

series of repressive measure, such as censorship of the press and elimination of a number of newspapers and other publications.[35] For example, under Decree No. 11 of the SCNR and Ordinance No. 1 of the Ministry of Public Information, 1,170 newspapers and various publications were forced to close down because of their failure to meet the government standards for publication.[36] The military junta explained that the measure was intended to clean out those phony journalists and publications which were trying to defile the sacred freedom of the press, and to establish a fresh order in journalism and develop a truly democratic press.[37]

Thus deprived of their political organizations and even of the support of the press which had been always a natural friend of the opposition,[38] the former politicians were not only mercilessly condemned and discredited for the plight of the country by the military junta without benefit of right to reply, but also completely disbanded and silenced in humiliation by the new rulers. Professor Robert T. Scalapino observed that the attitude of the military junta towards the former politicians was, as in the early days of the American occupation of Japan, "punishment and reform".[39]

In order to make the political purge complete, the SCNR issued the Political Activities Purification Law on March 16, 1962,[40] by

35. See Decree No. 1 of the Military Revolutionary Committee, May 16, 1961; Decree No. 11 of the SCNR, May 23, 1961; Announcement No.4 of the Martial Law Command, May 18, 1961; and Ordinance No.1 of the Ministry of Public Information, May 28, 1961, in ibid., pp. 20, 29, 49 and 66-8.

36. The SCNR, Military Revolution of Korea, op. cit., p. 29.

37. Ibid.

38. About the traditional role of the Korean press in support of the opposition see Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "Korean Press and National Elections," Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 1967, p. 87.

39. Robert T. Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea," Asian Survey, Vol. II, No. 7, September 1962, p. 3.

40. For the text of this law, see Kukka chaekŏn ch'oeko hoeŭi hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa p'yŏnch'an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee of the History of Korean Military Revolution, the SCNR), Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa (The History of the Korean Military Revolution), Vol. I, No. I, (Seoul, 1963), pp. 652-63.

which the military rulers blacklisted 4,369 persons including almost all former politicians of the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party, the New Democratic Party and other reformist and socialist minority parties; and including former high government officials, the so-called "illicit fortune accumulators" and political activitists among college students. The law also applied to those who were considered to be "apparently politically corrupt" and who "obstructed the execution of the revolutionary tasks" - - - included in these categories were the former military colleagues who were eliminated in the process of the internal power struggles of the SCNR but were still considered to be dangerous to the junta leadership, and the newpapermen who were critical of the military junta.[41.]

The persons placed on the list were barred from all types of political activities, including candidacy for elected office, political campaigns, political speeches, party activities, and others, for the period of six years (until the end of August 1968) unless a person on the list were to be cleared by a screening committee of the SCNR and approved by the SCNR chairman, General Park. General Park stated that the purpose of the political purification law was to prevent recurrence of irregular, corrupt politicis by eliminating the former politicians who had not shown the slightest indication of repentance for their past sins, and that the law was in effect a step to insure faithful execution of the sixth paragraph of the revolutionary pledges, i.e. "After we have completed our mission, we shall restore the government to honest and conscientious civilians, and return to our proper military duties."[42.]

41. For the scope of the blacklist, see Article 3 of the Political Activities Purification Law; and "Judgement on Fitness for Political Activities and the Old Politicians," Hankuk Ilbo, March 26, 1962. For an analysis of the intent of that law, see Asahi Shimbun, April 16, 1962; and Han Nae-bok, "'Old School' Veterans," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXVI, No.2, April 12, 1962, pp. 54-5.

42. "Speech Upon Declaration of the Political Activities Purification Law," March 16, 1962, in Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No.1, op. cit., pp. 67-8. The emphasis by underlining is mine.

Aside from the stated purpose, the law could have, had it been successful, eliminated all undesirable elements who could have been able to frsutrate the military junta and who could be later the sources of political retaliation against the leaders of the coup d'etat should they successfully return to power.[43] Thus the law was, to critics and opponents of the military junta, nothing but a sinister design to liquidate the enemies of the military junta. When the law was announced, President Yun Po-sŏn, who remained in the office as a figure head and was excepted from the blacklist in appreciation for his service to the military junta as President, resigned in protest.[44] The law was also denounced by former Prime Minister Chang Myŏn and Kim To-yŏn, the head of the former opposition party, the New Democratic Party.[45]

Among 2,775 persons on the list who applied to the SCNR's screening committee for examination of their fitness for future political activities, 1,336 persons were cleared in May 1962.[46] However in the face of strong resentment and criticism by the former politicians and critics of the military junta, the SCNR eventually cleared all but 268 persons from the blacklist by the end of February 1964.[47] But the clearance of politicians from the blacklist was so carefully timed[48] that the former politicians and critics have long accused the military junta of deliberate calculation to confuse the already confused camp of the opposition, in order to prevent the resurgence of a strong unified opposition

43. See Asahi Shimbun, April 16, 1962.
44. See Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kasphip'atkil, op. cit., pp.120-5.
45. See again Asahi Shimbun, April 16, 1962.
46. "Two and a Half Years in Turmoil: A Dairy of the Military Rule," Tong-A Ilbo, December 16, 1963.
47. Ibid.
48. The SCNR cleared 171 persons in December 1962 and 168 in early February 1963. Then in late February 1963, it cleared all but 268 persons, from which additional 192 persons were cleared in December 1963 after the elections were over. Ibid.

party which could have effectively challenged the DRP in the 1963 elections.

In addition to these systematic suppressive measures against the former politicians, the military junta, through its vast police apparatus of the CIA, had vigilantly maintained close surveillance over the political leaders of the past regime, coupled with occasional arrests and trials for various counter-revolutionary activities allegedly plotted by former politicians and the former military colleagues.[49] The numerous arrests and trials, particularly of former politicians including Chang Myŏn, were based on fear and suspicion rather than actual evidence. Most of the accused were either acquitted, or released after being sentenced to imprisonment. If extraordinary caution against counter-coups was a normal part of a regime established by a coup, it inevitably deepened the bitterness of the former politicians and strengthened the conviction of opponents and critics of the junta that the military junta was merely a political group aiming at total elimination of all major political opposition to it.[50]

GENERAL PARK'S DECISION TO RUN FOR PRESIDENCY

In the sixth paragraph of the revolutionary pledges, the military promised that it would restore the government to "honest and conscientious civilians" and then would return to its original duty. But who were these honest and conscientious politicians?

49. See W.D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 153-9; and "The case of Iju Party," Lee Byŏng-su et al, ed. Haebang iship nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 1138-9.

50. This was also an observation of Professor Scalapino who visited Korea after the military revolution. See Robert T. Scalapino, "Which Route to Korea," op. cit., p. 8.

The question was an important one that remained to be answered soon, especially in the light of the military junta's repeated expression of distrust of the former politicians.

On August 12, 1961, General Park announced that the military government would restore the civilian government in the summer of 1963 through elections in May of that year and that political activities would be allowed to resume from the beginning of 1963.[51] On December 31, 1962, in the statement which formally allowed resumption of political activities in preparation for restoration of civilian government, General Park warned the former politicians:

> Upon this occasion, the thing that the politicians as well as the people should deeply bear in their minds... is that should the political society of this nation return to the same old state of confusion and violence, it will surely bring about an unmanageable ruin to the democratic fatherland.
>
> Especially, most of you, the politicians, should remind yourselves that you are of the old discredited generation. You should keep pace with the change of time and should devote yourselves to the rehabilitation of your fallen honor by creating a fair and orderly political environment.[52]

The seriousness of Park's warning was already demonstrated by the enactment of the Political Activities Purification Law in March 1962, although the military junta was finding it increasingly difficult to keep most of the former politicians tied down on the blacklist.

On February 18, 1963, General Park made an important statement after having closely watched the political activities of the former politicians as well as of his military colleagues who were now retired from the military service and were organizing a political party (later to become the DRP) to support General Park's

51. "Announcement Concerning the Date of Restoration of Civilian Government," in Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op. cit., pp. 66-7.

52. "Speech upon Resumption of Political Activities," in ibid., p. 67.

presidential bid in the forthcoming elections should he choose to run. In that statement, he said:

> The revolutionary government is now about to transfer the government to civilians, still without having accomplished its revolutionary tasks. At this juncture, our supreme concern is whether the revolutionary ideology and tasks will be carried on by the forthcoming civilian government.
>
> Having observed during the past fifty days the political activities which were supposedly to create a new history of democratic politics, I cannot but express my utter disappointment at the political scenes which have hardly cast off their old patterns and which have no sign of change of the body politic. In view of this development, I can hardly conceal my feeling of uneasiness about the future of the nation.
>
> To my deep regret, there is no sincere political party which is willingly trying to carry out the revolutionary tasks. Instead most of the political parties take the attitudes of denying the revolution, of opposing the government policy, and of defying the revolutionary ideology...
>
> As a man responsible for this revolution, during the past few days I was impelled to give my concern and thought to this grave political situation and its problems. And I have reached a conclusion that restoration of the civilian government without change of the body politic or termination of the military government without guarantee for continuation of the revolutionary ideology is in consequence to forfeit the significance and the value of the May 16th Revolution and to retreat to the point prior to May 16, [1961]. 53.

With this conclusion, General Park declared that he would not be a candidate for presidency of the new civilian government, provided that both the politicians and the military leaders would promise to him and to the people that they would observe the following nine conditions he set forth: (1) The military would strictly observe neutrality in politics and support the government freely elected by the people; (2) the forthcoming government would promise to carry out the revolutionary tasks by upholding the spirit of the April Student Revolution and of the May 16th Military Revolution; (3) the leaders of the military revolution would be allowed to decide individually whether they will return to the military duty or participate in the civilian government; (4) the legitimacy of

53. "The February 18th Statement To Deal with the Political Situation," February 18, 1963, in ibid., pp. 73-4.

the military revolution must be accepted by all and any political vendetta against the leaders of the revolutionary government would not be made; (5) all political parties would immediately stop their slanderous and factional power struggles, and would compete to capture confidence of the people in the elections based on issues and programs; (6) the new Constitution, duly made and approved by the national referendum, would be preserved; (7) the ROK-Japan issue would be dealt with by non-partisan diplomacy; (8) the public officials lawfully employed by the military government would not be dismissed; and (9) special consideration would be given to able retired military officers in government employment policy.[54]

On February 27, in a pompous oath-taking ceremony in Seoul, the former politicians and the chiefs of the armed forces made their solemn pledges to observe the nine conditions in return for General Park's own pledge of non-candidacy.[55] Civilian participants in the ceremony represented twelve political parties. At the ceremony General Park admitted the failure of the military junta's efforts in the "change of generations" (replacement of the generation of old career politicians by a new generation of fresh politicians) in the face of determined opposition by opponents of the military junta.[56] At the time it appeared that in all practical purpose the military leaders were ready to transfer power to the civilian politicians in accordance with the revolutionary pledge.

54. Ibid.
55. See Tong-A Ilbo, February 27, 1963.
56. "The Statement at the Ceremony of Oath to Deal with the Political Situation," Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op. cit., p. 75.

Although General Park's decision not to run was welcomed by the people and most of the former politicians and although the former politicians lost no time in accepting Park's nine conditions, some former politicians like Yun Po-sŏn seriously questioned the sincerity of Park's pledge and dismissed it as a "grand political show".[57] The skeptics thought that General Park was preparing a political ground to justify later his reversal of the earlier pledge of non-candidacy by blaming the former politicians for continuing political confusion in treacherous violation of the pledge of February 27th. At the time of his pledge General Park was apparently sincere[58] about his disillusionment with politics in general and, in particular, with resurgence of the old patterns of politics such as factionalism and slanderous attacks not only among the civilian politicians but also among the members of his own military junta.[59] In spite of his apparent sincerity, it was however obvious that most of the conditions laid down by General Park and accepted by the civilian politicians were too impractical to be upheld. A pledge to elevate politics to a higher plane over-night by a mere ceremony of oath-taking was too inadequate and superficial to bring about a change in politics. If this was the reason for Yun Po-sŏn's fear that the whole affair was Park's design for the latter's comeback, his fear was soon justified.

57. Yun Po-sŏn claimed that he had a reliable information from a certain military junta member warning him it was a show. See Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 139.

58. On February 18 while General Park was making his speech I had the unique opportunity to observe closely Messrs. Kim Chong-pil and Kim Yong-tae, the two main architects of the Democratic Republican Party, who were listening to the live broadcast of General Park's speech. As the most active supporters of General Park's candidacy, they were utterly dejected by the unexpectedness of Park's announcement which they had apparently tried to avert. With the recollection of these two men, I am strongly inclined to believe that the pledge of General Park on February 27 was not a show.

59. For the circumstances of Park's announcement of his withdrawal from politics see Lee Kŏn, "The Real Facts in the Retreat of the Korean Military Regime," Chūōkōron, April 1963, pp. 106-12.

The political conditions following the ceremony were, as expected, deteriorating, instead of improving. On March 16 General Park suspended all political activities and proposed extension of military rule for another four years subject to approval in a national refrendum.[60] For this extraordinary counter-measure to the scheduled transfer of power to the civilian government General Park blamed the former politicians and the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction in the SCNR who were arrested on March 10 for a counter-coup plot.[61] On April 8, however, General Park was forced to withdraw his decision of March 16 in the face of indignant opponents and critics of the military junta, and under considerable pressure from the United States[62] as well as the influence of determined arguments for his candidacy by his own supporters.[63] The above was the train of the events that led to Park's decision to reverse his pledge of February 27 and to run for presidency of the Third Republic. And political activities were again allowed to resume.

About the imperativeness of his candidacy, General Park explained, "I arrived at the conclusion that if I turned power over these people /i.e. the former politicians/ I was giving them the tinder for a third revolution as well."[64] During the presidential campaign his main theme, which was also the reason of his candidacy, was that it was his responsibility, as "a member of the new

60. See "The Statement of March 16th," March 16, 1963, Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op.cit., pp. 75-7.
61. Ibid.
62. About the American pressure, see Kim Kyŏng-rae, "Secret Story of Negotiations between the Military Regime and the United States," Sasanagge, April 1964, pp.114-20.
63. E.g., on March 15 about 60 army officers of the Capital Defence Command in Seoul demonstrated in the front yard of the SCNR building to condemn the former politicians and to urge candidacy of General Park. See Chosun Ilbo, March 16, 1963.
64. Park Chung-hee, The Country, The Revolution and I, op. cit., p. 103.

generation", not to abandon the destiny of the country again to the hands of former politicians.[65] The 1963 elections were for the military ultimately a confrontation between an ideology of his own "new generation" and that of the "old generation".[66] Expounding on this, he said:

> Who is to become President? Who is to control political power? These are immaterial. Today we have several political parties. They can be broadly classified into two kinds. By classification we know there are two streams of political groups. One of them is the stream which fundamentally denies the May 16th Revolution and is trying to restore all the situation back to the point prior to the May 16th Revolution. This is so-called "the party of restoration" striving for revival of the old order which existed before the May 16th Revolution. The other stream is the constructive and willful political party which strives to reconstruct this nation into a modern nation where we can all enjoy better life, by continuously upholding the ideals of the May 16th Revolution and developing it into a national revolution.[67]

"CHANGE OF GENERATIONS": A SLOGAN

In a final analysis, the thirty-two months of the military rule was on the part of the military leaders a period of relentless struggle to change the foundation of Korean politics by forcing old career politicians into retirement in favor of a new generation of younger politicians -- this is what they called the "change of generations". In order to bring about the change of generations, the military leaders tried various barriers and restrictions against the former politicians. The attempt had not only failed, but instead had deeply divided the political elites of Korea by

65. See, e.g., "The DRP Nomination Acceptance Speech," August 31, 1963, in Shin Bŏm-shik, edited, Chokuk ŭi kŭndaehwa: Pak Taet'ongryŏng ŭi chŏngch'i rosŏn (Modernization of the Fatherland: The Political Route of President Park) (Seoul: Tong-A ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), pp. 81-90.

66. See, e.g., his campaign speech of September 23rd, 1963, in ibid., pp. 108-9.

67. His campaign speech of September 28, 1963, in ibid., p. 114.

irreconcilable emnity. Upon the failure of the military junta to find a group of civilian politicians to replace it, the leaders of the military junta became themselves the contenders for political power of the Third Republic, posing as the new generation of "honest and conscientious" politicians so much idolized in their revolutionary pledge. The military leaders claimed that they were of the young generation, full of ambition and passion and keenly aware of a new sense of history, and that they were the only ones capable of bringing solutions to the problems of Korea.[68.]

In spite of the military junta's claim that they were forced to participate in the new civilian government, it had been speculated as early as 1961 that the military junta had no intention of relinquishing power, not only because it is generally true that men who have had the taste of power are not in the habit of surrendering it voluntarily, but also because the military junta had an enormous faith in themselves and believed in their manifest mission of saving the country from Communism, chaos, corruption, poverty and superficial democracy.[69.] The intention of the military leaders to stay in power was already expressed by none other than Kim Chong-pil when he said in Tokyo in October 1962 that General Park's presidential candidacy and the junta members' participation in the forthcoming elections were inevitable.[70.]

On the other hand to the former politicians, thirty-two months under the military rule was a period of terrible insecurity. The earlier attempt of forcible retirement of the former politicians and the continuing intention of the military junta to deny return

68. E.g., Kim Chong-pil, "Modernization of Korea and A New Leading Force," op. cit., p. 28.

69. See Ellis Joffe, "South Korea After the Military Revolution," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vo. XXXIII, No. 11, September 14, 1961, p.517.

70. The statement of Kim Chong-pil, October 12, 1962, Chosun Ilbo, October 13, 1962.

of power to them became a serious threat to their political future. The former politicians and critics of the military junta charged that the seemingly noble slogan of the "change of generations" was in fact a clever idea of the new military oligarchy in alliance with certain elements of young intellectuals to prolong their personal power by unilaterally suppressing the old-timers.[71] Against the Political Activities Purification Law, they argued that the military oligarchy, fearful of political retaliation, intoxicated with the taste of power, and with the growing confidence in governing the people as experience grew, enacted the law which was really a coercive physical device to carry out the real intent behind the slogan of the "change of generations".[72]

There were a number of obvious reasons for the failure of the stated purpose of the slogan and the law. First of all, the former politicians refused to accept the central idea of the whole scheme that they were indeed the condemned ones, as depicted by the military leaders self-appointed to the tribunal of judgement on the former politicians, and who proved to be, as the rulers even with all political resources and absolute authority at hand, no better than the former politicians.[73] The law was indeed a very crude and undemocratic attempt to replace the natural process of elimination through election in democratic politics. The opposition's argument was in essence that law could not legislate a desirable politics.

The equally important case against such an artificial measure was that while some individuals undoubtedly should be barred from

71. "The Change of Generations," Tong-A Ilbo, December 14, 1963.
72. See e.g. Kim Ch'ŏl-su, "New Dimension of Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 80.
73. Kim Kyŏng-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transition," Sasangge, December 1963, p. 47.

future political activities, the country could not well afford the wholesale elimination of about four thousand persons who had, nevertheless, played important roles in political and economic fields.[74] Even assuming that the country would be better off without these persons, critics argued that the elections would be meaningless without real or effective opposition.[75]

Perhaps a more decisive reason for the total indifference of the former politicians, who were not totally immune from what the military alleged against them, to any of Park's ideas or propositions for political change was their total distrust of General Park. Instead of restraint or critical self-examination, the former politicians were increasingly antagonized by anything the military junta did. Kim Kyŏng-rae, the chief of the political department of Kyunghyang Shinmoon, an influential Seoul daily, gave the following reasons why Park's appeal for reformation of the former politicians, for example, in his speech of December 31, 1962, was so repugnant to them: the speech had no impact because it came from the man who willfully discarded the sixth paragraph of the revolutionary pledges which disclaimed any political ambition in the civilian government, and because it came from the man who branded the former politicians as traitors in his various statements.[76]

Finally the idealism of the change of generations for the sake of a clean and orderly politics was shattered by the military junta members themselves - - the very persons who repeatedly told the people that they had to resort to a military coup d' etat to stamp out the evils of the old politics such as factionalism, personal

74. E.g., Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 123
75. Robert T. Scalapino, "Which Route for Korea," op. cit., p. 8.
76. Kim Kyŏng-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transistion," op. cit., p. 47.

ambition and political corruption. The vicious factional struggles,[77] especially between the so-called "main stream" (The Kim Chong-pil faction) and the "non-main stream" (the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction led by Generals Kim Tong-ha and Lee Chu-il) inside the SCNR for political hegemony of the forthcoming civilian government, greatly undermined the image of the military leaders who claimed to be a group of new elites. In early 1963, when the inside feuds were brought out into the open by the factions attacking each other in open forums and in March when the Kim Tong-ha faction was finally eliminated by the arrest for an alleged plot of counter-coup, the creditability of the junta's slogans of the "change of generations", "clean politics", and a "new elite" was irrevocably damaged.[78]

The slogan of the "change of generations" was further compromised, ironically, by General Park himself by his famour formula, "idealism 60%, reality 40%," when the DRP, which had prided itself as a party of the new elite, had to accommodate a vast number of the old politicians under this formula, either as party nominees for the National Assembly or party functionaries, in order to win the 1963 elections.[79] Among the DRP's nominees, eighteen belonged to the defunct Liberal Party. Some of the eighteen nominees were the ones directly responsible for the infamous 1960 presidential elections and for other rigged elections.[80] The compromise of

77. See especially Kiyomiya Ryu, "The Inside of the ROK Supreme Council,"Chūōkōron, March 1963, pp. 248-51; and Daniel Wolfstone, "Park Goes to the Polls," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLI, No. 11, September 12, 1963, pp. 683-5.

78. See "The Balance Sheet of the Military Government: Power Structure and Political Power", Tong-A Ilbo, December 14, 1963.

79. The DRP admitted that the party had to nominate or recruit even those who were "totally unacceptable to the original ideology of the party," Minjukonghwatang (The Democratic Republican Party), Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa (The Four-Year History of the Democratic Republican Party) (Seoul, 1967) p. 127.

80. Chosun Ilbo, November 1, 1963. Many idealists in the party rebelled in dissatisfaction with the compromise and the party was in turmoil. See "Six Days' Feuds: The Dispute on the DRP Nomination," Chosun Ilbo of the same date. All eighteen were elected to the National Assembly, Tong-A Ilbo, September 28, 1963.

idealism with reality was explained by the DRP as "a strategic retreat" to attain a workable majority for political stability in the Third Republic.[81] Thus any meaningful purpose of the "change of generations" and of the political purification law disappeared, when all but a few hundred of the persons on the blacklist had to be cleared in order to give at least a semblance of fair elections, when the "new generation" (the military leaders) proved not to be better than the "old generation" (the former politicians) in political integrity, and finally when the DRP itself had to undermine its idealism in pursuit of victory in the 1963 elections.[82]

Furthermore the military leaders were the experts (but the poor handlers) in creating symbols and slogans, such as "old politicians and old evils", "human reform", "qualitative change", "change of generations", "a new political climate", "nationalistic democracy", "national subjectivity", "miracle of the Han River", and "self-sufficiency". No doubt they inspired and captured the imagination of the people. But it is one of the tragedies of the revolution that these were unfortunately consumed more for the purpose of willfully discrediting the old regimes and purging the former politicians and opponents of the military junta in order to find some rationale of their coup d'etat and to consolidate their power.[83]

81. Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 127; and Nam Chae-hŭi, "Pledges of the Park Regime and An Unknown Democracy," Sasangge December 1963, p. 55.

82. See Im Bang-hyŏn, "Slogan or Ideology?: Criticism and Anti-myth of the Change of Generations," Ch'oekohoeŭibo, No.21 June 1963, pp. 25-7; and "The Change of Generations," Tong-A Ilbo, December 14, 1963.

83. For attacks by intellectuals on the manipulation of symbols and slogans by the military, see Chi Myŏng-kwan, "The May 16th Coup is Not the Heir of the Spirit of the April 19th Revolution," Sasangge, April, 1964, pp. 28-37; and Nam Chae-hŭi, "Pledges of the Park Regime and An Unknown Democracy," op. cit., pp. 53-9.

Because of these attitudes of the self-righteous military leaders who justified first their military coup by expressing their unreserved contempt of the former politicians and blaming them for the evils of the old regimes, and who subsequently pursued puritanical politics by forceful elimination of the former politicians from politics, the leaders of the military government had not only failed in their quest, but in the course of time had implanted a seed of bitter political struggle for the future by dividing the nation.

CHAPTER 6

THE 1963 ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

The 1963 elections were in a sense a fierce contest between the "new elite" of the young generation represented by the military officers in alliance with some new politicians and the former career politicians thrown out of power by the military coup on May 16, 1961. More specifically for the military leaders the elections were to terminate formally their military rule and transform themselves as constitutional and legitimate rulers of the country by winning popular support. For the former civilian politicians who had been barred from all political activities and silenced during the great part of two and a half years of the military rule, the elections provided a battleground to oust the military from power and to restore themselves to power.[1.]

Although General Park Chung-hee, who retired from the army on August 30, 1963 to become a presidential candidate of the DRP, won the office of presidency, and his party gained a strong majority of seats in the new (Sixth) National Assembly,[2.] the elections were in many respects inconclusive, in view of the election returns and of the legal and political conditions under which the elections were held, for the DRP to claim for a clear

1. See the campaign slogans of major opposition parties, the Civil Rule Party, the Party of the People, the Democratic Party and the Liberal Democratic Party in the CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 364-5; and Chungang sŏnkŏ kwanri wiwonhoe (The Central Election Management Committee), Kak chŏngtang ŭi tanghŏn, chŏngkang chŏngch'aek (Charters, Platforms and Policies of Political Parties) (Seoul, 1964), pp. 80, 107-8, 129-30, and 149-53.

2. For overall reviews of the 1963 elections, see Lee Chong-sik, "Korea: The Search of Stability," Asian Survey, Vol. IV, No. 1 January 1964, pp. 656-65; Yim Hong-bin, "An Analysis of the General Elections in 1963," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 1, April 1964, pp. 120-8; and Kim Myong-whai, "The Presidential Election in Korea, 1963," Korean Affairs, Vol. II, Nos. 3 & 4, 1963, pp. 372-8.

mandate of rule, and, on the other hand, for the opposition to concede their defeat. As a result, doubt of the political legitimacy of Park's government remained the same as ever in the minds of the political opponents.

The central issue of the elections was naturally the nature of the government to replace the military junta and to bring a stable democracy to the Third Republic. The opponents of the military junta argued that a genuine stable democracy could only be brought about by restoration of civilian leadership, and urged the voters to reject another form of the military rule in the new Republic. On the other hand Park and his party maintained that unless they, representing the new generation, were elected to leadership, the nation would again face the old vicious circles of corruption, poverty, instability and revolution.[3.]

Instead of proposing policy alternatives to the electorate, both the military leaders and their opponents waged their campaigns chiefly by exploiting each other's personalities, past weaknesses, and failures and by blaming each other for the plight of the country. The low level of campaigning by attack on personalities reached its depth when Park Chung-hee ridiculed Yun Po-sŏn's democracy as "disguised democracy" and asserted that his own democracy was liberal democracy based on nationalism.[4.] This

3. See especially the speech of Yun Ch'i-yŏng, the Park's presidential campaign manager and at the time the chairman of the DRP, in Kwangju on September 29, Chosun Ilbo, October 1, 1963. Yun Ch'i-yŏng said in highly inflammatory invective, that if the "old politicians" were elected to power, another military revolution would be inevitable. His speech became also an issue of the campaign.

4. The campaign speech of Park in Seoul on September 23, Chosun Ilbo, September 24, 1963.

immediately invited Yun's attack on Park as a pro-Communist.[5] The exchange of these personal attacks, questioning each other's basic loyalty to the Republic, set the whole tone of the 1963 elections.[6]

The pre-election atmosphere was also darkened by the arrest of General (retired) Song Yo-ch'an, former premier of Park's military government and one of the most decorated generals in the Korean War. After his resignation from the premiership, he continuously criticized the military junta's decision to enter politics as a betrayal of the revolutionary pledge.[7] His arrest by the CIA on August 11, on the charges of executing a subordinate officer during the Korean War and of allegedly ordering troops to fire on students during the April Student Revolution (Song was then the Army Chief of Staff and the martial law commander),[8] was made three days after he wrote an open letter to General Park which criticized Park's running for the presidency.[9] Song's rearrest

5. Yun Po-sŏn's statement to reporters in Chŏnju on September 24, Chosun Ilbo, September 25, 1963. According to Pak Sŏng-hwan, a veteran reporter who has an immense knowledge of the history of Communist activities in the Korean army, Park Chung-hee, then an army major, was arrested and summarily sentenced to life imprisonment in 1949 by a military court on the charge of his activity as an agent in charge of organization of the Communist party in South Korea (the South Korea Labor Party) in the army. Pak Sŏng-hwan, who had access to the late CIC chief General Kim Ch'ang-yong's secret list of past Communists in the army, asserts that Major Park was an innocent victim of indiscriminate mass purges after the Yosu-Sunch'ŏn Communist rebellion in 1948. At the outbreak of the Korean War, Park Chung-hee was immediately reinstated in the army on suspension of the sentence. Pak Sŏng-hwan, P'ado nŭn naeil do ch'inda (Waves Will Come Also Tomorrow) (Seoul: Tong-A ch'ulp'ansa, 1965), pp. 185-99. See also Park Chung-hee's own denial, Chosun Ilbo, November 10, 1963.

6. The people and the press were very critical of these personal attacks, see, e.g., the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, September 26, 1963; and "The Ideological Debates," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp. 672-3.

7. See his statement of January 8, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, January 9, 1963. See also his memoire, Song Yo-ch'an "On Song Yo-ch'an," Hŭimang ch'ulp'ansa, ed., Sashil ŭi chŏnbu rŭl kisul handa, op.cit., pp. 472-8.

8. For the CIA's charges, see the organ of the government, The Korean Republic (an English daily), August 13, 1963. General Song was later cleared of these charges.

9. See his open letter in Tong-A Ilbo, August 8, 1963.

on September 4, three weeks after his release on a writ of habeas corpus, and the subsequent circumstances that Song had to conduct his presidential campaign from the Mapo prison cell in Seoul not only drew vigorous protests from the opposition parties but also aroused much consternation at home and abroad,[10] in spite of the government's denial that the arrest was a political retaliation.[11] In addition to the Song incident, on September 7, General Kim Chae-ch'un, the arch rival of Colonel Kim Chong-pil and critic of the DRP for the irregular fashion of its creation, was forced to quit the Liberal Democratic Party (the party of General Song's candidacy) which he created originally as a rival to the DRP and to go abroad for a temporary exile until the elections were over.[12] The departure of General Kim Chae-ch'un was also regarded by the opposition parties as a suppression of the opposition as well as a device to silence a star witness on the illegitimate organization of the DRP.[13]

In spite of the repeated assurance of the government and the DRP that fair and free elections were their supreme goal in the elections,[14] the appearance of various militant youth organizations -- such as the Patriotic Corps (led by Kim Tu-han, a onetime leader of hooligans in Seoul), the United Youth Corps (Kim Ŭng-cho), the Korea Youth Society, and the New Peoples Society -- aroused the

10. For the protests of the opposition parties, see, e.g. Chosun Ilbo, September 5 and 20, 1963. For the reaction abroad, see, for example, the statement of the U.S. Department of State, in Chosun Ilbo, August 12, 1963.

11. See the statement of the SCNR, Chosun Ilbo, September 5, 1963; and the editorial of The Korean Republic, August 22, 1963.

12. The SCNR spokesman, General Lee Hu-rak, was known to have pressed General Kim to leave the country, Chosun Ilbo, September 7, 1963. General Kim stated in Tokyo that his departure was involuntary, Chosun Ilbo, September 8, 1963.

13. E.g., the statement of the Liberal Democratic Party, Chosun Ilbo, September 8, 1963; the campaign speeches of Yun Po-sŏn and Hŏ Chŏng, Chosun Ilbo, September 28, 1963; and "Three Dimensional Mirror," a political commentary of Chosun Ilbo, September 11, 1963.

14. See, e.g., item 4 of the DRP's Election Pledges, The Democratic Republican Party, The Democratic Republican Party of the Republic of Korea (Seoul, 1965), p. 53.

the fear of the people. Against the past experience of the political terrorism during the elections by the various front youth organizations of Rhee's Liberal Party such as the Anti-Communist Youth Corps and the Anti-Communists Artists Corps,[15] the appearance of the new youth organizations in support of the DRP in the 1963 elections revived apprehension of possible terrorism. In particular the Patriotic Corps (Aekuktan),[16] which was organized along a paramilitary structure with 27,000 members and duly registered as a social organization with the Ministry of Public Information, made a threat, in August, to the former politicians in its pamphlet that "recapture of political power by the old politicians will be prevented to our death".[17] Later its head Kim Tu-han disclaimed any intention of using violence and the DRP also officially disassociated itself from the Patriotic Corps. But the DRP's chairman and Park's presidential campaign manager Yun Ch'i-yŏng's close friendship with Kim Tu-han and Yun's praise of Kim's activities had unquestionably intimidated the opponents of the military junta and cast a dark shadow on the forthcoming elections.[18] Fortunately the main activities of these youth corps during the election campaigns were confined to condemning and exposing (with photographs) the "evils" of the former politicians.[19]

15. See the court records of trials of 17 terrorists of the Anti-Communist Youth Corps and the Anti-Communist Artists Corps, in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 927-51. Also Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vo. I, op. cit., pp. 120-2; Paek Hyŏn-su, "Kwak Yŏng-ju and Political Hooligans," Kim In-kuk, "Shin To-hwan and the Anti-Communist Youth Corps," Yang Myŏng-dong, "Im Hwa-su and the Anti-Communist Artists Corps," in Shint'aeyangsa, edited, Hŭkmak, op. cit., pp. 88-91, 92-5, and 132-5; and Minjutang, T'ucheng ŭi chokjŏk, pp. 134-5 and 165-6.

16. For a detailed examination of the Patriotic Corps, see Cho Yong-chung, "Reappearance of Terrorism," Sasangge, October 1963, pp. 44-8.

17. Kyunghyang Shinmoon, August 6, 1963. See also Tong-A Ilbo, August 11, 1963.

18. Cho Yong-chung, op. cit., pp. 46-7.

19. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 365-6; and Chosun Ilbo, September 18, 1963.

The bitter 1963 presidential elections of October 15 opened with seven candidates -- six opposition candidates against Park of the DRP. The large number of opposition candidates in the race was the result of the failure of earlier efforts of the opposition leaders to agree on one unified opposition candidate against Park, even after they formed the Party of the People as their unified party. The failure is known as the "fiasco of the Party of the People" and became a symbol of factional strife in Korean politics.[20.] Among the six opposition candidates, Park's chief opponents were: Yun Po-sŏn of the Civil Rule Party (Minchŏngtan) -- former President of the Second Republic and, for a short duration, of the military regime; Hŏ Chŏng of the Party of the People (Kukmin ŭi tang) -- former Acting President of the interim government which followed the collapse of the Rhee government in April 1960; and General Song Yo-ch'an of the Liberal Democratic Party (Chamintang) -- former Army Chief of Staff and once premier of Park's military government. The Democratic Party (Minjutang), which lost its leader Chang Myŏn through the Political Activities Purification Law but was rejuvenated under the new leadership of Madam Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, did not proffer a candidate in order to preserve its strength for the general elections for the National Assembly.

In the middle of the campaigns Hŏ Chŏng and Song Yo-ch'an (who was conducting his campaign in prison) withdrew their candidacy in favour of Yun Po-sŏn. Thus, in the final phase of the presidential campaign, the elections became practically a contest between Park and Yun.

20. See Sŏ Byŏng-jo, Chŏngsang ŭi tochŏnja (The Challengers for the Pinnacle of Power) (Seoul: Byokp'asa, 1966), pp. 158-60; Song Kŏn-ho, "A New Political Force is Desirable," op. cit., p. 66. See also Yun Po-sŏn's own account of the fiasco in which he was the stormcenter, in his Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., pp.149-56.

THE ELECTION RETURNS AND THE INDECISIVE MANDATE OF PARK'S GOVERNMENT

The final presidential election returns[21] showed that of 12,985,015 registered voters, 11,036,175 (85%) participated in the elections. Victorious Park received 4,702,640 votes (46.6%) and Yun 4,546,614 (45.1%) of the 10,081,198 valid votes. The margin of Park's victory was 156,034 (1.5%).

TABLE I: RESULTS OF 1963 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Candidates	Votes Received	% of Votes
Park Chung-hee (DRP)	4,702,640	46.65
Yun Po-sŏn (Civil Rule Party)	4,546,614	45.10
O Chae-yŏng (Ch'up'ung Hoe)	408,664	4.05
Pyŏn Yŏng-tae (Chŏngmin Hoe)	224,443	2.22
Chang Ri-sŏk (Shinhŭng Party)	198,837	1.98
Totals	10,081,198	100.00

Source: The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p. 491
Percentages are computed.

In the general elections which were held on November 26, 976 candidates (825 for single-member electoral districts and 151 for the national constituency on the list of proportional representation) of twelve parties competed for 175 seats (131 in single-member districts and 44 for nationwide seats) of the National Assembly. Among 13,344,149 registered voters, 9,622,183 (72.1%) participated in the general elections.[22] Participation in the general elections

21. For the results of the presidential elections, see the CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 490-1 and 713-20.
22. For the results of the general elections, see ibid., pp. 453-66 and 863-914.

was 12.9 per cent lower than that in the presidential elections. The results of the general elections gave 110 seats (62.8%) of the seats to the DRP which received only 33.5 per cent of the total valid votes. In extreme contrast the opposition parties which drew altogether 66.5 per cent of the valid votes occupied only 65 (37.1%) of the Assembly seats.

TABLE II: RESULTS OF 1963 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Party	Votes Received	% of Votes	Seats (district + PR)	% of seats
DRP	3,113,985	33.5	110 (88 + 22)	62.8
Civil Rule Party	1,870,976	20.1	41 (27 + 14)	23.4
Democratic Party	1,264,285	13.6	13 (8 + 5)	7.4
Party of People	822,500	8.8	2 (2 + 0)	1.3
Lib. Demo. Party	752,026	8.1	9 (6 + 3)	5.1
Other oppositions	1,576,558	15.9	0 (0 + 0)	0.0
Totals	9,298,830	100.0	175 (131 + 44)	100.0

Source: The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p. 458

There were a number of reasons why the opposition forces to Park and his party failed in both elections of 1963. Among them, the foremost factor was an excessive proliferation of opposition parties and their candidates, as a result of the inability of the opposition to unite themselves in the elections despite their common slogan: "Let's put an end to the military rule". As Tables I and II indicate there was a considerable popular opposition in both elections. Had Yun Po-sŏn been able to unify the opposition or had a unified opposition presented one candidate, the margin of that slim victory would have easily turned against Park Chung-hee.[23] The inability of the opposition to unify and its consequences were

23. This was the consensus of election analysts. See, for example, the comments in the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, October 17, 1963.

more obvious in the results of the general elections which gave a disproportionately large number of the seats (62.8%) to the DRP in spite of the fact that the opposition had 66.5 per cent of popular support.

Actually a minority party government has been a permanent feature of Korean politics, ever since political parties in Korea began to play vital roles in elections and politics in the 1954 general elections. Either due to manipulation of elections, extreme proliferation of political parties, or the combination of both, the ruling parties have won the elections and become the majority parties in the National Assembly. But they have never received the majority of the total valid votes cast. Nevertheless the ruling parties have been commanding an unproportionately large majority of the seats in the National Assembly. In the 1954 general elections, the ruling Liberal Party received 36.8 per cent of votes and occupied 52.2 per cent of the Assembly seats;[24.] in the 1958 general elections, the Liberal Party drew 42.1 per cent of votes and captured 54.1 per cent of the seats;[25.] in the 1960 general elections after the April Student Revolution, the Democratic Party received 41.7 per cent of the votes and became the ruling party with 75.1 per cent of the Assembly seats.[26.]

24. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op cit., p. 407.
25. Ibid., p. 420.
26. Ibid., p. 436.

TABLE III: PERCENTAGES OF VOTES AND SEATS OF THE GOVERNMENT PARTY IN THE ASSEMBLY

Election yr.	Ruling Party	% of votes	% & no. of seats	Total seats
1954	Lib.	36.8	56.2 (114)	203
1958	Lib.	42.1	54.1 (126)	233
1960	Democ.	41.7	75.1 (175)	233
1963	DRP	33.5	62.8 (110)	175

Source: The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 407, 420, 436 and 458.

The disproportion in distribution of seats in favour of the ruling party unrelated to the popular support in the elections was described by a late politician, Ŏm Sang-sŏp, as "our abnormal political situation where the majority of the National Assembly disagrees with the majority of the people".[27] Especially when the discrepancy between the strength of the majority party in the National Assembly and the popular expression in the elections was as extreme as in the case of the 1963 elections, the ruling party was not only far from being a competent consensual majority with popular support, but had to meet a determined opposition who could easily appeal or resort to an extra-parliamentary mass movement in order to counter or supplant the unnatural majority in the National Assembly.[28] This was particularly true if the majority party, with an overwhelming number of seats but with less popular support, and the determined opposition, with some popular support, could not resolve their differences on important issues such as the issue of the ROK-Japan treaty. In this mathematical view alone both the elections in 1963 were too inconclusive to give any semblance of clean victory to the Park government and his ruling party.

27. Ŏm Sang-sŏp, op. cit., p. 259.
28. See Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The problems of Operating Parliamentary Politics," Sahoe kwahak ronjip (Collection of Theses in Social Sciences), of Yonsei University, Seoul, Vol. I, No. 1, 1965, p. 51.

Because of the poor showing of the DRP in spite of all political advantages in both the elections, political observers warned that moderation and compromise between the ruling party and the opposition and responsiveness of the ruling party to the public opinion were the keys to political stability in the Third Republic.[29.]

THE ISSUE OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES

Although on the election days no irregularities of any significance nor violence of any scale in voting and vote-counting procedures were reported,[30.] the opposition parties refused to accept the results of the elections, charging that the DRP rigged both elections. As to the general elections, the four main opposition parties (the Civil Rule Party, the Democratic Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the Party of the People) had immediately declared that the elections were "rigged ones unprecedented in history", while the DRP claimed them a victory through "fair elections".[31.] The opposition parties accordingly expressed their determination to repudiate the results of the elections.[32.] As to the presidential elections, Yun Po-sŏn claimed that Park Chung-hee was illegally elected, first, by his illegal candidacy and, secondly, by rigging vote-countings. Yun asserted that "I am the spiritual President of the people", because "I won the election in voting but lost it in vote-counting" which was

29. "Analysis of the Characteristics of the New National Assembly," Tong-A Ilbo, November 28, 1963; and "Balance Sheet of the October 15th Election," Series No. 2, Chosun Ilbo, October 19, 1963.

30. See the report on the elections by the UNCURK, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 18th Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/5512/Add. 1), 1963; and the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, October 17, 1963.

31. Hankuk Ilbo, November 28, 1963.

32. Ibid.

systematically rigged by pre-meditation.[33] He also declared his unlimited determination to unseat President-elect Park.[34]

In two separate law suits[35] against Park in the Supreme Court, Yun charged that Park was ineligible to be elected, because Park was still technically serving his suspended term of life imprisonment sentenced by a military court in 1949 for alleged involvement in a Communist rebellion when Park was a major; and because his membership in the DRP and his acceptance of the presidential nomination of the DRP while serving as Acting President and Chairman of the SCNR were in violation of the existing provisions of the Constitution (Article 53), the National Assembly Law (Article 19) and the Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures for National Reconstruction (Article 9), which all prohibited partisan political activities of both President and Speaker of the National Assembly - - in both capacities he headed the military junta.[36] President-elect Park was also accused of rigging vote-counts to get his 150,000 plurality by invalidating, destroying or stealing Yun's own and other dandidates' votes or by activating invalid votes for Park. Yun also demanded that the whole presidential elections be declared void because: (1) the Central Election Management Committee was biased in favor of Park's election; (2) the public officials

33. His statement on November 13, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, November 14, 1963. Yun also maintained that the military junta had already decided to elect Park by a margin of 150,000 votes by manipulation. See Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., pp. 174-5.

34. Chosun Ilbo, November 14, 1963.

35. One suit was to invalidate Park's election to presidency; and the other was to invalidate the presidential elections. See the texts of Yun's suits against Park and Sa Kwang-uk, the chairman of the Central Election Management Committee, in Chosun Ilbo, November 15, 1963.

36. All these provisions were changed with the new Constitution of the Third Republic. But when Park accepted the DRP nomination on August 30, 1963, the military junta was still technically operating under the old Constitution and the old laws with supplement of the Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures and other decrees of the junta. In order to legalize Park's candidacy, the SCNR amended the Law Concerning Extraordinary Measures on September 3, 1963 (See Chosun Ilbo, September 4, 1963).

were partisans for Park in violation of laws which guarantee political neutrality of public officials; (3) the national broadcasting stations were impartially mobilized for Park's candidacy; (4) the local authorities denied to the opposition use of public facilities; (5) the DRP and public officials illegally utilized various social and cultural organizations which were prohibited from political campaigns; (6) other various violations of the election laws were committed.

Although all the charges alleged by Yun and other opposition parties were hard to prove, and they were undoubtedly exaggerated in order to discredit the DRP and the military junta,[37] some of the accusations made by the opposition parties were not entirely without evidence. Particularly during the campaigns for the National Assembly, suspicion of irregularities was wide and deep.

In the history of Korean elections, the foremost cause of election irregularities has been always civil servants, especially national police, even though the pattern of their involvement varies from one election to another.[38] At this point of discussion, it may be appropriate to examine briefly the role of civil servants as an instrument of political power in Korea.[39] All constitutions

37. E.g. Chosun Ilbo, October 27, 1963, reported from one source connected with the Civil Rule Party that the law suit against Park being prepared by the party was partly intended for publicity against the DRP and restraining it from unfair campaigns in the forthcoming general elections.

38. See various court records at the trials of former officials of the Liberal Party government in the revolutionary courts in 1961, in Hankuk kyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 119-32, 178-201 and 295-318. See also the eyewitness reports of newspaper reporters in Lee Sang-chong, ed., Yŏksa ŭi taum tankye: naega kyŏkŭn 5.2 ch'ŏng sŏnkŏ (The Next Stage of History: The General Elections of May 2, 1958 which I saw) (Seoul: Ch'angp'yŏng Munko, 1958).

39. See especially No Chŏng-hyŏn, "Anatomy of Korean Bureaucracy and Elections," Sasangge, April 1966, pp. 70-5; No Chŏng-hyŏn, "The Korean Bureaucracy From the Point of View of Behavior," Sasangge, Supplement, May 1966, pp. 41-9; and "The Pulse of Korea: Permission to Political Activities for the Classified Civil Servants," Shindong-A, November 1965, pp. 142-4.

and civil service laws that have existed in Korea have always provided for the political neutrality of civil servants as one of the constitutional virtues of bureaucracy. The present Constitution (Article 6) states that "All public officials shall be servants of the entire people and shall be responsible to the people" and "The status and political impartiality of public officials shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of law". This constituional spirit is further stressed in detail in the National Civil Service Law (Article 65) and the Local Civil Service Law (Article 57).

But as in other developing countries, one of the salient aspects of Korean bureaucracy is that it is an important factor in the political process as a "servant of the ruling political party". Embryologically the tradition and attitudes of Korean bureaucracy, which started with the feudalistic bureaucracy of the Yi Dynasty had been greatly influenced by the authoritarian civil service of the Japanese colonial government and later by the extreme "personalism" and the centralism under the rule of Rhee Syngman (see Chapter 1).[40] With this background, one of the traits of Korean bureaucracy is a great instinct of self-preservation. As a measure of self-preservation, civil servants are inevitably involved in politics by paying their extreme loyalty to political groups in power. Professor No Chŏng-hyŏn describes the relationship between the ruling party and civil servants as follows:

40. For the development of Korean bureaucracy, see Lee Won-sul, op. cit., pp. 271-85; Lee Mun-yŏng, "The Korean Bureaucracy From the Point of View of Enactment of Laws," Sasangge, Supplement, May 1966. pp. 29-40; and Pak Tong-sŏ, Hankuk kwanryo chedo ŭi yŏksachŏk chŏnkae (The Evolution of Korean Bureaucracy)(Seoul: Hankuk yŏnku tosŏkwan, 1961).

> The characteristic trait of Korean civil servants is their strong bond with /the ruling/ political party. Self-preservation and the short-cut to higher position, are possible depending on the degree of civil servants' cooperation and involvement in politics on behalf of the ruling party, as demonstrated during the past regimes of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party. It has been generally acknowledged by the general public that the degree of cooperation between civil servants and the party is directly the degree of the party's success in elections. Among civil servants the election times are the real opportunities for flattering politicians, and this was the only way for them to stay or advance in the hierarchy of the government....[41.]

The importance of civil servants in deciding the fortune of a political party was shown by an official report of the Liberal Party submitted to President Rhee after Rhee's vice-presidential running mate Lee Ki-bung was defeated by Chang Myŏn of the Democratic Party on a separate ticket in the 1956 presidential and vice-presidential elections, in spite of the extensive rigging of ballot boxes. In this report the Liberal Party cited that one of the seven reasons for Lee Ki-bung's defeat was "the betrayal of police and other public officials" who were dependent for their livelihood on the party and yet did not "perform their duties."[42.]

According to a compilation of Lee Ung-hŭi, the pattern of election irregularities in the 1963 elections was small-scale but more subtle and effective.[43.] He listed the following irregularities, based on the actual exposures or confessions by public officials themselves who, in some cases, produced originals of the directives issued by their superiors:

41. No Chŏng-hyŏn, op. cit., p. 72.

42. About the report, see Lee Kwan-ku and Chu Yo-han, ed., 5.15 sŏnkŏ nonsŏl jip (Collection of Editorials Concerning the Elections of May 15) (Seoul: Kyŏnghyang shinmoonsa, 1956), pp. 182-6; and also Pae Sŏng-yŏng, "The Basic Pattern of Korean Politics in View of the Policies after the Elections of May 15," Sasangge, August 1956, p. 17.

43. Lee Ung-hŭi "The New Pattern of Irregularities in the Elections," Sasangge, December 1963, pp. 39-45. See also Chosun Ilbo, November 9, November 10, November 12 and November 21, 1963.

(1) Enlisting supporters for the DRP by local policemen by using implied threat.
(2) Directing local officials at the levels of "kun" or "ku" (county) to help DRP candidates.
(3) Making lists of voters who could be bought out for the DRP by local police and penetrating into them.
(4) Investigating by police past weaknesses of voters that could be sources of trouble with the authorities.
(5) Utilization of absentee votes in the polling stations installed in the military camps or installations where electoral observers had little access.
(6) Buying votes, utilizing absentee votes, and substituting voters by officials of "ri" and "tong" (the lowest level of local adminstrative units in rural and urban areas.
(7) Stepping up public works such as water systems, bridges, irrigational dams, pavements and housing in localities and advertising the benefits of such projects in order to demonstrate how the present government was effective and, on the other hand, to remind the local people that these projects might be jeopardized if they elected opposition members.[44.]

Besides the above list of irregularities, it was an open secret that the DRP was illegally conducting campaigns among and by members of such national, non-political organizations as the Korean Youth Association, the Korean Women's Association, 4-H Clubs, the Soil Improvement Society and other rural, social and cultural organizations which were dependent financially on the government.[45.] The opposition parties suspected also that the notable increase of the number of eligible voters in the general elections by 350,000 from 12,985,015 in the presidential elections in October to 13,344,149 in the general elections in November,[46.] was another method of election manipulation,[47.] as it had been standard technique in past elections.[48.]

The Central Election Management Committee reported that the

44. About the last item (7), see especially, "Tropical Areas: The Frontier of the November Elections," Chosun Ilbo, November 9, 1963; and "Comments on Current Events of Society," Sasangge, October 1963, p. 88.
45. See the statement of the opposition parties' Consultative Council for Struggling against Irregular Election, Chosun Ilbo, November 20, 1963.
46. The figures are from the CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 456 and 490.
47. E.g., the protest of the Party of the People, Chosun Ilbo, November 14, 1963.
48. E.g., see such cases in the 1958 general elections, Lee Sang-chong, ed., op. cit., pp. 117-20.

presidential elections had 701 cases (involving 931 persons of both the DRP and the opposition) of various violations of the election law, of which 173 cases were prosecuted; and the general elections had 1,064 cases (involving 1,582 persons of both the DRP and the opposition) of violations of the election law, of which only 19 cases were prosecuted.[49] In terms of the number of cases reported for violation, the 1963 elections were one of the most disputed elections in Korea. Whenever there are a large number of the people who believe that the elections are not fair or the validity of the elections is challenged -- whether or not their beliefs are based on actual irregularities, not only do the elections produce political bitterness but the foundation of a popular government is in serious jeopardy. But the results of the 1963 elections in Korea not only provoked bitterness from the opposition but also cast a dark cloud on the legitimacy of the new DRP government in the minds of the people who have always associated the elections with irregularities.[50] When the opposition felt that they were cheated in the elections, a political crisis of the future was already in making even before the Third Republic had officially begun.

49. The CHMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p. 646. All cases and prosecutions were dropped after the elections by State Council (cabinet) Decree No. 1678 on December, 1963.

50. According to Yun Ch'ŏn-ju's survey in 1961, 55.4% of the voters he sampled responded, "There should not be irregularities," when they were asked "What do you think about the elections?" Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, Hankuk chŏngch'i ch'ekye (Korean Political System) (Seoul: Koryo taehakkyo, 1961), p. 236.

"FUNDAMENTAL RIGGING": ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS FOR FAIR COMPETITION

Existence of an opposition is essential in determining whether or not there is democracy. But viability of democracy depends on whether the opposition is equipped with the rights and the political resources essential to its free and competitive functioning. The opposition parties in the 1963 elections emphatically felt that they were not only ill-equipped in these essentials but also deliberately denied them by the manipulations of the military junta.

Ever since Park Chung-hee declared his candidacy, which itself was one of the important campaign issues the opposition raised against the DRP,[51] the notion of "fundamental election rigging" had been widely circulated.[52] The notion referred to the initial, fundamental disadvantages and various restrictive political and legal measures that the military junta and the DRP had created or organized against the opposition well before the 1963 elections in order to insure continuation of Park's rule.[53] These were the factors that the opposition parties attributed to their defeat in the elections, and the bases on which the opposition parties argued that the elections were meaningless as their results were foregone conclusions well before the elections were held.

(1) Illegitimate Creation of the DRP

The foremost case of the opposition parties against the DRP was the fact that the DRP was illegitimately organized in violation of

51. For the repeated protest of six opposition parties (which during the elections organized the Struggling Committee for Fair Elections) and for the military junta' reply, see The Korean Republic, August 17, 1963; Chosun Ilbo, September 1, September 3, September 4, and September 22, 1963.

52. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p. 372; and the statement of the Struggling Committee for Fair Elections, October 21, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 1963.

53. For the DRP's advantages, see Yim Hong-bin, "An Analysis of the General Elections in 1963," op. cit., pp. 120-8.

the military junta's own decree which banned all political activities before January 1, 1963.[54] Kim Chong-pil and his group in the CIA started organizing the DRP as early as the early summer of 1962 while all other political parties and activities of the opponents still remained disbanded and suppressed under a military decree and were waiting for the resumption of political freedom from 1963.[55] The pre-emptive illegal organization of the DRP prior to January 1, 1963 was revealed on January 21, 1963, by Marine Corps General Kim Tong-ha, a leader of the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction who resigned from the founding committee for the DRP in protest against Kin Chong-pil's dominance of the new party.[56] General Kim Tong-ha, who also resigned from his post of the SCNR as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defence, expressed his deep dissatisfaction with the military revolution which, in his own words, "betrayed the trust of the people".[57] One of his complaints[58] was explained as follows:

> The DRP was reported to have already completed establishment of local party branches nationally by the early part of January [1963]. We heard also that it was not democratically organized; instead, organized by the Central

54. E.g. the accusation of the Struggling Committee for Fair Elections, September 21, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1963.

55. The secret organizational activities during the summer of 1962 were limited to activities of recruiting local party functionaries and influential personages for the planned party. These activities were sometimes known as the "V (Victory) Operation" in the CIA.

56. See General Kim Tong-ha's statement in Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1963. General Song Yo-ch'an also claimed during the presidential campaign in September 1963, that he knew the illegality of early organization of the DRP. See "Justification of Candidacy", Series No. 5 (Song Yo-ch'an), Chosun Ilbo, September 22, 1963.

57. See Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1963.

58. His motive in denouncing his military colleagues should be also viewed in the light of power struggle among the members of the junta who were fighting for hegemony of the new party, in which the faction of Kim-Chong-pil was already well entrenched and refused to share control of the party with his rivals who came belatedly to realize what Kim Chong-pil had already accomplished as the head of the CIA.

> Intelligence Agency. In order to find out the truth, five of us upon retiring from the military joined the party as promotors for the establishment of the party. What we have heard was all true. And we realized that we five were powerless to undo what they had already done.[59]

Due to this early start and with backing of the much feared and resourceful political instrument the CIA, the DRP under the leadership of Kim Chong-pil (now retired from the army and the CIA) could immediately emerge in the early 1963 as the supreme contender for political power in the Third Republic. On the other hand the former politicians and the opponents of the military junta, who were crippled by the blacklist and condemnation under the political purification law, divided by factionalism, and impoverished without political funds, were still in the stage of assembling their forces to form opposition parties. Aside from its prestige of being the party of General Park with more than two years of absolute military rule behind him, the DRP's advantage was clearly demonstrated by its phenomenal growth in party membership. For example when Park Chung-hee formally joined the DRP on August 30, 1963, he became the 706,611th member of the DRP. Ten days later on September 9, the DRP's total number of party members passed the mark of one million. In other words the DRP averaged an increase of membership of 30,000 a day. Between August 30 and October 15, 1963, the membership increase was on average 17,000 a day as Table IV indicates. Chosun Ilbo daily commented that the DRP's rate of expansion was "an unheard of thing in the past," and that at this rate (30,000 a day) the DRP was absorbing a city of fair size (in terms of number of voters) a day.[60]

59. Asahi Shimbun, January 22, 1963.
60. Chosun Ilbo, September 10, 1963.

TABLE IV: GROWTH OF DRP MEMBERSHIP

Date	Number of Members	Remarks
March 5, '63	154,982	
May 10, '63	179,033	
May 20, '63	200,000	
July 31, '63	296,837	
August 28, '63	596,970	
August 30, '63	706,611	Park joined
September 9, '63	1,020,000	
October 15, '63	1,568,000	Pres. elec.

Sources: Minukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 76-7, 106 and 563; Minjukonghwatang, Kyŏkrang ŭl hech'iko: minjukonghwatang i nyŏn sa (Wading Through Rough Waters: The Two-Year History of the Democratic Republican Party)(Seoul, 1964), p. 45; The Korean Republic, August 30, 1963; and Chosun Ilbo, September 10, 1963.

This phenomenal growth of the DRP was attributable to the efficient utilization of semi-officials of "tong" and "ri" (equivalent to "block") in enlisting voters in their areas to the DRP,[61] in addition to the invaluable help rendered by former heads of local branches of the People's Movement for National Reconstruction (PMNR), which was hierarchily organized by the military junta to instill the "spirit of self-reliance" and to arouse moral support for the goals of the junta and which had established contact with people of all levels down to the level of tong or ri.[62] A political potential of the PMNR of 3.9 million members was implied by its first Chairman Yu Chin-o when he referred to it as "an organization similar in structure to a totalitarian system."[63] At the time of the elections in 1963, the interlocking relationship between the local

61. See the protests of the opposition in Chosun Ilbo, August 30, 1963.

62. See "Law Concerning People's Movement for National Reconstruction" (Law No. 622, June 12, 1961; its amendment, Law No. 1171, November 20, 1962), Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op. cit., pp. 615-9.

63. Yu Chin-o, Minju chŏngch'i eŭi kil, op. cit., p. 80. For a criticism of the PMNR for its authoritarian structure, see Pak Un-dae, "The Structure and Remnants of the Military Government That Must Be Discarded," Sasangge, December 1962, pp. 35-6.

administrative units and the PMNR was admittedly non-existent.[64] Nevertheless the grassroots strength of the DRP had already been solidly constructed by those who were once engaged in the local branches of the PMNR.

Although the Central Election Management Committee rendered its view that political activities of the heads of tongs and ris were proper since they could not be classified as public officials,[65] the undue influence of these heads was beyond question when the DRP utilized them to its best advantages.[66] Ostensibly the heads of these local units are not on the payroll of the government; they are the administrative representatives elected by the people of tongs and ris. However because they maintained close relationship with local governmental authorities and were backed by them, it was possible for the heads of tongs and ris to exercise some coercive powers over the people in their areas.[67] As of December 1963, there were 18,510 tongs and ris in Korea.[68]

(2) Preponderance of Political Resources:

Political Funds of the DRP

The DRP's enormous basic advantage over the opposition was its political fund. The DRP stated that the "timely and efficient

64. Cf. Lee Kwan-ku, Director of the PMNR, "The People's Movement Stands at the Point of Historic Transition," Chaekŏn t'ongshin (The Reconstruction Press), the organ of the PMNR, No.12, December 1963, p. 6.

65. Chosun Ilbo, September 7, 1963. See the controversy of their political activities in Chosun Ilbo, August 30, 1963.

66. For example, some heads of tongs in Seoul organized in their area the so-called "Hyangu Hoe" (Home Area Friendship Society) and entertained the people in the area on behalf of Park's candidacy. See Chosun Ilbo, September 25, 1963.

67. See Lee Man-gab, "Korean Village Politics and Leadership," op. cit., p. 399. See also Lee Man-gab, "Social Strata in Village Society, Hankuk nongch'on sahoehak yŏnkuhoe, ed., op. cit., p. 192; and Chu Sŏk-kyun, "Rural Areas and Democracy," Chibang haengchŏng (Local Administration), Vol. 9, No. 7, August 1960, p. 143.

68. The U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., p. 216.

distribution of the campaign funds" during the campaigns was one of the factors contributing to its victory in the 1963 elections.[69] On the other hand, all opposition parties cited the "lack of money" as one of the key factors in their defeat.[70] The political fund has been a perennial problem for the opposition, and monopolization of this key political resource has been in a sense the cause and effect of both inter and intra-party struggles throughout Korean political history. The degree of financial ability of a party or a factional leader has directly corresponded with the degree of political success.[71] As Tables V and VI indicate, the correlation between money and electoral success in the 1963 elections was rather remarkably high.[72]

According to the financial statements submitted to the Central Election Management Committee by the political parties in compliance with the election laws,[73] inequality of political funds between the ruling party and the opposition parties was extreme even if one is to take these official figures at their face value. In the 1963 presidential elections, the DRP and the opposition parties spent the total amount of 110,767,924 won,[74] of which Park Chung-hee's share was 85,207,440 won (76.9%), in comparison to his main rival Yun Po-sŏn's 19,135,297 won (17.3%) as Table V indicates. The

69. Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p.146.
70. E.g., Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 146; and Chosun Ilbo, October 18, 1963.
71. See Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," op. cit., p. 33; "The Bottom of the Controversy of Special Favors," Series No. 1, Chosun Ilbo, February 14, 1965.
72. Beginning with the 1963 elections, candidates and parties were required by law to submit financial statements on their campaign expenses. Data on campaign expenses before the 1963 elections are not available.
73. About the election laws concerning campaign expenses, see Chapter 7 of the Presidential Elections Law (Law No. 1262, February 1, 1963) and Chapter 7 of the National Assembly Election Law (Law No. 1256, January 16, 1963), the Central Election Management Committee, ROK, Korean Constitution, Election and Political Party Laws (Seoul, 1964), pp. 103-67 and 209-308.
74. The official exchange of Korean won to U.S. dollars was at the time 130 won to 1 dollar.

amount spent by Park was within the maximum limit of 96,323,100 won set by the Central Election Management Committee, but no one would be naive enough to believe the figures submitted by the parties, especially in the case of the ruling party.[75]

TABLE V: CAMPAIGN EXPENSES AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN 1963 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Candidate	Expenses (in won)	% of expenses	Order by votes recv'd
Park Chung-hee (DRP)	85,207,440	76.9	1
Yung Po-sŏn (Civil Rule Party)	19,135,297	17.3	2
Hŏ Chŏng (Party of People)	3,847,782	3.5	withdrew
O Chae-yŏng (Ch'up'ung Hoe)	1,450,139	1.3	3
Pyŏn Yŏng-tae (Chŏngmin Hoe)	521,476	0.5	4
Song Yo-ch'an (Lib. Demo. Party)	471,620	0.4	withdrew
Chang Ri-sŏk (Shinhung Party)	134,170	0.1	5
TOTAL	110,767,924	100.0	

Source: the CEMC, Tahanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit. pp. 491 and 627.

The story of money was much the same also in the 1963 general elections. The total amount spent by 976 candidates (for 175 seats) of 12 parties officially reported as 324,170,992 won - - an average 332,142 won for each candidate, which was far less than the amounts limited by the election committees.[76] Of the total expenses

75. Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," op. cit., p. 33. See also "Political Funds," Series No. 3 (Campaign Funds for Presidential Elections), Chosun Ilbo, June 7, 1966.

76. The expenses were limited to 1,131,300 won on average for each candidate running in single-member districts and to about 45,000,000 won for each party on behalf of its candidates on the proportional representation list. The CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 629 and 636.

reported, the DRP spent 123,877,947 won (38%) in comparison to its nearest rival the Civil Rule Party's 48,889,114 won (15.1%). The DRP's expenses were 2.5 times higher than those of the Civil Rule Party as Table VI indicates. Undoubtedly all candidates' expenditures exceed these figures and the limited amounts set by the election committees.[77] The official amounts set by the election committees are always far too small to warrant any serious attention. In order to be a serious candidate for the National Assembly, it was estimated that for the 1967 general elections, for example, the amount of at least 15,000,000 won in the case of a ruling party candidate, or at least 5,000,000 won in the case of an opposition party candidate, was necessary.[78]

TABLE VI: CAMPAIGN EXPENSES AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN 1963 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Party	No. of Candidates	No. of elected	Expenses	% of Expenses	Av. exp. per Candidate	Order by Votes Rec'vd.
DRP	162	110	123,877,948	38.2	764,678	1
Civil Rule	158	41	48,889,114	15.1	309,488	2
Democratic	142	13	44,578,011	13.8	313,929	3
P. of People	129	2	41,525,281	12.8	321,901	4
Lib. Demo	128	9	29,350,013	9.1	227,519	5
Conserv.	82	-	17,446,834	5.4	212,766	6
Liberal	41	-	7,166,813	2.2	174,800	7
Chŏngmin Hoe	40	-	3,595,072	1.1	89,876	8
Shinmin Hoe	31	-	3,457,514	1.1	111,532	12
Ch'up'ung Hoe	36	-	1,736,022	0.5	48,222	10
Shinhŭng	12	-	1,701,826	0.5	141,818	9
Korea Ind.	15	-	836,540	0.2	55,767	11
	976	175	324,170,992	100.0	332,142	

Source: the CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 458 and 638.

77. See "Political Funds," Series No. 4 (Campaign Funds for General Elections), Chosun Ilbo, June 9, 1966.

78. Lee Chin-ŭi and Lee Kyŏng-shik, "Preparations for the General Elections /in 1967/," Shindong-A, June 1966, p. 67. The official exchange rate of Korean won to U.S. dollar was in 1966 272 won to 1 dollar.

The extreme constrast between the rich ruling party and the poor opposition parties, as reflected in the official statistics of campaign expenses, is also evident in their campaign styles and procurement of political funds. For example, during the presidential campaign the DRP candidate Park Chung-hee had his own luxurious special campaign trains with a huge staff of aides, while his rival Yun Po-sŏn depended on regular passenger trains.[79] The sources of political funds are officially enumerated as donations, party membership fees, revenues from party business, and voluntary contributions.[80] In the case of the opposition parties their leaders donate their personal property in many cases, and invariably candidates themselves pay their own campaign expenses. The problem of funds was so acute for the opposition that the major opposition parties, for example, literally sold to wealthy men the seats on the lists of proportional representation in the 1963 general elections - - the higher the payment, the higher on the list.[81]

As a ruling party the DRP had no problem as regards campaign funds, since the ruling party in previous regimes had always been able to find sufficient funds for its needs from various sources.[82] As however big or small they may be all interest groups and business firms in Korea are dependent upon the whim of the government for a license or protection in order to survive,[83] a ruling party always finds willing donors for political funds in anticipation

79. See Chosun Ilbo, October 5, 1963.
80. Ko Yŏng-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism in Korea," op. cit., p. 33.
81. E.g., the cases of the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party in "The No. 2 Strategic Map," Series No. 2 and No. 3, Chosun Ilbo, October 23 and October 25, 1963.
82. See Chung Chong-shik (or Chŏng Chong-sik), "Political Parties and Funds in Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 3, December 1964, pp. 286-95.
83. See O Byŏng-hŏn, "Political Pattern of Korea", op. cit., pp. 74-5; Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The Problems of Operating Parliamentary Politics," op. cit., p. 55.

of special favors. In addition to these willing sources, a ruling party is quite capable independently of raising political funds by manipulating budgets, foreign exchanges, public works, import licences, bank loans, public sales, etc.

According to the well documented evidence, to cite a few obvious instances, for the 1952 presidential elections Rhee's Liberal Party procured, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, about 24 million won ($4 million at the 1952 exchange rate)[84] by illegally disposing the government reserved U.S. dollars at higher rates to fourteen trading firms and collecting commission fees from them. They in turn made excessive profits on fertilizers and grains imported with those dollars.[85] For the 1956 presidential elections, the Liberal Party, through the Ministry of National Defence, procured at least 100 million won ($2 million) by illegally disposing of imported raw cottons which were earmarked for the winter clothes of the soldiers.[86] For the 1958 general elections the Liberal Party, in collusion with the national Industrial Bank, made 80 million won ($1.6 million) by illegally making industrial loans to twelve firms.[87] For the infamous 1960 presidential elections, the Liberal Party made 670 million won ($10.3 million), besides

84. All amounts in U.S. dollars in parentheses hereinafter are calculated at the exchange rates at the times.

85. Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 136-7. See also Kim In-ik, "Paek Tu-jin and the Case of Tungsten Dollars," Shint'aeyangsa, ed. Hŭkmak, op. cit., pp. 166-9.

86. Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 138-9. See also Pak Chae-il, "Son Won-il and the Case of Raw Cottons," Shint'aeyangsa, ed., ibid., pp. 202-5.

87. Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 139-40. See also "Activities Inside the Nation," Sasangge, October 1958, pp. 158-63.

other funds, with the help of the Ministry of Finance and national and commercial banks in the form of bonds and loans to fifty-two firms.[88] After the Democratic Party government of Chang Myŏn was overthrown, the military junta also accused its predecessor of procuring 455 million won ($4.5 million), by extortion from the same businessmen who were accused as "illicit fortune accumulators" by the revolutionary courts set up after the April Student Revolution, for the 1960 general elections and for securing the premiership for Chang Myŏn in the National Assembly.[89]

As a result of the DRP's generous spending in the early periods of its organization and in the 1963 elections and, afterwards, in maintaining its massive structure (1 to 1.5 million strong), with the salaried national and local secretarial offices, there have been speculations that the DRP's methods of procuring political funds are not much different from those of the previous ruling parties. It has been generally believed by observers and the opposition, who made some partial investigation in the National Assembly in early 1964, that the so-called "Four Great Scandals" -- which were all connected with the CIA during the military rule -- were the initial sources of the funds in creating the DRP.[90]

88. Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, ibid., pp. 140-4. See also the court records of the trials of the bank presidents in the revolutionary court in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 360-73.

89. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 201-4; and see also Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., p. 175. But the case against the Chang government was never proved in the courts. The charges were exaggerated by the military junta.

90. See "The Four Great Scandals," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp. 664-5; Daniel Wolfstone, "Park Goes to the Polls," op. cit., p. 683; and Lee Chin-ŭi and Lee Kyŏng-shik, op. cit., p. 67. According to a Japanese source, $20 million disappeared for Kim Chong-pil's political funds; see Kiyomiyo Ryu, "Inside the ROK Supreme Council," op. cit., pp. 249-51.

When General Kim Chae-ch'un, the arch rival of Colonel Kim Chong-pil, became later the Director of the CIA, suspicion of the DRP's involvement in the "Four Great Scandals" was further strengthened by General Kim's own investigations. After he resigned from the CIA post, General Kim Chae-ch'un had repeated his threat of revealing the whole truth about the scandals, as a part of his attempt to purge Kim Chong-pil from the DRP.[91] It was not a coincidence that both Kims, one as the prime suspect in the scandals and the other as a man who knew too much about them, were forced to leave Korea for extended trips abroad in order not to embarrass the military junta and the DRP in the 1963 elections.

Along with the "Four Great Scandals", the DRP was also suspected of receiving about 1,250 million won ($9.6 million) as commission fees when it arranged in 1963 importations of $2,569 million worth of capital and goods belonging to Korean residents in Japan into Korea.[92] The DRP was also accused by the opposition parties of having collected a huge amount of political funds from a few privileged industrialists by condoning their excessive illegal profits, in connection with the so-called "Three Flours Case" (sugar, flour mill, and cement industries), which amounted to about 5,000 million won ($38 million).[93]

Due to these extremely large amounts of political funds which were obtained through illegitimate sources, the opposition parties

91. See, e.g., Kim Chae-ch'un's statement on September 5, 1963, Chosun Ilbo, September 6, 1963. On September 7 he was forced to leave the country.

92. Hankuk Ilbo, January 26, 1964; the editorial of Kyunghang Shinmoon, January 28, 1964; the statement of Kim Yŏng-sam, Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 39th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 7 (December 26, 1963), p. 5.

93. "Excessive Profits on the Three Flours," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p. 692.

charged the DRP - - in spite of the latter's claim to clean politics because of its establishment through the military revolution - - with ruthlessly conducting the so-called "campaigns by unlimited tactics" by financial means.[94] The above is one of the main reasons why the opposition parties claimed that the 1963 elections were invalid.

The sharp contrast in financial capacity between the DRP and the opposition parties was further reflected in their monthly expenditures for party operation. For example in 1966 the DRP was reportedly spending monthly at least 40 million won ($150,000) for its routine expenses, which did not include the expenses for publicity and other secret projects. In contrast with the DRP's monthly expenses, the Mass Party (at the time, it was the unified party of all oppositions in the National Assembly) was reportedly spending about 1.5 million won ($5,500) per month, which came largely from party leaders and its Assembly men.[95] In January 1964 the Party Council of the DRP adopted a resolution on "Party Fund Collection Regulations"[96] and in December 1965 the Central Committee reaffirmed it and stipulated that political funds of the party were to be collected from among the members of the party.[97] The step taken by the DRP was certainly important because it was the first of such movements towards reform of party operations in

94. Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 169; and Lee Kŭk-ch'an "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition Parties," op. cit., p. 79.

95. Lee Chin-ŭi and Lee Kyŏng-shik, op. cit., p. 67; Chosun Ilbo, February 13, 1966.

96. "A Brief History of Our Party," The DRP Bulletin (English edition), Vol. I, No. 6, July-August 1966, p. 10.

97. Chosun Ilbo, December 29, 1965.

Korea. But so long as the irregularities, as in the case of the massive political corruption in the Office of Railroads, in June 1964,[98] still remained as the major sources of political funds,[99] such a step taken by the DRP in December 1965 was to remain a sham.

Unless sources of political funds are regularized with some measures of legitimacy and they are fairly shared among political parties, the fundamental inequality in access to this key political resource will continue to be a factor that would diminish legitimacy of a government that came into existence by monopolizing it. So long as political power equates with monopoly of political resources or vice versa, a political competition such as election would be a naked struggle for survival. The outcome of such a struggle will be always a totality typical of the "two-person zero-sum game" (the amount that one player loses is equal to the amount that the other one wins), not only in terms of the political capabilities that have been just examined here, but also in view of the permanence of the political dominance by one party until it is physically overthrown.

(3) Legal and Electoral Devices against the Opposition

Another main reason why the opposition parties complained of the "fundamental election rigging" was that the laws and regulations concerning political parties and elections were too stringent and restrictive for opposition parties to compete with the DRP.

98. See Paek Nam-ju, Ŭihok sok ŭi iship nyŏn, op. cit., pp. 282-4.
99. Lee Chin-ŭi and Lee Kyŏng-shik reported that the DRP, through its factional bosses and government ministers, was collecting 5% commission fees for its political funds for the 1967 elections from business and construction firms in return for governmental contracts and bank loans. See Lee Chin-ŭi and Lee Kyŏng-shik, op. cit., p. 67.

Kim Yong-sam, a veteran opposition politician and the spokesman of the Mass Party charged that "The 1963 elections were onesided affairs which were held in accordance with the electoral system and the laws conveniently made for the perpetuation of the rule of the military junta."[100.]

The laws that governed political activities, political parties and elections were the Political Activities Purification Law of 1962,[101.] certain provisions of the Constitution,[102.] the Election Management Committees Law (Law No. 1255, January 1963), the Political Party Law (Law No. 1246, December 1962), the Presidential Election Law (Law No. 1262, February 1963) and the National Assembly Election Law (Law No. 1256, January 1963).[103.] These various laws on political parties and elections were in spirit created, first, to foster orderly politics by a sound party system and to prevent reappearance of mushrooming political parties, and secondly, to guarantee fair elections by eliminating conditions detrimental to equal opportunities for candidates and to freely-expressed popular elections.

These are the most prominent features of the laws: (1) the stringent requirements in forming a political party[104.] and the requirement of party nomination to be candidate either for

100. Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'i nŭn kilko chŏngkwon ŭn tchapda, op. cit., p. 99.

101. This law became a part of the Constituion as Article 4 of Supplementary Rules.

102. Article 7 (guarantee of free and plural party system, and definition and function of party), 36 and 64 (requirement of party nomination to be candidates for presidency and the National Assembly). See interpretations of these provisions in Mun Hong-chu, Hankuk hŏnpŏb, op. cit., pp. 327-43. For criticism, see Kim Ki-bŏm, "Certain Features of the Constitution," op. cit., pp. 25-6.

103. For these various laws and the decrees implementing these laws, see the CEMC, Korean Constitution, Election and Political Party Laws, op. cit.

104. See Articles 3, 25 and 27 of the Political Party Law.

presidency or for the National Assembly[105]. - - in other words, discouragement of minor parties and prohibition of independent candidates; (2) strengthening the role of the election committee at each level in conducting, managing and supervising election campaigns and expenditures;[106] (3)severe limitations and restrictions on the methods of and expenditures for campaigns, and accompanying steep penalties for violations of these provisions.[107] The laws limit drastically the number and qualification of campaigners and the number of campaign publications and speeches; they restrict the use of publicity and news media, public address systems and transportation facilities; they prohibit the door-to-door canvass, soliciting or accepting donations for campaign funds and remarking critically on the career and personality of an opponent; and they forbid campaigns for a candidate by other than his own party members.

In spite of the avowedly good intent of these laws, the processes of making the Constitution and the laws concerning political parties and elections were neither normal nor democratic. In the creation of the Constitution,[108] the military junta solicited advice from various scholars and experts in the related fields in drafting the Constitution and was successful in getting approval by registering 78.78 per cent of the voters in the national refrendum for the Constitution held on December 17, 1962.[109] But the fact

105. See Articles 36 and 64 of the Constitution.

106. See Chapters 6 (Election Campaign) and 7 (Election Expenditures) respectively of the Presidential Election Law and the National Assembly Election Law; and Article 6 of the Election Management Committee Law.

107. See Chapters 6, 7 and 12 of the Presidential Election Law and Chapters 6, 7 and 13 of the National Assembly Election Law. See also, for special features of the èlection laws, the CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., pp. 85-9 and 93-6.

108. See Mun Hong-chu, "The History of Korean Constitution," op. cit., pp. 23-5.

109. For the returns of the refrendum, see Hankuk kunsa hyŏkmyŏng sa, Vol. I, No. 1, op. cit., pp. 550-3.

remains that the Constitution was drafted while the opponents of the military junta were still voiceless under the martial law and the decree which banned all political activities. For instance, Professor of Law Hwang San-dŏk of Seoul National University, an editorial writer for a Seoul daily, Tong-A Ilbo, was arrested by the CIA for his criticism of the draft of the new Constitution and of the national refrendum in an editorial of Tong-A Ilbo (July 28, 1962), entitled "National Refrendum is not a Panacea".[110] If the important Constitution of the Third Republic came into existence without sufficient and free debates, such important laws as the political party and election laws were also enacted unilaterally by the SCNR without participation by other political groups who had vital interests in the future party activities and elections.[111] The imprudence and high-handedness of the military junta in making these basic legal and procedual foundations of the forthcoming civilian government were not only to diminish the dignity and effectiveness of the laws but also to prepare a ground of bitter debates on the merits of the laws. On these same grounds, a case can be made against a part of the preamble of the present Constitution. This part reads:

> We, the people of Korea .... now being engaged in the establishment of a new democratic Republic on the basis of ideals as manifested in the April 19th Righteous Uprising and May 16th Revolution, have determined ....

A preamble as an important part of any constitution usually bears the spirit or the ideal of a nation. The above preamble says that

110. For the case, see Lee Byŏng-su et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 1142-3. See also Hwang's own account of the case, in Hwang San-dŏk, Chahwasang, op. cit., pp. 11-82.

111. Cf. Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'i nŭn kilko chŏngkwon ŭn tchapdă, op. cit., p. 101.

the Third Republic of Korea is partly based on the ideal of the military revolution. However the opposition parties during and after the 1963 elections had continuously condemned and repudiated the "ideal" of the military revolution as nothing but a "seizure of power" by a military group. This was an outright denial of a part of the spirit of the Constitution by a considerable number of the people.

For various reasons (mostly for their artificiality, restrictiveness and undemocratic nature), the constitutional provisions and the laws concerning political party and elections had been criticized.[112] Before and during the 1963 elections the opposition parties, through their united body of the Struggling Committee for Fair Elections, especially demanded elimination of such restrictive measures as the provisions limiting the number of campaigners, campaign posters, campaign literature, and campaign speeches; the provision prohibiting the use of public address systems in the streets; the provision prohibiting critical remarks or attacks on the opponent's career and personality; the provision prohibiting campaigning for candidates by others than their own party members; and other special laws and decrees issued by the SCNR which in various ways limited basic rights of the citizens.[113] The opposition viewed that the above limitations and restrictions reduced the effectiveness as well as the choice of their campaigns

112. See Shin Sang-ch'o et al in a discussion, "Constitutional Amendment As we See," Sasangge, December 1962, pp. 61-6; Yu Chin-o "My Belief is Still Against It", Sasangge, January 1965, pp. 66-9; Kim Ki-ok, "A Proposal for Revision of the Election Laws," Chosun Ilbo, November 15, 1966; "Seminar on the Party and Election Laws", Series No. 1 (Chosun Ilbo), No. 2 (Yun Kun-shik), No. 3 (Han Tong-sŏp), No. 4 (Ku Bŏm-mo) and No. 5 (Kim Ch'ŏl-su) in Chosun Ilbo, March 29 through April 12, 1966; and the positions taken by the DRP's chairman of the Policy Committee (Paek Nam-ŏk) and by the Mass Party's counterpart (Lee Ch'ung-hwan) in Chosun Ilbo, April 9, 1966. Lee Hyo-sang, Speaker of the National Assembly, was also unusually critical of some of these provisions, see his "Historic Meaning of Constitution Making and the Task faced by the Constitution," Kukhoebo, No. 46, July 20, 1965, pp. 4-8.

113. E.g., the statements of the Struggling Committee in Chosun Ilbo, September 21 and October 22, 1963.

against the disproportionately (and unfairly) well-organized and well-endowed campaign machines of the DRP.[114]

The Sasangge magazine, for example, commented that while the opposition parties were unable to attack the candidate Park Chung-hee because of the provision that forbade any critical remarks about an opponent, the pro-Park May Comrades Society was improperly conducting campaigns for Park Chung-hee by praising the military revolution and candidate Park, under the cover of educational lectures through its vast membership of 300,000.[115] The May Comrades Society was a friendship organization of military junta members including Park as its president and their civilian friends. The above activities of the society, the Sasangge magazine claimed, were in violation of the laws which prohibited election campaigns by other than certain qualified party members.[116]

According to one analysis Yun Po-sŏn did better than Park Chung-hee among the voters in the areas where the Tong-A Broadcasting Station in Seoul, a large private station sympathetic to the opposition, could reach during the campaigns.[117] From this example it is difficult to establish a general pattern of voting behavior in the 1963 elections in such a proposition. However the inability of the opposition parties due to the laws to rely on certain publicity media and personal contacts such as public address systems in the streets and the door-to-door canvass had certainly created problems for them to appeal directly to voters.

114. See the report on the election campaigns in Chosun Ilbo, September 24, 1963; and the analyses of the elections in Chosun Ilbo, October 18 and October 20, 1963.
115. "Comments on the Current Events," Sasangge, October 1963, p. 88.
116. Ibid.
117. Chosun Ilbo, October 18, 1963.

Although withdrawal of presidential candidates Hŏ Chŏng and Song Yo-ch'an made Yun Po-sŏn the sole major opponent of Park Chung-hee, the provision forbidding aid or campaign for other than their own candidates also prevented the opposition parties from forming an effective coalition machinery against Park in the presidential elections. This is not to say that the provision was the only factor that prevented a concerted effort of the opposition camp. Actually the opposition camp after the "fiasco of the Party of the People" was too deeply divided by mutual animosity to unite themselves, even had they been legally permitted to unite. However the legal requirement of party nomination for candidates was undoubtedly a factor directly contributing to factional struggles in the opposition camp and indirectly preventing unification of the opposition leaders.

The purpose of making party nomination mandatory for candidacy was to develop a party system in which preferably two or three major parties would compete. In view of the fact that factionalism and personal ambition were the main traits of politicians and parties in Korea, the provision requiring party nomination forced opposition parties to bring many heterogenous factional elements into a party, in order for them to stay in politics and to get party nomination of a large party.[118] Dr. Yu Chin-o, who served in the constitution draft committee in 1962, recalled later that he was at the time opposed to the provision requiring party nomination on the following grounds:

118. Shin Sang-ch'o in a discussion, "Problems of Political Party Activities," Shinsekye, January 1963, p. 76; Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition Parties," op. cit., pp. 81-2; and Kim Ch'ŏl-su, "New Dimension of Korean Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 81-2.

> Independent candidates will disappear as a result of development of political party system. Prohibition of independents by law will not necessarily develop political party system ... If disappearance of independents is the result of development of political party system, the members of the party will voluntarily submit themselves to party discipline. However in the event that independents are artificially barred from politics, it will hamper development of political party because it will forcibly bring many of them to join a party for the sake of running for offices even if they have little loyalty to the party and its leadership. If this is the case, it will not only weaken unity of the political party but will also hamper the development of the political party ... Prohibition of independents from politics will instead increase the chance of proliferation of minor parties.[119]

Dr. Yu's skepticism was soon borne out by the disasters of the Party of the People and, later, of the Mass Party during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis. The fact that, in spite of the legal barriers against multiplication of parties, seven parties competed in the presidential elections and twelve parties in the general elections in 1963 proved that no legal prescription can develop a political party system. Instead the legal prescription had greatly weakened the opposition camp and the party system in Korea.

A more important aspect of the requirement for party nomination in the present context of discussion is its by-product. In the process of a forcible amalgamation of heterogeneous factional groups into a semblance of a party under this law, a party becomes a "party of parties" - - this is even true in the case of the ruling DRP. Unlike the ruling party which has enough political and economic leverages to appease or suppress open defiance of factional groups, an opposition party built on various factional groups under this legal pressure is susceptible to open factional strifes which have usually led to division of the party,[120]

119. Yu Chin-o "My Belief is Still against it," op. cit., p. 69.
120. Cf. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions of Korean Political Parties," Shindong-A, February 1967, p. 217.

particularly when the prospect of political reward (such as party nomination for presidency) or political and emotional stress (as in the case of the ROK-Japan treaty issue) is great. When a cycle of amalgamation, factional struggle, break-up and formation of a new party or parties by dissenters is completed, the ability of future cooperation among the opposition parties is already greatly damaged. This was certainly the state of the opposition camp in 1963 after the disaster of the Party of the People, and they could not wholeheartedly unite on behalf of Yun Po-sŏn's candidacy.[121.]

THE PRIMACY OF MILITANT POLITICS: THE CASE OF THE MASS PARTY'S ROLE IN THE TREATY CRISIS

Because of these various actual and imaginary grounds on which the ruling party had rigged the 1963 elections in advance as well as during the elections, the opposition parties flatly refused to accept the results of the elections and, more significantly, the establishment of the Park government. Kim Yŏng-sam had singularly traced the direct cause of the continuing instability of the Third Republic to the unfairness and irregularities in the elections.[122.] He said that, for example, the main reason for the militant political attitude of Yun Po-sŏn, who personified the entire opposition movement in the treaty crisis, was Yun's belief that he was defeated by the rigged elections.[123.] As to the frequent

121. See Kim Kyŏng-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transition," op. cit., pp. 46-53.
122. Kim Yŏng-sam, Chŏngch'i nŭn kilko chŏngkwon ŭn tchapda, op. cit., p. 99.
123. Ibid., p. 100.

violent confrontations between the members of the ruling party and of the opposition in the National Assembly, he attributed them to the same elections as follows:

> Only when both the ruling party and the opposition recognized that the elections by which they were elected to the National Assembly were fair, the members of the opposite parties would have mutually respected each other's political integrity and recognized each other's existence. Only such a National Assembly could be operated smoothly...
> From the beginning of its adminstration the DRP government had been advocating political stability, cooperation, and contest based on issues. But such advocation had been in vain. The cause of the failure lay in the irregular processes through which the DRP gained power.[124]

Yun Po-sŏn once declared that "I am convinced that the political opposition we are waging today in this country is a patriotic movement."[125] And his conviction is widely shared by many opposition politicians, especially among those whose political struggles date from the days of Rhee's dictatorship. Why are opposition politics patriotic? In the history of more than two decades of the Republic, Koreans have never experienced a peaceful change of government by election. During this period, defeat of the opposition has been seemingly always pre-determined in spite of its vigorous challenge and, in some cases, in spite of the overwhelming popular support it received (See Chapter 1). Thus the opposition party became a part in the so-called "one and a half party system."

Rather conditioned by this frustrating experience, the opposition has increasingly been losing patience and faith in a peaceful change of government and has instead been resorting in elections and politics to extreme struggles by extolling its role

124. Ibid.
125. Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 229.

as a defender of the Constitution, a champion of democracy and a watchdog for fair elections and just politics.[126] The repeated failures of the opposition to gain a majority had made it less responsible as an opposition and made it the last desirable group with which the ruling party would share the task of government.[127] As a perpetual underdog fighting for political democracy, the opposition largely views its struggle against the government as patriotic duty -- the more extreme the struggle, the more patriotic the struggle for democracy of the country. This is one of the fundamental reasons why in the times of political crises the militant factions in both the opposition party and the ruling party have been dominating the whole complexion of the situations, with one as the challenger and the other as the defender.

As it was proposed earlier that the treaty crisis was a crisis of political legitimacy, the examinations of the origins of the present political leadership and of the opposition revealed that there existed a great division between the two opposite political forces, regarding both the natures of the military revolution and of the present government. The division was accentuated by, and further developed into, the primacy of hostilities as motivation in politics. Any crude content analysis of the statements of both the sides quoted earlier in the previous chapter might be enough to establish certain motivations of hostility.[128] Separated

126. See Lee Kŭk-ch'an, "The Task and Pathology of the Opposition," op. cit., pp. 78-9.

127. For certain conditions for an opposition to be responsible, see Ferdinand A. Hermens, The Representative Republic (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1958), p. 170.

128. About what constitutes a hostile statement, see, for example, the three sets of hostile themes -- (1) rejection or manipulation, (2) hostile -aggressive, and (3) suspicious; in Dina Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behaviour of Decision Makers in Simulate and Historical Data," World Politics, Vo. XVIII, No. 3, April 1966, p. 480.

by hostility and emotionalism and fortified with different views on the 1963 election returns, the start of politics in the Third Republic, i.e. the political climate preceeding the treaty crisis, was in a sense a renewal of the political struggle carried over from the elections.[129]

The continuing crisis of legitimacy was further intensified when the militant faction of the opposition party openly declared its intention to overthrow the Park government during the treaty crisis. The attitude of the militant faction was well exposed when it had to make its political stand clear in the course of factional struggling against the moderate faction inside the Mass Party (see Chapter 8). In June 1965 Yun Po-sŏn's Civil Rule Party and Pak Sun-ch'ŏn's Democratic Party merged in the Mass Party in order to consolidate the opposition forces against the ROK-Japan treaty ratification. At the time of the merger the Mass Party was composed largely of the two factions -- the moderate and the militant factions.[130]

The main point of the militant argument was that the Park government had to be overthrown at any time and by all means if an opportunity arose, unrelated to the Park government's constitutional terms of office.[131] Here is some of the reasoning of their arguments:

129. For the political climate in the early 1964, see "One Month of the Civilian Government," Chosun Ilbo, January 17, 1964; "The Stage of Struggle to Eradicate the Military Rule," Tong-A Ilbo, January 15, 1964; and the editorials of Tong-A Ilbo, January 15 and January 30, 1964.

130. See "Factional Struggle In the Mass Party," Shindong-A, September 1965, pp. 304-8; and "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggle?" Kyunghyang Shinmoon, June 22, 1965.

131. "The Return of the Mass Party to the National Assembly As a Sign of Division of the Party," Shindong-A, November 1965, pp. 138-9. See also the two excellent articles "The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series Nos. 4 and 5, Chosun Ilbo, October 23 and October 26, 1965.

> The Park government set a bad precedent of military coup d'etat which hinders political development of a developing country ... To oust the Park government which has its embryo in a coup d'etat is to sweep away this bad precedent. It may be inevitable to use even unconstitutional means to bring the Park government down.[132]
>
> Any regime, either established by a coup d'etat or conceived by a seed of a coup d'etat can never be justified in a historical view, even if it was sanctioned by elections.[133]
>
> The "militant line" is the resultant reaction to the unconstitutional means employed by the Park government ... Suppose the opponents in a soccer game play the ball with both feet and hands, we should not be unilaterally forced to observe the rules of the game by playing the ball only with the feet.[134]

On the other hand Pak Sun-ch'ŏn's moderate faction did not agree with the extreme position of the militant faction for tactical reasons, although they shared with the militants the basic distrust in the Park government. The argument of the moderate was articulated by Yu Chin-san, a brilliant strategist and a talented organizer.[135] He argued that in spite of the illegitimate nature of the Park government, the overthrow of the Park government either by violence or other irregular methods would further contribute to political instability of the country by setting up a vicious cycle of coups. He further took the view that the Park government was so well entrenched that it was practically impossible to be thrown out. Even granting that it could be overthrown, the ouster of the Park government would not guarantee invitation of the opposition politicians to power; thus, Yu urged the militants to

132. The statement of Assemblyman Chŏng Hae-yŏng, a Yun Po-sŏn's top lieutenant. Quoted in "The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series No. 4, ibid. See also the similar statement cited by Chŏng Chong-Shik in "A Round Table Talk; Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., p. 164.

133. The statement of Assemblyman Kim Chae-kwang, Quoted in "The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series No. 5, ibid.

134. The statement of Assemblyman Kim Su-han, Quoted in ibid.

135. For his views, see "The Return of the Mass Party to the National Assembly as a Sign of Division of the Party," op. cit., pp. 138-9; and "The Opposition Parties in Korea," Series No. 4 and No. 5, op. cit.

adhere to the constitutional principle of peaceful change of power and to avoid the futility of extreme tactics in the treaty struggle.

In order to facilitate collapse of the Park government or at least to bring it down to its knees, the opposition party, under the leadership of the militant faction, adopted the so-called "unlimited maximum struggle" strategy both inside and outside the National Assembly[136]. in struggling against the ROK-Japan treaty. The strategy involved, at the first stage, the maximum employment of delaying and obstructive tactics to halt deliberation on the treaty ratification bill in the important Special Committee of the National Assembly; and, secondly, upon failure in the Special Committee, resignation of the opposition members en masse from the National Assembly either through individual resignation from the Mass Party or through dissolution of the party, and leading a massive popular struggle in the streets by mobilizing the maximum moral pressures as well as demonstrations against the "one-party National Assembly" of the DRP and the government.

The argument behind this strategy was that ratification of the treaty by the "one-party National Assembly", without the opposition, would be not only morally wrong but also unconstitutional in view of Articles 7 (1) and 36 (2) of the Constitution.[137] Article 36 (2) stipulates that "The number of the members of the National Assembly shall be determined by law within the range of no less than one hundred and fifty and no more than two hundred

136. See "The War Without a Retreat Route: Strategies of the Ruling Party and the Opposition", Chosun Ilbo, July 11, 1965; and "The ROK in Upheaval," op. cit., p. 13.

137. Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p. 243; Assemblyman Chŏng Hae-yŏng's statement of resignation from the Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, August 11, 1965; and the arguments for and against resignation from or dissolution of the Mass Party in Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1965.

persons". Article 7 (1) provides that "The establishment of political parties shall be free and the plural party system shall be guaranteed". In other words, the legal points that the opposition (the militant faction) raised were that, first, the "one-party National Assembly" with only 110 members of the DRP was contrary to the provision of "no less than one hundred and fifty" and that, secondly, it was also in violation of the spirit of the constitutional guarantee of the plural party system.[138] The argument was a two-edged weapon, (1) to halt ratification of the treaty and (2) to dissolve the National Assembly. It was also to find some moral and legal grounds to carry their struggle to the extremity in order to bring down the government. If the treaty bill was put aside and the government agreed for new general elections -- though the possibility of this concession from the government and the DRP was entirely remote, the concession itself would have constituted a great political victory for the opposition. If there were elections the opposition felt that they could win such elections.

Parallel with the development in the Mass Party, the strategy of the DRP for the treaty was also dictated by its militant faction (or the "main stream") hand in hand with the militant group in the cabinet of Park's government.[139] For example, Lee Hyo-sang, Speaker of the National Assembly, and his followers in the moderate

138. This argument of the militant faction was challenged by the moderate faction. See the arguments in Chosun Ilbo, ibid.

139. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op.cit., pp. 179-81 and Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 56 Days of the Martial Law," Sasangge, September 1964, pp. 58-63. About the strategy meeting between the militant leaders of both the DRP and the government at the presidential Blue House in preparation of the forthcoming confrontation with the opposition on the treaty ratification bill, see Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965.

faction (or the "non-main stream") of the DRP were more receptive to the Mass Party's proposal for dissolution of the National Assembly and for new general elections in the place of a national refrendum on the treaty issue.[140] Some moderates of the DRP also suggested to the government, in order to accommodate the views of the opposition and the people, that they make some reservation on certain provisions in the treaty which were the targets of attacks of the treaty opponents.[141] The suggestions of the moderates of the DRP were completely ignored by the militants and were even interpreted as a challenge to the supreme leadership of Park Chung-hee.[142]

As the street demonstrations against the treaty and the government grew fast and furiously, the militant faction of the Mass Party immensely strengthened its position and prestige, enough to carry the party along its pre-determined course although it was, in number, the minority in the party. The DRP believed that the opposition was actually plotting a violent overthrow of the government by using the treaty issue as a rallying point of popular insurrection.[143] Because of this belief that the opposition party was merely using the treaty issue to ferment a revolution, the resultant feeling of insecurity in the DRP had naturally strengthened

140. Chosun Ilbo, April 13; and "The Two Theories on Resignation," Chosun Ilbo, July 4, 1965.
141. Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 1965.
142. "The Two Theories on Resignation," op. cit.
143. See the statement of the DRP spokesman Shin Bŏm-sŏk which revealed the alleged insurrection plot of the Civil Rule Party, Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 1965; Minjukonghwatang, Chŏnjin ŭn tang gwa tŏburŏ, op. cit., pp. 28-9; and the speech of Park Chung-hee at the Central Committee of the DRP, on May 13, 1965, Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 263.

the initiative of the militants, which in turn made the position of the DRP and the government on the treaty issue more inflexible. Thus the predominance of the militant faction in both parties radically reduced the chances of compromise.

The outcome of the treaty struggles both in the National Assembly and in the streets have already been mentioned. However as to the basic political aspect of the treaty crisis, it can be concluded that the prime motivation of the extreme opposition against the ROK-Japan treaty was not so much that the treaty was "humiliating" and "treacherous", but that the issue of the treaty could have been deadly ammunition for the opposition to topple the Park government. Conversely, upon failure of the opposition in halting ratification of the treaty, the ratified treaty would immensely strengthen the power and prestige of the Park government and the DRP and it would enable them to control a vast amount of grants and credits that would flow in from Japan -- the very same reason that also motivated the opposition party, the New Democratic Party, in the Second Republic when it opposed Chang Myŏn's efforts to bring about a conclusion to the ROK-Japan negotiations.[144]

One of the grave consequences of the treaty crisis was, of course, the complete disintegration of the Mass Party. After the Mass Party resigned from the National Assembly on August 12, the day after the DRP members forcibly concluded deliberation on the treaty ratification bill in a lightening coup in the Special Committee, factional disputes between the militants and the moderates

144. See Hwang San-dŏk, "Resumption of ROK-Japanese Diplomatic Relations and Our Expectation," Shindong-A, January 1966, pp. 64-5; Lee Hang-ŭi, "When the ROK-Japan Relations are Normalized," Series No. 2, op. cit.

developed on the problems of the future course of the Mass Party.[145] The resignation submitted to the National Assembly on August 12 was rejected by the "one-party National Assembly" of the DRP, and the only remaining way to resign irrevocably was either to resign individually from the Mass Party or to dissolve the party itself, as prescribed in Article 38 of the Constitution, which provides that a member of the National Assembly can lose his seat "when he leaves or changes his party or when his party is dissolved."

The militant faction argued that the only effective course remaining for the opposition to take was to dissolve the Mass Party in order to prevent possible "resignation dodgers" (pointedly the moderates) and to maintain solidarity of the opposition members, and to carry on the struggle among the people[146] in compliance with the several resolutions adopted earlier by the party.[147] Eight opposition Assemblymen of the militant faction, including Yun Po-sŏn, resigned from the party and lost their seats in the National Assembly. But the moderate faction and a majority of the

145. See especially "Factional Struggle In the Mass Party," op. cit., pp. 304-8; "The Return of the Mass Party As A Sign of Division of the Party," op. cit., pp. 139-41; and the summary of the disputes in the Mass Party in Chosun Ilbo, August 14, 1965. See also an excellent account of the Mass Party's discords by the DRP, in Minjukonghwatang, Chŏngjin ŭn tang gwa tŏburŏ, op. cit., pp. 142-54.

146. For the militant view, see Assemblyman Chŏng Hae-Yŏng's statement of resignation from the Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, op. cit.; the militant faction's statement of departure from the Mass Party, November 1, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, November 2, 1965; and Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., pp. 244-56.

147. These resolutions pledged resignation from the National Assembly if the Mass Party failed to halt deliberation of the treaty ratification bill in the Special Committee. See the resolution at the National Convention, June 14, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965; the resolution of the Central Committee of the party, August 4, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, August 5, 1965; and the resolution of the Mass Party Parliamentary Group Conference, August 7, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965. The texts of these resolutions are also available in "Factional Struggle in the Mass Party," op. cit., pp. 304-8.

militant faction Assemblymen refused to abdicate their seats, and argued that since the treaty was ratified, neither individual resignation nor dissolution of the party would be anything but self-destruction and that the supreme duty of the Mass Party was now to continue its vigilant opposition against the government in the National Assembly and in the constitutional framework.[148] Blaming each other for the responsibility of the failure in stopping the ratification, the Mass Party after August 12 became the scene of invective and violence between its opposing factions.

On October 11, exactly two months after they walked out from the National Assembly, the Mass Party (the moderate faction and "the resignation dodgers" among the militants) returned to the National Assembly. In her return speech Madam Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, the leader of the moderate faction, made a self-criticism on the Mass Party's ineffective, extravagant and irresponsible ways in the struggle against the treaty and on the discords in the party; blamed the party's failure upon the "misguided leadership" of Yun Po-sŏn's militant faction; and promised that the Mass Party would be a constructive and loyal opposition.[149] The return of the moderate faction to the National Assembly prompted the departure of the militant faction from the Mass Party, after accusing the moderates as the group of "bankrupts of national spirit" and "the Machiavellists".[150] On March 30, 1966, Yun Po-sŏn and

148. For the moderate views, see the statement of Hŏ Chŏng, Chosun Ilbo, August 18, 1965; the announcement of the moderate faction Assemblymen in Chosun Ilbo, August 24, 1965; Pak Kwon-sang, "Interview with Pak Sun-ch'ŏn," Shindong-A, August 1966, pp. 250-60; and Kim Yŏng-sam "Retrospect on the Parliamentary Politics in 1965," Kukhoebo, No. 50, December 20, 1965, pp. 6-7.

149. For the text of her speech in the National Assembly, see Chosun Ilbo, October 12, 1965.

150. For the accusation, see the militant faction's statement of departure from the Mass Party, Chosun Ilbo, November 2, 1965.

his militant faction formed Shinhantang (the New Korea Party) as a "clean-cut opposition party" in contrast to the Mass Party. Thus the opposition struggle against the ROK-Japan treaty ended with the division of the Mass Party - - only to repeat the fate of its illustrious predecessors in the old Democratic Party and the Party of the People. It was a sort of a return to status quo ante-bellum.

CONCLUSION

Throughout these two chapters (5 and 6) the characteristic feature of the contemporary Korean politics has been the political instability caused by lack of legitimacy, largely generated by hostility between the major political groups, the extreme imbalance in the power relationship and in the distribution of political resources between the ruling party and the opposition, and lack of a basic consensus regarding the nature of the government and important issues. This created perpetual tensions and conflicts in which the extreme views and groups were bound to control political hegemony. The situation under these conditions impaired the political capacity of Koreans to resolve important issues such as the ROK-Japan treaty issue through normal political process. Bruce M. Russet, in his empirical study of politics of the United Nations, set forth a proposition, "If those who hold the most extreme attitudes also hold them most intensely, a serious threat to the system's stability may exist, especially if the extremists are numerous.[151.] His proposition neatly explains the characteristic instability of Korea that these two chapters have just examined.

151. Bruce M. Russet, op. cit., p. 62.

CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS: THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN PARTY

INTRODUCTION

The confrontation between the government (the ruling party) and the opposition during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis had dramatized the problem of political instability stemming from the lack of legitimacy. The struggle between them was the renewed conflict between the two elites: the ruling versus the deposed. The consequence of the extreme confrontation was the paralysis of the capacity of the political system to solve the issues through the normal political processes. Much of this incapacity was attributable to the inordinate functioning of the two major rival political parties. At the height of the treaty crisis in the summer of 1965, the major parties in the struggle were the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) and the Mass Party (MP).

Why did the parties not function? With this as the focus of the investigation of the following two chapters (7 and 8), the two parties will be closely examined in terms of their origin and history, goals and programs or ideologies, recruitment and composition, leadership and organizational structure, and internal political processes. In the case of the MP, less attention will be paid to the organizational structure, for it had never developed proper structure, and, instead, greater attention will be devoted to its history because it provides an insight into the problem of the MP.

THE ORIGIN AND THE IDEALS OF THE DRP

It can be said, as a general rule, that a military junta established as a cure for political instability in a democracy may be successful in the short run. But it fails to achieve stability in the long run, because it has no "institutional basis such as an effective and representative political party would provide."[1] When military officers take over the power of a democratic country, they invariably make the promise that they will return to their original duty as soon as they achieve their purpose. By the time they decide to restore a constitutional government to civilians, it is very difficult for the military to refrain from entering into civilian politics. The reasons are obvious. The first is their feeling of insecurity because they have made so many embittered political enemies in the course of securing the short-run political goal. The second is their taste of power. The prospect of relinquishing their power seems too unpleasant to honor their original pledge of "return to original duty." The third is the problem of succession. It is very difficult to ensure that the civilian successors would guarantee their political security and their professional careers and would continue their military revolutionary ideals and tasks.[2]

Incapable of solving these problems, they have to continue in power. But they cannot rule the country indefinitely by military dictatorship if internal and external pressures develop for a democratic form of government. They then need popular consent.

1. Frank Tannenbaum, Ten Keys to Latin America (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 153. The notable cases of the military juntas' failures, outside of Latin America, were: Burma, Greece, Iraq, Pakistan, South Korea, South Vietnam and Turkey.

2. Cf. the nine conditions set forth by General Park in his "The February 18th Statement to Deal with the Political Situation." The conditions were already cited in Chapter 5.

For this reason, they, if prudent, begin to build a strong political party as the vehicle of legitimate politics replacing the politics based on force.[3] In the light of the above circumstances, the DRP was officially launched on February 26, 1963, as an instrument for the leaders of the junta to continue their rule in the name of revolutionary tasks.

The DRP asserts, "The party would not have existed now, had it not been for the military revolution. In this sense our party is the direct offshoot of the military government."[4] In other words the DRP claimed to be the heir of the ideals of the military revolution, committed to "modernization of the fatherland" by bringing about social order, political stability, and economic prosperity.[5] In order to achieve these goals, the organizers of the DRP saw the task of their party as the primary vehicle of reform and modernization.[6]

In a certain sense the DRP is the child of the turbulent past of Korean politics. After the unsuccessful experiment with democracy in the First Republic and the Second Republic, an increasing number of people began to think that the critical element of a successful democratic government was the men who operated a given political system. Thus Kim Chong-pil and his fellow organizers of the DRP maintained that the establishment of a new leading political force representing a "new generation," imbued with new ideas and

3. See F. A. Hermens, The Representative Republic, op. cit., p. 37.

4. "The Democratic Republican Party Moves Toward Stability," The DRP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1966, pp. 5-6.

5. Ibid., p. 6; and see also Kim Sŏng-hŭi (the Director of the Policy Research Office of the DRP), "The Third Republic Moves Toward Stability: DRP," Korean Affairs, Vol. III, No. 1, April 1964, pp. 52-62.

6. "The Declaration of Inauguration of the DRP," in Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. v-ix.

proper social values, was the prerequisite for modernization and democracy.[7] This new leading force had to be based on a stable and responsible political party without which a stable democracy could not be realized. Cognizant of the importance of leadership, the DRP was created to be the master of political affairs and the innovator of changes.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE DRP

The master plan of organization of the DRP adopted at the Founding Committee on January 18, 1963 strongly reflected the above thinking in an attempt to create a modern and stable party. The eight-point master plan stressed the following principles: (1) open and mass party; (2) proper party structure suitable for party politics; (3) ideological cohesion and party discipline -- and elimination of factionalism; (4) centrally directed hierarchical leadership; (5) a greater role in formulating and implementing policies; (6) capacity for continuous recruitment; (7) permanent party executive structure in charge of party administration and implementation of party policies; and (8) education and training of party members.[8] In particular, the founders of the DRP stressed that theirs should be a "modern party" based on organization, professional skill and dedication, as opposed to an "old party" which depended on factional bosses and money.[9] This was the gist

7. Ibid.; and see Yang Ho-min, in "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., p. 152.

8. See Minjúkonghwatang, ibid., p. 38. An English translation of the eight-point plan is available in the Democratic Republican Party, The Democratic Republican Party of the Republic of Korea, op. cit., p. 15.

9. "A Brief History of Our Party," The DRP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1966, p. 14.

of the so-called "Kim Chong-pil Plan."[10] According to this plan, the DRP was to become a highly centralized and disciplined party with a single command directed from the central party headquarters down to provincial or city and district branches of the party, through the establishment of a hierarchically organized and powerful executive secretarial structure that would control party affairs, personnel and finance of the entire party from the center down to districts. The central secretariat was to have the director-general and at each subordinate level a secretary was to be appointed by him. Kim Chong-pil's idea was, in principle to operate the party by a stable party bureaucracy (the secretariat),[11] in order to check the National Assembly-centered operation that had marked the operation of the old parties, and to prevent the party from degenerating into a group of factional cliques centered around National Assemblymen.[12]

But the DRP had hardly lived up to its original promise, despite some basic features of the original structure which distinguished it from other parties. Again the task of building a massive modern party out of the old political heritage of Korea was as difficult as the attempt to elevate politics to a higher plane overnight. In this sense the DRP was not much different from the parties in the past and from present parties, although as a ruling party the DRP had been able to ride out major internal crises

10. For the details of the "Kim Chong-pil Plan," see Kim Yŏng-su, "Creation of the Democratic Republican Party Before the Legal Date," Shindong-A, November 1964, pp. 168-73

11. For the secretarial structure and function, see "Introduction on A Party Structure: Secretariat," The DRP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 10, December 1966, pp. 25-8. This article was written after the power of the secretariat was considerably weakened, but still reflected the original ideas kept by the secretariat members.

12. See "Organizational Principles of Our Party," The DRP Bulletin, Vo. 1, No. 3, March 1966, pp. 4-5.

without a breakdown and had maintained a semblance of unity.

The major difficulty of the DRP was evident when the party had to undergo major modification of the original organizational structure even before it was officially launched. As mentioned elsewhere, the DRP was the brainchild of Kim Chong-pil and his associates in the CIA. The anti-Kim Chong-pil faction in the junta, who had not been consulted on the matter of creating the party, strongly objected to the Kim Chong-pil Plan which would certainly transform the party into machinery for Kim's "one-man show." In such a party structure, there would hardly be a guarantee of new political status for other junta members who had distinguished themselves in the military revolution. Many of the anti-Kim faction took the plan as a threat to their personal status.[13] This was the reason why General Kim Tong-ha resigned on January 21, 1963 from the founding committee of the DRP. General Kim argued that a party power structure resembling a Communist "democratic centralism" would not only endanger democracy in the party, but would also entail an enormous amount of expense to maintain such a system and was likely to invite political corruption.[14] The disputes over the party structure and Kim Chong-pil's alleged involvement in the "Four Great Scandals" eventually led to his resignation from the party and to his departure from Korea (from February 25, 1963 to October 23, 1963). Kim Chong-pil's departure inevitably led to some modification of

13. "A Brief History of Our Party," Vol. I, No. 2, op. cit., p. 15.

14. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," Series No. 4, Chosun Ilbo, May 5, 1964; and Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200. See also the criticism of General Yu Won-shik, former Chairman of the Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs, SCNR, in Chosun Ilbo, January 16, 1963; and Lee Kŏn, "The Real Facts in the Retreat of Korean Military Regime," op. cit., p. 106.

the power and the structure of the secretariat.

After the 1963 elections the issue of the party structure again became the main issue of intra-party strife when the anti-Kim groups (or the non-main stream faction) demanded in November 1964 abolition of the secretarial structure.[15] The intra-party struggle ended on February 24, 1965, when both factions finally agreed on a settlement that amended the party charter.[16] The change of the party charter had considerably decentralized the party power structure and established a collective type of leadership by diffusing the highly centralized power in the hands of the central Secretariat among various non-oranizational sectors of the party. The change had also considerably strengthened the parliamentary wing of the party on which the strength of the non-main stream faction rested.

According to the current charter (see the organizational chart of the DRP below),[17] the party's supreme governing body is theoretically its National Party Convention, annually convened by the Party President. The National Party Convention elects the Central Committee which consists of less than 1,800 representatives, who in turn elect the Central Standing Committee as the highest representative body. The Central Standing Committee which consists of 300 to 500 is, however, largely a sounding body which approves what the party hierarchy has decided.[18]

15. See Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 1964, January 15, 1965 and January 22, 1965.
16. Minjukonghwatang, Chŏnjin ŭn tang gwa tŏburŏ, op. cit., p. 17.
17. See the charter and the organizational chart of the DRP in Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 655-78 and 672-82.
18. See Article 17 of the charter.

Organization of the Democratic Republican Party

Reprinted from: The Democratic Republican Party, The Democratic Republican Party of the Republic of Korea (Seoul, 1965), pp. 91-2.



As the head of the party, the Party President is the supreme leader who superivses and controls the party affairs.[19] The actual operational head of the party executive is the Party Chairman who is appointed by the Party President and approved by the National Party Convention. He controls and executes all party affairs by order of the Party President.[20] He presides over the powerful Party Council and nominates all important party officers including the Director-General of the central party's Secretariat, subject to approval of the Party President.

The most important collective body that governs the party is the fifteen-man Party Council consisting of the Party Chairman and the highest ranking party members.[21] All major matters pertaining to the party are debated and decided by the Party Council. However its power can be circumscribed by the Party President's veto or intervention (which happens very often) and in principle its decisions need the approval of the Central Standing Committee of the party. Its important power includes decisions on the party's basic policy and on party finance and budget and recommendation of party nominees for the National Assembly to the Party President.[22]

The Secretariat of the central party, under its Director-General, is under the supervision of the Party Chairman. It executes the administrative affairs of the central party and maintains and controls local party secretariats. The original power of the Secretariat was considerably weakened since the Director-General lost his appointive power on local party cadres to the local party

19. See Article 20 of the charter.
20. See Article 24 of the charter.
21. See Article 21 of the charter.
22. See Article 22 of the charter.

chairmen by the charter amendment of February 1965.[23] It also became a common practice after late 1964 that the DRP National Assemblymen automatically became the local party chairmen. Because of these developments, the local party affairs have been more or less independently managed by local party chairmen. But the Director-General is still primarily responsible for routine operations of the central party and, to some degree, of local party secretariats.

As the DRP had professed to be the "party of policy," the party charter provides an elaborate set-up for policy-making bodies. The Policy Committee is responsible for initiating party policies and advising the Party Council as well as coordinating the party and the government in order to translate the party policies into governmental policies.[24] The fifty-member Policy Committee comprises the key DRP National Assemblymen, the government ministers belonging to the party, and the party members appointed by the Party President. Under the Policy Committee there are the Policy Review Board of thirty members and the Policy Research Office of specialists which is in charge of research, study and formulation of policies.

The power structure of the party has undergone a considerable change under internal stresses since its inception in 1963. Although there are still some remnants of the originally planned structure, which stressed centralism and strong leadership, based on a stably organized party bureaucracy in the secretariat structure, the DRP of today is a federation of factions under the tight personal grip of Party President Park, who as the President of the country acts as the balancer among the factions by commanding the absolute loyalty of all the party members.

23. See Article 26(b) of the charter.
24. See Articles 27 through 31 of the charter.

THE PARTY SECRETARIAT: RISE AND FALL OF THE DRP

Erosion ofthe central power of the party is best illustrated by the steady decline of the secretarial structure. This also explains the dilution of idealism of the party. Originally conceived as the "operational headquarters" of the party which would control not only its local party branches but also its National Assemblymen and the government, the DRP organized in March 1963 the Secretariat with 1,300 permanently salaried staff members (300 at the center, 20 to 30 each at provincial/city branches, and 6 each at 131 district offices) at the estimated cost of $700,000 (100 million won) per month.[25] The central Secretariat consisted of 4 departments, 1 board, 1 office and 1 bureau which altogether had 48 sections.[26] In April 1963 after Kim Chong-pil's departure, the number of the secretarial staff was reduced to 600 and its organizational structure was also reduced to 4 departments and 1 bureau.[27] In June 1964, the number of the central party secretarial departments was further reduced to three (the Departments of General Affairs, Organization, and Public Relations),[28] in the face of the increasing challenge of the discontented DRP National Assemblymen of the non-main stream faction. The irrevocable weakening of the single command structure by the central Secretariat was sealed finally by the charter amendment of February 1965 which took away the substance of the power of the Director-General and gave a more or less free hand to local chairmen in operation of their local party branches.

25. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," Series No. 4, op. cit.; and "One Year of the DRP," Hankuk Ilbo, February 27, 1964.
26. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," ibid,; and Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 55-6.
27. Minjukonghwatang, ibid., p. 88.
28. Ibid., pp. 187 and 573.

According to the original plan the local party offices were to be staffed entirely with "new faces" recruited from the new generation of politicians who would be the backbone of the DRP. But incapable of constructing a massive party aimed at capturing political power with only inexperienced secretarial members, the DRP had to recruit a greater number of the politicians of the old generation who had the necessary political experience and individual bases in constituencies. The influx of the old politicians either as candidates or cadres generated frictions between the new and the old faces -- the new faces primarily attached to the secretarial organization, and the old faces to the parliamentary wing or the non-main stream faction.[29] The duality of these two essentially different groups in the party soon became one of the early factors that contributed to emergence of factional struggle in the party.[30]

Although by the time of the 1963 elections the Secretariat, as the important instrument of party control, was less than that which the original plan had conceived, it was nevertheless a potent machine as its strength and effectiveness in the elections showed.[31] After the elections it tried to carry its momentum of power into the new era of civilian politics and to impose its will on both the legislative and executive branches of the government.[32] But as soon as a number of centers of power emerged with the civilian

29. See Chŏng Chong-shik and Kim Ki-ch'ŏl in "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., pp. 152-6.
30. See Kim Ki-ch'ŏl in ibid., p. 154; and "One Year of the DRP," op. cit.
31. See "One Year of the DRP," op. cit.
32. "The DRP and the Secretarial Organization," the editorial analysis of Tong-A Ilbo, January 8, 1964.

government and politics, by virtue of the constitutional separation of power and with the manifestation of the heterogeneous composition of the party, the decline of the secretarial power was inevitable. As diffusion of power became a reality, the share of political funds for the Secretariat became smaller and smaller. This was an important factor that militated against the maintenance of the secretarial structure which required an enormous amount of political funds.[33]

Today the polycentrism with respect to control of the party and decision-making is more or less an accepted phenomenon, although the factional alignments are still in flux depending on issues, policies, distribution of posts in the party and the National Assembly, and personality differences. Thus the extent of the decline of the Secretariat was a measure of the degree of transformation of the DRP from the idealism of its founders to the realism of its political life in Korea.

THE RECRUITMENT AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE DRP

The most pervasive problem of the DRP has been factionalism.[34] The structural change of power from the central control by the Secretariat to the dispersion of control among various sectors and groups in the party had been largely the work of factionalism. This has been one of the main reasons why intra-party conflict continued even after the seemingly over-riding issue of the secretarial power was in fact settled in February 1965. A study of the DRP's recruitment and composition sheds much light on the aspects

33. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," Series No. 4, op. cit.

34. For the factionalism in the DRP, see an excellent study by two political reporters of Tong-A Ilbo, Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 199-209.

of the factional politics, of the leadership, of the relationship between the party and the government, and of the extent and the degree of participation by the party in governmental policy matters.

Although the nucleus of the party comprised Kim Chong-pil's factional group of the junta origin, the DRP recruited at the initial stage of its organization a large and impressive number of new faces of various political, social and professional origins at both the high and lower echelons of the party. The composite picture of the DRP reflected the diversity of the founding members of the DRP in February 1963, as indicated by the following Tables I and II which are compiled from the biographies of 70 of 78 founders of the DRP.

TABLE I: FOUNDING MEMBERS OF THE DRP- - WHEN AND HOW ENTERED POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

Year	Junta	Party	Bureaucrcy	Cabinet	Pol. Mov.	Nat. Ass.	Total
Pre-1945			5		2		7
1945-48			6		3		9
1948-60			3	5		3	11
1960-61				1		3	4
1961-	16	22	1				39
	16	22	15	6	5	6	70

TABLE II: PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS OF FOUNDING MEMBERS OF THE DRP

Occupation	Number
Military	20
Education	13
Politics	8
Press	7
Commerce	7
Bureaucracy	7
Legal profession	4
Banking	2
Medicine	1
Artist	1
	70

Sources for Tables I and II: Lee Chong-sik, Political Parties in Korea, an unpublished monograph, April 1967, Philadelphia, pp. 60-1.

Especially in its central secretarial organization, the basis of the DRP was a group of political amateurs such as former bureaucrats, young businessmen, journalists, college professors, and retired army officers. Although the rank and rile of local party branches of the party were recruited in large number from the ranks of the former Liberal Party,[35] the men who were responsible for the organization of the local party branches were also political amateurs as indicated by their original occupations.[36] Their intention was to place the party under the control of the new faces who were installed in the central and local secretariats, while acquiring necessary experience and skill in politics and electioneering by recruiting former politicians. Characteristic of the early composition of the party was thus the conscious efforts to entrust the control of the party to political amateurs who were recruited after the coup d'etat. This is evident by the small proportion of the former politicans as indicated by Table III below.

TABLE III: PREVIOUS CONNECTIONS OF THE DRP LEADERS

Previous Party Connection	Percentage
Former Democratic Party	2
Former New Democratic Party	2
Former Liberal Party	8
Independents	10
Military	26
New comers	50
Others	2
	100%

Source: Kyunghyang Shinmoon, November 1, 1963.

35. Han Nae-bok, "The Korean Elections," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XLII, No. 1, October 3, 1963, pp. 16-8.

36. Among the eleven men responsible for organization of party branches in their respective provinces and "special cities," five were professors, three bureaucrats, two lawyers, and one businessman. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

Evidently special care was taken in recruitment not to allow factional cliques to form within the party by selecting the well-known civilian leaders individually without considering the past factional or political connection.[37] In spite of this conscious attempt, there were already four groups when the DRP was created: the Kim Chong-pil faction of the junta origin, the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction of the junta origin, the former politicians, and the young political amateurs representing the party secretarial organization.[38]

THE SHAPING OF FACTIONALISM

The first factional struggle in the DRP was between the Kim Chong-pil faction and the anti-Kim Chong-pil faction of the junta origin who injected their old factional feud into the new party.[39] At the time of organizing the DRP in early 1963, the junta members were roughly divided into two factions: the Kim faction which supported Kim Chong-pil was composed of young officers, belonging to the 8th Class of the war-time military academy; and the anti-Kim faction consisted of two groups.[40] The first group of the anti-Kim faction was the so-called May Comrades Society led by Chang Hyŏng-sun and O Ch'i-sŏng. The second group was an assortment of senior ranking junta generals such as Kim Tong-ha and Kim Chae-ch'un who were in favor of dissolution of the DRP in order to form a broadly based "pan-national" party[41] which was at one time in the mind of

37. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," op. cit.
38. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200.
39. See Kiyomiya Ryu, "The Inside of the ROK Supreme Council," op. cit., pp. 250-1.
40. See Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200; and "The Balance of the Military Rule: Power Structure and Political Forces," Tong-A Ilbo, December 14, 1963.
41. Another important opponent of Kim Chong-pil, Lee Hu-rak (then spokesman of the SCNR) also advocated a "pan-national" party. See his "Why is A Pan-National Party Necessary?" Koreana Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1963, pp. 11-6.

the vacilliating General Park.[42] The second group of the anti-Kim faction finally severed their relationship with the DRP, but the first group returned to the DRP in October 1963 just in time to participate in the general elections under the banner of the DRP.[43] The first group (the May Comrades Society) later became the backbone of the "non-main stream faction" in the party to challenge the hegemony of the "main stream faction".

The complexity of factional alignment in the DRP was further increased following the February 27th oath-taking ceremony at which General Park pledged his non-candidacy. Following the oath, General Park urged formation of a "pan-national" party which would include all political forces subscribing to the ideals of the military revolution. General Kim Chae-ch'un, then the Director of the CIA, immediately started to organize such a party, which became later the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[44] General Kim and anti-Kim Chong-pil faction had not only succeeded in rounding up various groups and individuals within and outside the existing political parties but also made such a deep inroad into the DRP itself that the DRP was almost on the verge of dissolution in April 1963.[45]

The appearance of the LDP and the crisis of the DRP under the impact of General Park's momentary decision in favor of a "pan-national" party shed light on the capacity of Korean parties to be made or unmade over-night by the decision of a personal leader like Park.[46] The point is further illuminated by the fact that the LDP

42. "The DRP: Yesterday and Today," op. cit.; and Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 200.

43. See Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 1963.

44. For the circumstance of the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party, see Han Nae-bok, "The Korean Elections," op. cit., p. 17; and Kim Chong-shin, Yŏngshi ŭi hawetbul: Pak chŏng-hŭi taet' ongnyŏng tt'ara ch'il nyŏn (A Torchlight at Zero Hour: Seven Years with President Park Chung-hee)(Seoul: Hanlim ch'ulpansa, 1966), pp.209-15.

45. Han Nae-bok, ibid.; and Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 209.

46. See Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., p. 209.

turned against General Park in October when Park decided to side with the DRP and run for the presidency on the DRP ticket. The transformation of the LDP from a pro-junta party to an opposition was largely an emotional reaction of the former junta members who lost the favor of General Park to the rival faction of Kim-Chong-pil.

However Park ordered in May the merger of the two parties by using a slightly modified version of the existing DRP structure and by equitably distributing party posts between the two partisan members in the merged party.[47] General Park's order for merger did bring another influx of anti-Kim Chong-pil elements and other individuals into the DRP, although the bulk of the LDP members chose to remain with their party when the merger negotiations with the DRP were not successful.[48]

By the time of the 1963 elections the factional alignments were however so fluid, due to a massive injection of heterogeneous groups, that a clear distinction of factional alignments was impossible to make. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, there were two main factions; the main stream faction and the non-main stream faction.[49] The main stream faction comprised the original party members who had participated in the creation of the party and had faithfully upheld the party throughout the dissolution crisis in April and May.[50] The backbone of the main stream faction was the secretarial members who were recruited and protected by the founders

47. Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 83.

48. The merger negotiations were not successful because the Liberal Democratic Party demanded dissolution of the DRP's secretarial organization. See The Korean Republic, August 23, 1963.

49. See Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 201-2.

50. "The Current Map of the Political Street," Series No. 1, Chosun Ilbo, March 16, 1965.

in the main stream faction. The non-main stream faction comprised (1) all other individuals and groups in the party who did not belong to the inner circle of the party and who joined the party at late stages, and (2) those who were either members of the anti-Kim faction in the military junta or sympathizers with the anti-Kim faction. The non-main stream faction was at this time a federation of various groups roughly representing the May Comrades Society, the former leaders of the pro-Park Chung-hee faction of the LDP, and former members of the defunct Liberal Party, who all joined the DRP in time for the 1963 elections.

In the general elections of November 1963, the DRP gained an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. But the composition of the DRP Assemblymen represented a variety of origins. There were five factions: (1) the main stream faction, (2) the secretarial faction (pro-main stream faction), (3) the May Comrades faction, (4) the old Liberal Party faction, and (5) former Democratic-New Democratic Parties faction.[51.]

The resultant factional struggle was immediately reflected in December 1963, in the distribution of posts in the National Assembly.[52.] The struggles for the posts were so intense that President Park intervened to balance the distribution of the posts among the factions.[53.] Former Party President Chŏng Ku-yŏng and former Party Chairman Yun Ch'i-yŏng, both of whom belonged to the main stream faction, competed for the speakership; but under the

51. See Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 202.

52. The exact information on the factional connections of the individuals who occupied the posts are not available. Nevertheless, see ibid., pp. 198-209; and Hankuk Ilbo, December 25, 1963. There were two Vice-Speakers: One was occupied by a member of the DRP and the other was given to a member of the opposition.

53. See Chosun Ilbo, December 7, 1963.

instruction of President Park the post went to a relatively unknown former university professor Lee Hyo-sang who was yet to be identified with any faction. The vice-speakership was given to Chang Hyŏng-sun, the leader of the anti-Kim May Comrades Society. The post of the floor leadership went to Kim Chong-pil's right-hand man, Kim Yong-tae. The twelve chairmanships of the standing committees were also distributed according to the strength of each faction - - with six posts to the main stream faction and the remainder to other factions. President Park's distribution of the posts among the factions was made to check complete domination of the main stream faction which could have easily controlled all the posts.

Although the main stream faction made concessions in the allocation of the posts to the non-main stream groups, the former under the leadership of Kim Chong-pil and Kim Yong-tae and in alliance with the secretarial faction had not only completely controlled the DRP but had also dictated all party policies and strategies in the matters of legislation as well as in the operation of the National Assembly.[54] The members of the non-main stream and non-secretarial factions thus intensely resented the domination of the main stream faction and were awaiting an opportunity to rise against it.

PARTY POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM DURING AND AFTER THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY CRISIS

The opportunity came in March 1964 when the ROK-Japan treaty issue triggered the wide-spread student demonstrations and opposition campaigns. By this time the factional alignments, formerly

54. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 202.

comprising a group of five, were by amalgamation reduced to a group of two: the secretarial faction merged into the main stream faction, and the remainder became formally the non-main stream faction. The moderate non-main stream faction favored decentralization of the party leadership and demanded an increased voice and participation of the parliamentary wing in party affairs. The non-main stream faction also favored peace with student demonstrators and some compromise with the opposition on the treaty issue. On the other hand, the militant main stream faction felt that any undue compromise with the students and the opposition would undermine the party's position on the treaty issue and that any soft-line approach in dealing with the students and the opposition would invite further weakening of the government instead of settling the differences.[55] For instance, the reconciliatory meeting between the President and the student leaders on March 31, 1964 was conducted under the influence of Vice-Speaker Chang Hyŏng-sun, the leader of the non-main stream faction.[56] This directly countered the strong measures recommended by the main stream faction to President Park on the night of March 24.[57] In spite of these ostensible differences, the real cause of the factional rift between the two factions was largely the issue of party hegemony.[58]

The open rebellion of the non-main stream faction against the leadership of the main stream faction was staged in March 1964

55. The U.S. Department of Army, op. cit., p. 259.
56. Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp. 260-1.
57. Ibid., p. 258.
58. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 31, 1964.

in connection with the motion for the vote of non-confidence in Minister of Interior Ŏm Min-yŏng. The motion was introduced by the opposition which charged that Minister Ŏm was responsible for the police brutality in the March 24th demonstration. In this crucial vote, twenty members of the DRP voted for the motion, and the government only saved the day by a bare majority of eleven votes.[59] The incident was known as the "rebellion by vote."[60] The rebellion of the non-main stream faction Assemblymen continued in April with the subsequent opposition's motions of non-confidence in Vice-Prime Minister Kim Yu-taek and Minister of Agriculture Won Yong-sŏk.[61] The additional cause of the "rebellion by vote" was a deep-seated discontent of the non-main stream faction Assemblymen with the secretarial organizations in local party branches of their own constituencies.[62]

The revolt of the non-main stream faction in the National Assembly brought about the resignation of the first team of the DRP floor leadership of Kim Yong-tae and the appointment of the second team of Kim Sŏng-jin (a relatively moderate member of the main stream faction.)[63] Both factions, however, wanted some drastic change of power holding in the party. Vice-Speaker Chang Hyŏng-sun strongly demanded that President Park should retire

59. According to Article 59 of the Constitution, the National Assembly can recommend the removal of a minister by a simple majority vote - - at present 88 votes constitute the simple majority. The President is bound by the non-confidence decision of the National Assembly unless he has an impelling reason to object it.

60. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa. op. cit., p. 179; and Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29, 1964.

61. See Minjukonghwatang, ibid.

62. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 203.

63. For the ensuing DRP's internal struggle after the revolt, see ibid., p. 203; Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 179-85; and Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp. 264-6.

Kim Chong-pil from all party posts including his party chairmanship, on the pretext of the need to pacify the students and the opposition.[64] Vice-Speaker Chang also urged President Park to divorce himself from the party should the solution of the treaty crisis necessitate this. In other words, the non-main stream faction was using the treaty issue and its crisis as the opportunity to weaken the position of Kim Chong-pil and his faction.[65]

In conjunction with the rebellion within the party, the enemies of Kim Chong-pil outside the party -- the former anti-Kim junta members and the anti-Kim group in the administration -- also marshalled and coordinated their pressure on President Park to dismiss Kim Chong-pil from the party.[66] The recall of Kim from Tokyo on March 28 to pacify the treaty opponents was thus partly the work of this coalition of the anti-Kim forces.[67] In the confusion of this political development the second team of the DRP floor leadership resigned again on April 27, only two days after its formation. The third team of the DRP floor leadership was formed on the same day with Hyŏn O-bong, a member of the non-main stream faction.

The persistent challenge of the non-main stream faction with a certain degree of success had established itself as a formidable force to be reckoned with in the party, in spite of the fact that the main stream faction still controlled ninety per cent of 131 district party branches and 11 provincial city branches.[68] In

64. Minjukonghwatang, ibid., p. 179; and Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 203.
65. See "A Weather Map," Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964.
66. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 31, 1964.
67. The visit of former Kim Chong-pil's foes in the SCNR, Generals Kim Tong-ha, Kim Chae-ch'un and Pak Won-bin, to the presidential Blue House on the day (March 28) of Kim Chong-pil's recall from Tokyo to Seoul was one of the anti-Kim movements. See ibid.
68. Ibid.

order to stave off the challenge of the non-main stream faction and its allies outside the party, the main stream faction tried to rebound by using their power base in the party. One of the maneuvers was the rally of some 500 secretarial members in support of Kim Chong-pil to condemn Vice-Speaker Chang in the party headquarters on April 29.[69] The counter-attack of the main stream faction was directed not only at the non-main stream faction but also at the administration. The main stream faction's grievances against President Park were the latter's condoning of the activities of the minority (i.e. the non-main stream) dissenters in the party, his allowing non-party members' (pointedly, Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu-rak's) intervention in party affairs, and his reliance on the non-partisan cabinet of Ch'oe Du-sŏn.[70]

On May 9, 1964 a part of the grievances was redressed by replacing the non-partisan cabinet of Prime Minister Ch'oe Du-sŏn[71] with that of Prime Minister Chŏng Il-kwon, whose cabinet included

69. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 180.

70. See ibid., pp. 181-4.

71. The non-partisan cabinet of Ch'oe Du-sŏn was appointed in December 1963 when the various factions in the party could not agree on the nominees for the premiership recommended by them. Ch'oe's cabinet was also purported to be a transitional cabinet from the military rule to the civilian government until the DRP could consolidate its governing capacity. But it was, from the beginning, not well received by the main stream faction which wanted to install a partisan cabinet of its liking. See Cho Yong-jun, "The Path of Ch'oe Du-sŏn Cabinet," Sasangge, April 1964, pp. 74-81; and also Chosun Ilbo, December 3 and December 5, 1963.

eight DRP members.[72] But as the street demonstrations against the treaty reached a climax on June 3 when the army was invited to quell them under martial law, Kim Chong-pil was forced to resign from his post of the party chairmanship on June 5 and to leave Korea for his second "exile" to the United States on June 18.[73]

The main stream faction was at least successful in installing former Party President Chŏng Ku-yŏng in acting party chairmanship in the absence of Kim Chong-pil. However the main stream faction's position was already on the decline, particularly since the reshuffling of the important Party Council on May 15 had increased the number of the non-main stream faction members to such an extent that numerically they almost equalled the main stream faction.[74] Thus the retreat of the main stream faction was aggravated by the series of events following the March 24th demonstrations and the "rebellion by vote." In the face of the mounting opposition to the ROK-Japan treaty President Park could not afford serious party disunity or possible defection of the non-main stream faction in the National Assembly.[75] Despite these accommodations and the roughly equitable balance of power, the intensity of factional strife increased because the achievement of balance of power made factional struggle more competitive.

The continuing feud within the party was further evident during the period of martial law (between June 3 and July 29, 1964). On June 15, in order to resolve the political crisis, Speaker Lee Hyo-sang

72. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 185.
73. For the circumstance of Kim's resignation under pressure of the non-main stream faction, see Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp. 264-80.
74. See Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 185.
75. See ibid., pp. 180-1.

(now a prominent leader of the non-main stream faction) took the initiative in creating the "Bipartisan Consultative Conference for Resolving the Situation" with opposition leaders in the National Assembly.[76] The Bipartisan Conference held a series of negotiations throughout the months of June and July 1964 to normalize the situation. The negotiations were extremely difficult. The opposition demanded the immediate lifting of martial law. Under pressure from the militant faction (the main stream faction),[77] the DRP maintained that, as the conditions for terminating martial law, the opposition should cooperate in enacting laws that would control student demonstrations and political activities[78] and that would limit activities of the press.[79]

Initially the Bipartisan Conference made some substantial progress and on June 28 Speaker Lee announced that the deadlock between his party and the opposition was almost resolved, and that he was ready to recommend that the government withdraw martial law.[80]

76. See Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 56 Days of the Martial Law," op. cit., pp. 58-9 and 62.

77. "The Settlement of the Press Law Uproar Must be Brought by the Government's Retreat," Tong-A Ilbo, September 9, 1964.

78. The government's proposal for a law controlling students' demonstrations and political activities was formally introduced to the National Assembly on August 4, 1964. But the bill was dead immediately when the opposition vigorously fillibustered it. For the text of the bill, see "The Proposal for Enactment of the Protective Law for Academic Institutions," Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 44th Session, Plenary Meetings, No. 17 (August 4, 1964), pp. 1-4.

79. On August 2, 1964, the National Assembly passed the "Law Concerning the Press Ethics Committee" by the DRP majority, and President Park proclaimed it on August 5. For the text and the debate on the law, see Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 44th Session Plenary Meetings, No. 13 (July 31, 1964), No. 14 (August 1, 1964), and No. 15 (August 2, 1964). But in the face of the intense and widespread protest of the press and intellectuals, President Park withdrew his proclamation of the law on September 9. For criticism of the law, see Mun Hyŏng-sŏn, "The Press Law is Abuse of the People's Sovereignty," Sasangge, September 1964, pp. 83-7; and Hankuk shinmun yunri wiwonhoe (The Korean Press Ethics Committee), Hankuk ŭi shinmun yunri (The Ethics of the Korean Press) (Seoul, 1967) pp. 27-65.

80. Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 56 Days of the Martial Law," op. cit., p. 62.

He stated also that if the government rejected the recommendation, the National Assembly would act independently of the government.[81] In the afternoon of the same day, the government rejected Lee's recommendation and stipulated that the laws controlling the students and the press should be legislated prior to the termination of martial law.[82] The failure of Lee's effort to resolve the political situation strengthened, in consequence, the determination of the militant factions of the opposition parties.

Finally, on July 28 the Bipartisan Conference succeeded in bringing about a compromise and in lifting martial law on July 29, 1964. The government and the militant main stream faction were, towards the end of July, in a mood to normalize the political situation in the capital as the student demonstrations were markedly receding since the government had practically given up the timetable for the early conclusion of the treaty within the year. Caught in their earlier stubborn positions, all militant parties concerned (i.e. the government, the main stream faction of the DRP, and the opposition) had found, under the pretense of a compromise, a face-saving device in Speaker Lee's Bipartisan Conference.

The initial failure of the Bipartisan Conference in June was partly attributable to the factional struggle within the DRP. Since the Bipartisan Conference was organized on the initiative of Lee Hyo-sang, the main stream faction regarded it with indifference and suspicion. One indication of this was that Kim Yong-tae of the main stream faction had never attended the Bipartisan

81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.

Conference, although he was designated as the leader of DRP representatives to the conference.[83] It was also common knowledge that the difference of personalities between Speaker Lee and acting Party Chairman Chŏng Ku-yŏng had rendered the negotiations difficult.[84] Had the ruling DRP been a united party speaking as one authoritative voice to both the opposition in the negotiations and to the government in that recommendation, the effort of the Bipartisan Conference could have brought an early lifting of martial law and could have relaxed the political tension in Seoul. But at the time of the June negotiations, the DRP as a ruling party was utterly divided by factional strife. In fact the main stream faction sharply differentiated between its militant position and the moderate position of the non-main stream faction on the treaty issue in order to check the rising power of its intra-party foes who might buttress their power if the prestige of success in the Bipartisan Conference were to be accorded.[85] The suspicion that the non-main stream faction's engagement in the negotiations was motivated by its factional strategy for party hegemony had undoubtedly strengthened the argument of the main stream faction against lifting martial law.[86] In time of crisis, therefore, the factional conflict within the ruling party was one of the factors that prevented any constructive discussion not only within the party but also between the opposite parties.

After the amendment of the party charter in February 1965 there developed a sub-faction inside the main stream faction. The

83. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 204.

84. See ibid.

85. "The DRP: the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," Series No. 2, Tong-A Ilbo, August 25, 1964.

86. See Hyŏn O-bong (then the DRP floor leader), "Surroundings of the Uproar," Series No. 8, Chosun Ilbo, December 16, 1964.

sub-faction - - sometimes referred to as the "moderate main stream" in contrast to the main parental faction as the "militant main stream" - - was a group dissatisfied with Kim Yong-tae, under whose leadership, the sub-faction argued, the main stream faction suffered the series of defeats which, in turn, were responsible for fragmentation of the party.[87] The development of the sub-faction was also partly a personal challenge by Kil Chae-ho to the leadership of Kim Yong-tae who happened to have controlled the provincial (Ch'ungch'ŏng Namdo) party hierarchy to which Kil belonged.[88] The sub-faction of Kil relaxed its militant political position to one a shade closer to the non-main stream faction in order to form a coalition with it in preparation for a challenge to the powerful position of Kim Yong-tae's "militant main stream."

Nevertheless the main stream faction was able to maintain its unity throughout the ROK-Japan treaty crisis. This was one of the factors that helped the achievement by the DRP of complete unity among its National Assemblymen in passing the treaty ratification bill in August 1965. There were, of course, other important factors that induced unity.[89] First of all, the fate of all in the DRP and the government was so directly involved with the crucial treaty issue that a defeat would jeopardize the positions of all concerned. Another factor was that President Park could, to some extent, alleviate the deep-seated grudge of some non-main stream members by diverting part of the sources of political funds, hitherto heavily concentrated in the hands of the main stream faction, to

87. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 204-5.

88. Ibid., p. 206. This is also of my personal knowledge as an intimate of Assemblyman Kim Yong-tae.

89. See "The Pulse of Korea: the Crisis After the Ratification of the ROK-Japan Treaty," Shindong-A, September 1965, p. 309.

the non-main stream faction.[90] In addition President Park could effectively exploit personal and factional ambitions in connection with the forthcoming reassignments of various posts in the National Assembly.[91]

After the ROK-Japan treaty was ratified, the main stream faction desperately tried to recover its weakened position by re-asserting the old principle of "party supremacy" over the administration andthe dissenting minority faction in the party. As a first step towards this, Chŏng Ku-yŏng demanded of President Park the replacement of non-cooperative members of the administration who frequently bypassed or ignored the authority of the party.[92] President Park refused Chŏng's demand. On August 24 Chŏng resigned from his post of acting party chairmanship, expressing his deep disappointment at "erosion of the original ideals that created the party."[93] On September 25 another demand of the main stream faction was put forth when the Central Standing Committee, under pressure from the secretarial members, urged reinstatement of Kim Chong-pil to party chairmanship.[94] The main stream faction attributed the fading of the party from the central stage of politics to the lack of leadership and it argued that such a necessary leadership could be supplied only by Kim Chong-pil.[95]

As a last resort the main stream faction had attempted to purge the leaders of the non-main stream faction in the forthcoming elections for various posts in the National Assembly. The main

90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Chosun Ilbo, August 17 and August 18, 1968.
93. See an excerpt of Chŏng's resignation speech of August 25, 1965, in Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., p. 299.
94. "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, September 25, 1965.
95. Ibid.

stream faction, in alliance with some elements of the non-main stream faction who had their own reasons for dissatisfaction, had planned to replace the incumbent Lee Hyo-sang and Chang Hyŏng-sun with Chŏng Ku-yŏng and Min Kwan-shik (a leader of the non-main stream faction who shared the militant view on the treaty issue as the Chairman of the Special Committee) for the posts of speakership and vice-speakership respecitvely.[96] The main stream faction also planned to reorganize the fifteen-man Party Council into a smaller but powerful body which could effectively exercise the leadership of the party over party affairs as well as over the government ministers.[97] But President Park again overruled these plans and favored the non-main stream faction in the allocation of the posts in the National Assembly.[98]

On December 16, 1965, reportedly with the tacit encouragement of Kim Chong-pil,[99] Kim Yong-tae led the main stream faction in support of Chŏng Ku-yŏng for speakership against the incumbent Lee Hyo-sang in the elections in the National Assembly, in spite of the personal pleas and warnings of Park Chung-hee who ordered party solidarity in support of Speaker Lee and Vice-Speaker Chang.[100] In the second ballot Lee was barely re-elected by the required minimum majority of 88 votes.[101] Vice-Speaker Chang was also barely re-elected over Min Kwan-shik in the second ballot.[102] Had

96. See Chosun Ilbo, September 16 and November 4, 1965.
97. Ibid., November 4, 1965.
98. For President Park's selections for the posts, see Minjukonghwatang, Minjukonghwatang sa nyŏn sa, op. cit., pp. 350-1.
99. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 2, Chosun Ilbo, August 30, 1966.
100. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 206.
101. In the first ballot, Chŏng received 69 votes and Lee 55 votes among the total present votes of 162 (the DRP 105, the MP 52, and 5 Independents). In the second ballot Chŏng received 66 votes and Lee 88 among the total present votes of 164 (the DRP 108, the MP 51, and 5 independents), in spite of Chŏng's withdrawal and the appeals of solidarity. See Chosun Ilbo, December 17, 1965.
102. Ibid.

there been no support from the opposition members who tended to prefer the moderate stand of Lee and Chang, their re-election would probably have been impossible.[103] The rebellion by the main stream faction was known as the "disobedience incident." For the responsibility of the incident, Kim Yong-tae and Min Kwan-shik had their party privileges suspended for six months and two other rebels were reprimanded by the Party Disciplinary Committee by order of an angry President Park.[104]

At the National Party convention on December 27, 1965, Kim Chong-pil was successfully reinstated to his former post of party chairmanship. But the non-main stream faction (now including Kil's sub-faction and the middle of the road faction) took advantage of the main stream faction's retreat to inactiveness after the "disobedience incident,"[105] by capturing important posts such as the posts of the Director-General by Kil Chae-ho and of the Chairman of the Party Finance Committee by Kim Sŏng-kwon of the non-main stream faction.[106] Thus, through reorganization of the posts of the National Assembly and of the party in December 1965, the non-main stream faction replaced in reality the main stream faction as the majority faction.[107] (See the chart of factions below.)

THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRP

Since the "disobedient incident" the DRP had maintained an

103. Chosun Ilbo, December 19, 1965. Kim Yong-tae's main stream faction was known to have commanded solidly 59 votes and attempted to negotiate with the MP for additional 30 votes in order to elect Chŏng and Min.

104. Chosun Ilbo, December 25, 1965.

105. Chosun Ilbo, December 19, 1965.

106. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean political Parties," op. cit. p. 205.

107. See ibid., pp. 205-6. Sometimes the non-main stream faction (or the coalition) was referred to as the "new main stream faction," while the main stream faction was referred to as the"new non-main stream faction."

FACTIONS AMONG DRP ASSEMBLYMEN
(As of December 1965)



outward tranquility through the 1968 presidential and general elections up to May 1968. But underlying the tranquil surface there presisted an intense power struggle for party hegemony. On May 30, 1968, Kim Chong-pil suddenly resigned from the party chairmanship and from his seat in the National Assembly. The reason for his resignation was his disenchantment with the purge of Kim Yong-tae from the party on May 24, 1968.[108] Assemblyman Kim Yong-tae,[109] a member of the powerful Party Council, was ousted from the party when his secret activities for organizing supporters for Kim Chong-pil's presidency in 1971 were discovered.[110] The two-term presidency of Park will end in 1971. According to the indictment of the Party Disciplinary Committee, Kim Yong-tae and his lieutenants had for some time been recruiting about 900 loyal supporters most of them from the present and past nucleus of the DRP secretarial members under a cover organization known as the Korean People's Welfare Research Institute.[111] He was charged with a factional activity creating "a party within the party" and outrightly disobeying President Park's order which forbade any activity for succession of his leadership until at least 1970. A position paper of the institute had reportedly maintained that they would oppose any constitutional amendment that would make Park eligible for a third term of presidency.[113]

108. For the circumstance of Kim Chong-pil's resignation, see Chosun Ilbo, May 31, 1968.

109. After the expulsion from the DRP, he was automatically became an independent in the National Assembly. Although Article 38 of the Constitution disqualifys a person's membership in the National Assembly "when he leaves or changes his party, or when his party is dissolved," the article however excepts a person from losing his membership in the cases of loss of his party membership caused by amalgamation of parties or by expulsion from his party.

110. See Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 1968; and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 26, 1968.

111. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," ibid.

112. "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 31, 1968.

113. "The DRP: Today's Current of Air," Series No.1, Tong-A Ilbo, May 27, 1968.

At the time of writing, it is unpredictable whether Kim Chong-pil and his faction will be able to maneuver for a political comeback to succeed the mantle of Park's leadership in 1971. The main stream faction was reportedly even considering, if necessary, defection from the party (which fell under the tight control of the non-main stream faction)[114] and a rally around Kim Chong-pil for a new party.[115] The personal setbacks suffered by Kim Chong-pil and Kim Yong-tae suggested not only a sound defeat of the main stream faction in the power struggle but also a bitter end to the original idealism of the founders of the party.

IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE DRP'S FACTIONALISM

In essence, the factionalism in the DRP was not much different from that in other parties. What had distinguished the factionalism of the DRP from that of other parties was that there had been at least some ideological and political contention between the two rival factions. The ideological aspects of factionalism of the DRP were frequently overlooked because its factionalism was predominantly that of personalities.

As the founders of the party, the main stream faction represented a "new politics" for modernization of politics and nation; while the non-main stream faction, as a "mercenary" recruited by the DRP for political expediency, represented an "old politics" and was generally skeptical about the idealism of the main stream

114. The non-main stream faction completely controlled all key posts in the party, the National Assembly and the administration: the Director-General of the party Secretariat by Kil Chae-ho, the Chairman of the Party Finance Committee by Kim Sŏng-kwon, the Chairman of the Policy Committee by Paek Nam-ŏk, the floor leadership in the National Assembly by Kim Chin-man, Speakership of the National Assembly by Lee Hyo-sang, and the Chief Presidential Secretary by Lee Hu-rak, See ibid.

115. "The DRP: Today's Current of Air," Series No. 3, Tong-A Ilbo, May 29, 1968.

faction.[116] Under control of the main stream faction, the DRP's ideological slogan was "nationalistic democracy" (or, sometimes, "Koreanized democracy"). However, "nationalistic democracy" was too fragmentary and incoherent, to be defined as an ideology and to be properly understood even by the party members themselves. But its central theme, gathered from various and often contradictory pronouncements of Park Chung-hee and Kim Chong-pil,[117] is interesting: it bears directly on the factional positions in the party.

"Nationalistic democracy" may be outlined as follows: It is difficult for an Asian nation like Korea to import "pure" Western democracy for her political development under the prevailing social and economic conditions. Liberal democracy has been incapable of tackling such problems as poverty, unemployment, political confusion and external influence. Liberal democracy must be Koreanized to fit the peculiarities of Korean society and must be based on a constructive nationalism. Only this tailoring can enable the Korean society to free itself from foreign domination and from its past, to recover its self-consciousness (or "subjectivity"), and to adapt itself to a new world. In order to Koreanize Western liberal democracy, Korea needs at this transitional period a strong driving force (elite) imbued with a nationalism for modernization and dedicated to creating a liberal society. Liberal democracy by an elite, in an extreme form, was once advocated by Park Chung-hee

116. Cf. the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, February 9, 1965.

117. See, e.g., Park Chung-hee, Our Nation's Path, op. cit., pp. 207-10; "This is My Belief," Presidential Candidate Park's Policy Speech, (of April 15, 1967), the DRP Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1967, pp. 8-10; Kim Chong-pil, "Modernization of Korea and A New Leading Force," op. cit., pp. 28-37; and Kim Chong-pil, "Leadership in Developing Democracies," Hankuk Ilbo, September 22, 1963 (This was his speech delivered at Fairleigh Dickinson University, New Jersey, U.S.A., on September 20, 1963.).

in his concept of "administrative democracy." Park foresaw that in the course of creating favorable conditions for democracy, political freedom might be compromised, even though every effort would be made to maintain a democracy at the level of the governing elite.[118.]

Thus it seems that the DRP's "nationalistic democracy" is, to state it simply, a formula that combines liberal democracy with nationalism for modernization under the guardianship of a nationlist elite. As the two concepts of nationalism and liberal democracy are often incompatible, the formula is not tenable as a coherent ideology. This is especially true in view of the tendency of a nationalist elite to overdevelop jealously its authority into an authoritarianism when the task of modernization is formidable.

However its main justification of the "nationalistic democracy" here is the transitory nature of nationalism which calls for a strong political leadership by an elite which educates, harnesses and leads the masses for the task of modernization. The need of strong leadership by an elite was strongly expressed by Kim Chong-pil in his speech in September 1963:

> In order to respond instantaneously to changing situations, advanced democracies are today markedly expanding the power of central leadership and exercising it more strongly than ever. The securing of strong leadership is necessary to overcome the cumbersome effect of centrifugal force inherent in parliamentary democracy. In view of this development, it is superfluous to stress once more the importance of strong political leadership in small, weak democracies that are striving to shake off the yoke of their underdevelopment.
>
> Only those advanced democracies which enjoy economic and political stability and which have attained a high cultural

118. Park Chung-hee says, "We cannot, as a matter of fact, enjoy complete political freedom in this /military/ revolutionary period. Nevertheless, democratic principles must be maintained at least at the administrative levels, and the opinions and rights of the people should be respected in accordance with democratic principles." His Our Nation's Path, ibid., p. 209.

> standard can afford politics responsive to public opinion. But in underdeveloped democracies the leaders must provide guidance to public opinion and must arouse the aspiration, determination and courage of the people.... The leaders must impart the true value of democracy, which is often regarded as a "burden" by the masses in the midst of their poverty.... Progress prerequisites establishment of proper institutional structures, but it depends invariably on the leaders and their leadership.[119]

The above concept of strong political leadership was initially reflected in the organization and operation of the DRP, as envisaged by the "Kim Chong-pil Plan." It led to the advocation of a hierarchical power structure under control of the new generation (i.e. the main stream faction). This was subsequently the focal point of contention of the main stream faction in the intra-party struggle.

In a meaningful sense, the factional struggle between the two rival factions was thus the struggle between one political group which had embraced the above concept of leadership in the quest for control of the party, and another group which had regarded it as a pretext of maintaining the former's position in the party. On the part of the main stream faction, the factional struggle was a defensive operation to prevent erosion of party ideology and diffusion of power from the central leadership. On the other hand, for the non-main stream faction, it was an insurgent movement refusing submission to the arbitrary discipline and will of the party which were largely regarded as the products of the main stream faction in the name of party ideology.[120] In a final analysis, "nationalistic democracy," which was neither sufficiently articulated nor widely acceptable, was thus reduced to a factional ideology for party hegemony and became one major polemical item in the factional struggle.

119. Kim Chong-pil, "Leadership in Developing Democracies," op. cit. This is my English translation of the Korean text.

120. Cf. the editorial comment of Chosun Ilbo, February 9, 1965.

FACTIONAL ARGUMENTS: FUNCTIONAL AND DYSFUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF FACTIONS

In spite of the fact that every annual resolution of the DRP's national party convention since 1964 had repeatedly condemned factionalism and had stressed party unity as an important yearly goal,[121] and in spite of the stern disciplinary measures personally directed by President Park himself against factional leaders such as Kim Yong-tae, factional activities in the DRP became more or less legitimate with the amendment of the party charter in February 1965.[122]

The main stream faction had often asserted that its struggle for the establishment of a strong leadership and for control of party hegemony was "the struggle of one and a half million party members against twenty."[123] (The "twenty" was a deprecating reference to the non-main stream faction National Assemblymen.) The main stream faction maintained that the party could perform its proper role only if the party could forget its preoccupation for compromise with the minority non-main stream faction on every issue and only if the party could be firmly united under its banner.[124] These assertions by the main stream faction were certainly exaggerated. But they provided a good indication of the anxiety and frustration of the main stream faction who had founded the "modern" party only to find it soon deadlocked in a factional stalemate.

On the other hand, the non-main stream faction had persistently

121. See, e.g. the resolutions of the national conventions of 1964 and 1965 in Chosun Ilbo, December 29, 1964 and December 28, 1965.
122. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, February 28, 1965.
123. Chosun Ilbo, December 31, 1964.
124. See ibid.; and Chosun Ilbo, January 8, 1965.

argued for formalization of factions. The main point of its contention was that as long as Kim Chong-pil's group was exclusively organized for and under his personal leadership and aimed at maintenance of his grip over party affairs, it was, in reality, a faction.[125] Therefore, the non-main stream faction had to be also legitimately recognized as an equal faction with full rights to be heard and to participate in party affairs. So long as the main stream faction was recognized as the sole voice of the party, the non-main stream faction argued that it would be not only unrealistic and self-righteous, but also tyrannical of the majority faction.[126] It further argued that formalization of factions and their proper representation through institutionalized channels to the party decision-making bodies were desirable in order to have a competitive intra-party democracy.[127] Further, it was felt that vigorous factional competition would modify the main stream faction's militancy in relation to the opposition party by the moderate approach of the non-main stream faction.[128]

The members of the non-main stream faction felt so strongly about the need of formal recognition for their faction that they even threatened defection from the DRP and organization of a

125. See "The DRP: the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," Series No. 2, op. cit.

126. On this ground the non-main stream faction, for example, had continuously threatened to boycott the national convention which was re-scheduled in December 1964 after it rejected the originally scheduled convention in April 1964. It charged that the convention would be manipulated by the secretariat. It also charged that the Director-General was even manipulating the agenda of the Party Council in favor of the main stream faction. See Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 1964; and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, February 28, 1965.

127. "The DRP: the Direction of Intra-party Conflict," Series No. 2, op. cit.,

128. Ibid.

separate negotiating body in the National Assembly.[129] The amendment of the party charter in February 1965 institutionalized certain guarantees of independent political bases of the non-main stream faction and of collective leadership in the party. The amendment initiated tacit toleration of factional activities, to the point where the two rival factions could maintain their separate offices.[130]

To sum up the arguments of both factions against the background of factional politics, it may be said that recognition and formalization of factions to a certain degree is functional, at least in the short run, in mitigating the party's internal crises stemming from the diverse composition of party membership. But factionalism is certainly dysfunctional for the party in providing a necessary leadership for solving national issues and in performing certain requisite functions that are expected from a party in a normal sense. The dysfunctional effect of factionalism is more apparent in the following examination of the relationship between the DRP and the administration.

THE RULING PARTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION

Party politics in the DRP were further complicated by the existence of a group of administrative associates of President Park -- such as Chief Presidential Secretary Lee Hu-rak, key cabinet ministers, and other top advisors -- who had great political influence with President Park. Although not organized into a solid third bloc, they were nevertheless powerful enough to be instrumental

129. Ibid.
130. "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, February 28, 1965.

in thwarting the attempts of the main stream faction to impose the principle of party supremacy over the administration and to discipline the minority faction within the party.[131] In opposition to the main stream faction's drive for party supremacy, this group found a natural ally in the non-main stream faction and helped the latter prevent complete domination of the party by Kim Chong-pil's faction. However this group had shared few of the vital national problems -- such as the ROK-Japan treaty issue -- with the non-main stream faction.

This group was, for example, largely credited for persuading President Park to recall Kim Chong-pil from Tokyo in March 1964[132] and, again, to dismiss him from the party chairmanship and send him to his second exile in June 1964.[133] During the martial law period of June 1964, this group was known as "the sponsors of martial law."[134] In concert with the non-main stream faction in the party, the group credited Kim Chong-pil and his faction with aggravating the political situation to the point of necessitating the introduction of army rule in Seoul.

There were a number of differences that caused friction between the main stream faction and the group of presidential advisors -- i.e. between the party and the administration. Their basic difference centered on the role of the DRP in the governmental policy-making process. As mentioned earlier, the DRP, as the "party of

131. See "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 2, op. cit.

132. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29, 1964.

133. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 207; and Kim Yong-t'ae, "The National Assembly During the 56 Days of the Martial Law," op. cit., p. 58.

134. See Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, ibid., pp. 207-8; and "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 1 and No. 2, Chosun Ilbo, August 28 and August 30, 1966.

policy," had maintained a complex of bodies in charge of research, review and formulation of governmental policies, spearheaded by the specialists in the Policy Research Office.[135] In April 1964, in response to party pressure, and impelled by party unity in preparation of the impending treaty crisis, President Park issued the "Directive for Improving Organic Cooperation between the Government Party and the Government."[136] The directive instructed the cabinet to strengthen mutual consultation and cooperation with the party in matters pertaining to appointment of key administrative posts and to establishment and implementation of important governmental policies.

But the contribution of the party to formulation of governmental policies had so far been minimal. The party had, in fact, often been excluded from participating in a number of important governmental decisions.[137] Many party leaders frequently complained of the situation in the following terms:

> The DRP is the ruling party only in name. We don't know how the party operates, how party policy is being made, nor what is the direction of the party policy... Thus we can often see disagreements and confusion in policy matters between the party and the government.[138]

The record of the Policy Research Office verified the fact that the party played a secondary role by reviewing legislative and policy proposals already decided by the government, instead of the primary or equal role of initiating and formulating them.[139]

135. See "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 1 (the Policy Research Office of the DRP), Chosun Ilbo, May 6, 1966.

136. For details of the directive, see Minjukonghwatang, Chŏnjin ŭn tang gwa tŏburŏ, op. cit., p. 34.

137. See "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 1, op. cit.; and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, December 23, 1964.

138. Yang Ho-min in "A Round-Table Talk; Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., p. 154.

139. "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 1, op. cit.

The weakening of the DRP's role in policy-making was strongly contrasted by the ascendance of the Presidential Secretariat. In principle the Presidential Secretariat was established not as policy advisory machinery: it was conceived to provide administrative and secretarial assistance for the President.[140] But as the principal machinery that exclusively assisted the President, it rapidly emerged as an integral part in exercising presidential power itself with an organizational and functional structure closely corresponding to that of the cabinet.[141] Because of this similarity to the regular cabinet, the Presidential Secretariat was sometimes called the "small cabinet," and was generally recognized for its vital political and administrative role.[142] One usual but important example of the Presidential Secretariat's participation in policy-making is the preparation of the President's annual message on the state of the nation and other important policy speeches.[143]

Thus the conflict between the main stream faction, which vigorously asserted the principle of party supremacy over the administration, and the Presidential Secretariat, which with equal vigor clung to its independence, became inevitable. The overall effect of the emergence of the strong Presidential Secretariat had been the forcing of the party to surrender the responsibility of government to it.

140. See Article 9 of the Governmental Organizational Law (Law No. 1506, promulgated December 14, 1963) in the Ministry of Public Information, ROK, Structure of Government, Korea Series No. 4 (Seoul, undated), pp. 38-52. For details of the duty of the Presidential Secretariat, see "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 6 (The Presidential Secretariat at the Blue House), Chosun Ilbo, May 15, 1966.

141. "A Policy-making Body," Series No. 6, ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid.

The second point of conflict between them was the matter of controlling political funds. The ability or inability of factional bosses to procure their own political funds has been one of the factors responsible for the continuing existence or decline of factions, or vice versa.[144] In principle political funds in the DRP were to be collected and distributed through the single channel, the Party Finance Committee. But all the individual factional leaders had maintained their own sources of political funds to command their own groups.[145] As a measure to check factionalism, President Park had recently tightened the dispersed factional "pipelines" of political funds by placing them under his control.[146] The DRP explained that this would ultimately lead to the centralization of fund raising activities into one official channel and to the systemization of administration of political funds.[147]

As a result of this measure, the primary responsibility of raising and distributing political funds initially fell to two main channels: (1) the Party Finance Committee chaired by Kim Sŏng-kwon of the non-main stream faction and (2) the presidential advisors in the administration under the control of Lee Hu-rak and Chang Ki-yŏng.[148] In other words, the reform meant that all major sources of political funds were placed under the control of the groups hostile to the main stream faction.

144. See especially "Political Funds," Series No. 6 (The Genealogy of Political Funds and the Factions), op. cit.
145. Ibid.
146. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op. cit., p. 207.
147. Shin Tong-jun, the DRP spokesman, "The DRP and Political Funds," Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1966.
148. See Chosun Ilbo, February 7, 1965; "Political Funds," Series No. 6, op. cit.; and "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 1, op. cit.

Because of the direct impact of political funds on the factional position in the party, the increasing control of political funds by the non-main stream faction and by the group in the administration, aroused a great deal of resentment and anxiety among the main stream faction members. The diminishing control of political funds by the main stream faction was partly reflected in the decreasing number of the party's secretarial members. In March 1965 the discontent of the main stream faction was openly expressed by the motion of non-confidence in Vice-Prime Minister Chang Ki-yŏng by thirty-three members of the DRP Assemblymen, who charged Chang ostensibly with granting special loans to a handful of big business firms.[149] But the real reason behind the motion was believed to be the main stream faction's discontent with Chang's "non-cooperation" in policy matters and with his increasing power over sources of political funds.[150]

The decline of the main stream faction was also caused, to a large extent, by President Park's personal views on the operation of the government and on the exercising of political power.[151] "The kind of politics we need today," President Park once said, "is productive politics. There cannot be any politics other than productive ones."[152] His concept of "productive politics" is the

149. See Chosun Ilbo, March 25, 1965. The motion was defeated by votes of 54 "yeses," 16 "nos" and 65 abstentions. In view of 84 DRP Assemblymen and 51 opposition members present at voting, 65 abstentions plus 3 "yes" votes cast by the DRP members were, in reality, a massive revolt of the party against the leadership of Park Chung-hee. For details of the vote, see Chosun Ilbo, March 26, 1965.

150. Ibid., March 25, 1965.

151. Cf. Park Chung-hee, Leadership (Seoul: Ministry of Public Information, ROK, undated).

152. Quoted in "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 4, Chosun Ilbo, September 1, 1966.

gearing of all political activities to contribute to the supreme goal of "modernization of the fatherland," a goal which may be attained chiefly through economic development.[153] He sees in himself the embodiment of this goal; he justifies the exercise of his enormous authority in this light; and, accordingly, he demands absolute obedience from all governmental officials and party members to his leadership.[154]

Because of his "productive politics," which gives priority to administrative efficiency, President Park dislikes "things overtly political" and tends to rigidly separate his administrative affairs from political affairs[155] so as to allow his administration to perform to its fullest ability without fear of intervention by the party.[156] His dislike of politics is further mirrored in his activities as President: he rarely attends "meetings political" held in the party or related to the National Assembly; and, instead, he concentrates his attention on details of administration and party affairs through his associates or through direct contacts with high officials in the administration and the party.[157] Against this background, it was no wonder that he openly expressed distrust of his own party which was torn apart by factionalism.[158] He might have reached the conclusion that his party was not a party but an assemblage of factions - - neither able to function as a driving force for modernization nor able to be a hierarchical command capable of supporting his program. In view of his long career in the army,

153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Ibid.; and Glen D. Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future," Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 1, January 1967, p. 21.
156. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 3, Chosun Ilbo, August 31, 1966.
157. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 4, op. cit.; and Glenn D. Paige, op. cit., p. 22.
158. See Kim Ki-ch'ŏl in "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., pp. 156-7.

President Park appears to be more comfortable in the political scene with a hierarchical order of leadership than a turbulent order of leadership he saw in his party. His liking of a military type of leadership has been evident in his intolerance of any political challenge to his leadership as well as in his establishment of a military command-type of administration in which he delegates responsibilities to trusted subordinates so long as they remain loyal and capable.[159] Consequently he has been relying more on his close advisors and associates in the administration whom he regards as being less "political" and more "productive."

Another factor that tended to separate his administration from his party was perhaps his confidence in the exercise of power and authority. In spite of the fact that Kim Chong-pil and his main stream faction were largely credited with Park Chung-hee's political success, President Park steadily gained confidence in his ability to rule the party and the country without Kim Chong-pil or people like him - - having discovered this ability during Kim's six-month exile in 1964.[160] Assertion of this capacity was demonstrated by his total resistance to the main stream faction's numerous pressures which aimed at reshuffling his cabinet and his Presidential Secretariat in order to install more of Kim's own followers who could be more amenable to the DRP's views.

The chief beneficiaries of President Park's personal concepts of administration, politics and leadership were, thus, his close associates in the administration who enjoyed not only the President's personal confidence and protection but also outlived their political

159. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No. 4, op. cit.; and Glenn D. Paige, op. cit., pp. 21-2.
160. See The New York Times, November 14, 1964.

rivals in the party. This had worked chiefly against the main stream faction in the party. It may also be said that a general result of Park's indifference to his party and its politics had contributed, in some degree, to perpetual tension and rivalry between the party and the administration. It is certain that his attitude had contributed to relegating the party to a position subordinate to that of the administration in policy matters.

The resignation of Kim Chong-pil and the purge of Kim Yong-tae in May 1968 may have ended the very controversial struggle of the main stream faction to establish the party supremacy. Their ousting may have lessened factional tension among the rival groups in the ruling circle of Park's government. But, in spite of the relatively formidable and calm appearance of the party at present, the DRP, like other political parties in Korea, is not a unified party with a certain degree of institutional stability. It is indeed a "dormant volcano" dangerously pent up with factional tension. The critical test of survival of the party lies ahead when the DRP will have to find a successor to the leadership of President Park Chung-hee.

CHAPTER 8.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICS: THE MASS PARTY

THE ORIGIN AND THE IDEALS OF THE MASS PARTY

The Mass Party (Minjungtang) was formed on May 3, 1965[1]. when the two leading opposition parties, the Civil Rule Party and the Democratic Party, which jointly controlled all opposition members in the National Assembly, merged their forces for the struggle against the ROK-Japan treaty.[2]. The merger was the final phase of unification of all opposition forces, following the mergers of the Liberal Democratic Party into the Civil Rule Party in November 1964 and the Party of the People into the Democratic Party in December, 1965. As a result of the final merger in May 1965, the politics of the National Assembly became those of a two-party system -- the ruling DRP with 110 seats, the opposing Mass Party, 62, and three independents.

Because the leaders of both opposition parties felt that their supreme duty was to halt ratification of the treaty and to harness their forces against Park's government on this critical issue, they could put aside momentarily their personal differences and could easily agree on the formation of the Mass Party (MP). This was the culmination of one and a half years' joint struggle against Park's government and, in particular, against the ROK-Japan treaty negotations. Furthermore, the widespread popular opposition to the treaty generated a tremendous moral pressure to opposition leaders to unite. In any case, it was axiomatic that cohesion or concentration of opposition forces provided more organizational strength and a better chance in any opposition to

1. The MP was formally inaugurated with registration with the Central Election Management Committee on May 8 and the merger was ratified by the new partys' national convention on June 14.

2. For the purpose of the merger, see, e.g. Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op.cit., p.228. See also the merger resolution of the MP, May 3, 1965, and the resolution adopted at the national party convention, June 14, 1965, in Chosun Ilbo, May 4 and June 15, 1965.

the government -- the latter possessing superior political resources. Naturally there was considerable reluctance to accept the merger among the older powerful leaders in both parties who were still mentally inhibited by their past personal animosity and factionalism. The movement for the successful merger was initiated and sustained by relatively younger "intermediate" leaders of both parties.[3.]

In terms of long-range significance, the merger was greeted by the people and the press as the "realization of fervent wishes" of the people,[4.] who wanted to see major opposition parties united into one party capable of materially becoming the alternative to the governing DRP and of establishing itself as a constructive part in shaping a true two-party system.[5.] In this respect the merger was a most significant development of opposition politics since the resumption of party politics in 1963, regardless of the unique circumstance that gave birth to the MP. The merger had also measurably repaired the image of the opposition which had been badly damaged in the fiasco of the Party of the People.

As the genealogy of opposition parties in Korea below shows, the MP was in reality a reconstruction of the old Democratic Party (DP). The Civil Rule Party (CRP) and the Democratic Party (DP) were, in origin, the direct descendants of that old DP. After Rhee and his Liberal Party government were overthrown in 1960, two warring factions divided the old DP.

3. See the editorial comment of Chosun Ilbo, February 11,1965.
4. See the editorials of Tong-A Ilbo, May 4, 1965, and of Chosun Ilbo, May 4, 1965.
5. See, e.g., the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, February 25, 1965.

GENEALOGY OF OPPOSITION PARTIES



Sources: Chosun Ilbo, May 2, 1965; and Cho Il-mun, "The Genealogy of Our Political Parties since Liberation," Sasangge, October 1966, p.163. For a conscice view of Korean political parties' genealogy, see "The Brief History of Political Parties for Twenty Years," Chosun Ilbo, August 15, 1965.

The reconciliation of the two parties in 1965 thus represented the merger of these two old factions of the old DP. Because these two large factions together represented practically all current opposition forces in Korea, the long term political potentiality of the reconciliation was more meaningful than the immediate strength against the treaty brought about by the merger.

The MP was launched with the solemn pledge to restore freedom to the people: (1) it would be "the ultimate rallying point of all liberal democratic forces" that opposed "the militaristic power group" of Park Chung-hee; (2) it

would oppose the particular interests and the privileged business enterpreneurs in favor of the middle income strata, farmers and toiling masses; and (3) it would wage an all-out struggle to halt the "treacherous" ROK-Japan treaty.[6] Besides various economic and social reforms, the MP adopted the following basic policies as immediate tasks: (1) to revise the Constitution to replace the presidential system with a cabinet system, and to repeal parts of the party and election laws in order to safeguard political freedom and to insure fair elections; (2) to guarantee political neutrality of the armed forces and the police; and (3) to make independent the government's personnel administration.[7]

In self-criticism the MP also promised that it would purge "all remnants of the old reactionary habits" of the past politics, would halt chaotic factional struggles, and would strive to be a truly progressive democratic party contributing to the modernization of Korean politics.[8]

In spite of this determination to depart from the anachronic old politics that had been the mark ofthe opposition, the MP ended in disaster when it could not withstand the renewed factional struggles that immediately started with the merger and climaxed with ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty in August 1965. As previously stated, the party was finally split in November 1965 when the dissenting militant faction seceded altogether to form a new rival party.

The failure of the MP could be attributed to the failure of its extreme campaigns against the treaty. The underlying cause of the party's disintegration lay, however, in the inability of the opposition groups to overcome their own old political habits. Although the desire to halt the treaty was so over-

6. See the declaration and the resolution of the merger, May 3, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, May 4, 1965.
7. See "The Basic Policies" of the MP announced on June 14, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965.
8. See the declaration of the national convention of the MP, June 14, 1965, ibid.

whelming as to have brought these diverse groups together into one party, the desire was not sufficient to overcome other issues that deeply divided them. As always, the most serious issue yet to be compromised was that of party leadership or party hegemony. Indeed, this issue was the key reference point of various political motivations that made the factional groups differentiate sharply on the means and extent of the strategy against the treaty and the government during the treaty crisis. Because of this serious division and the resultant intrigues within the MP, the opposition during the critical hours of the treaty crisis reached its weakest point in terms of its political effectiveness and its popularity. In the history of Korean opposition parties, no opposition party had, in fact, ever reached such a degree of feebleness and unpopularity.[9.]

THE GENEALOGY OF FACTIONS AND THE COMPOSITION OF THE MASS PARTY.

The Civil Rule Group (the "Old Faction): Although the MP was a new party in name and in some minor aspects, it was in reality an old party with respect to leadership and factional composition which had once dominated the old DP.[10.] Generally speaking, the CRP group of Yun Po-sŏn -- the militant faction, later, in the MP -- could be traced to the oldest conservative anti-Communist Korean Democratic Party, or KDP (September 1945 - February 1949) (see Chapter 1). In alliance with other opponents of Rhee - notably Korean Nationalist Party of then National Assembly Speaker Shin Ik-hŭi and Great Solidarity Youth Corps of nationalist Chi Ch'ŏng-ch'ŏn, the KDP was reorganized into the Democratic Nationalist Party, or DNP (February 1949 - September 1955) in February 1949. In September 1955 the DNP broadened its political base and reorganized into the old DP (September 1955 - May 1961). The old DP brought in still other important opposition groups, and it emerged as the most powerful opposition party

9. "The Opposition Parties in Korea", Series No.3, Chosun Ilbo, October 22, 1965.

10. See especially "The History of the Mass Party," Chosun Ilbo, May 2, 1965.

that Korea has ever had. After the death of its powerful leaders Shin Ik-hŭi and Cho Pyŏng-ok, the "old faction" (the main stream of the KDP and DNP) seceded from the old DP in November 1960 and formed the New Democratic Party or NDP (November 1960 - May 1961). The NDP was finally dissolved by the military in May 1961. With resumption of political activities in 1963, it re-emerged as the CRP under the leadership of former President Yun Po-sŏn.

The Democratic Group (the "New Faction): On the other hand, the group which revived the DP in 1963, without its former leader Chang Myŏn, originally joined the old DP in 1955. The group in 1955 was a coalition of various non-KDP and non-DNP origins -- the remnants of the old patriotic organization Youngmen Education Corps (Hŭngsadan) and the "parliamentary faction" of the Liberal Party who had lost President Rhee's favor since 1953. This new group became the "new faction" in opposition to the orthodox "old faction." In the Second Republic the "new faction" became the majority faction in the old DP (and also kept the party when the "old faction" departed from it) and took control of the government under the leadership of Prime Minister Chang Myŏn until it was disbanded by the military coup in 1961. This was essentially the same group which revived the DP in 1963 and which became the moderate faction in the MP.

Thus the MP, created in 1963 by the merger between the CRP and the DP was in an authentic sense the reunion of the two rival factions that contended for the hegemony of the old DP prior to the division of the party in 1960. Interestingly enough, if one traces further the origins of these two factions in history, the factions date back to the Independent Club (Tongniphyŏphoe)[11]. which was established in July 1896 in Seoul and continued for many years at

11. About the Independent Club, see especially Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism, op.cit., pp.58-66.

around the close of the Yi Dynasty (see the chart below).[12] The Independent Club was a nationalist movement whose purpose was to reform the anachronic and corrupt Yi Dynasty in the face of challenge from the West and Japan.

GENEALOGY OF FACTIONS



12. For the lineage of factions in Korean politics, see Kim Kyŏng-rae, "Korean Political Parties in Transition," op. cit., p.52. The genealogy diagram of the factions, though modified by me, is also from the above source.

As the general lineage of factions among the contemporary Korean opposition leaders reveals, the factions in the present opposition parties date back to the past century. The problem of factionalism has become, in the course of time, further complicated by the cycle of unity, division, and reconciliation of opposition forces under the impact of volatile political changes. This has steadily contributed to proliferation of factions and generated some deep-seated emotional and political animosity among them.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPPOSITION

In general all opposition parties in Korea were formed by the factions or groups who had been either eliminated through power struggles or had splintered from the original inner group of power,[13] rather than by those who were motivated by political and ideological differences. Whenever a faction or group failed in the struggle for party hegemony or for control of the government, the loser separated from the mother party and formed its own new party to become an opposition party whether it was opposed to a ruling party or to a mother party. This was the case of the KDP which left Rhee's ruling coalition; of the NDP which separated from the old DP; or more recently, the LDP which was the coalition of those who had been defeated in power struggles in the junta, the DRP, and the Civil Rule Party. Therefore, a generalization about the cause of formation of an opposition party can be made: an opposition party in Korea is the product of factional power struggles and is largely motivated by resistance. Along with this generalisation, it must also be remembered that a majority of the early opposition leaders were formerly nationalists and, as such, they were schooled for resistance and revolution and were rarely trained for politics.[14]

13. See Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties, op. cit., pp.218-9

14. Cf. Richard L. Park, Problems of Political Development," Philip W. Tahyer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). p.103.

From this motivational origin, the opposition parties have been thus essentially and inevitably too negative in outlook and too limited in potentiality to be constructive oppositional groups. Furthermore, having been perpetually confined to a minority status with little prospect of becoming a ruling party -- not to mention their possession of little or no experience in government, the negative attitudes which have been best illustrated by extremism and irresponsibility became a permanent fixture of the opposition.

The negative mentality has been compounded by factionalism, which the opposition party, without political power and substantial means of rewards and punishment, has been hardly able to suppress and discipline.[15] There were, of course, the times when factions could put aside their differences. These were only when they were all extremely emotional about their external enemy (the government); or when the balance or stratification of power between the factions was more or less stablized; and when reorganization of party leadership was not immediately the pressing issue. These exceptional periods of dormancy of factional strife were seen in the days of the desperate struggle of the old DP against Rhee in 1956 and 1960.

Due to this negative mentality and helpless factionalism, the opposition parties have most of the time been the prisoner of their own inertia and are unable to break away from their pre-modern pattern of politics manifested in extremism and irresponsibility. This is one of the reasons why the factions that advanced the most militant line of argument and tactics against the government have usually dominated the direction of the opposition politics. Under the domination of extreme factions, the strategy of the opposition has often been committed to the destruction of the existing government or regime

15. Pak Kyŏng-sŏk and Nam Shi-uk, "Factions in Korean Political Parties," op.cit., p.219.

by using whatever resources available. This type of opposition is what Robert A. Dahl calls the "revolutionary opposition"[16] or what Otto Kirchheimer calls the "opposition of principle."[17]

THE HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION:

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY DURING THE RHEE REGIME

In order to understand the perspectives and the limitations of the MP, an examination of the MP should begin with the old DP. Just as the MP started as a protest movement against the ROK-Japan treaty and was created largely under the external pressure of popular demand, the old DP in 1955 was also developed under similar external pressure.[18] The DP started as a pan-opposition movement of diverse groups who had rapidly crystalized their common ground on the issue of "defense of the Constitution" against Rhee's dictatorship.[19] The direct impetus that prompted the formation of the DP was the highly irregular constitutional amendment in November 1954 made by the Liberal Party. Spearheaded by the Comrades Society for Safeguarding the Constitution (Hohŏntongjihoe) of sixty opposition National Assemblymen, the old DP was formally established on September 19, 1955, by the progressive dissolution of the DNP.

The old DP was a coalition of diverse political veterans and their cliques which had, in various capacities, dominated the political scene of Korea since the liberation. They had been elected to the National Assembly at some point of their political career and had maintained their own political bases independent of parties or political institutions which were then quite

16. See Robert A. Dahl, "Patterns of Opposition," Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 344-7.

17. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes," Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, ed., Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1961), pp.216-7.

18. See, e.g., Cho Pyŏng-ok, Minjujuŭi wa na (Democracy and Me) (Seoul: Yŏngshin munhwasa, 1959), pp.208-9.

19. For the circumstance of formation of the DP, see Han T'ae-su, Hankuk chŏngdang sa, op.cit., pp.150-3; and Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., pp.241-53.

incapable of supplying stable political bases.[20] Having been brought up during this era of extreme instability of political institutions, the leaders that made up the top stratum of the old DP were, in a sense, the political institutions themselves.

Even today these leading personalities are quite rigorous and constitute the hardcore of the opposition. Some of the most colourful personalities of the old DP, such as Shin Ik-hŭi, Cho Pyŏng-ok and Chang Myŏn disappeared from the scene. But such recent leaders of the MP as Yun Po-sŭn, Kim To-yŏn, Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, Sŏ Min-ho, Yu Chin-san and Hŏ Chŏng had all been the bosses of factions or sub-factions for at least two decades. The degree of control by these old generational politicians also suggests a corresponding degree of anachronism in the political attitudes, styles, and modes of behavior of the MP in contrast to those of the ruling DRP which has a more progressive outlook and modernity in certain aspects of leadership and organizational structure.[21]

From the beginning, the most difficult task of the old DP was the solution of the problem of satisfying the two major factions -- the "old" and "new" factions -- in allocation of party posts.[22] The structure of collective leadership in the form of the "Supreme Council" of the party reflected this problem. Although Shin Ik-hŭi of the majority "old faction" headed the party as the head of the Supreme Council, the party was collectively controlled by five men (including Shin) of the Supreme Council which was divided three to two in favor of the "old faction."[23]

20. See Chong-sik Lee, "Institutionalization of Political Parties in Korea," op. cit., pp.13-4.
21. See Yang Ho-min in "A Round-Table Talk: Inquiry for Change of Party Politics," op. cit., p.159.
22. See "The Democratic Party in Pain for Unity," Chugan Hŭimang, No.33, August 10, 1956, p.4.
23. The members of the council were Shin Ik-hŭi, Cho Pyŏng-ok and Paek Nam-hun of the "old faction" and Chang Myŏn and Kwak Sang-hun of the "new faction," see Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., p.250.

The reason why the formal launching of the DP was delayed for nine months since the merger movement started in November 1954 with the formation of the Comrades Society was to achieve this balance of power. Another controversy in forming the party was, ostensibly, the question whether the new party should include the so-called "progressive elements" of Cho Bong-am who was potentially a threat to the leadership of the conservative coalition of the two major factions.[24] The exclusion of Cho Bong-am's group from the new party, on the ground of ideological difference, had certainly removed another potentially powerful faction from the DP.[25] But the problem of resolving the power struggle between the two rival factions remained nevertheless.

The intense power struggle came into the open in March 1956 during preparation for the presidential elections of May 15, 1956. The physical violence which occurred between the two factions in the organizational meeting of the provincial party in Chŏlla Bukdo in December 1955 provides an example of the intensity of the power struggle in the ultimate showdown for the party nomination.[26] However, the party's national convention in March 1956 was successfully concluded by providing a balanced ticket by nominating Shin Ik-hŭi and Chang Myŏn for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates respectively.

The sudden death of popular Shin[27] (caused by a cerebral homorrhage)

24. Cho Pyŏng-ok, Na ŭi hoegorok (My Memoirs) (Seoul: Minkyosa, 1959), pp.366 and 372-3: Kim Chun-yŏn, Tokrip nosŏn (The Independent Road) (Seoul: Shisa shibosa, 1959, 6th ed.), pp.190-3; and Sŏ Byŏng-jo, Chukwŏnja ŭi chungŏn (The Witness of the Sovereign) (Seoul: Moŭmch'ulp'ansa, 1963), pp.189-92.

25. Ŏm Sang-sŏp, op. cit., p.185.

26. See "The Democratic Party in Pain for Unity," op.cit., p.6; and Paek Kwang-ha, ed., Tansang tanha (On and Off the Stage), Vol.4 (Seoul: Paekmunsa, 1958), p.176. A "tansang tanha" was a short political commentary carried daily on Tong-A Ilbo, and the above work is a collection of these commentaries.

27. Had he lived, he might have been elected. His popularity was such that his historical campaign rally on the beach of the Han River in Seoul on May 3 attracted 300,000 people. About Shin, see Kim Sŏk-yŏng, Shin Ik-hŭi sŏnsaeng ildaeki (A Biography of Mr.Shin Ik-hŭi) (Seoul: Waseda taehak tonch'anghoe, 1956). About 1.5 million (16%) of voters cast their votes in the memory of the late Shin on the election day. See CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op.cit., p.477.

just ten days before the elections, left only Chang Myŏn to be elected against Rhee's running-mate Lee Ki-bung to the vice presidency.[28] The circumstances brought about by the death of Shin and the election of Chang to the vice-presidency, in conjunction with the necessity of expansion of the party organization after the elections, rapidly plunged the party into an intense factional struggle over the leadership vacated by the late Shin.[29] The "old faction" regrouped behind Cho Pyŏng-ok while the "new faction" strengthened its ranks behind Vice-President Chang Myŏn.

Cho Pyŏng-ok was elected head of the party and his resourceful "old faction" retained the numerical superiority in the Supreme Council by three to two through a series of tactical maneuvers in the Central Committee in July 1956.[30] However the victory of the "old faction" came only after the "new faction" had totally exhausted its long list of tactical maneuvers.[31] The defeat of the "new faction" was so bitterly received that the National Assemblymen belonging to the "new faction" immediately demanded resignation of Kim To-yŏn and Kim Chun-yŏn of the "old faction" from the Supreme Council and threatened to form a separate party with Chang Myŏn.[32] The threat of defection was, however, subdued when it was learnt that the Liberal Party was contemplating a constitutional amendment for a cabinet system.[33] The amendment would have deprived Vice-President Chang of the existing constitutional right to succeed President Rhee in the event of the latter's death, and would have made Lee Ki-bung President via premiership.[34] The serious division

28. The election law did not permit replacement of candidate during the election.

29. See Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4. op.cit., p.176.

30. See Lee Ki-ha, op. cit., pp.308-8.

31. See ibid., and "The Democratic Party in Pain for Unity," op.cit.,pp.6-7.

32. Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4. op.cit., p.205. Cf.the editorial of Kyunghyang Shinmoon, July 20, 1956.

33. Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., p.309.

34. See the draft and explanation of the amendment by one of its sponsors, Kim Su-sŏn, in his Nukurŭl wihan chŏngch'i inka (Politics: For Whom) (Seoul: T'ongil ch'ŏngnyŏn unbyŏnhoe, 1958), pp.120-39. For the reaction of the DP, see the DP's statement of July 4, 1956, in Minjutang, T'uchaeng ŭi chokchŏk, op.cit., pp.168-9.

between the two factions was averted in September 1956 when the "old faction" made a drastic concession that enabled the "new faction" to control the Supreme Council by the majority of three to two.[35] But Cho Pyŏng-ok retained his post of the party headship.

The old DP was again in turmoil in the fall of 1959 when the party had to solve the problem of selecting the party's standard bearer from Cho Pyŏng-ok and Chang Myŏn, as the presidential elections, scheduled in the spring of 1960, were approaching.[36] The factional rivalry was much more intense now than four years ago. First of all,there was a really good chance of winning the presidential elections. The whole country was in a mood to revolt against Rhee's rule. In contrast, during these intervening years, the old DP had increased its popularity as the party fighting for democracy with the benefit of relative internal calm maintained by the intricate balance of power within the party. The second main factor was that the "new faction" was no more the helpless minority, especially in the Supreme Council and local party organizations.[37] Unlike in 1956, the "new faction" had a really good fighting chance. In preparation for confrontation in the forthcoming national party convention in November 1959, the two factions spread their antagonism all the way down to district party branches in the hunt for favorable delegates.[38] The depravity of the factional struggle was such that they did not even hesitate to publically accuse each other of corruption and graft.[39] As an extreme example, the provincial party in Kyŏngsang Namdo was unable to hold a party

35. See Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., p.311; and Paek Kwang-ha, Vol.4, op.cit.p.325. The members of the council were Cho Pyŏng-ok and Paek Nam-hun of the "old faction" and Chang Myŏn, Kwak Sang-hun and Pak Sun-ch'ŏn of the "new faction."

36. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid., pp.379-91; and Min Kwan-shik, Nakchaesaeng (The Failed Student) (Seoul: Chungsŏkwak, 1962), pp.132-3. Min was a devoted follower of Cho Pyŏng-ok and as a Democrat he served two terms in the National Assembly. In the Third Republic, he joined the DRP. His work above is a recollection of his ten years with the old DP.

37. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p.380; and Kim To-yŏn, Na ŭi insaeng paeksŏ (A White Paper on My Life) (Seoul: Kangu ch'ulp'ansa, 1968), p.327. Kim To-yŏn was former Chairman(head) of the New Democratic Party and the above work is his political memoirs(unfinished at the time of his death in July 1967).

38. See Lee Ki-ha, ibid.

39. Ibid., pp.381-2

plenum before the national convention due to repeated incidents of violence.[40.]

In the final showdown of strength on November 26, 1959, Cho captured the presidential nomination by 484 votes to 481 — a margin of three votes,[41.] and his rival Chang became his vice-presidential running-mate against the Liberal Party ticket of Rhee and Lee Ki-bung. After settling the nomination, the two factions again clashed for the control of the party in election of the head of the Supreme Council. The attempt of the "old faction" to retain another important prize was, however, thwarted when the convention elected Chang Myŏn to replace Cho Pyŏng-ok as the head of the party. Some seventy delegates who had earlier voted for Cho for his presidential candidatship shifted their allegiance and voted for Chang, when they sensed an imminent split of the party — this split being amply clear in the desperate efforts of the "new faction" to remain in the party only as an equal partner.[42.] Thus the "new faction" captured the headship of the party for the first time, and in so doing put itself in a favorable position should it fail in the nomination contest. As soon as the two main issues were settled, both sides could amicably settle on the allocation of various party posts by dividing them evenly,[43.]

The distrust between the two factions was well indicated by the equivocal attitudes taken by the two factions on the constitutional amendment for the cabinet system. The old DP had been advocating the amendment ever since its inception as its key program, because it believed that the presidential system was partly responsible for the rise of Rhee's dictatorship.[44.] In spite of this

40. See ibid., pp.383-4 and 388-9; and Min Kwan-shik, op.cit., pp.140-1.
41. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., p.390.
42. See ibid.; and Min Kwan-shik, op.cit., pp.311-5.
43. See Lee Ki-ha, op.cit., p.351. The number of the membership of the Supreme Council was increased to six in order to give each faction three seats; Cho Pyŏng-ok, Paek Nam-hun and Yun Po-sŏn of the "old faction" and Chang Myŏn, Kwak Sang-hun and Pak Sun-ch'ŏn of the "new faction."
44. See an excerpt of Chang Myŏn's speech at the inauguration of the DP on September 19,1955, in his "On Chang Myŏn," op.cit., pp.360-1; and a part of Cho Pyŏng-ok's "An Open Letter to President Rhee," in his Minjujuŭi wa na, op.cit., pp.223-39. Cho's open letter, an indictment of Rhee's dictatorship, was carried in five instalments on Tong-A Ilbo between May 31 to June 8, 1957.

strong commitment, the two factions differed their views according to their political expediency. While Chang Myŏn was serving the vice-presidency with a good chance of succeeding old President Rhee,[45] the "new faction" had not only tacitly opposed the amendment but also regarded any advocation or movement for the amendment by the "old faction" with uneasiness and suspicion.[46] When the "new faction" advocated the amendment in 1959, it was, however, only on the condition that Chang Myŏn would be designated as the future Prime Minister in case of his defeat in the contest for the presidential nomination. In contrast, it was not coincident that during Chang's vice-presidency the most ardent advocators of the cabinet system were the members of the "old faction." It was true, Min Kwan-shik says, "that some persons in the 'old faction' dreaded the idea of Dr. Chang becoming the President, should anything happen [to Rhee]."[47] But in 1959 it was the "old faction" which took the lukewarm attitude toward the cabinet system, because the "old faction" was then confident that Cho would get the nomination and would be elected to the presidency. The contrasting positions and the opportunism of the factions shown on the issue of the cabinet system revealed: how the extreme factional distrust made the opposition politicians irresponsible and how the politicians put their factional interest ahead of the integrity of the party's key political stand.

The death of presidential candidate Cho Pyŏng-ok on February 15, 1960 (just a month before the election day, March 15), from a heart attack, created similar disarray in the party as the death of presidential candidate Shin Ik-hŭi did four years ago. The death of Cho was the irreplaceable loss of the party's

45. The importance of the vice-presidency was attested by the assassination attempt on Vice-President Chang's life by the Liberal Party at the DP's national convention on September 28, 1956. The Liberal Party and the government tried to convince the public that the three assassins were hired by the "old faction." See the indictment of former Liberal Party Assemblyman Im Hŭng-sun, former National Police Chief, Kim Chong-won and others by the Seoul District Prosecution Office in June 1960, in Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.1, op. cit., pp.333-6.

46. Min Kwan-shik, op. cit., pp.122-3.

47. Ibid., p.122.

presidential candidate since the election law forbade a replacement.[48] Especially for the "old faction," his death was a fatal blow because his death was tantamount to the loss of the party hegemony to the "new faction" which had just won the headship of the party in the last convention. For this reason, militant members of the "old faction" took indifferent attitudes to Chang's vice-presidential campaign and even urged Chang to withdraw from the elections by arguing that the whole elections without the party's presidential candidate were meaningless.[49] The militants argued for a set of immediate actions — including non-cooperation in the campaign, a forcible purge on the hardcore of the "new faction" and overthrowal of Chang's party leadership — in order to immediately restore the balance of power in the party.[50] If these actions failed, the militants also recommended the formation of a separate party.

The grave effect of the prolonged intra-party feuding in the old DP was also the weakening of party loyalty among its members. This was visibly evident in the shrinking of the number of seats held by the old DP in the National Assembly. In the general elections in May 1958, despite extensive ballot rigging, the Liberal Party failed to elect 156 or more seats — the necessary two-thirds of the total 233 seats for a constitutional amendment that would lay down a foundation of its permanent rule.[51] The results of the elections gave the Liberal Party 126 seats, the old DP 79, and independents 28.[52] Since then, both the Liberal Party and the old DP had increased their holdings of seats by absorbing the bulk of independents. By the summer of 1959 the distribution of the seats (at the time 232) was the Liberal Party 141 seats, the old DP 83, and independents 9.[53] But as of March 1, 1960, the old DP's

48. Sometime in 1959 the Liberal Party, mindful of the health of octogenarian Rhee, proposed to the old DP a revision of the election law to permit replacement of a deceased candidate. The old DP rejected it cognizant of a mortality table that was highly against old Rhee. See Min Kwan-shik, op.cit., p.144.

49. Chang Myŏn,"On Chang Myŏn," op.cit., p.371; and Lee Ki-ha,op.cit., p.419.

50. Lee Ki-ha, ibid., pp.419-21

51. See Kim Tŏng-myŏng, "Criticism of the May 2nd General Elections," in Lee Sang-chong, ed., op.cit., pp.20-1.

52. CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p.420.

53. For the change of distribution of the seats, see the chart "The Changes of Political Parties in the 4th National Assembly," the Secretariat of the National Assembly, "The National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, op.cit., p.120.

strength was reduced to 74 seats, while that of the Liberal Party was increased to 148 seats mainly at the expense of the old DP.[54] This development meant that the old DP's strength fell four seats short of maintaining the absolute necessity of 78 seats for defeating any constitutional amendment bill proposed by the Liberal Party. Taking the opportunity of the decline of the old DP's strength, it was reported that, at the time, the Liberal Party was planning a constitutional amendment in the forthcoming session of the National Assembly in April 1960.[55]

However Rhee and his Liberal Party government were overthrown by the April Student Revolution in 1960. The revolution was triggered by the students' anger at massive election irregularities organized by Rhee's government and his Liberal Party.[56] The revolution eventually thrust the old DP into power in the Second Republic.

THE HISTORY OF THE OPPOSITION: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN POWER

As the old DP was the only alternative to the discredited and shattered Liberal Party to control the forthcoming new government in the aftermath of the revolution, it was only natural that the factional struggle became intensified because whoever controlled the hegemony of the party would also control the government.

With the enactment of the new Constitution for the cabinet system on June 15, 1960, the immediate focus of their factional struggle was party nominations for the National Assembly in the general elections of July 29. Under the cabinet system the National Assembly became much more important than ever, because it selected the Prime Minister. Despite the official nominations for both the House of Representative and the House of Councillors

54. See ibid.

55. "The Korean Presidential Elections and the Uprising in Masan," Sekai, May 1960, p.212. The planned amendment was intended to elect, in the future, Rhee and his apparent successor Lee Ki-bung on the same ticket by an indirect election in the National Assembly where the Liberal Party could line up its own 148 members and perhaps 9 independents.

56. By rigging votes, unopposed Rhee received 88.7% of the total valid votes, and his running-mate Lee Ki-bung on a separate ticket had 79% while the incumbent Chang Myŏn received a meager 16%. The whole results of the elections were, however, invalidated by the National Assembly on April 26, 1960. See CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op.cit., pp.482-3.

which were equally divided between the two factions, the two factions had virtually opposed each other in the general elections when the defeated of the opposite faction in the nomination ran at least 110 districts as independents with the tacit sanction of their own factions.[57] The party was thus already quite divided into two separate entities.[58]

In the elections, the DP as a single party won 175 of the 233 seats (75.1%) in the House of Representatives and 31 of the 58 seats (53.4%) in the House of Councillors.[59] Ofthe 175 elected to the House of Representatives, the exact factional strengths of the two factions were not known because of extremely fluid factional alignments in the aftermath of the elections. Because of this uncertainty of factional strengths, each faction believed that it could muster a majority of votes to control the new government. Under the new Constitution, the President was the ceremonial head of state with the authority to nominate the Prime Minister who was to wield the real power as the head of the government. The "new faction" had decided to divide the above two offices between the two factions by electing Yun Po-sŏn of the "old faction" as the President and its own faction's Chang Myŏn as the Prime Minister. The "new faction"s" strategy was obviously to eliminate Yun, the most eligible contender for the office of Prime Minister, well in advance. The "old faction" had decided, however, to monopolize both offices with Yun Po-sŏn and Kim To-yŏn.[60]

On August 12 along these lines of strategies, both factions had joined in electing Yun Po-sŏn as the President of the Second Republic in the joint session of the National Assembly. In view of the serious threat to the stability of the new Republic in the aftermath of the revolution, newly-elected President Yun should have suppressed factional considerations in nominating a Prime Minister. Instead, the President designated his former factional friend Kim To-yŏn to the premiership in accordance with the earlier decision made within

57. Ibid., p.430; and Min Kwan-shik, op.cit., p.152. See also Yun Po-sŏn, "On Yun Po-sŏn," Hŭimang ch'ulp'sa, ed., Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa, op. cit., p.301.

58. Min Kwan-shik, ibid., p.153.

59. CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op.cit., pp.435 and 448.

60. See Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., p.84; and Kim To-yŏn, op. cit., p.362.

the "old faction."[61] On August 17 Kim To-yŏn, however, failed to get the consent of the House of Representatives by three votes. On the next day President Yun then designated Chang Myŏn and on August 19 Changdid get the consent of the House by the votes of 117 "yeses," 107 "nos" and 1 abstention.[62]

The series of frantic confrontations had clearly demonstrated the lack of internal party cohesion even at the very moment when the situation within the new Republic most urgently demanded party solidarity. The artificial unity of the party, so far maintained by the intricate arrangements in allocation of party posts during the days of opposition to the common enemy Rhee, was no longer relevant after the party was brought into power. The DP had neither machinery to reconcile factional conflicts nor a capable leadership to instill a new sense of purpose.[63] If the victorious "new faction" had displayed magnaminity by forming a truly non-factional cabinet, as it pledged during the contest for the premiership, there would still have been a thin thread of hope for the continuation of the single party. But the first cabinet of Prime Minister Chang was completely dominated by his own faction, apart from two independents and one pro-Chang "old faction" member.[64]

61. Yun Po-sŏn recalled that the "old faction's" decision to monopolize both offices was "too greedy." However he defended his nomination of Kim: he thought that the "old faction" was the majority in the House of Representatives, as the House had earlier elected Sŏ Min-ho of the "old faction" as a Vice-Speaker by the plurality of 15 votes. See Yun Po-sŏn, ibid., pp.84 and 90. On the other hand, Kwak Sang-hun, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, claimed that the "new faction" was slightly stronger than the "old faction." He also accused Yun that the latter betrayed the "gentlemen's agreement" by designating Kim To-yŏn. See his"ŏn Kwak Sang-hun," Hŭimang ch'ulp'ansa, ed., Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa, op. cit., pp.262-3.

62. For the votes in the house, see Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, op.cit., and Mun Ch'ang-ju, Hankuk chŏngch'i ron (On Korean Politics) (Seoul: Ilchokwak, 1965), p.324.

63. Kwak Sang-hun, one moderate leader of the "new faction" said that if such heroic leaders as Kim Sŏng-su, Shin Ĭk-hŭi and Cho Pyŏng-ok (incidentally, of the "old faction") were still alive, the DP might have survived the crisis in the aftermath of the April Student Revolution. See his "On Kwak Sang-hun," op. cit., p.268.

64. See Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op.cit., p.194.

The defeat of the "old faction" precipitated execution of its earlier proposal for division of the party. The opponents (especially among the members of the "new faction") of division argued that there was no significant difference between the two factions in national policies or ideology to justify the separation and that the DP had been entrusted with power as a single party with a single platform and should remain so.[65] On August 31 the "old faction" formally registered with the House of Representatives as the Comrades Society of the Old Democrats (Minkutongjihoe) and started earnestly to hamper Chang's legislative programs including the much needed budget bill. The two factions finally separated when the "old faction" formed a separate party, the New Democratic Party, on November 14, 1960 under the leadership of Kim To-yŏn (the head) and Yu Chin-san. Thus the great coalition of anti-Rhee forces formed in 1955 had ended by nothing less than an internal power struggle.

Some conclusions may be drawn from the history of the old DP. The most serious problem that prevented the party from developing into a cohesive and effective organisation was its lack of internal unity largely stemming from the persistent factionalism that bred distrust, suspicion and intolerance between the factions.

Because it was the coalition of the two major incompatible, conservative groups -- brought together into a single party only by the common detestation of Rhee's dictatorship, there was no durable common ground on which they might forego their factional differences and integrate themselves into a party with a strong common identity. Neither ideology nor national policy was the issue that separated them: it was the issue of leadership or hegemony of the party. In the absence of an articulated set of common perspectives, a semblance of party unity was maintained therefore by intricate arrangements in the distribution of power. Whenever the balance of power was threatened, conflicts followed not only to restore it but restore it for preponderance.

Since factions were constructed from leading personalities, the usual mechanism available for resolving factional conflicts was direct personal

65. See Kwak Sang-hun, "On Kwak Sang-hun," op.cit., pp.266-8; and "Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, 16th Session, Supplement No.13 (A/4900), op.cit., p.3.

negotiations between the leaders of antagonistic factions. Such negotiations were made possible by bypassing the formal party mechanism which was always rendered ineffective by deadlock between the factions. This practice was hardly conducive to institutionalizing the party as the final authority in the matters of arbitrating conflicts, instilling party discipline, and integrating the diverse elements and their interests for the larger interest of the whole party. This was the most critical area of functional failures of the party. Consequently, forceful showdowns usually accompanied by denunciations, invectives, intrigues and even physical violence had often occurred when personal negotiations between the factional leaders failed to settle the major issues.

The failure to institutionalize the party inevitably made the factions the loci of loyalty and activities of individual party members who could not find institutional loyalty and security in the party per se. In this sense, the old DP was not a party but a collection of the factions which in the end could no longer accomodate each other. The instability of the old DP thus caused to a considerable degree the political instability of the Second Republic.

THE OPPOSITION POLITICS BEFORE FORMATION OF THE MASS PARTY.

With the advent of the military government in May 1961, all political groups were disbanded and their political activities remained under suspension for the next two and a half years. With the resumption of political activities on January 1, 1963, the two groups of the old DP immediately emerged prominent among opposition parties against the military leaders who were about to organize their own party. But in spite of their identical goal in opposition to the "extension of the military rule", it soon became apparent that they had to regroup separately under the old factional banners for exactly the same reason that they had to split the old DP in the Second Republic.

In the early stage of political activities,[66.] there were several movements

66. For an excellent summary of political party activities in the early part of 1963, see "Report of the UNCURK," United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, 18th Session, Supplement No.12 (A/5512), 1963, pp.9-10; and CFMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op.cit., pp.355-61.

for the formation of a "pan-opposition" party to consolidate civilian opposition forces against the military. The first serious effort for the formation of a "pan-opposition" party was the creation of the Civil Rule Party (CRP) on January 3, 1963, by four prominent leaders: former President Yun Po-sŏn, Kim Byŏng-no (former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court), Lee In (former Minister of Justice and an independent), and Chŏn Chin-han (former Minister of Social Affairs and the former head of the Labor and Agrarian Party). The composition of the initial participants in the CRP appeared to be a grand coalition including the two rival factions of the old DP, a number of independents and social leaders, and some Liberal Party members.

However, the proposed CRP was in reality the revival of the former New Democratic Party under the leadership of Yun Po-sŏn and his friends Kim To-yŏn and Yu Chin-san. The predominance of the New Democratic faction (the "old faction") in the CRP became clear when the entire contingent of former members of the New Democratic Party came out in support of the new party on January 14[67.] and joined it as soon as they were released from the political blacklist after February 1963.[68.] Having been deprived of its boss (former Prime Minister Chang) and of a number of prominent leaders either through the junta's blacklist or retirement from politics,[69.] the Democratic faction (the "new faction") was no match for the New Democratic faction in the CRP. Its own lack of factional strength was obviously the reason why, on January 17, the Democratic faction withdrew from the CRP. The withdrawal of the Democratic faction made the CRP far removed from a "pan-opposition" party and rapidly accelerated its transformation into de facto a revival of the former New Democratic Party. At its inauguration convention on May 14, the CRP, as expected, nominated Yun Po-sŏn as its presidential candidate.

67. See the statement of former members of the New Democratic Party in Chosun Ilbo, January 15, 1963.

68. Sŏ Byŏng-jo, Chŏngsang eŭi tochŏnja, op. cit., p.157.

69. Chang Myŏn, Kim Yŏng-sŏn (Minister of Finance), Kim Sang-don (Mayor of Seoul), Kim Sŏn-t'ae (Minister without Portfolio) and Lee Ch'ŏl-sŭng (Chairman of the National Defense Committee in the House of Representatives) were on the blacklist; while Kwak Sang-hun, Hyŏn Sŏk-ho (Minister of National Defense) and O Wi-yŏng (Minister without Portfolio) were in retirement. See "The History of the Mass Party," op. cit.

After withdrawal from the CRP, the Democratic faction decided to revive and re-develop the old party. However, due to the lack of a leader prominent enough to be presidential candidate, it was losing a significant number of party members to Hŏ Chŏng.[70] Hŏ Chŏng, the former Acting President of the interim government, commanded vast prestige for his political integrity and administrative experience and was generally considered the alternative to Yun Po-sŏn as the strongest presidential candidate of the opposition. Hŏ was also about to form the New Rule Party (Shinjŏngtang) with his own followers.[71] But the group of the Democrats which joined Hŏ's New Rule Party in March nevertheless withdrew from it in May when the New Rule Party failed to give it proper "consideration" in the distribution of party posts and in the organization of local party chapters.[72] On July 18 the old DP was revived and inaugurated under the collective leadership headed by Pak Sun-ch'ŏn.

Thus the hope of forming a "pan-opposition" party was effectively dead when the two leading groups that comprised the old DP could not unite into a single party and they had practically reconstructed their old parties by re-grouping respectively under the CRP and the DP (see Table 1).

TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF OPPOSITION PARTIES IN 1963

Former parties	Civil Rule	Democratic	Party of People	Lib. Demo.
New Demo. Party	67.7%	-	-	34.0%
Democratic Party	6.5	91.4%	18.0%	15.8
Liberal Party	6.5	-	19.0	12.6
Unification Party	-	-	-	6.3
Independents	12.8	-	45.0	6.3
Military origin	-	-	-	6.3
New comers	6.5	8.6	16.0	18.7
Others	-	-	2.0	-
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Kyunghyang Shinmoon, November 1, 1965.

70. CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, op. cit., p.358.

71. About the New Rule Party, see ibid.; and United Nations, 18th Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/5512), op. cit., p.10. The New Rule Party was reorganized into the Party of the People in September 1963 after the failure of a merger movement among the CRP, Popular Friendship Party (Minutang) of Lee Bŏm-sŏk and Hŏ's own party. Hŏ became the presidential candidate of the Party of the People.

72. CEMC, Taehanminkuk sŏnkŏ sa, ibid., p.360.

In the view of their similarities in political ideology and programs, of their common experience in the single party in the past, of the compelling need of their unity against the military rule, and above all, of their mutual knowledge of effectiveness of collective action,[73] these two groups had more reasons for uniting into a single party than for separating into two parties. Certain moves to voluntary integration occur more easily if previous integrative experience has been adequately and equally beneficial to all participants.[74] However, the integrative experience of the two major factions in the old DP had hardly been adequately and equally beneficial. It was rather an experience of perpetual struggle for gaining power by a stronger faction at the expense of a weaker faction. The relentless challenge of the "new faction" to the dominant "old faction" in the quest for an equal share of power in the party in the pre-April revolution period, or the monopoly by the "new faction" of governmental power in the Second Republic had clearly demonstrated that the fruits of their long cooperation were not for the all to share but for the strongest to grab.

Because of this unhappy integrative experience in the past, it was natural that the weaker Democratic faction refused to join the stronger New Democratic faction in the formation of a "pan-opposition" party which would inevitably be controlled by Yung Po-sŏn and his faction. This was also the reason why the revived DP chose Hŏ Chŏng for the presidential candidate against Yun Po-sŏn during the height of the nomination struggle within the Party of the People in August and September 1963.[75]

THE FACTIONAL COMPOSITION AND THE STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE MASS PARTY

As the above review of the career of the opposition in Korea revealed,

73. About some sociological and psychological factors for political integration, see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, ed., The Integration of Political Communities (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964).

74. For general ideas suggestive of this hypothesis, see Karl W. Deutsch, "The Price of Integration," and Henry Teune, "The Learning of Integrative Habits," ibid., pp.143-78 and 247-82.

75. Yun's candidacy was formally opposed by the DP when its "Consultative Conference for Promotion of A Single Presidential Candidate for the United Opposition" outlined the five categories of fitness of persons running for the presidency. See Chosun Ilbo, August 27, 1963.

the MP was indeed the latest version of the oldest party in Korea which had survived the cycle of unity and division over many years. Although some changes in leadership and internal alignments occurred under the stresses of political changes during this period, the internal problems that confronted the MP in 1965 were, however, essentially the same ones in nature that had continuously plagued the opposition. The most serious problem was again the lack of internal cohesion stemming from factionalism and personal ambition. The factional strife in the MP was, in fact, more intensified than ever because the restrictive party and election laws made the control of party hegemony more important than anything else (cf. Chapter 6). The reason was this: the laws required party nomination mandatory for prospective candidates, and the number of the aspirants for elective offices exceeded the number of nominations for the seats or offices available. Whenever parties merged, the competition for party nomination thus became keener because each party participating in the merger brought with it its own aspirants for party nominations of the merged party.

Just before the inauguration of the MP in June 1965, it was generally known that the MP was composed of "two corps and eight divisions."[76] The two "corps" meant the two parties -- the CRP and the DP; and the eight "divisions," the eight major factions under the two parties -- three factions within the CRP and five factions within the DP. The factional alignments and their approximate strengths (among 1,055 convention delegates) just before the inauguration of the party were reportedly as follows:

76. For the factional composition of the MP, see "Is it Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" Kyunghyang Shinmoon, op. cit., and Kim Byŏng-su, "The Analysis of the Mass Party," Chibang haengchŏng, Vol.14, No.7. July 1965, pp.133-7.

TABLE II: FACTIONS IN MASS PARTY BEFORE INAUGURATION.

Party & Strength	Faction and Strength		Group & Strength		Total
Civil Rule 615 (Yun Po-sŏn)	Yun Po-sŏn	300	Yun Group	460	
	Kim To-yŏn	90			
	Yu Chin-san	200	Yu Group	200	
	Others	25			
Democratic 440 (Pak Sun-ch'ŏn & Hŏ Chŏng)	Cho Chae-ch'ŏn (Pak Sun-ch'ŏn)	120			
	Lee Chae-yŏng	85	Demo.group	330	
	Hong Ik-pyo	80			
	Chŏng Il-hyŏng	70			
	Lee Sang-ch'ŏl	45			
	Others	40			
			Total Delegates ---		1,055

Source: The table was constructed mainly based on "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" Kyunghyang Shinmoon, June 12, 1965.

To group them again cross-sectionally in terms of major issues in the party, the MP was composed of three large groups: (1) the Yun Po-sŏn group (the coalition of the factions of Yun Po-sŏn and Kim To-yŏn of the CRP and of the faction of Chŏng Il-hyŏng of the DP): (2) the Yu Chin-san group; and (3) the Democratic Group (the four factions of the DP which supported Pak Sun-ch'ŏn and Hŏ Chŏng).[77] Later the Yun group was also known as the "militant faction," and the coalition of the Democratic group and the Yu group as the "moderate faction." Their political differences and different strategies against the ROK-Japan treaty have already been discussed in Chapter 6.

The complexity of factional alignments and accompanying factional claims presented a considerable problem to organizing a leadership structure of the MP. In making the charter of the party, the guiding principle was, first, to construct a collective leadership in order to prevent domination of the party by the will of one man or one faction, and, second, to accomodate the bosses of the major factions in order to maintain party unity.[78]

Based on this principle they constructed a "dual collective leadership," by creating the Supreme Council of three men (one to be the head of the council, i.e., the head of the party) as the highest leadership body reserved for the top leaders and the Leadership Council of 12 men for the important factional bosses.[79]

77. "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" ibid.

78. "A Hypertrophy of the Upper Part: the Leadership Structure of the Mass Party reflected in the Party Charter," Chosun Ilbo, June 13, 1965.

79. For the organization and the structure of the MP, see ibid.; Kim Byŏng-su, op. cit., p.136; and "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" op.cit.

CENTRAL PARTY ORGANIZATION OF THE MASS PARTY



Source: "A Hypertrophy of the Upper Part: the Leadership Structure of the Mass Party Reflected in the Party Charter," Chosun Ilbo, June 13, 1965.

All important party affairs and policies were to be made by the Joint Conference which consisted of the entire membership of both the Supreme Council and the Leadership Council. Under the control of the Joint Conference, the Party Council of twenty-eight men was to supervise the Office of General Affairs which was in charge of operating the daily routine of the party. In short, the leadership structure was custom-made exclusively to accomodate important factional leaders, rather than to create a dynamic leadership to lead the party (see the chart of the party organization above).

There was however, from the beginning, an intense struggle for the hegemony of the MP. This was well reflected in the positions taken by the three major groups, for example, on the issue of the number of the membership in the Supreme Council. The largest Yun group wanted to limit the number to two; the second largest Democratic group, to five; and the smallest Yu group, to nine.[80] The group which believed that it could control the hegemony of the party attempted to exclude others from the party leadership as much as possible, while the group which regarded itself as weak wanted to diffuse it as much as possible.

The decisive and clear factional division between the Yun group, on the one hand, and the coalition of the Democratic group and the Yu Group, on the other hand, was established in the MP's first national convention of June 14, 1965. In the election for the head of the Supreme Council, Yun Po-sŏn was unexpectedly defeated by Madam Pak Sun-ch'ŏn of the Democratic group by votes of 513 to 460.[81] By a face-saving device, Yun was, by acclamation, elected to the "Advisor" post (the post instantly created by the convention when Yun declined a seat in the Supreme Council) which he declined to accept.[82] The

80. "Is It Possible to Terminate Factional Struggles?" ibid.; and "A Hypertrophy of the Upper Part: the Leadership Structure of the Mass Party Reflected in the Party Charter," op.cit.

81. For the elections, see Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965; and Tong-A Ilbo, June 15, 1965.

82. Chosun Ilbo, ibid.

convention also elected Hŏ Chŏng (the Democratic group) and Sŏ Min-ho (the Kim To-yŏn faction in the Yun group) to the membership of the Supreme Council. In the ensuing elections on the following day for the Leadership Council, five members of the Democratic group, four members of the Yu group and three members of the Yun group were elected.[83] The decisive defeat of Yun Po-sŏn and his group in both the elections was due to the alliance of Pak Sun-ch'ŏn's Democratic group with the Yu group. As a result of the elections, the coalition of the Democratic-Yu groups took control of the party by outnumbering the Yun group by 11 to 4 in the important Joint Conference.[84] The defeat of Yun Po-sŏn and his group meant the sudden collapse of his hitherto unchallenged personal leadership in the opposition camp as well as the defeat of his militant line by the moderate line of the coalition.[85] This also meant the disappearance of the central force which had led the opposition movement in the Third Republic, and replacement of it by a loose coalition of the two groups.

The result of the elections was bound to have a serious impact on the future of the MP. The immediate question was: How would the still largest and relatively cohesive Yun group take the defeat? As mentioned earlier, the leadership structure of the party was deliberately constructed to reflect the strength of each group in the dual collective leadership. But the distribution of the seats in the Joint Conference after the elections was tantamount to self-defeat of the purpose of the party, because the cornerstone of stability of the party had to be realistically based on the strength of each group whose cooperation was essential for party unity. When the militant faction (the Yun group) refused to accept its minority status[86] and tried to impose its will

83. See Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1965; and "The Fight Without Compromise on Allocation of the Posts," Chosun Ilbo, of the same date.

84. About the new leadership of the MP, see "The Pilots of the Mass Party," Chosun Ilbo, June 17, 1965.

85. "The Female Head of the Party and the Road Ahead," Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965.

86. One of the most revealing stories about the extreme factional antagonism generated by the defeat of the Yun group was told by Pak Sun-ch'ŏn in her vivid description of the atmosphere of Yun's camp when she visited Yun's residence after the elections. See Pak Kwŏn-sang, "Interview with Pak Sun-ch'ŏn," op.cit., pp. 259-60.

on the party during the treaty crisis, the intense intra-party struggle between the militant faction and the moderate faction (the coalition) was thus initiated.

THE ISSUES AND THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF FACTIONS.

One important aspect of the new factional alignments after the elections was that for the first time the factional division between the rival groups in the opposition was, at least in appearance, demarcated by the difference of political attitudes rather than by the traditional factional loyalty. The distinction between the "militant" and "moderate" factions could be determined from their respective political attitudes as to the degree and means of opposition to the ruling DRP and the government or the question of collaboration with them. On this ostensive ground, the Yu Chin-san group of the CRP crossed the party line and joined the Democratic group, while the Chŏng Il-hyŏng faction of the DP likewise joined the Yun Po-sŏn group.[87]

Although the factional alignments in the MP appeared to be based on the difference of political attitudes, it was in fact the by-product of the continuing factional struggles in both the CRP and the DP before the merger took place. In other words, the new alignments in the MP were the result of the defection of the minority factions (the Yu group and the Chŏng Il-hyŏng faction) which were disowned by their respective former parties.[88] Yun Po-sŏn's defeat in the convention was thus due to the defection of the Yu group. This was a factor that had certainly contributed to the intensification of factional rivalry between the militants and the moderates under the pretext of political difference.[89]

In this connection, the reason why Yu Chin-san defected his former boss

87. See the analysis of the elections in "The Fight Without Compromise on Allocation of the Posts," op. cit.

88. See, e.g., "The Democratic Party Hoists Sail," Chosun Ilbo, December 15, 1964; and "The Civil Rule Party: The Factions in Motion," Chosun Ilbo, March 17, 1965.

89. See "The Return of the Mass Party to the National Assembly As a Sign of Division of the Party," op. cit., p.139.

Yun Po-sŏn sheds a certain light on the nature of the new factional alignments in the MP. When the CRP was formed in early 1963, there were two main rival factions among the members of the former New Democratic Party: the Yun Po-sŏn faction under the command of the field-general Yu Chin-san; and the Kim To-yŏn faction under the command of the field-general So Sŏn-kyu.[90] Kim To-yŏn, in view of his former capacity as head of the New Democratic Party, naturally resented Yun's hegemony in the CRP which was practically the reconstruction of the old party. This resentment finally led to the defection of So Sŏn-kyu (in June 1963) and Kim To-yŏn (in September 1963) from the CRP and to their participation in the Liberal Democratic Party, after the Kim To-yŏn faction had been defeated in the struggle for party hegemony.[91] After the elimination of the Kim To-yŏn faction, Yu Chin-san began to assert his independence, notably by trying to persuade Yun Po-sŏn to give up his presidential ambition in favor of Hŏ Chŏng when the Party of the People was deadlocked in September 1963.[92] This was the beginning of their personal animosity that culminated in the expulsion of Yu Chin-san and his thirteen supporters from the CRP on October 8, 1964.

This was the so-called "Yu Chin-san uproar" which flared up on August 5, 1964, three days after the National Assembly enacted the controversial press law. This law, proposed by the DRP, was supposedly a part of the legislative package deal agreed upon between the DRP and the opposition parties in the Bipartisan Consultative Conference in exchange for the lifting of the martial law declared on June 13, 1964. The opposition opposed the press law bill, but did not register its dissent by casting negative votes.[93] Since Yu was the leader of the parliamentary wing of the CRP at the time and had been known

90. Sŏ Byŏng-jo, Chŏngsang eŭi tochŏnja, op. cit., p.157.
91. Ibid., p.158; and Kim To-yŏn, op. cit., p.436.
92. See the advertised statement of the Yu Group, "The Statement concerning the Reckless Act of Mr. Yun Po-sŏn," in Chosun Ilbo, December 22, 1964.
93. See Kim To-yŏn, op. cit., pp.486-7.

for some time to be a moderate in dealing with the ruling DRP,[94] Yun immediately took the case of the feeble opposition of the CRP shown in the press law, as a good opportunity to brand Yu as a traitor to the party and to the press,[95] and lodged a vigorous purge campaign against Yu and his faction in the name of "unification of the party's political orientation."[96] With this uproar the militant political position of the Yun faction and the moderate position of the Yu faction became sharply articulated.

Much the same can be said about the case of the Chŏng Il-hyŏng faction in the DP.[97] In the course of factional struggle against the dominant Cho Chae-ch'ŏn faction, Chŏng also sharpened his militant line to attack Cho, by accusing him also of collaborating with the DRP, for instance, in the press law. As the two cases cited above alone attested, the true nature of conflict between the militants and the moderates was the struggle for party hegemony rather than the contest between two "true believers."

PARTY POLITICS AND FACTIONALISM DURING THE ROK-JAPAN TREATY CRISIS.

In view of the above genesis of the factional alignments in the MP, the strategy and tactics for halting the ROK-Japan treaty naturally became the central issue in the factional struggle. Although defeated, the militant faction was in an excellent position to regain party hegemony by taking the initiative in the treaty struggle which was itself the main purpose of forming the MP. Since the struggle against the treaty was also directly connected with

94. For instance, Yu was in favor of participation in a non-partisan diplomatic mission to the United States in January 1964. But the Party Council of the CRP vetoed it. Tong-A Ilbo, January 25, 1964.

95. Yun capitalized the attack of the press and intellectuals on the opposition for its failure to halt the press law. For criticism of intellectuals, see, e.g., Sŏn U-hŭi, "Advice to the Opposition," Chosun Ilbo, June 30, 1965.

96. For the Yu case, see Sŏ Byŏng-jo, Chŏngsang eŭi tochŏnja, op. cit., pp.168-70; Yun Po-sŏn, Kukuk ŭi kashipat'kil, op. cit., pp.205-7; the Yu faction's "The Statement concerning the Reckless Act of Mr. Yun Po-sŏn," op. cit.; "The Civil Rule Party: the Direction of the Intra-Party Conflict," Series No.1, Tong-A Ilbo, August 24, 1964; and "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, December 8, 1964.

97. See "The Democratic Party: the Direction of the Intra-party Conflict," Series No.3, Tong-A Ilbo, August 26, 1964; "The Gloomy Political Streets at the End of the Year," Chosun Ilbo, March 18, 1965.

the ultimate overthrowal of the Park government, an extreme opposition to the treaty was regarded as the best potent weapon for the militant faction to attack their enemies within and outside of the party.[98]

This strategy was apparent even before the merger took place. The proposal for dissolution of the National Assembly by Yun Po-sŏn on May 7, 1965, was reportedly decided by his strategists who had calculated that only by political commitment to an extraordinary extent, they could, first, maintain Yun's eminent leadership in the opposition camp, and second, they could arouse the masses, who were indifferent to usual political slogans, to a sense of extreme urgency in opposing the treaty and the government itself.[99] Obviously Yun's strategy was sensationalism. Nonetheless it proved to be effective as the opponents to the treaty grew in number and in intensity.

Because of the overwhelming support for the militant line of Yun Po-sŏn from the treaty opponents in the streets, the moderate faction could neither consolidate its majority position in the party nor could it assert its moderate line of struggle against the treaty. The initiative of the militant faction in the treaty struggle was felt when the same national party convention, which only a few hours ago had entrusted the party leadership to the moderates, had to adopt unanimously the following resolution calling for resignation of the opposition members en masse from the National Assembly:

> If a treaty bill, unacceptable to the Mass Party, is introduced into the National Assembly ... , the opposition members should resign from the National Assembly should it become impossible to halt ratification of the treaty in spite of having struggled against it to the last minute. 100.

If this resolution was to be carried out despite the objection of the DRP majority to such resignation, the opposition would also have to resign

98. See, e.g., Kim Yŏng-sam, "Retrospect on the Parliamentary Politics in 1965," op. cit., p.6.
99. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, May 9, 1965.
100. For the resolution of June 14, 1965, see Chosun Ilbo, June 15, 1965.

from the MP in order to make their resignation irrevocable. Furthermore, in order to enforce this resolution uniformly to include potential "resignation dodgers," the only remaining possibility was to dissolve the party itself. The dissolution of the party would automatically lead to the loss of the seats of the entire opposition members in accordance with a constitutional provision. Because of this potential danger in the resolution, a few days later Pak Sun-ch'ŏn belatedly warned against an extreme extension of the resolution by saying that "resignation is not the best way" for the party.[101] But armed with this resolution, which was, in effect, the official endorsement by the party of the militant strategy, the militant faction had decided to enforce its will on the majority moderate faction.

The first serious confrontation between the two factions commenced with the issue of the allocation of about 250 seats in the party's Central Standing Committee.[102] In spite of the urgency of immediate functioning of the party to give an effective opposition to the treaty, the disagreement on the allocation of the seats prevented the formation of the Central Standing Committee until July 24.[103] The Central Standing Committee was empowered to organize various operational departments of the central party. Without the functioning of the Central Standing Committee the MP was thus without a proper party apparatus to operate it or to deliberate and decide a single strategy against the treaty.[104] It was during this factional bickering that the DRP had forcibly introduced the treaty ratification bill to the National Assembly on July 14.

In the state of extreme indignation at the DRP's forcible manner in the introduction of the bill, on July 15 the party's Parliamentary Group Conference

101. Kim Byŏng-su, op. cit., p.137.

102. The head of the party Pak had allocated the seats in the following ratio: the moderate faction 60% (the Democratic group 40% and the Yu group 20%) and the militant faction 40% (the Yun group 30% and the Kim To-yŏn faction 10%). But the Yun group demanded 35%. See Chosun Ilbo, July 4, 1965.

103. The Central Standing Committee was finally formed after militant faction agreed to accept 42.4% of the seats. See Chosun Ilbo, July 15 and July 25, 1965.

104. Cf. the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, July 6, 1965.

had reaffirmed the national party convention's resolution on the resignation.[105] The National Assemblymen had also resolved to submit by 10. a.m. of the next day their letters of resignation from the National Assembly to the head of the party, who would then decide the time of submission of their letters to the Speaker of the National Assembly.[106] The above step was a substantial concession on the part of the moderates to meet the extreme demand of the militants. But the militants were not satisfied with this measure and insisted further on their immediate resignation from the National Assembly by either resignation from the party or dissolution of the party.[107] In a counter-move, the moderates, who controlled the party's leadership in the Joint Conference, issued a statement to the effect that the militant faction's movement for dissolution of the party had not been snactioned by the official party machinery and constitued a "treacherous act" against the party.[108] The moderates claimed that the dissolution movement of the militants was motivated purely by a desire to capture party hegemony.[109] Because of this factional distrust, the National Assemblymen's resolution to submit letters of resignation to the head of the party was not fully carried out.[110]

Their difference was further widened when Pak Sun-ch'ŏn, as the head of the MP, had committed the party to the "five-point compromise" at the summit meeting with President Park on July 20. The summit meeting was arranged to find a way of avoiding the imminent head-on collision between the government and the opposition on the treaty bill. The important points of the compromise were (1) both the government and the opposition should avoid an extreme confrontation, and any confrontation should be made within the framework of the constitutional order; and (2) there should be sufficient time to debate the bill in a special session of the National Assembly.[111] This compromise by

105. Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965.
106. Ibid. See also Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1965.
107. "The Opposition Party in Agony," Chosun Ilbo, July 18,1965.
108. Chosun Ilbo, July,17, 1965.
109. "The Opposition Party in Agony," op. cit.
110. Among the 62 members, no more than 50 members had actually submitted their letters of resignation. Chosun Ilbo, July 17, 1965.
111. See Chosun Ilbo, July 21, 1965; and Tong-A Ilbo, July 20, 1965.

the moderates was directly opposed to the strategy of the militants who had rejected any compromise with the government. The militants denounced the compromise as contrary to the earlier resolutions of the MP.

Although the moderates apologetically explained away the compromise as a tactical victory in that it gained a respite without necessarily modifying the existing strategy,[112] by this compromise the moderates tried to check the initiative of the militants and to assert their position in the party.[113] As expected, the compromise prompted the intensification of the separate intra-party strategies: the "dissolution of the party" by the militants versus the "consolidation of the party" by the moderates.[114] The militants attacked the moderates with a bellicose statement that "the Mass Party was occupied by the 'sakuras'." ("Sakura" is a Japanese word for cherry blossom; and here used as a reference to fifth columns sent in by the ruling party to subvert the opposition party).[116] They even spread a rumor that the moderates were being financed by the government after the summit meeting of July 20.[117]

The Central Standing Committee was, for the first time, convened on July 26 (exactly 42 days after the inauguration of the party), first, to organize the party's operational departments and, second, to decide the specific steps of the strategy against the treaty. Since the militants had already decided to wreck the party, they did not see any utility in organizing the departments which they could not in any case control.[118] The militant faction thus vetoed organization of the departments and, instead, insisted on a showdown on the issue of the strategy.[119] The issue of the strategy was officially

112. See the statement of Cho Chae-ch'ŏn, the spokesman of the moderate faction, in "The Prospect of the 52nd Session of the Ratification National Assembly," Chosun Ilbo, July 22, 1965. For an excellent summary of the arguments between the two factions, see "The ROK in Upheaval," op. cit., pp.13-4.

113. See "A Dialogue Opened," op. cit., pp.13-4.

114. Ibid.

115. See "From the Lobby," Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 1965.

116. The term "sakura" was so slanderously used that anybody who made friendly contact with members of the DRP or of the government was called by it. For the abuse of this term, see Lee Hyo-sang (Speaker of the National Assembly), "A Message Bidding the Old Year," Kukhoebo, No.50, December 20, 1965, p.2.

117. See "From the Lobby," Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 1965.

118. The militant faction earlier demanded at least 50% of the 27 posts while the moderate faction was willing to give only 40%. See Chosun Ilbo, July 25, 1965.

119. Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965.

decided after nine hours of heated debates by the adoptation of the moderates' version of the resolution by 151 votes out of the 252.[120] The entire text of the resolution of the Central Standing Committee was as follows :

> (1) In order to halt ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty the Mass Party should utilize all possible means by concentrating its entire power and capacity.
> The Mass Party demands general elections before any ratification to form a (ratification) National Assembly that shall reflect the will of the people. The party rejects any negotiation that might compromise the party's position against ratification of the treaty.
> (2) The party's National Assemblymen should develop to the maximum the parliamentary struggle in accordance with the above principle. If such a struggle becomes useless and if it becomes apparent that the treaty will be forcibly ratified, all the party's National Assemblymen should resign from the National Assembly in accordance with the resolutions of the National Party Convention and of the Parliamentary Group Conference.
> (3) Resignation from the National Assembly must be carried out. In the event of the letters of resignation from the National Assembly being rejected by the Democratic Republican Party, the party's National Assemblymen should not reconcile themselves to such rejection.
> (4) As a means of implementing that resignation, it is recommended to the party's National Assemblymen that they submit their letters of resignation from the party. The floor leader of the party shall collect such letters and hand them to the head of the party.
> (5) Hereafter no argument concerning dissolution of the party as the means of halting ratification of the ROK-Japan treaty should be made. 121.

Although both factions were in complete accord with the ultimate aim of the struggle against the treaty, the moderates sharply differed from the militants by stressing the "parliamentary struggle" instead of the "struggle in the streets." The moderates were also opposed to the dissolution of the party and to the forcible resignation of the National Assemblymen against their wishes, although the party would "recommend" that they resign from the party in order to finalize their loss of membership in the National Assembly.

In spite of the differences in technicalities between the two versions of the strategy, there was actually very little substantial difference in terms of the political and moral commitment implied in both versions -- assuming

120. Ibid.; and "A Civil War in Front of the Enemy," Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965.

121. Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965. The text of the minority version submitted by the militant faction is also available in the above issue of Chosun Ilbo.

that both factions were sincere in their common struggle against the treaty. However, each version had been selfishly designed. The moderates were as much opposed to the treaty as the militants were; but they were also preoccupied with preserving their hegemony in the party. In contrast, the militants saw little chance either for capturing party hegemony or for defeating the treaty and the government, unless they had the party and its moderate leadership wrecked and made the entire opposition go out and join the struggle in the streets. In the streets the militants could easily regain the hegemony of the opposition in alliance with such extreme struggling groups as the students, the Struggling Committee and the Consultative Council.

Because of the serious division within the MP, the DRP could immediately exploit the situation. The DRP announced that it would not only refuse to accept the letters of resignation if submitted to the National Assembly but would also immediately fill the vacancies in the National Assembly by by-elections if opposition members individually lost their seats via resignation from the MP.[122] Since the moderates had already decided neither to resign from the party nor to dissolve the party, the DRP's announcement made it doubly clear that the moderates were going to keep the party and to remain in the National Assembly whatever happened to the treaty ratification bill. Thus the resolution of the Central Standing Committee of July 26 was now clearly unacceptable to the militant faction.

In defiance of the resolution of the Central Standing Committee, the militants attempted to convene another national party convention by protesting that the resolution of July 26 was contrary to the instruction of the resolution adopted by the national convention on June 14.[123] In conjunction with this movement, on July 28 Yun Po-sŏn suddenly submitted his letter of resignation from the party, and other militant members immediately followed suit. Although Yun declared that his resignation had nothing to do with the issue of the hegemony of the party, he explained his resignation as a step towards dissolution

122. Chosun Ilbo, July 27, 1965.
123. Chosun Ilbo, July 28 and July 29, 1965.

of the party.[124]

In order to pacify the militants, the Central Standing Committee met again on August 4 and succumbed to the demand of the militants by passing another resolution that ordered the MP's National Assemblymen to submit their letters of resignation from the party by noon of August 18.[125] This resolution was in fact illegal, as the moderates pointed out, in view of the Political Party Law which provides that "No person shall be forced to affiliate with or to resign from (excluding expulsion) a political party without his consent being freely given."[126] However on August 7 the party's Parliamentary Group Conference, where the moderates were the majority, modified this resolution by resolving that they "should take the advice" of the Central Standing Committee "only when" the DRP rejected the letters of resignation, which were submitted to the National Assembly as soon as the likelihood of ratification of the treaty became apparent.[127] Even though the opposition Assemblymen's resolution was conditional and less drastic than the resolution of the Central Standing Committee, it was nevertheless a victory for the militant faction.

This latest reversal of the MP's strategy in favor of the militant line was unquestionably due to the intense pressures generated by the resignation of Yun Po-sŏn and exerted by the militant opponents of the treaty. On August 2 the militant Consultative Council warned the opposition National Assemblymen that they "must uphold the pledge made voluntarily before the people" by throwing away their seats in the National Assembly.[128] In reference to this tremendous external pressure, La Yong-kyun, of the moderate faction, said, "Under the pressure of extra-parliamentary threat and agitation, the National

124. See Yun's statement of July 29, 1965, in Chosun Ilbo, July 30, 1965. See also "Factional Struggle in the Mass Party," op. cit., p.304.
125. Asahi Shimbun, August 5, 1965; and Chosun Ilbo, August 5, 1965.
126. Article 19 of the Political Party Law.
127. For the resolution of the Parliamentary Group Conference, see Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965.
128. See Chosun Ilbo, August 3, 1965.

Assemblymen were compelled to submit the letters of resignation from the National Assembly and from the party. Under these circumstances the National Assemblymen cannot discharge their duty."[129]. Another moderate faction Assemblyman Ch'oe Hŭi-song flatly declared that he would remain in the National Assembly because the resignation affair of the MP was a "political show."[130]. As a consequence to this statement he was expelled from the party.

Due to the disunity in the party, as of August 9 only five members (including Yun Po-sŏn) submitted letters of resignation from the party; fifty-three members submitted letters of resignation from the National Assembly; and one member declared he would remain in the National Assembly.[131]. Because of this serious internal strife and confusion, the MP had never developed a common strategy against the treaty and was hardly effective in debate on the treaty ratification bill in the Special Committee during the 52nd Session (July 29 - August 14).[132].

The DRP's successive forcible steps leading to the ratification of the treaty caused only intensification of the factional strife in the MP. The MP resigned en masse from the National Assembly on August 12 in accordance with the resolution of the party's Parliamentary Group Conference. Nevertheless the moderates refused both to resign from the party and to dissolve the party when the DRP in the "one-party National Assembly" declined to accept the letters of resignation. Caught between their previous pledge to resignation under pressure from the militants and a strong desire to remain in the National Assembly, the moderates were in a deep dilemma.

The result was a prolonged political and constitutional crisis, manifested in the so-called "one-party National Assembly." The MP was full of recurrent scenes of vicious factional struggle between the militants committed

129. See Chosun Ilbo, August 10, 1965.

130. For his speech to this effect in the National Assembly, see Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 52nd Session, Plenary Meetings, No.10 (August 12, 1965) p.1.

131. Chosun Ilbo, August 10, 1965. Two members were at the time travelling abroad.

132. See the advertised statement of the DRP, August 12, 1965, in Chosun Ilbo, August 13, 1965. The statement purported to justify the DRP's forcible manner in the Special Committee. Nevertheless, it revealed that the Special Committee was almost daily idle at least for 5 to 8 hours, because of the incessant conferences of the MP to settle factional difference on the strategy. When the opposition members finally showed up in the committee, they were preoccupied with filibustering instead of debating the bill.

to the destruction of the party and the moderates preoccupied with finding face-saving devices to pave their return to the National Assembly. Betrayed by the opposition politicians and fed up with the MP's prolonged factional struggle which shamelessly exposed its true character, the public was more angry with the opposition than with the ruling party which was no less responsible for this crisis. The mood of the country was best expressed by the editorial of Chosun Ilbo which reads in part as follows:

> In short, it is too elementary to stress that the National Assemblymen ought to return to the National Assembly, for it is also common sense that normalization of representative government cannot be achieved without the opposition ....
>
> However there are questions that you have to answer. Why did you have to place yourselves in this dilemma by producing the extreme show of "resignation" which you did not really intend? Why do you have to now go through the pain of devising some absurd "excuses" to bail yourselves out of this dilemma? Don't you think that you owe the people a totally sincere explanation at least?
>
> Whatever you decide, you must keep the following things in mind: First, if you are to return to the National Assembly, repent and rehabilitate your political attitudes so as not to repeat such a reckless mistake in the future ...; second, take this advice -- never abuse again the sacred names of "the people" and "the constitutional government"; and lastly, if you are not to return, make your course of action clear. 133.

As it has already been detailed in Chapter 6, on October 11 the MP (except the eight members of the militant faction) returned in disgrace to the National Assembly by eating their own words of pledge to resignation. The return of the moderates to the National Assembly and the departure of the militants from the MP to form a new party of their own brought the turbulent career of the MP to an end.

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARTY POLITICS.

To be ideal, a political party must be stably organized with sufficient internal cohesion, with the objectives of (1) securing or maintaining control of the government and giving ideal and material benefits to the members of the party through such control,[134] and (2) mobilizing and expressing mass opinion

133. The editorial of Chosun Ilbo, September 15, 1965. See also Che Chae-yang, "The National Assembly in 1965 Observed from the Press Box," Kukhoebo, No.50, December 20, 1965, pp.50-3.

134. See Carl J. Friedrich, op.cit., p.419; and E.E.Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1942), pp.35-6.

on public issues[135]. and bringing forth and carrying out programs to which it commits itself.[136] In order to have a party "stably organized" and to provide the above objectives, the party in a full sense must satisfy certain prerequisites, such as the following four criteria suggested by William N. Chambers: (1) durable and regularized structure: (2) performance of certain key political functions, aside from the primary function of capturing political power by nominating and campaigning, such as mediating and aggregating conflicting interests, providing links between the branches of government, and management of the government; (3) command of a certain degree of stable support both in range and depth; and (4) articulation of a set of perspectives or ideology.[137] Using these criteria, certain conclusions may be drawn from the examination of the selected aspects of the DRP and the MP.

The examination of the two parties has revealed that both parties were, although different in degree, extremely unstable. For they were fundamentally not institutionalized to be cohesive parties, especially with respect to leadership and organizational and operational structure. This was attested by the chronic factional strivings for party hegemony that had not only undermined the existing party structures but had also prevented development of proper structures of the parties.

The DRP still boasts that it is a modern party with advanced structural features such as the secretarial organization and the elaborate policy-making bodies. But this claim is not supported by the performance of the party during the period under consideration in this paper. It is, to a certain extent, true that the DRP was in theory a modern party especially in view of the fact that no Korean party had ever been launched as meticulously structured as the DRP had been.

135. See Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (New York: The Macmillian Co., 1947), p.209.

136. See American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, Toward A More Responsible Two Party System (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1950), p.1.

137. William N. Chambers, Political Parties in A New Nation: The American Experience, 1776 - 1809 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.45-8.

The secretarial organization was the case in point. But in the course of factional struggle and with the inevitable ascendancy of the parliamentary wing of the party, the party's highly centralized leadership and control structure was all but decentralized in order to provide a collective leadership of factions as well as to accomodate individual ambitions of the party's National Assemblymen particularly in their own constituencies. Instead of operating the party by a set of rules or by the party charter, the DRP was operating mainly to satisfy the feuding factions. The difficulty in institutionalization of the party's power and organizational structures was clearly evident in a number of revisions in the party charter and the frequent reorganization of the party's leadership by the personal intervention of President Park.

On this same structural aspect, the ill-fated MP was from the outset hopelessly fragmented. Unlike the ruling DRP which had enough material and disciplinary resources at the hands of President Park, the MP had neither these resources nor a single strong leadership to submerge the rival factions into a semblance of a party. The leadership and organizational structure of the MP, as reflected by the party charter, was constructed to reconcile these factions which had been in continuous existence from the early days of Korea's independence. The prolonged difficulty, due to factional disputes, in organizing the Central Standing Committee -- which as a result had never fulfilled its given task of organizing the party's operational departments --- illustrated well the non-institutionalization of the MP. The several contradicting resolutions on the issue of "resignation" formulated by different sections of party machinery were another indication of the extreme instability and confusion of the leadership.

In the area of the essential political functions -- namely, formulation of public opinion and policies, aggregation of various interests, and management of the government (in the case of the DRP); both parties had utterly failed. The reason for the failure of the parties in this critical area is self-explanatory, if one sees the extreme instability of the parties due to the vicious factional strife. As the examination of factionalism in both parties

indicated, a factional position or alignment at the center was purely an affair among the leading personalities in Seoul on the issue of party hegemony instead of on the issue of politics. Unlike such political terms as "liberal" and "conservative" in the Western democracies, such labels as "militant" and "moderate" in Korea were the indications of the differences of intensity of emotion or attitudes rather than the differences of political values. "Main stream" and "non-main stream" were indicative of the power position of a faction at a particular moment. As these Korean political terms imply, the factions in Korean politics were mainly identified with their power positions within parties and with their differences of intensity of feeling. Depending on how their power position changed, the intensity of their designs for power also changed.

Since politics within the parties were founded on this basis of political expediency, the parties seldom reflected even the wishes of the rank and file, not to mention public opinion. So long as the parties were constantly torn apart by factionalism, they were hardly able to respond to public opinion, to formulate consistent policies, or to aggregate various interests, because there were simply no persistent centripetal forces to make party policies. This is attested by the factional politics in both parties during the treaty crisis. When the parties appealed to the public, the appeals were often not those of the parties, but those of the factions that controlled the parties. The appeals were also rather framed to elicit emotional response from certain sectors of the public in order to strengthen their internal positions in the parties. This was certainly the case with the MP.

In the early days of the DRP, there was some indication that the DRP was eager to solicit public opinion and to formulate policies for the government. But these efforts were wasted as the party became increasingly shaky in the midst of factional turmoil. The doom of King Chong-pil's main stream faction's struggle for "party supremacy" was a frustrating admission that the party could not function as the policy-maker and the manager of the government. Even though it was granted that under a presidential system the performance of these functions by a ruling party was normally difficult (particularly if the personality

of the president was dominant), the poor performance of the DRP in these two areas was below normal expectations. The failure of the DRP to perform these functions eventually led to a virtual breakdown in communication between the party and the government. President Park's aggressive assertion of his independence from his chaotic party as well as his complete subjugation of the party had more or less proved that the "ruling" party had been existing in name only and had been demoted to a mere electoral instrument of Park who preferred the more efficient governmental administrative machinery to the party in ruling the country.

As a consequence of this incapacity to perform certain essential functions, the parties could not generate stable and diffuse support --- not only among the public but even among the members of the parties. Often the DRP proudly refers to itself as a mass party with one and a half million members (about 11% of the total eligible voters in Korea),[138] and with some institutional decives for invigorating local party activities.[139] But the massive membership did not reflect the actual degree of political support from these members. As to this, one should remember, for instance, the manner in which the DRP had recruited them at unbelievable speed in the early stage (see Chapter 6). The opposition was typically a collection of factions which represented virtually nobody except themselves. Especially at grass-roots, local party branches were hastily organized as the Political Party Law required a minimum of forty-four local party chapters each with a minimum membership of fifty,[140] and they were merely assemblages of a handful of supporters of certain personalities such as their own National Assemblymen or a few factional leaders of long association in Seoul, (see Chapter I).

138. As of March 1966, the DRP membership was 1,467,903 (males 1,182,684 or 85% and females 255,219 or 14.5%). See "Organization Principles of Our Party," op. cit., p.6.

139. See, e.g., "Organizational Diagnosis: First of its Kind in Political Party History," The DRP Bulletin, Vol. 1, No.4, April, 1966, pp.20-1.

140. Articles 25 and 27 of the Political Party Law.

Lastly, on the problem of articulation of a set of perspectives or ideology, the first thing that has to be mentioned is that Korea has not been fertile political soil for the development of progressive ideologies or ideas, mainly because the ideological division of the country and the continuing subversion from the north has severely limited freedom of thought (see Chapter I). The development of ideologies and ideas has been further limited by the inarticulate socio-economic structure inherent in the pre-industrial society of Korea. The combination of these limitations bred a monotonous conservatism which had tendencies towards authoritarianism, as President Rhee could have manipulated anti-Communism against his political foes. One indicator of the effect of these limitations at present is the virtual non-existence of a viable progressive or socialist party in Korea. Another grave consequence of the lack of a free market of political ideologies has been the tendency to exuberate political contests into personality or factional contests.

Another condition adverse to the development of ideologies was also implicit in the recruitment and the composition of the parties. Since the parties were no more than collections of diverse elements and factions brought together either through the selfish objectives of electoral victory and of material benefits (as in the case of the DRP), or through external pressures and the ulterior motives of the factions (as in the case of the MP), they needed to develop stable centripetal forces which could provide certain consistent party ideals and programs (if not ideologies) to which these diverse elements could be committed. The Kim Chong-pil group in the DRP had tried to assume the role of this centripetal force and to provide an ideology to the party. But as his group was, in origin and on the record, no more than a faction, it soon lost its vitality in the power struggle. The DRP's "nationalistic democracy" advanced by Kim and his associates thus degenerated into a factional polemic as it was suspected of being a high-powered

rationalization of the main stream faction in maintaining party hegemony. This may be a part of the inevitable phenomena that Robert Michels observed in modern mass parties: "As the organization increases in size, the struggle for great principles becomes impossible. ... [the great conflicts of view] therefore degenerate more and more into personal struggles and invectives, to be settled finally upon consideration of a purely superficial character."[141] Admittedly the MP never had a set of perspectives. However the coalition of the moderates in the MP made some efforts to consolidate the party along its moderate line of opposition to the government. But this also failed because their political position was rather motivated by factional consideration. Moreover, the habitual marriages and divorces for political expediency among the factions in the opposition, and their narrow conservatism moulded in negativism had contributed to the creation of a condition that was hardly ideal for the cultivation of constructive ideas and programs.

The final analysis of party politics during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis may be concluded by commenting on the factional politics. It may be difficult to accept the notions that the history of the Korean parties was that of factionalism and that the internal dynamics of Korean parties were singularly generated by factional struggles. Nevertheless, factionalism was the factor that had critically weakened the capacity or the potentiality of the parties to institutionalize themselves structurally and to perform certain vital functions.

In his study of the parties in Western democracies, Maurice Duverger argues that the development of factions is not necessarily an indication of the liberty of party members or of increase of intra-party democracy, because each faction is itself authoritarian in structure and because the nature of factional struggle is essentially "an attempt by subordinate leaders to oust leaders of high rank, or of certain high-ranking officials to obtain the majority in collective executive bodies."[142] This argument is also valid in

141. Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p.366.
142. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen & Co., 1954), p.174.

the Korean parties. Nevertheless, it may also be added that in the case of Korean parties, which were constantly under the threat of disintegration, factionalism at best had some functional utility in maintaining a semblance of party unity and in providing some degree of intra-party democracy however fragile or sham these may be. But the overall effect of factionalism in the Korean parties was devastating. It bred (1) intolerance and suspicion among party members; (2) inflexibility and solidification of attitudes detrimental to the politics of compromise; (3) opportunism rather than principles on vital issues; and (4) general chaos of the parties detrimental to rational deliberation and formulation of party policies. These attitudes led to: "The interest of my faction is more important than that of the party or the nation," or "If you don't agree with me, you are a 'sakura' or my enemy." Because of the irrational and intolerant nature of factional conflicts, the parties could hardly develop certain neutral forces which would be sufficiently strong to moderate the factional differences and to stabilize the parties in order to commit them to a road of constructive and responsible politics.

There was strong evidence that certain positions taken by the factions in both parties during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis were rather motivated by factional considerations. For example the two major inter-party negotiations -- the Bipartisan Conference in June-July 1964 and the summit meeting in July 1965 -- were largely ineffective, because of the strong factional opposition to them by both parties' militant factions who had ulterior motives. Equally, the moderates of both parties who sponsored these negotiations were motivated by the desire to enhance their relatively weak intra-party positions. The absence of constructive centripetal forces to moderate and to check these extreme factional rivalries eventually led to breakdown of rational communication on the vital treaty issue, not only between the rival factions but also between the opposite parties. Thus the severe

political and constitutional crisis in 1965 was also attributable to the incapacity of the political parties to function responsibly and to provide necessary political leadership and rational deliberation.

CHAPTER 9.

MAJOR GROUPS AND POLITICS: THE MILITARY AND THE STUDENTS

In spite of the alleged mass basis of party politics, the Korean parties have evidently failed to mobilize and express mass opinion in orderly fashion and to mediate and aggregate conflicting demands on the treaty and related issues.[1] The parties were incapable of functioning responsibly and of providing the political leadership necessary for the solution of national issues through the existing constitutional framework.

The treaty issue itself was, of course, so grave and emotional that it aroused an unprecedented degree of public awareness to the extent that it had mobilized some three and a half million people representing important segments of Korean life. However it can be concluded from the outset that the mass movement in the streets during the treaty crisis was rather a clear manifestation of the inherent weakness of the existing Korean political system than a healthy sign of growing political awareness of the masses. In other words, the mass movement was an effort on the part of the significant segments of society to supplement the inadequacy of the democratic process or to supplant politicians and the existing political institutions.[2] This was a situation of political instability stemming from the "participation crisis"[3] in absence of an effective relation between the political elites and the people.

In turn, this indicated that the existing political institutions -- the government and the parties -- were not effective elements in the political process of Korean society. The breakdown of political institutions and the

1. The by-product of this failure was the widespread apathy of the people to politics after the treaty crisis. This was evident in the unprecedented low voting rate (26.1%) in the by-elections of November, 1965, which were held to fill five district seats in the National Assembly vacated by resignation of the five MP members. See Chosun Ilbo, November 10, 1965; and Shin Sang-ch'o, "The People's View on Parliamentary Politics Reflected in the November 9th By-Elections," Kukhoebo, No.50, December 20, 1965, pp.66-8.

2. Cf. Lee Ung-hŭi, "Direction of the Upheaval," Sasangge, December, 1965, p.138.

3. See Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Developments, op. cit., pp.65-78.

appearance of extra-political forces that replaced the former in the political process raised the question whether the instrument of power and control in Korean politics may be found outside the framework of the existing political institutions.[4] The danger of such phenomena is that very often the groups that function as extra-political forces are not instrumental for mediating conflicts between various social and economic groups and, above all, between political elites. They are rather instrumental in intensifying political conflicts between the opposing political elites, as in the case of the military and the students during the treaty crisis in Korea.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine such extra forces which relegated the political institutions to a secondary importance: the military which had to come out to support physically the government and the students who had not only contributed to the main force of treaty opponents but also threatened the life of the Park government. This examination will illuminate the following aspects of their potential significance in politics: Why were they so potent in politics? Why did the opposition rely on the students? Why did the government have to combat the students with the military? What are their future political potentials as they have already demonstrated their power? However, the actuality and potentiality of these two groups must be seen first against the level of development of other major interest groups that nevertheless play certain roles largely through their inertia in Korean political process -- namely, as instruments of the ruling party.

An interest group (voluntary group, pressure group, or lobby group) as an intermediate between the individual and the state provides continuous consultation between the government and the people all the time by checking and balancing and advising or warning the government.[5] As the prime means

4. Cf. Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York: Doubleday, 1955), p.48.

5. S.E. Finer, Anonymous Empire, Second Edition (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966) pp.112-3.

of the right to participate in policy-making and of the right to demand redress of grievances, the role of interest groups is also crucial in a mass society in helping the individual avoid "the dilemma of being parochial, cut off from political influence, or an isolated and powerless individual, manipulated and mobilized by the mass institutions of politics and government."[6.]

The development of interest groups is dependent upon three main factors: (1) development of socio-economic structure with its attendant social division of labor; (2) better communication that enables groups to amalgamate and to coordinate their pressure; and (3) increasing scope of public responsibilities and control which necessitates formation and greater activities of the groups.[7.] Considering these factors, not only are interest groups in Korea infant and weak due to the underdevelopment and inarticulation of socio-economic structure, but also their actions are hardly spontaneous as their formation and actions are dependent upon government authorization.[8.] Therefore, political participation by both the masses (see Chapter I) and groups in the Korean political process is hardly open and free and not sufficiently mature enough to narrow the gap between the ruling elites and the people.

During the treaty crisis literally several hundreds of names of local and national interest groups appeared in newspapers -- if not in the streets -- to register their voices in support of or in opposition to the treaty and the government. This was totally a new experience in Korea. As of 1963 the number of interest groups registered with various ministries and agencies of the central government was about 650,[9.] and if all groups registered with

6. Gabriel A.Almond and Sydney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1965), p.245.

7. S.E. Finer, op. cit., pp.7-8.

8. For interest groups in Korea, see especially Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., pp.557-70; O Byŏng-hŏn, "Political Pattern of Korea," op.cit., pp.74-5; Shin Sang-ch'o, "Interest Articulation: Pressure Groups," C.I.Eugene Kim, ed., A Pattern of Political Development: Korea (Kalamazoo, Michigan: Korea Research and Publications, 1964), pp.41-7; and An Hae-kyun, "The Administration and Pressure Groups," Sasangge, December, 1966, pp.50-6.

9. An Hae-kyun, ibid., p.54. According to the Hapdong News Agency, Korea Annual 1966 (Seoul, 1966) pp.325-35, there were as of 1965 253 nationally organised groups: 156 promotional (civic, professional, cultural, religious and welfare) groups and 97 special interest (farmers, labor, business, industry, and finance) groups.

provincial and local governments were tabulated, the number would reach at least to a thousand. Among them only 16 to 20 groups are considered to be reasonably effective as interest groups.[10.]

While expression of views by some of these groups on the treaty issue was voluntary and genuine, that by most of them was involuntary and manipulated by the government and its ruling party or by their own leaders who were eager to line up their support for the government.[11.] For example, while the majority of fishermen in Pusan (the largest center of Korea's fishing industries) demonstrated against the treaty,[12.] their own local and national organization leaders supported the government treaty position. This was a typical example that leaders of interest groups failed even to represent the wishes of the rank and file of their own groups. As expected the groups that supported the government position were those of labor, business, fishermen, farmers, veterans, dead soldiers' families, and anti-Communist functionaries.[13.] These groups were all highly dependent for their formation and existence on the government which maintains systematic control on them through license, registration, legal and administrative protection, subsidies, loans, grants and special favors.[14.] On the other hand, those who opposed to or, at least, exercised their independent judgement on the treaty issues were students, professors, the press, writers and artists, lawyers, clergymen, former generals and former politicians (see Chapter 4), whose existence was more or less independent collectively and individually and whose activities were less materially inclined. In short, the degree of

10. An Hae-kyun, ibid., and the list of major interest groups in Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., pp.568-9.

11. See, e.g., Assemblyman Kang Sŏn-kyu's criticism of the government's manipulations of the public opinion in Kukhoe hoeŭirok, 52nd Session, Plenary Meetings, No.8 (August 10, 1965), pp.3-4; and Chosun Ilbo, April 7, 1965.

12. See, e.g., Tong-A Ilbo, January 22, 1964.

13. For the statements supporting the government, see the labor unions' in Chosun Ilbo, April 6, 1965; major economic groups' (including farmers') in Chosun Ilbo, April 4, 1965; fishermen's in Chosun Ilbo, July 16, 1965; dead soldiers' families' in Chosun Ilbo, July 7, 1965; Veterans' in Chosun Ilbo, April 30 and July 16, 1965; and anti-communist organizations' in Chosun Ilbo, April 20 and July 17, 1965.

14. See the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, April 6, 1965; and "For or Against Ratification: the Third Confrontation," Chosun Ilbo, op. cit.

their dependence upon the government for their material benefit was the degree of their susceptibility to manipulation and control of the government.

As development of socio-economic structure with accompanying degree of social division of labor is a presupposition for the development of interest groups, the existence of such an extraordinary number of groups in Korea casts a doubt on their social and economic basis. A clear weakness of such basis is reflected best in the distribution of gross national product (GNP) and of labor force as indicated in Table 1. The statistics in Table I alone indicate sufficiently that Korea is still predominantly an agricultural society were 63.2 percent of the labor force is contributing only 32.5 percent to the GNP, while only 11.2 percent of the labor force is engaged in modern industries and producing a meager share of the GNP.

TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF GNP AND LABOR FORCE (1963)

Indus. Sectors.	GNP %	Labor Force %
Primary	32.5	63.2
Secondary	23.8	11.2
Tertiary	43.7	25.6
Total	100. 0.	100.0

Sources: For GNP (at the 1960 constant prices), Bank of Korea, op. cit., Table 21, p.27; and for labor force, Kim Yun-hwan, Hankuk ŭi nodong munje yŏnku (A Study of Korean Labor Problems) (Seoul: Koryo taehak, Asea munje yŏnkuso, 1967), p.232.

Without development of the secondary industries, the fact that 25.6 percent of the labour force in the tertiary industries is producing the largest share of the GNP is certainly an indication of abnormal economic and social structure. In short, the statistics suggest that Korea is economically not yet ready to develop a society conducive to a participant democracy. They also suggest that about 64 percent of the population has little capacity to articulate their promotional or special interests through organized activities,[15] because of their extreme poverty, ignorance and political inertia.

15. Cf. Yun Ha-yŏng, "Necessary Factors in the Formation of Leadership Force and Organization of Political Parties," Sasangge, July 1962, pp.33-4; and An Hae-kyun, op. cit., pp.50-1.

Despite some remnants of provincialism and occasional provincial rivalry,[16] Korea is also a most homogeneous country in historical, ethinical, cultural and linguistic aspects. Politically it has been a unitary state with a strong tradition of centralism. Korea has, thus, no serious sectional differences or cleavages to breed sectional interests and groups.[17]

Why are there, then, so many groups whose existence, in many cases, does not reflect neither the low level of socio-economic development nor the high degree of homogeneuity of the society? Obviously, the mushrooming of interest groups in Korea is a sign of fragmentation of groups, instead of specialization and differentiation based on an ultimate sense of integration. First of all, this can be attributable to the peculiar political culture that is heavily infested with a chronic disease of factionalism that has spread to organization and operation of groups and that has fragmented groups to render them ineffective in pursuing their common objectives and incapable of exercising positive influence in political decision-making process. (see Chapter I). Because of internal division and ineffectiveness, interest groups hardly command loyalty and solidarity of their members. Secondly, it is due to the fact that the predominant motive of leading personalities in organizing interest groups is the desire to use them as bases for their personal political or material gains.[18] The internal dissension within groups can be attributed to the power struggle among these leading personalities. It is not uncommon to find that, with few exceptions, leadership of interest groups is closely interlocked with leading positions of the government and the ruling party or is headed by persons who maintain intimate political connections with leading politicians in power.[19]

Accordingly, the unique feature of interest groups is that they are not voluntarily organized and operating autonomously. Shin Sang-ch'o describes it

16. The most recent cases of provincial rivalry was between the provinces of Chŏllanamdo and Kyŏngsangnamdo. To protest the government's favor of the latter in allocation of new industries, non-partisan political, social, economic and other groups in the former formed a protest organization and vigorously pressed their demands to the government. See "Three Dimensional Mirror," Chosun Ilbo, August 21, 1966.

17. See Shin Sang-ch'o, "Interest Articulation: Pressure Groups," op.cit.p.42.

18. Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., p.569; and An Hae-kyun, op. cit., p.56.

19. Pak Mun-ok, ibid. p.559.

as follows:

> From the outset, they are organized as a subsidiary to the government party. They are agents of the government or a political party, and the leadership within a group is decided not on the basis of the majority support of its members, but on the amount of support that one receives from the parent organization ... They may be said to exercise pressure, but their pressure is that of a government agent, and is downward and not upward -- downward against the general populace. 20.

The classical example of this type of formation and operation was the four main groups -- the National Association, the Korean Youth Corps, the Korean Farmers' Association and the Korean Federation of Labor Unions[21] -- which were formed by President Rhee as non-political national organizations. However they were soon transformed into the constituent groups in founding Rhee's Liberal Party, and became the most faithful agents of Rhee's government in mobilizing and manipulating the "popular will", in supplying political funds and in delivering votes for the party.[22.]

Although major organized groups, labor, business and farmers, have recently shown some sign of presenting their demands to the government,[23.] they are still hardly independent and free.

The labor movement[24.] during the Japanese rule had virtually gained no foothold for its development. After Korea's liberation from the Japanese rule, the present national labor organization started as a front organization of right-wing politicians to destroy the powerful Communist infiltration in the ranks of labor.[25.] Under Rhee it became a subservient instrument of the

20. Shin Sang-ch'o, "Interest Articulation: Pressure Groups," op. cit., p.43.

21. For these organizations, see Kŏnkuk ship nyŏn ji kanhaenghoe (Publication Society of Ten-Year History of Nation-Building), Taehanminkuk kŏnkuk ship nyŏn ji (The Ten-Year History of Nation-Building of the Republic of Korea) (Seoul, 1956), pp. 281-310 and 317-24.

22. See Kim Tong-myŏng, Chŏk gwa tongji, op. cit., pp.160-4; and Cho Pyŏng-ok, Minjujuŭi wa na, op. cit., pp.147-9.

23. On labor, see Hankuk Ilbo, December 5, 1963; and "Waves of Labor Disputes," Chosun Ilbo, January 25, 1966. On business groups, see Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., pp.546-6. On farmers, see Nongŏp hyŏdong chohap chunganghoe (National Agricultural Cooperative Federation), Nongŏp nyŏngam 1967 (Agricultural Yearbook 1967) (Seoul, 1967), pp.251-8; and Kim Il-ch'ŏl, "Social Cooperation and Interest Groups in Rural Areas," Hankuk nongch'on sahoehak yŏnkuhoe, ed., op. cit.,pp.141-62.

24. For the labor movement, see Kim Yun-hwan, op.cit., pp.171-238; Tak Hŭi-jun, "Early Unions in Korea, 1919-1950, "Korean Affairs,Vol.I, No.1, March-April 1962, pp.75-80; and Kim Tae-jung, "The Road of Korean Labor Movement," Sasangge, October 1955, pp.136-52.

25. Kim Yun-hwan, ibid., pp.174-5.

Liberal Party as well as the object of political spoils of the "labor aristocrats."[26.]

As of 1964 only 10.7 per cent (294,000) of 2.7 million workers are organized into sixteen industrial unions under the Korean Federal Association for Labor Unions. (KFALU)[27.] Aside from its weakness in number and organization, the labor movement in Korea is still suffering from the crippling effect of factionalism of bosses and from manipulation of the government and even by rival factions of the ruling party.[28.] Another major problem that impedes development of labor unions is that they are still operating under various legal and administrative restrictions that prevent them from exercising the rights of association, collective bargaining and collective action.[29.] Their working conditions and living standard are perhaps best illustrated by the government's decision in August 1965 not to allow the KFALU to join the International Labor Organization (ILO), because the government felt that it would not be able to observe and enforce Article 87 of the ILO which provides various basic rights and privileges of laborers.[30.]

In terms of electoral votes, farmers are potentially the most powerful economic and political group in Korea if they can be organized. But farmers who own, in average, less than one hectre of land per household to support about seven family members[31.] are the most impoverished masses without any organizational strength[32.] predominantly due to an excessive paternalism and manipulation by the government and its appointed agencies.

26. Ibid., pp.176-9.
27. Ibid., p.225
28. See ibid., pp.228-303; and Hankuk Ilbo, October 30 and November 1, 1964.
29. See Kim Ch'i-sŏn, "Inviolability of Labor's Three Rights," Sasangge, October 1964, pp.56-60.
30. See Chosun Ilbo, August 21, 1965.
31. Nongŏp hyŏpdong chohap chunganghoe, op. cit., pp.6 and 16. For a vicious cycle of poverty of farmers, see Kim Chun-bo, "The Portrait of Korean Rural Areas," Shindong-A, October, 1966, pp.60-82.
32. See Chu Sŏk-kyun, "Rural Areas and Democracy," op.cit., pp.141-8. See also Chu Sŏk-kyun; "Political Participation of Farmers: A Discourse on Political Party for Farmers," Sekye (The World), May 1960, pp.41-7.

Despite ritualistic li-services of the successive governments for improvement of their economic conditions, the economic policy of the government for industrial development has been largely at the expense of poor and illiterate farmers.[33.]

The agricultural cooperatives which in various forms have been operative for many years are potentially the most powerful organizations to influence the government's farm policy. Today the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) is the largest organization in Korea with 10,000 full-time officials and 20,000 local branches in villages allegedly serving the interests of the 85 percent of farmers.[34.] However, from its inception the NACF has not been a voluntary organization by and for farmers themselves.[35.] All high managerial officials from the national down to local levels are government appointees. Most of its business are franchised or commissioned by the government. Naturally farmers have no access to their "own" organizations to decide and check activities of the cooperatives. Under the Rhee government, the majority of local heads of cooperatives were appointed from among local members of his party. Even today most of important positions of the NACF are occupied by former military officers and a half of local branches are headed by village chiefs of ris and dongs.[36.] Thus agricultural cooperatives are regarded by farmers merely as government agencies that administer the government's farm policies, if not as outright subsidiary agents of the ruling party that provide jobs to its local party members and deliver farmers' votes to it.[37.]

33. Chu Sŏk-kyun, "Agriculture in National Economy: A Historical Review," Chosun Ilbo, January 25, 1967.

34. Ch'oe Sang-mi, "Agricultural Cooperatives: Why Do They Not Belong to Farmers?" Sasangge, April 1966, p.92.

35. See ibid., pp.93-5; and "Agricultural Cooperatives and their Hypertrophy," Chosun Ilbo, May 21, 1966.

36. Ch'oe Sang-mi, ibid., pp.98-9.

37. See the controversial attempt of the government in 1965 to amend the charter of the NACF to allow local members of the DRP to join openly the cooperatives, in Chosun Ilbo, March 30, 1965. See also Tong-A Ilbo, January 24, 1966.

On the surface the most numerous and articulated interest groups in Korea are those of business, industry, commerce and finance. As of 1963, there were some 120 such economic groups registered with various economic ministries of the central government.[38] Among them, the Korean Businessmen's Association of a handful of big businessmen, who virtually control Korea's economy, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, which comprises 28 local chapters with 120,000 members, are the most active and powerful groups.[39] Their economic interests are largely maintained and expanded through speculation, price fixing, foreign exchange manipulation, special loans, and other governmental preferential treatments.[40] Since favorable treatment by the government and the ruling party is essential for their business, they are always eager to please politicians in power and high government officials through supply of political funds, supporting government positions, and often delivering votes of employees in elections. Unmistakenly, they are most efficient in looking after their own economic interests largely through dubious means. But the degree of their subservience to the government is not much different from that of the groups of labor and farmers.

Since the government in Korea is in a position to create or alter basic conditions of existence of any group or individual, exercise of independent political action by interest groups is practically impossible. Particularly in view of the tendency that one group of politicians perpetuates political power, a prospect of interest groups to resist arbitrary pressure from the government and its ruling party and to assert their genuine interests is doubly dim. As a proposition drawn from the experience of interest groups in

38. An Hae-kyun, op. cit., p.53.

39. About these two groups, see Pak Mun-ok, op.cit., pp.564-5; and Lee U-hyŏn, "Seventeen Years of Constitutional Government and Interest Groups," Kukhoebo, No.46, July 20, 1965, p.43. See also Korean Businessmen's Association, Korean Businessmen's Association: Its Functions, Organization and Membership, (Seoul, 1963)

40. See especially Kim Kyŏng-dong, "Enterpreneurs and Politics," a draft chapter in Lee Chong-sik and Hong Sung-chick, ed., op.cit., pp.15-8 and 26-32.

Korea, it can be said that an essential condition for independence or constructive influence of interest groups in the political process presupposes a political system in which change of power is made freely, openly and, above all, frequently among different political groups or parties.

As a conclusion, the characteristics of interest groups in Korean can be described in the following terms: The more massive a group is, the more available it becomes for manipulation and control of the government; and the more dependent a group is on the government, the more susceptible it becomes to pressure of the government. With few exceptions like the Korean Lawyers Association and the Korean Newspaper Publishers Association, interest groups in Korea have always been readily available to the government if the latter decides to mobilize opinions favorable to itself. This was one of the main reasons why so many interest groups came out in newspapers to support the government on the treaty issue in 1964-65.

Against this political immaturity of socio-economic groups and their feeble role in the political process -- i.e., also, the absence of a condition that could moderate the intensity of partisan political struggle, the roles of the military and students in Korean society, particularly in her politics, become extraordinary and critical. Since 1960 it has almost become an axiom that no government or political party in Korea can be expected to endure long without the support or with the antagonism of the military and the students.

THE MILITARY

In many newly emerging countries which maintain large military establishments, the military is now either a revolutionary force or an instrument of the establishment by defending the status quo. Whichever side it chooses, it is apparent that the military is the most powerful force in that country. In such countries the influence of the military is the most pervasive in political, social and economic affairs, especially where civilian governing elites constitute a meager counter-balancing force. Because of its enormous power,

the military is directing the rate and direction of change in such countries.[41.]

The role of the military in Korea must be also seen from this aspect. After the Korean War, the military in Korea had rapidly emerged as the most powerful group with experience and maturity, social and professional respect, technology and expertise, and, above all, organization and discipline. On the strength of these capacities, the military is today potentially the most dangerous enemy or the most reliable ally of the existing civilian regime, depending on how it would exercise its awesome coercive power.

After the liberation from Japan, the military in southern Korea started as a small constabulary force under the auspices of the American military government.[42.] The initial composition of the officer corps was highly heterogeneous --- comprising the Koreans who formerly served in the armies of Japan, Nationalist China (including Chang Hsüeh-liang's army) and Manchukuo as well as in various Korean patriotic resistance forces in China.[43.] The enlisted men were largely recruited from the jobless and, often, social outcasts.[44.] The heterogeneous elements were gradually forced into a cohesive army with esprit de corps, largely stimulated by a sense of glory and power as expressed by such slogans as "defense of sovereignty" and "Unification of the fatherland."[45.] Even before the Korean War, the prestige of the military was enhanced by successful internal military operations against several Communist armed rebellions.[46.]

With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the fate of the nation fell to the hands of the military and the military was accorded the highest

41. See especially Davis B. Bobrow, "Soldiers and the Nation-State," The Annals, Vol. 358, March 1965, pp.65-76: Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, op. cit., pp.172-87; and Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964).

42. See A. Wigfall Green, The Epic of Korea (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1950), pp.61-3.

43. See Ko Chŏng-hun, Kun (The Military), Vol.I, (Seoul: Tongbang sŏwon, 1967), pp.34-5. Those who served in Chu Teh's 8th Route Army joined later the North Korean Army.

44. "The Military of the Liberal Party Era," the recollections of six newspaper reporters, Shindong-A, May 1966, p.284.

45. Ko Chŏng-hun, Kun, op. cit., p.45.

46. Lee Man-gab, "A Social History of Twenty Years' Liberation," Kukhoebo, No.47, August 20, 1965, p.40.

social status with extra privileges as well as the highest priority in commanding both the total manpower and national resources. During the war, the military recruited a countless number of brilliant young people into its officer corps and became the most largest in number and the best in quality. For the officers, the military also provided higher education through advanced training in military schools both in Korea and the United States. Both the higher internal social mobility (in promotion of rank and in diversification of skills and responsibilities) and the easier access to the highest political power made the military officers an elite of society. The increasing contact with high-ranking military and civilian leaders of foreign countries further enhanced their prestige. Furthermore, under the necessity of national security and by virtue of independent jurisdictional authority over its own manpower, the military enjoyed a unique degree of autonomy.[47.]

Today the 620,000-strong[48.] military establishment is so deeply and extensively involved in all phases of Korean life that, aside from their primary duty of national defense, their role is varied and important.[49.]

First, the military is one of the largest educational institutions that has contributed to upgrading the literacy rate to the present 90 percent, by teaching all illiterate inductees to read and write.[50.]

Secondly, despite a disquieting tendency to undermine democratic values and individualism due to the military's institutional value which stresses

47. Ibid.
48. The total active strength of the armed forces was, as of 1966, 620,000: the army, 560,000; the navy, 20,000; the air force, 15,000; and the marine corps, 25,000. Source: Hapdong News Agency, op. cit., pp.64-5.
49. For the role of the military, see especially Kim Song-shik, "Letter to the 600,000-man Armed Forces," Sasangge, January 1965, pp.56-62.
50. Ibid., p.57.

hierarchical order, the solution to problems through violence, the unquestioning obedience, and collectivism, the military service is also a melting pot that dissolves remnants of traditional social classes and that creates an equalitarian society chiefly through its universal service system, instillation of national consciousness, and the internal mobility based on competence.

Thirdly, the military is also the largest civic action group in Korea.[51] It teaches agricultural techniques; builds irrigational systems, roads, schools, medical clinics and even towns;[52] and supplies manpower in busy farming seasons.

Fourth, it not only handles highly sophisticated weapons, and electronic and mechanical gears and vehicles, but also adopts, develops and maintains the most efficient and rational organizational and administrative structures unrivaled by those of civilian groups. Ever since the military coup in 1961, the military has supplied the largest number of administrators in the government and public corporations both in the higher and lower echelons.[53] The growing role of the military in administration is apparent as it is, after all, the only major career opportunity in Korea generally open to the talents and as it is the only professional group with reasonable social mobility based on skill and competence.[54] The military is also more receptive to new ideas and more rational in attitudes towards administration than the civilian counter-part.[55]

51. For its civic action programs, see, e.g., Haengchŏng paeksŏ p'yŏnch'an wiwonhoe (The Editing Committee of A White Paper on the Administration), Haengchŏng paeksŏ 1964 (A White Paper on the Administration 1964) (Seoul: Taehan kongronsa, 1964), pp.199-200.

52. Towns like Ch'unch'ŏn, Wonsan and Ŭichŏngpu are the prime examples of military creation.

53. E.g., the military supplied 61% of cabinet ministers during the military government, compared with 10% during the Liberal Party government, Pak Mun-ok, op. cit., p.436. In the Third Republic, the 15.26% of high-ranking officials (above Grade 3: equivalentbto a section chief) are of military origin, Yoo Hoon (or Yu Hun), "Social Background of High Civil Servants in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 1968, p.52. In the 19 public corporations, important positions are occupied by former generals and colonels, Chosun Ilbo, June 17, 1965.

54. Daniel Wolfstone, "Park Goes to the Polls," op.cit., p.684.

55. Ibid. This was also my impression during my two years' experience in the army and the military government.

Lastly, the military as the guardian of national security is the foremost oversee of the national ideology (i.e., anti-Communism).[56] Not only are the military officers trained in anti-Communism but their rainson d'etre as a professional group depends upon this ideological policy, especially in the context of the present semi-state of war. For them any serious move for or debate on the issue of unification of Korea would spell professional suicide.[57] It is understandable why the military junta in 1961 listed anti-Communism as the first of the "Six Revolutionary Pledges". The ideological purity was achieved even before the Korean War by a series of purges (often, witch-hunting) of Communists in the army[58] and was reinforced by the war itself.

The growing role of the military in varied fields of Korean society inevitably made it the foremost modernized elite group that could provide strong leadership for modernization of Korea, as the civilian governments of both Rhee and Chang were unable to operate government responsibly and could not solve economic and social problems.[59] When the military eventually took over government in 1961, the military could assert its role in the following terms:

> The Korean people and their present leaders are fully aware of the dangers inherent in military government. However, there is universal acceptance of these facts: (1) the Armed Forces, hitherto aloof from politics, were the only remaining organizations which retained the respect of the people; (2) the Armed Forces, by virtue of their training in organizational matters, were alone capable of reorganizing the Government into an efficient body functioning for the welfare of the nation rather than the private interests of officials and civil servants; (3) the Armed Forces were the only force strong enough to eliminate the corrupt and self-serving interests which had brought the country to the verge

56. See Kim Sŏng-shik, op. cit., pp.58-9.
57. Daniel Wolfstone, "The Generals Strike," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. XXXII, No.8, May 25, 1961, p.348.
58. See Pak Sŏng-hwan, op. cit., pp.136-202; and "The Military of the Liberal Party Era," op.cit., pp.287-92.
59. William A. Douglas, "South Korea's Search for Leadership," op.cit., pp.20-36.

> of disintegration; (4) only the Armed Forces, in the existing emergency, were able to stop increasing Communist infiltration and subversion and the growth of pro-Communism among some irresponsible elements among the people. 60.

Of course, some of these claims were exaggerated. Like any other groups in Korea, the military -- especially considering its size and composition -- has also weakness to act as a cohesive group mainly due to internal dissension. Aside from its inter-service rivalry, the military was from its infancy an arena of power struggle for control of leadership among groups of various origins, often externally supported by politicians and parties.[61.] Nevertheless, due to President Rhee's absolute command of loyalty and his shrewd handling of generals, a potentially serious internal dissension was avoided. During the Rhee government the military was Rhee's personal political instrument rather than a potential threat to his authority.[62.] The generals were the least discontended elements with Rhee's government.[63.] Their main activities were factional rivalries which were centered on the issue of hegemony in the military through gaining the personal favor of Rhee and of the powerful faction in the Liberal Party.[64.]

The military's intervention in politics started from 1952. In May 1952 when General Lee Chong-ch'an, then Army Chief of Staff, refused Rhee's order for deployment of one combat division into Pusan to intimidate the defiant National Assembly which opposed Rhee's constitutional amendment bill, Rhee had not only fired General Lee but also had illegitimately declared martial law in the Pusan area under the command of a subservient general, Won Yong-dŏk.[65.] General Won's military policemen rounded up eleven key opposition

60. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK, The Military Revolution in Korea, op.cit., p.3.

61. See Ko Chŏng-hun, Kun, op. cit., pp.54-121. General Lee Hyŏng-kŭn, Army Chief of Staff, acknowledged in 1956 that the army was divided by various factions and that unity of the army was threatened by factional activities. See "The Man of the Week: Lee Hyŏng-kŭn," Chugan Hŭimang, No.32, August 3, 1956, p.15.

62. The U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy: Asia Studies (Prepared by the Conlon Associates, Ltd.) 86th Congress, 1st Session (November 1, 1959)) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), p.115.

63. Yang Hŭng-mo, "Dr. Rhee Syngman and the Military," Shindong-A, September 1965, p.234.

64. "Military of the Liberal Party Era," op.cit., p.315.

65. See Chŏn Sŏng-chong, "Lee Chong-ch'an and the Incident of Refusal to Dispatch Soldiers to Pusan," Shint'aeyangsa, ed., Hukmak, op.cit., pp.155-6.

Assemblymen on the charge of conspiracy with Communists. This military intervention was the decisive element that forced the National Assembly to pass the first constitutional amendment in July 1952.

With the emerging dominance of the militant "main stream faction" in the Liberal Party after 1955, the military became overtly an auxiliary of the party.[66] Promotion and assignments of top generals and admirals were politically dictated by the Liberal Party's ruling faction. Even the army's counter-intelligence funds were often extorted for personal funds of the Liberal Party members of the defense committee in the legislature.[67] Major military contracts for civilian supplies and services were arbitrarily allocated to the friends of the ruling party.[68]

During this era, "political generals" -- examplified by Major General Kim Ch'ang-yong (Commander of the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps) and Lieutenant General Won Yong-dŏk (Supreme Commander of the Military Police Headquarters) -- wielded extraordinary power under the personal protection of Rhee. Generals Kim and Won not only ignored their own superiors in military hierarchy but also intimidated them by abusing their security investigatory power. General Kim was finally assassinated in January 1956 by fellow generals and colonels.[69] If General Kim was the symbol of terrorism among fellow officers, General Won was the counter-part among civilians and politicians. One of the most flagrant involvements in partisan politics of General Won was his plot to implicate six opposition leaders in subversion by planting Communist propaganda materials from the north into the politicians' residence.[70] When his involvement was exposed in January, 1955, he testified

66. Hankuk hyŏmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. I, op. cit., p.914.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. See also Kim Sŏk-yŏng, ed., P'okchŏng shipi nyŏn (The Twelve Years of Depotism), Vol. I (Seoul: P'yŏngjin munhwasa, 1960), pp.95-110.
69. See Yu Sŭng-taek, "The End of Kim Ch'ang-yong," Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p.455-8.
70. See "The Incident of Seditious Literature in the National Assembly," Lee Byŏng-hun et al, ed., Haebang ishipnyŏn sa, op.cit., pp.723-7.

to the National Assembly's investigation committee that he hatched the plot to test loyalty of the opposition leaders to the nation.[71.]

During the Liberal Party government, generals also played an important part in delivering votes and rigging elections, including participation in the infamous presidential elections in 1960.[72.] The standard method was to install polling places inside military camps or installations in violation of the law, where the opposition was forbidden to campaign and even denied of observing voting.[73.] Where military personnel and their dependents were heavily concentrated, military commanders could actually decide the outcomes of elections.[74.]

The effect of corruption of ranking generals and degradation of professional pride of the military by the hands of ruling politicians resulted in a general decay of discipline and morale of the military as well as in the raising of the military's political consciousness especially among a vast number of young officers in the ranks of lieutenants and colonels.[75.] Their political consciousness was further stimulated by the military takeovers in other countries, such as Colonel Abdel Nasser's in Egypt (1954), General Ne Win's in Burma (1958) and General Ayub Khan's in Pakistan (1958).[76.] The growing of the military's consciousness was also inevitable after the cessation of the Korean War. The end of the war abruptly terminated their wartime privileges and prestige.[77.] The effect of the acute discrepancy between their status, which they had earned through the gruelling war, and the

71. See General Won's statement in ibid., p.726.
72. See John Kie-chiang Oh, Korea: Democracy on Trial (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), p.99. See also Kim Chong-shin, op. cit., pp.33-44.
73. E.g., see Lee Sangchong, op. cit., pp.163-4.
74. E.g., see the role of General Lee Myŏng-jae of the 15th Army Division in Ch'ŏlwon in electing the unofficial candidate of the Liberal Party to the National Assembly in the 1958 general elections in ibid., pp.133-4. See also the statement of the Democratic Party pleading for political neutrality of soldiers in the 1956 presidential elections, "A Note to All Soldiers," Minjutang, T'uchaeng ŭi chokchŏk, op. cit., p.33.
75. Son Jae-sŏk, "Korean Politics and the Military," Chosun Ilbo, July 8,1965.
76. Hankuk hyŏngmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op. cit., p.915.
77. See Son Jae-sŏk, op. cit.

inadequacy of rewards by the society after the war began to be felt especially among the ranks of colonels.

The manifestation of this effect was the rise of their attitude generally critical of privileged civilians and politicians and, above all, their own generals who allowed themselves to be manipulated by politicians and businessmen in return for their luxurious living.[78] Their frustration was accelerated by the increasing failure of society to provide decent living suitable to their status. Their general dissatisfaction was put in the following words:

> Although the first and second lieutenants of the pre-war had now reached to the rank of colonels, their living standard remained all the same. When the past heroes of the military were discharged from the service, only poverty and starvation were awaiting for them. Some retired colonels had to go out to the streets to earn living as "A-frame" manual workers ... In contrast, most generals, who had the least personal danger during the war, got promotion after promotion and had enriched themselves from dubious sources to enjoy luxurious life. 79.

Therefore, the general causes of frustration and discontent of the officer corps after the war were: (1) the disintegration of military discipline and morale due to the corruption and intrusion of politics at the top; (2) the rapid degeneration of their social status; and (3) the failure of society to provide adequate living. This made the officer corps of junior and middle ranks an "intellectual proletariat," filled with highly critical attitude towards the society. The feeling was particularly strong in view of the fact that the officer corps was largely composed of the men of lower social background.[80] Obviously a quick and

78. John Kie-chiang Oh, op. cit., pp.98-9. See also Song Yo-ch'an, "6nSong Yo-ch'an, op. cit., p.467.

79. Paek Nam-ju, Hyŏkmyŏng chidoja pak chŏng-hŭi ron (On the Revolutionary Leader Park Chung-hee) (Seoul: Inmulkesa, 1961), p.103.

80. The U.S. Congress, Senate, the studies by the Conlon Associates, op. cit., p.115; and Son Jae-sŏk, op. cit.

sweeping remedy of these maladies was to assume political power by themselves. This is a part of the process what Morris Janowitz says that infusion of men of lower social background into the officer corps actually weakens civilian control, because they are ambitious and less liable to be governed by the traditional restraints than are men of higher social background.[81.]

When in April 1960 the students demonstrated against Rhee, the military was called upon to quell the uprising. But the military stood idle to let Rhee's government go down, for it realized that it could not save the extremely unpopular government.[82.] It was however doubtful whether the military was at the time able to take over the government. For the military was not only surprised by the event but also was torn apart by factionalism of generals.[83.] But the overthrowal of Rhee by the students and the subsequent students' demands for reform in the Second Republic had undoubtedly awakened the officers politically and made them aware of their political potentiality.

The first sign of a definite unrest of the military was the "purification of the military" movement in May 1960 by nine colonels,[84.] who were all members of the 8th Graduating Class (1949) of the Korean Military Academy.[85.] The colonels put the following five demands to Hŏ Chŏng's interim government:

> (1) Scrutinization and punishment of top military officers who had collaborated with the Rhee government in rigging the 1960 presidential elections.
> (2) Punishment of generals who had illicitly accumulated wealth.
> (3) Elimination of incompetent and unscrupulous commanders.
> (4) Elimination of all elements responsible for factionalism and guarantee of political neutrality of the military.
> (5) Improvement of over-all treatment for the military personnel. 86.

Although the colonels' purification campaign which had persisted to the period of Chang Myŏn's government ended with the forced retirement of their

81. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1964), pp.253-4.
82. See Song Yo-chan, "On Song Yo-chan," op.cit., pp.469-70.
83. See Son Jae-sŏk, op. cit.
84. See Hŏ Chŏng, "On Hŏ Chŏng," Hŭimang ch'ulp'ansa, Sashil ŭi chŏnpu rŭl kisul handa, op. cit., pp.213-7.
85. The nine colonels included Lt.Colonels Kim Chong-pil, Kim Hyŏng-uk and Kil Chae-ho who distinguished later in the military coup d'etat and politics. For the list, see Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol.I, op. cit., p.916.
86. Ibid.

ring leaders without producing the desired result, their movement led nevertheless to the ultimate retirement of the total twenty-one generals (including two Army Chiefs of Staff) and admirals from the armed forces.[87] The failure of the colonels' movement was chiefly attributable to the objection of the United Nations Commander, U.S. General Carter B. Magruder, in Seoul, who feared that the all-round purge might weaken the defense capability of the Korean armed forces by retiring even able generals.[88]

The military coup d'etat in May 1961 was explained as an extraordinary measure to save the nation from corruption, chaos and Communist threat. Perhaps it was a symptom of Korea's search for a stable and capable leadership. However, if one looks deeper into the imbalance of the composition at the top stratum of officer corps, another important reason for the coup --- i.e. a major factor for the general unrest in the military --- may be found in the continuing conflict between the generals and the colonels. The conflict between them stemmed largely from the fact that after the war the opportunity of colonels for promotion to the rank of general --- hence, for better social privileges and better living --- was practically closed.[89] There has been constant pressure from the poorly-paid colonels to have an all-round purge of generals in order to make some room at the top.[90] What made this situation more unbearable for the colonels was the fact that the rapid expansion of the military during the Korean War had promoted the entire members of some earlier classes of the military academy over-night to the rank of general, while those who had joined the academy slightly late missed the wholesale opportunity.[91] Those who reached the rank of colonel at the

87. Ibid., p.917.
88. See Daniel Wolfstone, "The Generals Strike," op. cit., p.348; and Hŏ Chŏng, "On Hŏ Chŏng," op. cit., p.215.
89. Son Jae-sŏk, op. cit., See also Kiyomiya Ryuji, "Lieutenant General Chang and His Comrades," Bungei Shunju, July 1961, pp.?
90. Daniel Wolfstone, "The Generals Strike," op. cit., p.348;
91. Son Jae-sŏk, op. cit.

end of the war had, thus, lost, perhaps forever, their opportunity for promotion due to a complete saturation at the top by exceptionally young generals. They therefore became the most impatient and discontented elements.

The fact that the 1961 coup was practically masterminded by the colonels of the 8th class,[92] who missed that opportunity during the war and again failed in the purge of generals, was not a surprise.[93] Although a few generals like Park Chung-hee and Kim Tong-ha joined the coup, it was in a sense a mutiny within the military by one group of the colonels.[94] The division within the military itself even after the coup was evident in the six abortive counter-coup attempts by different groups in the military between May 1961 and May 1963.[95] The example of the 1961 coup is unlikely to be lost on other colonels who are suffering from essentially the same kind of frustration that precipitated the colonels who staged the coup. Most of the colonels and generals who took part in the coup and had survived subsequent power struggles are now in the locus of power either in politics or in the military. This had unquestionably spread tension of ambition among the vast number of officers still in uniform.

The possibility of future military intervention in politics is not diminished in view of persisting factionalism within the military. Factionalism is based on provincial origin, military academy class and personal ties. The factional rivalry and discontent are closely interwined with the issues of promotion and assignment.[96] For example, in the coup plot of

92. Among the 94 officers participated in the coup, the number of colonels was 72, to which the 8th class supplied 36. See "Yesterday and Today of the 94 Key Figures in the May Revolution," Chosun Ilbo, May 16, 1965.

93. Cf. "The Background of the Coup D'Etat in Korea," Yomiuri Shimbun, May 17, 1961.

94. See Walter Briggs, "The Military Revolution: On Its Leader and Achievements," Korean Affairs, Vol.V, No.2, Summer 1963, pp.22-8.

95. See "The Genealogy of Conspiracies," Hong Sŭng-man, Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p.736; and "Will the National Assembly Clarify?" Series No.8 (The Military Coup Plots), Kyunghyang Shinmoon, December 26, 1963.

96. See "An Inside Story of the Screening Committee for Promotion of Generals," Chosun Ilbo, December 26, 1965; and "Reassignments of the Stars and the Implication," Chosun Ilbo, March 22, 1965.

Colonel Won Ch'ung-yŏn in May 1965, the investigation revealed that the conspirators were dissatisfied with the army's promotion and assignment policy of 1965, which, they believed, unduly favored the members of the 8th class.[97] It was not coincident that the ten conspirators were all north Koreans by birth.[98] So long as there exist personal frustration and political ambition amidst of factional rivalries among officers, there is little guarantee against military intervention into politics.

The objectivity and fairness in the government's promotion and assignment policy have recently improved. However, in the 1966 army promotion, the 8th class was again favored over the senior 6th and 7th classes.[99] It was also noticeable that the three generals who rose from the rank of major general to that of lieutenant general in 1966 were all President Park's classmates of the 2nd class.[100] The favoritism by the present government leaders (former officers) towards their fellow classmates was unmistakably a move to consolidate the position of the present government in the military. This indicates that the separation of politics from the military is not yet complete.

With the military coup of 1961 the military had emerged as the foremost political pressure group in Korea, in terms of its decisive role in politics. General Park's decision to run for Presidency in 1963 was partly due to the pressure of the military. In March the young officers of the Capital Defense Division in Seoul staged a demonstration to urge General Park to stay in power.[101] On the following day, this demand was backed up by the "all military commanders conference."[102] The indispensability of support of the military for the Park government was clearly demonstrated

97. See Chosun Ilbo, June 27, 1965.
98. See the list of the arrested, in Chosun Ilbo, May 13, 1965.
99. See "An Inside Story of the Screening Committee for Promotion of Generals," op. cit.
100. See Chosun Ilbo, November 17, 1965.
101. See Chosun Ilbo, March 16, 1963.
102. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No.3, op.cit.

during the ROK-Japan treaty crisis when he had to depend on the military to maintain the government against the students and the opposition. In absence of cohesive support from Park's own political party, the importance of the military in the crisis became supreme. The critical role of the military was equally appreciated by the opponents of the government. For instance, during the treaty struggle the former generals belonging to the militant Consultative Council directly appealed to the military to side with the treaty opponents and to defy Park's government.[103].

A great appreciation of loyalty of the military by President Park is evident in his meticulous courtesy paying to the military and in his eagerness to solicit views of the military and to reflect them to his administrative policies.[104]. It was not coincident that in the summer of 1965 the government, in anxiety to woo the military, announced its intention to increase the salaries of soldiers by 80 percent --- an extraordinary generosity compared with 30 percent increase planned for other government employees.[105]. Kim Chong-pil appealed for the support of the military in 1967 by saying that the re-election of Park as President and the stability of Park's government were essential for Korea's economic and political development.[106]. It seems that insurance of absolute loyalty of the military to the present government has become an obsessed priority. This development made the military the ultimate political instrument of power, and, in return for its loyalty, the military emerged as the most powerful pressure group capable of advancing its vested interests.

Since 1965 about 50,000 Korean troops joined the Americans in the Vietnam war. More recently military activities, including the creation of a militia of 2.5 million men, are markedly stepped up to meet North Korea's increasing armed provocation and infiltration.[107]. These developments may have provided an outlet to divert the attention of politically restless

103. See the statement of eleven generals, "The Appeal to the Soldiers," August 27, 1965, in Kyunghyang Shinmoon, August 27, 1965.
104. "The Dynamics of Today's Ruling Power in Korea," Series No.3. op.cit.
105. "Salary Increase for the Soldiers," Chosun Ilbo, August 8, 1965.
106. Kim's speech at the 1st Army Hdqrs., January 10,1967, Chosun Ilbo, January 11, 1967.
107. See Philip Shabecoff, "Army's Great Leap Forward," in a special report on South Korea, The Times (London), June 18, 1969.

officers. Nevertheless, in net effect the influence of the military is bound to increase.

At present it seems that the military is firmly allied with the present government. But nobody can predict to what extent the military would ultimately assert its potential political power. However, it is apparent that if the constitutional process would fail again and the society would be torn apart by chaos and conflicts, the military would be able to assert openly again the primacy of soldiers in national life.

THE STUDENTS

Korean college students are today one of the most potent political forces as they have repeatedly proved their ability to act as a powerful pressure group although their involvement with political activities was motivated by varying factors at different times. Their potential as a stably organized force is somewhat limited by their lack of national organization and of coherent action programs as well as by various restrictions and penalties set by the government and school authorities.

Nevertheless, in 1960, they toppled Rhee and paved the way to power for Rhee's opponents. During the Second Republic their power virtually drove the country to the verge of an anarchy that eventually brought the military into power. During the ROK-Japan treaty crisis they again acted as the foremost opponents of the treaty and of the Park government which had to repeatedly protect itself from them with the aid of the military.

What makes them such a powerful group in Korea? A satisfactory answer to this question may require an analysis based on the following factors: (1) Korea's unique national problems that have frustrated students who constitute a large portion of the Korean intellectual elite;[108.] (2) their historical role as the vanguard of popular movement; (3) their value

108. Intellectuals in Korea are considered to be teachers, writers, journalists, lawyers, preachers, artists and other professionals, besides students as "young intellectuals."

orientation on social and political issues; and (4) the impact of the extraordinary degree of mass education since 1945 and their current social status.

The history of contemporary Korea is a history of the tragedy and suffering of the masses. This stems from Korea's unique national problems (see partially in Chapter I). These problems have decided the current status of Korea and have become the focus of the student movement in Korea.[109] The Japanese colonialism was followed by the division of Korea which was arbitrarily set by foreign powers. Because of the division, Koreans had paid a heavy human and economic toll during the Korean War. The division of Korea is still imposing a heavy burden on the national economy. The division is also responsible for the rigid anti-Communism which is not only limiting the perspective of Korea's foreign policy detrimentally to her national interests abroad, but also stifling domestically the creative energy of the people and their various essential freedoms as citizens. Under these conditions, the full potentiality of Korea's economic, political and cultural development is severely limited.

The soverignty and national security of Korea since its independence have been largely maintained by the massive American military and economic aid. The country's economic structure was built by foreign aid and investment, which makes Korea economically highly susceptible to foreign economic and political pressure. Militarily, Korea's vast armed forces are logistically maintained by and operationally controlled by the U.S. military authorities. In this sense, Korea's independence has been a fiction to many intellectuals like students.

109. For Korea's general conditions that breed dissatisfaction of students, see Yu Tal-yŏng, "Concerning Student Demonstrations," Chosun Ilbo, July 2, 1965; Hwang Ch'an-do, "The Carrier of National Liberation," Student Power Series, No.3 (Korea), Asahi Jānaru, Vol.10, No.28, July 7, 1968, p.35; O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol.9. No.4, Winter 1967, p.1; and Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "Why No Self-Confidence?" Sasangge, September 1964, pp.50-6.

The successive governments have been authoritarian and suffering from illegitimacy and, hence, hardly enjoyed a genuine popular support. Elections have been generally stained by irregularities and the governments which come to power and are maintained through such irregularities have been further discredited by widespread corruption and favoritism, which have contributed, in a considerable degree, to the uneven distribution of wealth between the rich and powerful and the rest.

Against these serious problems which constantly command attention of students as well as of other intellectuals who are deeply concerned about the future of their country, the nature of the Korean student movement must be viewed. Accordingly, the three basic ingredients (or goals) of today's Korean student movement are: (1) nationalism (anti-foreign influence and re-unification of Korea), (2) democracy (anti-authoritarianism) and (3) modernization (self-sufficiency, and just and equal society).[110] Since the issues raised by their movement are closely related to the problems of Korea and their goals of struggle are relevant to the aspirations of the entire Korean people, their movement has a great degree of historical and social validity that in turn strengthens the legitimacy and tenacity of their protests. Furthermore as the social origin of today's college students fairly well represents all socio-economic strata of society, their reactions to social and political issues often reflect the prevailing mood of the country.[111] Therefore it can be said that a moral strength of their movement lies in the fact that their view reflects, more or less, congruous views of the public and that their attention focuses on the historical tasks of Korea.

110. Cf. Hwang Ch'an-do, ibid., p.36; and Kim Sŏng-shik, "The Characteristics and Directions of the Recent Student Movement," Sasangge, January 1961, pp.233. Also cf. John Israel, Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966).

111. E.g., a survey on the economic strata of participants in the April Student Revolution by Kim Sŏng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," Sasangge, April 1961, p.83.

Another factor that makes the student movement a powerful pressure group is its historic role as the vanguard of popular movement. Under the Japanese rule students (including high school students) served as the main vehicle of Korean nationalistic movement. All major nationalistic movements during this period, such as the March 1st Movement in 1919, the June 10th Incident in 1926 and the Kwangju Students Incident in January 1929, were spearheaded by students. Nationalism is still the main ingredient of today's student movement.

Between 1945 and 1948 (American military government), students were divided between the left and right. Their attention was focused, firstly, on the ideological debate between liberal democracy and Marxism and, secondly, on the issue of the best course for Korea's immediate independence and unification.[112] With the establishment of Rhee's government in 1948, students had achieved an ideological unity and were generally content with Rhee's government which, although representing only the southern part of Korea, served as the symbol of independence.[113] Turning serious attention to social and political problems and asserting their role were delayed by the Korean war. Until students suddenly revolted against Rhee in 1960 and found their political strength, students were most of the time docile and were readily mobilized in support of Rhee's policies mainly through the Student Defense Corps, the national organization which was created and controlled by the government.[114]

While the issue of the rigged elections of March 1960 was the direct cause of the April Student Revolution, it was also the catalyst that released the pent-up general discontent with Rhee's misrule of twelve years and prompted the

112. See O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op.cit., pp.9-10.
113. Ibid., p.10.
114. See Hyŏn Sŭng-chong, "The Direction of New Student Movement," Sasangge, April 1961, p.127; and Kim Sŏng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," op. cit., p.82.

masses to rally around the leadership of students.[115] What had insured the success of the student revolt was thus the existence of a revolutionary condition in the country. But why did students, not other groups, play the leading role in overthrowing Rhee? With the exception of the students there were no organized groups that were strong enough to directly challenge Rhee's government.[116] The military, as mentioned earlier, was indulging in its own brand of factionalism and its top generals were eargerly serving Rhee's government. Although the popular Democratic Party played a leading role in opposing Rhee and in educating the masses, it was not only organizationally too weak, due to severe persecution, to lead a revolt, but also too cautious to take such a drastic step.[117] Therefore at the time, only the students, who had the strength in number of one million members (including high school students) and certain common democratic ideas inimical to Rhee's dictatorship, were in the position to lead a revolution.

The April Student Revolution was a significant landmark that saw the emergence of students as a formidable political force with increasingly articulated demands. Elated by their power and prestige by ousting the dictator and taking advantage of newly gained freedom, the students put excessive demands on Chang's government often by resorting to direct action which had greatly undermined the stability of the Second Republic. The inherent difficulty of Chang's ruling group lay in the fact that it was not the main body of the revolutionary force but the main beneficiary of the students'

115. For the factual account of the April Student Revolution, see especially Cho Dŏk-song, ed., Sawŏl hyŏkmyŏng (The April Revolution) (Seoul: Ch'angwonsa, 1960). See also Lee Hwa-su, "An Analysis of the April Revolution in Korea," Koreana Quarterly, Vol.8, No.2, Summer 1966, pp.96-110; Sawŏl hyŏkmyŏng ch'ŏngsa p'yŏnch'anhoe (The Editing Board of the History of the April Revolution), Minju hankuk sawŏl hyŏkmyŏng ch'ŏngsa (The Brief History of the April Revolution in Democratic Korea) (Seoul, 1961), pp.470-88 and 499-541; Hankuk hyŏkmyŏng chaep'an sa, Vol. 1, op.cit., pp.140-76; and O So-paek, "The April Revolution," Lee Kang-hyŏn, "The Demonstration of Korea University," Lee Sang-ŭn, "Professors Also Rose," and Chang Sŏk-jin, "The Surrender of the Dictator," in Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op.cit., pp.543-79.

116. Cf. Kim Sŏng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," op.cit., p.82; and O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op. cit., p.13.

117. For a criticism of cowardice of the Democratic Party, see Ko Chŏng-hun, "An Untold April 19th Story," Sasangge, April 1966, p.188.

revolution.[118] Such was the power of the students that the National Assembly was, for example, occupied by a group of extreme students in October 1960 and was forced to enact retroactive laws in order to punish Rhee's officials and party leaders.[119] In spite of this and other incidents, the students' pressure was instrumental in producing quickly some revolutionary enactments including amendment of the Constitution.[120]

During the Second Republic, the objectives of the student movement clearly emerged. Their movement was focused on the following four areas: (1) consolidation of democracy by purging anti-democratic and corrupt elements; (2) reform of academic institutions (purge of incompetent and corrupt teachers); (3) enlightenment of the people for new morality (austerity and self-help); and (4) search for steps leading to eventual re-unification of Korea based on neutrality.[121] The military take-over of 1961 was a severe setback to the student movement, However, even under the military rule which banned all organized activities, the students could demonstrate in June 1962 to demand a speedy conclusion of a status of forces agreement with the United States.[122] This indicated that the student movement, though unable to openly rebel against military rule, could still express nationalism with which the military rulers then closely identified themselves.

The motivation of student opposition to the ROK-Japan treaty is too complex to be discussed here (see Chapter 4). However, aside from their distrust of Japan as the prime motive of their opposition, the series of

118. See Cho Ka-kyŏng, "Spiritual Confusion of the Revolutionary Mainstream," op. cit., pp.71-2; and Ŏm Ki-hyŏng, "Pre-Modernism of Korean Politicians," Sasangge, March 1961, p.131.

119. See Chang Myŏn, "On Chang Myŏn," op. cit., pp.381-2.

120. See Yun Ch'ŏn-ju, "The Role of Students: A Social Stimulus," Sasangge, January 1961, p.108; and Ko Yŏng-bok, "The Meaning of the Social Movement After the Revolution," op. cit., p.91.

121. See Hyŏn Sŭng-chong, op.cit., p.128; Kim Sŏng-shik, "The Characteristics and Directions of the Recent Student Movement," op. cit., pp.233-5; Pak Dŏk-man, op. cit., pp.147-8; and Han Nae-bok, "April Anniversary in Korea," op. cit., p.209.

122. See Hankuk Ilbo, June 8, 1962.

slogans[123]. against the treaty and the government revealed their deep dissatisfaction with the conditions of growing economic difficulties, chronic scarcity of job opportunity, foreign (American) influence, lack of freedom and police brutality, and prevailing corruption in the government and business circles.[124] The demand by some segments of students for certain steps for gradual rapprochement with North Korea, instead of with Japan, was a symptom of despair in search for an outlet from these conditions, rather than a naive demand for unification at any cost.[125] In analysing the student's unification movement during the Second Republic, Professor Kim Sŏng-shik saw that the unification movement was essentially an intensive form of protest against the society and the older generation (i.e., politicians) who, in the students' eyes, had perpetuated the status quo with indifference and for selfish interest.[126] This same sentiment reappeared during the treaty crisis. In short, the moral strength of the student movement in Korea derives from the nature of their protest that has a great degree of relevance to the critical problems of Korea, and which hence elicits popular support.

As Korea is in the midst of transition to modernization -- the process which generates a conflict between traditional values and modern values, the values held by Korean students naturally reflect this. Politically, their values are highly selective: they still retain certain Confucian values such as "rule by virtue and example,"[127] while they cherish modern democratic values such as government by constitution[128] and participation

123. See Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., pp.688-9.

124. See also The New York Times, April 26, 1964.

125. See Kameyama Akira, op. cit., pp.197-8.

126. Kim Sŏng-shik, "The Characteristics and Directions of the Recent Student Movement," op. cit., p.235. See also Lee Hang-yŏng in "A Discussion: A Revolution Without Main Body Is A Political Change," Sasangge, April 1962, p.163; and Stephen Bradner, "Korea: Experiment and Instability," Japan Quarterly, Vol. VIII, No.4, October-December 1961, p.414.

127. See Kim T'ae-kil, Hankuk taehaksaeng ŭi kach'ikwan (Values of Korean College Students) (Seoul: Illchokwak, 1967), pp.223-5.

128. Kim Sŏng-t'ae, "The Psychology of the April 19th," op. cit., pp.80-1. Kim's survey among the participants in the April revolution indicate that they are overwhelmingly opposed to unconstitutional rule.

in decision-making. However, a substantial number of students doubt that Western democracy without modification is quite suitable to Korea.[129] Their pessimism with respect to Western democracy is undoubtedly based on the experience of Korea under such democracy. What kind of democracy is suitable to Korea under the present condition? According to Professor Kim T'ae-kil's survey data (1964-1965), students are, of course, opposed to any political system that is oppressive, corrupt and Machiavellian, even if it promises economic progress and stability.[130] They would equally reject any form of Western democracy, if it fails to solve economic problems.[131] On the other hand, they would accept a paternalistic or guided democracy if it can provide a strong but virtuous leadership instrumental for national development.[132]

As their type of government suggests, their social values in general are highly idealistic and ambivalent although they may reflect the dilemma of an under-developed country. As their values are selectively assembled -- largely in reaction to the present social and political conditions -- from legacies of Confucianism and Western liberalism, their attitudes on public issues tend to be abstract, moralistic and universal, instead of specific, realistic and particular.[133] Because of this, students are often not only confronted with the difficulty of explaining their political activities with logical consistency and rationality, but also are frequently criticized for the lack of constructive criticism addressed to specific problems and for the naivity that overlooks the defects in their own idealistic inclination.[134]

Students feel that under present conditions they have a distinctive role

129. To the question of whether or not Western democracy was suitable to Korea: 38% expressed "unsuitable" and 30% "suitable." And 29% took the middle of the road position. See Hong Sŭng-chick, "Values of Korean College Students," Asea yŏnku, Vol. VI, No.1, May 1963, pp.70-1.

130. See Kim T'ae-kil, op. cit., pp.25-30 and 39-58.

131. See ibid., pp.28-30.

132. See ibid., pp.28-32.

133. O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op.cit.pp.35-6.

134. Ibid.; and "The Student Movement Since the April 19th," a summary view of the professors at an UNESCO seminar in April 1967 in Seoul, Chosun Ilbo, April 25, 1967.

to play in national affairs. According to, again, Professor Kim T'ae-kil, about 79 percent of them believed that politics should not be left to politicians, and about 62 percent expressed that they should speak out even if this may penalize them.[135] Students regard themselves as the nation's political conscience and believe that the masses should be led by younger intellectuals like themselves.[136] Many older intellectuals[137] think this attitude is justified, while others,[138] disturbed by the excessive student power, regard it as an illusion from their exaggerated sense of elitist role.

The excessive participation of students in politics is certainly a sign of political or social instability. However this phenomenon in Korea must be reconciled with the current status of Korean politics that, in a certain sense, has impelled students to play such a prominent role as a pressure group.[139] Political parties have continuously failed to provide solutions to the problems and to represent public opinion. Social, economic and labor groups are either too weak to function as pressure groups or they survive only at the pleasure of the government. In this situation, the question arises: Who has to speak for the public and the conscience of the nation? For better or worse, the students (along with the press and intellectuals), who have the least wordly conflict of interest and are highly motiviated by idealism and genuine concern, come into the picture to fill the role of opinion maker or pressure group.

135. See Kim T'ae-kil, op. cit., pp.58-64 and 224. According to another survey, students expressed: 1% for "Very active participation"; 14% for "active participation"; and 57% for "normal participation." See Hong Sŭng-chick, "Values of Korean College Students," op. cit., pp.71-2.

136. O Byŏng-hŭn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op. cit., p.37.

137. E.g., Yu Tal-yŏng, op. cit., Cho Ji-hun, "President Park's Statement in Chinhae and the Student Demonstrators, the Journalists and Intellectuals," Chosun Ilbo, May 5, 1965; and Kim Sŏng-T'ae, "Subjectivity and the Japanese Influence," Series No.7, Chosun Ilbo, August 25, 1965.

138. E.g., the views of the professors in "The Student Movement Since the April 19th," op. cit.

139. See Kameyama Akira, op. cit., p.197; and Yu Tal-yŏng, op.cit.

Their potential as political force is further enhanced by their strength in number as well as their heavy concentration in the capital[140]. where their direct action in the crowded streets always creates a maximum impact that spreads nationwide. Although they have neither a national organization to coordinate and sustain their actions nor a coherent program to challenge the government, their repeatedly successful demonstration of ability to act spontaneously as a cohesive force makes the authorities extremely nervous and prompts either the utmost cautious or the severest measures whenever a student demonstration takes place. To a certain degree, the exalted power of students is due to the exaggeration of the gravity of student demonstration by the panic-stricken government which automatically reacts with unnecessary harsh measures to suppress students, instead of trying to solve the basic causes of their unrest with sincerity.[141] Why? One of the basic reasons of the government's feeling of extreme insecurity is the Korean political culture in which the element of violence has played the main part in change of power among political elites. Another reason is that historically a student demonstration has been a good indication of popular unrest.

Another important factor that generates frequent students' revolt against society, particularly the government, is their deep dissatisfaction with their own present social status which is unfitted to them as the educated members of society. This is the inevitable result of the massive expansion of higher education since 1945 without a matching expansion of socio-economic capacity of Korea to accomodate them in accordance with status expectation.

140. Over 70% of college students is concentrated in Seoul. O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op. cit., p.18.

141. Ch'oe Sŏk-ch'ae, "Why No Self-Confidence?" op. cit., pp.50-2.

In 1965 the number of college students attending 110 colleges,[142] universities and various higher educational institutions in Korea was 141,636.[143] There are approximately 441 students per 100,000 members of population in a total population of 28,649,176 (1965). The proportion of college students to the total population is abnormally large,[144] considering Korea's economic and social capacity to support them both during and after their education. At the time of Korea's liberation in 1945, the total number of college students was 7,819, attending 19 colleges.[145] During two decades (1945-1965) the number of college students thus multiplied more than eighteen times.

Why do Koreans have such degree of educational aspiration? The traditional importance of education can be traced to the Yi Dynasty. In the society of the Yi Dynasty, the ruling class exclusively consisted of higher government officials and their families (see Chapter I). Yet in theory, and to a certain extent in practice, recruitment to higher governmental positions in that society was made among the best educated youngmen in Confucianism who passed the highly competitive national examinations (kwagŏ). Education became the major means of attaining power and prestige.[146] Although the opportunity for taking national examinations was largely restricted to the ruling class, educational aspiration was nevertheless well established in traditional society. Even today the majority of Korean political and social leaders still come from the elite which possesses either social status or wealth. But education is the third means to attain political and social prominence.[147] During the Japanese rule, Koreans were discouraged from higher education, because the

142. Hapdong News Agency, op. cit., pp.313-8.
143. Ibid., p.227.
144. For example, in 1963 college enrolments per 100,000 population in the following countries were as follows: U.S., 1,987; U.S.R. 1,118; Japan 750; Israel, 700; France, 667; West Germany, 528; U.K, 484; Turkey, 255; and Communist China, 25. See United Nations, Compendium of Social Statistics 1963, Statistical Papers, Series K, No.2 (New York, 1963); and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1963, 15th Issue, (New York, 1964).
145. O Byŏng-hŏn, "University Students and Politics in Korea," op.cit., pp.5-6.
146. Ibid., p.2.
147. Hahn Bae Ho (or Han Bae-ho) and Kim Kyu-taik, "Korean Political Leaders (1952-1962): Their Social Origins and Skills," Asian Survey, Vol.III, No.7, July 1963, p.322.

Japanese feared that an increase in the number of Korean intellectuals through education would increase nationalism among Koreans.[148] The liberation of Korea suddenly unleashed the traditional aspiration for education which was further precipitated by the American idea of mass education.

The effect of this massive increase in the college student population presented many acute social problems by 1960s. Above all, this lowered the social esteem of college students.[149] The current status of college students is radically different from that of their predecessors who, few in number, were regarded as "select group" and commanded a high social status. The change of their status is one major source of their discontent, increased by the widening gap between their aspirations and the capacity of society to meet them. The foremost problem has recently been Korea's inability to accomodate the large numbers of college graduates. In 1964, for example, there were 28,600 new graduates and only 39 percent of them were able to get employed.[150] In average, about two-thirds of new college graduates are joining the already vast ranks of the unemployed,[151] whose number is estimated between two to two and a half millions. The seriousness of the problem was pointed out by a 1964 proposal by the Minister of Education. He proposed to limit the total college enrollment to 50,000, in a view of the fact that the success of Korea's economic planning would not even create a capacity to absorb more than 9,000 new graduates annually.[152]

As this illustrates, the immediate individual concerns of students are employment and livelihood in the future.[153] One important effect of the massive expansion of higher education was thus an increase of social tension

148. See C.I. Eugene Kim, "Japan's Colonial Education and Korea's Nation-Building," C.I. Eugene Kim, ed., op.cit., pp.1-11.

149. Kim In-su, "A Campus Report: Dark Streets on College Campuses," Sasangge, April 1962, p.134.

150. Chosun Ilbo, February 4, 1965.

151. See a summary of the study made by the Central Educational Research Institute, in Chosun Ilbo, June 16, 1966.

152. Mun Hŭi-sŏk, "The Meaning of Reorganization of Universities," Hankuk Ilbo, September 14, 1964.

153. See a summary of the 1965 survey by Korea University among its students, in Chosun Ilbo, February 1, 1966.

among the increasing number of young intellectuals who are highly dissatisfied with their socio-economic status. This is certainly an additional factor that reinforces their critical attitudes and that frequently motivates them to political action.[154].

Considering the nature and direction of their movement, their historic role, their idealism and their deep discontent with the society, it was only natural that students played the leading role in opposing the ROK-Japan treaty. Additionally, the issue of the "humiliating" treaty had also provided an opportunity to release their suppressed discontent which had been accumulating since the military take-over.[155].

The potential danger of the increasingly furious student agitation against the treaty and the government was the possibility that the student unrest might develop into a serious popular revolt against the government. Apparently the government was alarmed by the existence of some strong popular sympathy with the student cause.[156]. The government's anxiety was matched by the opposition's eagerness to intensify this and to exploit and rely on the students for their political comeback. Because of this fear on the part of the government and the expectation on the part of the opposition, the students were zoomed into the central stage of politics by virtually replacing politicians.[157]. Aware of this danger of student demonstrations which in 1960 had overthrown Rhee, the Park government was initially cautious in dealing with student demonstrators by adopting a mixed approach of "public relations" and concessions[158]. when the students staged their first demonstration in March

154. See Lee Joung-sik, "The Structure of Korean College Students' Political Consciousness," Chosun Ilbo, November 21, 1965.

155. "Surroundings of the Uproar," Series No.4 (Demonstrations), Chosun Ilbo, December 11, 1964.

156. See, e.g., various public opinions expressed in Hankuk Ilbo, March 29, 1964.

157. See Lee Bang-sŏk, "The Faded Democracy and Nationalism," Sasangge, December 1965, pp.38-9.

158. See "Surroundings of the Uproar," Series No.4, op.cit.; and Henry Chang and David Conde, "Tokyo-Seoul: All Normal?" Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 1, No.5, November 4, 1965, p.198.

1964. Students' potential power was amply displayed by the fact that the government had to abandon the hope of concluding the treaty negotiations with Japan in June 1964.

Despite the government's cautious policy of separating the demonstration by students from that by non-students by tolerating the former while suppressing the latter,[159] the student demonstrations had an inevitable tendency to merge with the force of the opposition. For instance, as soon as a slogan of student demonstrators focused their target on Kim Chong-pil, the mastermind of the treaty, the opposition immediately plunged into a strategy of developing the anti-Kim student demonstrations into a massive anti-government revolt by agitating the students through tactics of exposing political weakness of Kim during the military rule.[160] The opposition hoped that a downfall of Kim would inevitably lead to that of the Park government. This was the reason why that throughout the treaty crisis the opposition was mainly preoccupied with agitating the students without even hesitation to use demagogic denunciation against the government and its leading personalities.[161]

Unquestionably the students were initially moved by the opposition campaigns against the treaty. However, the students' response did not necessarily mean that they were supporting the opposition as the alternative to the Park government.[162] This was evident in a slogan of the students that "We are not the subject of the opposition propaganda"[163] and in a resolution of the Seoul National University which warned both the government and the opposition not to exploit them as political tools.[164] In spite of this effort to remain independent, the government had soon reached the conclusion that the student demonstrations were no longer patriotic and were becoming subversive.[165] The

159. See, e.g., the decision of the Council of Ministers on March 25, 1964, Kukje Shinbo, March 26, 1964.

160. See Kyunghyang Shinmoon, March 29 and March 31, 1964.

161. See the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, April 14, 1965.

162. "A Weather Map," Tong-A Ilbo, March 31, 1964; and "The Background of Korean Student Demonstrations," Asahi Jānaru, April 12, 1964, p.7.

163. Hong Sŭng-man, et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol. for Records, op. cit., p.688.

164. The resolution of April 13, 1965, Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 1965.

165. E.g., the special statement of President Park, June 3, 1964. See an excerpt of the speech in Hong Sŭng-man et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn, Vol.for Records, op.cit., p.689.

government's suspicision that the student demonstrations were no longer spontaneous was based on the change of students' slogans from anti-treaty to anti-government, parallel with the direction of the oppositions management of the treaty issue. The government's decision to use the military against the students was partly based on this suspicion.[166] But the more practical reason for the show of force was the fear that if left unchecked, the increasingly violent student demonstrators might physically overthrow the government.

Although students displayed their enormous power during the treaty crisis, their movement had reached a certain limit by two main reasons. The first factor was a series of harsh suppressive measures in combination with tightening of surveillance of the campuses by the government. Even before students demonstrated, their ranks were for some time infiltrated and watched by agents from the CIA, the police, the Ministry of Education and even the DRP.[167] After June 1964 the government had diligently punished the student demonstrators by mass arrests, conscription into the army, expulsion from colleges, and even criminal prosecution under the Anti-Communist Law.[168] The most brutal case of suppression was the intrusion of soldiers into the two leading private universities in Seoul and the assaults on students in August 1965.[169] At the same time the government adopted a more stringent measure by instructing universities to expel "trouble makers" among students and professors.[170] Unable to resist the intense government pressure, universities finally expelled twenty-one professors and fifty-two students in accordance with

166. See the comment by a Japanese journalist, Matsumura Tatsuro in "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Anti-Korean Sentiment," op. cit., p.151.

167. See the content of a DRP's secret report on the government's and its own campus activities exposed by Maeil Shinmoon (of Taegu), September 4, 1964; and "The Song Ch'ŏl-won Lynch incident," Lee Byŏng-hun et al, ed., Haebang iship nyŏn sa, op.cit., p.1180.

168. See Henry Chang and David Conde, op. cit., p.198; Lee Byŏng-rin, "Lawful Rule and Politics," Shindong-A, November 1965, pp.64-5; and the editorial of Chosun Ilbo, April 10, 1965.

169. "The Decree of Garrison State, the Terror and the Politics without Masters," Shindong-A, October 1965, pp.163-6; and Chosun Ilbo, August 26 and August 27, 1965.

170. See, e.g., the four-stage policy of the government, Chosun Ilbo, August 28, 1965.

the list prepared by the government.[171] These measures were a demonstration of President Park's personal determination "to exterminate the idea of the students that they should act for politicians on every issue and decision."[172]

The second factor that weakened the student movement was the fact that the students lacked a sharp focus of protest, like the one they had had in 1960, which could generate popular mass support. Since the characteristic strength of the Korean student movement lies in mass support, any realization of their potential power must have a specific issue that can marshall a strong popular support. In fact the treaty issue was so complex and controversial that it could not provide a clear answer to the people as to its consequences. As this was the nature of the issue, the people were roughly divided on it and the students did not have the undivided support of the people. There was also some awareness among the people that the excessive degree of student demonstrations was not justified in producing a continuing political and social chaos that might lead to overthrow of the Park government.[173] This would only result in a political instability in the absence of capable and responsible opposition to replace the present government. This was one main reason that the government could at last exercise the stark force against the students when it suspected that the combined force of students and the opposition was only a part of the public opinion that acted against the treaty and the government.

Another obvious fact was that the students were not equipped to operate the government themselves. What was, then, the justification to overthrow the present government which could not be replaced to their satisfaction? The prospect of facing this dilemma in the event of ouster of Park's government was a deterrence to the extent of their possible action.[174] This was perhaps

171. See Chosun Ilbo, September 5, 1965 and July 14, 1966.
172. Park's statement, Chosun Ilbo, April 20, 1965.
173. See The New York Times, June 7, 1964 and August 29, 1965.
174. Yoshioka Tadao in "Anti-Japanese Sentiment and Anti-Korean Sentiment," op. cit., p.152.

one reason, as some critics said, that the political activities of students began to lose constructive potentiality and to reach the point of negativity[175]. that made them exploitable by militant opposition politicians. In retrospect, this was the tragedy of the student movement during the treaty struggle.

The student movement against the treaty started initially with tremendous impact but ended with such a crushing defeat that it greatly reduced even their own academic freedom. However, in view of the current political, social and economic conditions in Korea, they will continue to express their grievances and to demonstrate in the streets as "watchdogs" of the masses. If and when they feel that they are obliged to act, their collective action will certainly have a staggering impact on the Korean political process, if the past experience is a measure of their political potentiality.

175. See, e.g. Kameyama Akira, op. cit., p.198.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS

Since 1945 Koreans have been experimenting with a political system modeled on Western democratic ideas and institutions such as parties, electoral contests and representative government. As the products of neither the masses nor of the evolutionary development of Korean society, the Western ideas and institutions are, however, yet to take firm roots in Korea in order to develop a viable political system which would be representative, legitimate, stable and efficient.

During the past two decades (1945-1965) the characteristic features of the Korean political system were the recurrent crises of political legitimacy, authoritarian power manipulation, general instability of political institutions and organizations, fragmentation of political elites, alienation of the masses from politics and government, and political changes and solutions largely through extra-constitutional or extra-parliamentary means.

The significance of the ROK-Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965 is twofold. Firstly, it was an acute aggravation of the symptom of political instability latent in the Korean political system. It was a political crisis triggered by the treaty issue. Secondly, the unprecedented degree of mass participation (to be more accurate, of elitist participation) in the treaty struggle was a new phenomenon unparalleled in Korean domestic politics, for it indicated the emergence of a popular movement to register views of the people directly with the political process. Although it is unpredictable to what extent and in what fashion this new phenomenon will be sustained, the mass movement will definitely be a factor in the Korean political process unless the masses find channels of expression through the representative process.

In spite of the fact that some three and a half million people who participated in the treaty struggle were initially motivated by their belief that the treaty was humiliating and against national interests and that the process of the negotiations for the treaty was irregular without proper consideration of public opinion, their central motives which sustained their determined struggle were, however, their rejection of the legitimacy of the government, their distrust in the political elites, and their serious doubt of the efficacy of the political process. In short, the complex of these political motives was the very indication of the failure of the Korean political system.

In this connection, the basic question here is: Why does the Korean political system not function normally? Or why have Koreans yet to develop a political system capable of resolving such political issues as the ROK-Japan treaty issue through normal political and constitutional process? As they have been examined in the previous chapters, the causes or determinants that have shaped the current status of the Korean political system and culture are multifold.

Among historical and social factors, democracy was alien to Koreans, introduced only after the liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Traditional ideas of government and politics were still prevalent from the Yi Dynasty which was ideologically, politically and socially an authoritarian society based on the principle of absolute obedience of the masses to the rulers. In that society, the masses were not only excluded from participation in political and social affairs, but also politically inert and socially immobile; the government was of and for the privileged few and was corrupt and despotic; and the ruling elite was utterly divided by factionalism. The Japanese colonial rule destroyed much of traditional political

and social order, but it did not fundamentally alter the traditional social and political attitudes and values.

However, owing to the latent social transformation during the Japanese colonial rule and under the impacts of the division of Korea and the Korean War, both of which uprooted the traditional ruling elite and erased the last traces of traditional social order, since 1945 Korea underwent rapid social change, coming close to having only one vast class of poor peasantry. Today a new social elite drawn from various previous origins is emerging. However it is meager in socio-economic basis as a force to provide social and political stability; it is unstable and fragmented due to a series of social and political upheavals; and it lacks a progressive and liberal spirit still under the influence of traditional attitudes.

Despite the rapid disappearing of traditional order since 1945, this change has not been accompanied by substantial transformation of Korea's socio-economic structure nor has it completely eradicated traditional attitudes and behavior of the masses, especially the rural. The strong imprints of traditionalism are more prevailing in political attitudes and behavior of the rural masses. This is the basic social condition which has enabled the political elites to manipulate the masses and to maintain an authoritarian political leadership and which has perpetuated the wide gap between the government and the masses -- the most serious factors contributing to social unrest and political instability in contemporary Korea.

A further ground for the authoritarian power manipulation and the inhibition of progressive political development in Korea is rendered by anti-Communism, which has become the guiding principle of Korea under the continuing threat of a Communist take-over. The over-all effects of anti-Communism are the complete domination of

the political scene by extreme right-wing conservatives, the strengthening of authoritarianism and a repression of political freedom, and the construction of an ideological monolith which has restricted programs of political parties to a narrow sphere of action. With the leftist influence rooted out of the political scene, Korean politics have been those of the status quo by the conservatives.

Since 1948 the Constitution has tended to authoritarian principles as it has revolved largely around the power struggle among political groups for their expediency. Frequent breakdown of constitutional order through manipulation, revision and abuse of the basic law has prevented it from becoming a force of stability in the political process and a basis of legitimacy of government. As a result, the Constitution has been ineffectual in limiting the rulers, providing rules for fair play, and in insuring peaceful transfer of political power - - none in more than two decades of the Republic. This has been one of the fundamental reasons why the ruling group which has come to or maintained power through manipulation of the Constitution and laws has been suffering from a weak basis of legitimacy of its power.

The party system in Korea is aptly the "one and a half party system." There has been a perpetual imbalance of power between the ruling party and the opposition. This imbalance has been artifically created and maintained by the ruling party through procedures and means which the opposition regards as illegitimate and unlawful. The outcome of political contests has been always in favor of the ruling party, unrelated to the popular expression. It has been not uncommon that although the ruling party has a minority of the popular votes, it has a disproportionately large majority of seats in the National Assembly and acts as if it were a competent consensual

majority with popular support. Especially when the discrepancy between the artificial strength of the ruling party in the National Assembly and the popular expression in elections is extreme, a determined opposition can easily appeal or resort to an extra-parliamentary mass movement in order to counter the unnatural majority in the National Assembly. As a consequence, there has existed a serious problem stemming from the "participation crisis."

The manipulation to maintain this imbalanced power relationship by the ruling party is not only one main cause of the perpetual failure in peaceful transfer of power by electoral means, but also a basis of the recurrent crisis of legitimacy and of the chronic political instability. The opposition, in desperation, often resorts to extreme militant tactics of struggle and becomes irresponsible and reckless, which in turn strengthen repressive measures of the government and its ruling party. This is the major reason why party politics in Korea are dominated by militants, and in this atmosphere, political decisions and changes are often made by extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary means when the opposing parties are in deadlock.

Although the Korean party system has tended towards a two-party system and political parties have become the primary vehicles for politics, Korea has yet to develop a stable and meaningful party system. In view of the level of socio-economic development and the division of Korea, the characteristics of Korean parties are not distinguished by ideology, program and class basis. This partially explains why political contests among Korean parties are based on personalities and factional differences rather than on programs and issues.

The foremost cause of the immaturity and instability of Korean parties stems from the difficulty in institutionalizing their structures

as mass organizations and in developing the capacity to function responsibly and to provide necessary political leadership. The initial difficulty lies in the lack of tradition and experience in party or organized politics. This difficulty is compounded by the elements of strong personalism and authoritarianism, and by the extreme atomization of political elites and the constant division of party leadership due to factional power struggle. The pervasive effect of strong personalism is evident in the fact that all Korean parties are, without exception, dominated by one single personality or a few factional leaders in their establishment, organization and operation. It is thus common to find the life span of parties dependent upon the life span of current leaders, for parties are no more than personal organizations of dominant personalities who assembled their factional followers. When a party develops a certain degree of structure and diffuse support under the semblance of mass party, it is owing to the overflow of personal cult of a leader or leaders. As personal parties all Korean parties have shown a critical functional inability in adapting themselves to political change and in responding to popular demands. Thus, as practically closed parties, the weakness of Korean parties is amply clear, for example, in their failure to develop them into organizations with respectability, diffused support and identification among the masses at the grassroot level.

In spite of the heightening of political awareness and the establishment of formal institutions of democracy, the extent of the masses' exercise of political rights and of their political participation ends with casting votes in elections. Apart from the factors of poverty and ignorance, the masses are still psychologically inhibited from political participation by traditional social and

political inertia and are constantly manipulated by the government and by political elites. In a sense their political participation is a totalitarian participation. Thus the overwhelming majority of Koreans are practically alienated from politics and neglected by the government.

As the existing political institutions frequently break down, extra-political forces - - the military and the students - - emerged as the decisive instruments of power and control in the political process by relegating the political institutions to a secondary important. The circumstances that have brought on the military and the students to play the prominent roles as pressure groups shed another important aspect of the Korean political system and process.

Interest groups in Korea have a weak basis without sufficient socio-economic development and an accompanying degree of social division of labor. The mushrooming of interest groups in Korea is thus a sign of fragmentation of groups, a phenomenon attributable to the pervasive culture of factionalism, rather than an indication of specialization and differentiation based on an ultimate sense of integration. In most cases, they are established and used by leading personalities as bases for their personal power and material gains. The unique feature of interest groups in Korea is that they are not voluntarily organized and operating autonomously. The larger the group is, the more available it becomes for manipulation by the government. The more dependent the group is on the government, the more susceptible it becomes to pressure from the government. With a few exceptions they have always been available to the government if it decides to mobilize opinions favorable to itself. Thus they are hardly exercising positive influence in the political process in Korea.

Therefore, political participation by both the masses and groups in the Korean political process is hardly open and free, and is not sufficiently mature to narrow the gap between the political elites and the masses. The acute alienation of the masses is further evident in the failure of the political parties to mobilize and express mass opinion and to mediate and aggregate conflicting demands of society. In these political conditions, the roles of the military and the students in Korean politics have become extraordinary and critical.

Students feel that under the present conditions in Korea they have to act as the national political conscience, to speak for the masses, and to fill the role of opinion-maker and pressure group. Although students' involvement with political activities has been motivated by varying factors at different times and their potential as a stably organized force is somewhat limited by their lack of national organization and of coherent action programs, they have nevertheless repeatedly proved their ability to act as a powerful pressure group.

Of course, students have their ulterior reasons for discontent with the government and society, such as dissatisfaction with their own social status. However, as idealists their main goals in political activities have been nationalism, democracy and modernization - - these are the historical aspirations of all Koreans. Since the moral strength of the student movement in Korea derives from the nature of their protest, which has a great degree of relevance to the critical problems of Korea, and which hence elicits popular support, the student movement is not only tenacious and powerful but respected and feared. This is the reason why the government reacts to a student demonstration with extremely cautious or harsh measures.

On the other hand, with the military coup d'etat in 1961 the military had emerged finally as the foremost force maintaining the stability of the government, although there is little guarantee against a future military intervention into politics in view of the heightening of political ambition, personal frustration and persisting factionalism among officers. In the absence of solid support from the ruling party, the importance of the military as a political and physical shield for the government against the students and the opposition in time of crises has become supreme.

Thus it was only natural that during the treaty crisis the students and the military played the most crucial roles in front: the former as the main force of anti-treaty and anti-government by replacing the opposition, and the latter as the defender of the government by replacing the ruling party. The confrontation of these two leading groups with stark force during the treaty struggle was one of the main elements that intensified the political crisis.

The ROK-Japan treaty crisis of 1964-1965 is a summation of two decades of trial of democracy in Korea. In the final analysis, the basic cause of the unprecedented degree of political crisis on the treaty issue lies in the chronic crisis of political legitimacy, in the extreme power struggle between the two opposing political elites, and in the incapacity of political parties and elites to function responsibly in resolving national issues through normal political and constitutional process. Therefore, the phenomena of the mass movement and the extra-constitutional and extra-parliamentary struggles were not only an indication of the failure of the Korean political system, but also a direct effort on the part of significant and articulated groups in society to find channels of their expression and to supplement or supplant the inadequacy of the existing political institutions and elites.

The future of democracy in Korea is however not bleak. Compared

with the experience of the Western nations in democracy, it was only yesterday that Koreans adopted democracy. The record of Korea's experience in this new system is so far not impressive. Nevertheless, Korea's record must be judged against the historical background of Korea's political and social experience, and against her unique position in the divided world.

As the masses are awakening through education and continuing political and social upheavals, and as their experience in democratic institutions and ideas grows with the parallel development in socio-economic capacity, Koreans will eventually overcome the traditional political culture and will develop a workable democracy at least suitable to Korean conditions. The rate of development in this direction will ultimately depend upon how fast and to what degree the masses will politically mature and the political elites will develop astute and responsible political attitudes. It is however certain that the political elites will have to reckon soon with the politically conscious groups who refuse to look idly on the political affairs managed by the undisciplined and irresponsible political leaders.

In this sense, the ROK-Japan treaty crisis is perhaps a significant turning-point, as witnessed in the mass movement, towards a new political era, in which the masses will be no longer a docile object of manipulation but the main entity of politics, for whose favor the political elites will have to compete, on whose behalf they will have to serve, and in the face of whose opinion they will have to respond. Otherwise the mass movement of 1964-1965 will have no meaning as a lesson except to add another new feature to the anachronic Korean political culture, and its recurrence in the future may greatly imperil the development of democracy in Korea.

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